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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis empirically analyses corporate governance reforms in Saudi Arabia 
using a mixed-methods research design. Saudi Arabia has recently pursued corporate 
governance reforms; the establishment of the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in 2003 and 
the publication of the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) in 2006 constitute a 
central part of these reforms. This study attempts to provide new insights by exploring the 
corporate governance reforms pursued. In particular, by using an integrated research design 
framework, the study seeks to: (i) examine the level of compliance with, and disclosure of, 
the governance provisions contained in the SCGC by Saudi listed firms; (ii) ascertain 
whether the introduction of the SCGC has helped improve corporate governance standards 
in the Saudi corporate context; (iii) investigate the factors affecting voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure among Saudi listed firms; (iv) examine the association between a 
number of individual corporate governance mechanisms (i.e., equilibrium-variable model) 
and financial performance in Saudi listed firms; (v) analyse the relationship between 
voluntary compliance with the SCGC and firm financial performance by employing a broad 
composite corporate governance index (i.e., compliance-index model); and (vi) explore the 
level of awareness and appreciation of good corporate governance practices among key 
internal and external stakeholders in Saudi Arabia.      
 The first five objectives outlined above are examined using a quantitative 
methodology, whereas the sixth objective is investigated by employing a qualitative 
research design. Efforts have been made to achieve integration between the two different 
research designs by applying the Explanatory Sequential Design (two sequential stages) 
proposed by Creswell and Clark (2011) within a multi-theoretical framework that 
incorporates insights from agency, managerial signalling, stakeholder, stewardship and 
resource dependence theories. The decision to employ a mixed-methods research design is 
motivated by the relative lack of, and recent calls for, mixed-methods approaches in 
corporate governance research. The mixed-methods approach seeks to provide a more 
complete understanding of the effects of corporate governance reforms on corporate 
disclosure and performance. In addition to the quantitative analysis, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with five different groups of key stakeholders. The interview 
data offers further scope to: (ii) explore the corporate governance reforms; (ii) examine the 
impact of such reforms on actual governance practices; and (iii) provide a unique 
opportunity to further understand and explain the quantitative findings.  
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Through the quantitative approach, the study examined balanced panel data of 80 
Saudi listed firms from 2004 to 2010. This generated a total of 560 firm-year observations 
that were collected manually from the sampled firms’ annual reports. First, the constructed 
Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) showed that the introduction of the SCGC has 
helped improve voluntary corporate governance disclosure among Saudi listed firms. 
Second, this study found that board size, audit firm size, the presence of a corporate 
governance committee, government ownership, institutional ownership and director 
ownership have a positive influence on the level of compliance with the SCGC. In contrast, 
the analysis showed that the proportion of independent directors and block ownership are 
negatively correlated with the level of voluntary corporate governance disclosure.  
Third, the findings obtained from the compliance-index model suggest that good 
corporate governance practices, proxied by the SCGI, are positively related to return on 
assets (ROA), but have no significant relationship with firm value, as measured by Tobin’s 
Q (Q-ratio). Similarly, the results from the equilibrium-variable model are by and large 
mixed. Whereas CEO duality, proportion of independent directors, board sub-committees 
and director ownership are positively related to ROA, board size is negatively associated 
with ROA. On the other hand, the proportion of independent directors, board size, 
frequency of board meetings and director ownership are positively related to firm value, 
while CEO duality and the presence of board sub-committees have no significant 
relationship with firm value. The results from the quantitative analysis are robust to 
controlling for a number of potential endogeneity problems. Finally, the findings obtained 
from the interview data generally suggest that the regulatory authorities and the CMA in 
particular need to further strengthen efforts to enhance the level of awareness and 
appreciation of good corporate governance practices among key internal and external 
stakeholders of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia.  
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION   
Saudi Arabia has recently pursued comprehensive corporate governance reforms, 
primarily by: (i) establishing the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in 2003; and (ii) 
releasing the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) in 2006. The Saudi government 
is also working to re-organise and strengthen the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul). 
Generally, such reforms are often pursued with the aim of enhancing the ways in which 
listed firms are governed by encouraging greater board accountability, discipline, fairness, 
independence, responsibility, transparency and disclosure (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009; 
Samaha et al., 2012).  
 The aim of this study is mainly to explore the corporate governance reforms that 
have been pursued in Saudi Arabia. Specifically, in response to the corporate governance 
reforms pursued, this study seeks to achieve six integrated objectives using mixed-methods 
research as a new approach to investigating the effects of corporate governance reforms on 
corporate performance and voluntary disclosure behaviour (Boyd et al., 2012; Johl et al., 
2012; McNulty et al., 2013; Zattoni et al., 2013). First, this study explores the level of 
compliance with the SCGC among Saudi listed firms. Second, it investigates whether the 
introduction of the Saudi code has helped in improving corporate governance practices. 
Third, it attempts to explore the factors affecting voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure. Fourth, it estimates the link between a number of individual corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm financial performance using the equilibrium-variable 
model. Fifth, it investigates the relationship between the level of compliance with the 
SCGC and firm financial performance using the compliance-index model. Finally, it 
examines the level of awareness and appreciation of good corporate governance practices 
among key internal and external stakeholders of firms in Saudi Arabia. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.1 presents a background and 
overview of the corporate governance framework in Saudi Arabia. Section 1.2 discusses 
the motivation and also sheds light on the significance of the study in the context of Saudi 
corporations. Section 1.3 describes the research questions and the methodology for the 
study. Section 1.4 highlights the contributions of this study to the extant literature. Finally, 
Section 1.5 presents the organisation of the whole thesis.  
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1.1 BACKGROUND – OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
SAUDI ARABIA  
Saudi Arabia has witnessed political, social and economic reforms in the last two 
decades (Al-Filali and Gallarotti, 2012; Al-Matari et al., 2012). The resent economic 
reforms led to an improvement in the economic position of Saudi Arabia. Specifically, 
Saudi Arabia has become one of the largest emerging economies in the world, including 
having the largest stock market in the Middle East (Piesse et al., 2012). It has also become 
an important member of the largest 20 economies in the world (G20) (Al-Filali and 
Gallarotti, 2012). Corporate governance reforms are an important part of the Saudi 
economic reforms. These reforms coincided with the increasing attention paid to corporate 
governance following the collapses/scandals in developed countries, such as the UK and 
the US (e.g., Barings Bank, Enron and WorldCom), and developing countries, such as the 
1997/1998 Asian economic crisis (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 
2012; Ntim et al., 2012a). 
However, until the early 2000s, the importance of corporate governance was little 
appreciated in the Arab world in general and Saudi Arabia in particular (Al-Motairy, 
2003). Similarly, until 2006, the Companies Act of 1965 was the main legislation 
governing companies’ behaviour in Saudi Arabia1 (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Hussainey 
and Al-Nodel, 2008). A major limitation of this legislation is that the Companies Act does 
not directly address internal corporate governance mechanisms, except for a few of the 
provisions associated with the composition of the board of directors. Moreover, important 
provisions relating to disclosure, transparency, accountability and protection of 
shareholders, especially minority shareholders, are also not covered by the Companies Act. 
Thus, until the publication of the SCGC, there were no explicit voluntary corporate 
governance guidelines the focused directly on regulating the behaviour of officers and 
directors of corporations in Saudi Arabia. 
  Furthermore, and as discussed further in Chapter Two, it is worthwhile to note that 
stock trading was not formalised until the early 1980s, when the Saudi government formed 
an official stock exchange, as part of the broader attempt at to creating a free market 
economy (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; Tadawul, 2012). There were only 14 listed firms 
in 1975, a number that gradually increased to 72 in 1995. Due to the absence of a 
supervisory body, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) was responsible for 
                                                 
1
 A new Companies Act has been proposed by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI). This new Act 
is currently pending approval by the Saudi Council of Ministers. The most prominent features of the new Act 
include the: (i) expansion of the powers of the general assembly; and (ii) enhancement of internal control 
mechanisms (Alriyadh, 2011a). 
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operating, regulating and monitoring the stock market until the CMA was established in 
2003 (SFG, 2009; Tadawul, 2012).  
This engendered a debate in Saudi Arabia about the need to adopt good corporate 
governance principles with the aim of improving the performance of the stock market, as 
well as protecting shareholders’ rights (Al-Motairy, 2003; Alshehri and Solomon, 2012). 
Specifically, academics, investors and practitioners urgently called for the development of, 
and improvement in, corporate governance standards by: (i) strengthening the financial 
market (for example, by enhancing market capitalisation, increasing the number of listed 
firms and allowing direct foreign investors’ participation2); (ii) protecting shareholders’ 
rights; (iii) improving disclosure and transparency; and (iv) limiting speculation and 
insider dealing in order to maintain market stability and mitigate sharp fluctuations in share 
prices (SFG, 2009; Alshehri and Solomon, 2012). In addition, international bodies, such as 
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) generally encouraged developing 
countries, and particularly Saudi Arabia, to make corporate governance a priority, 
including facilitating the introduction of codes of good corporate governance (Rwegasira, 
2000; Clarke, 2004; ROSC, 2009). 
Consequently, in 2003, the Saudi government established the CMA in response to 
the increasing domestic and international pressure (Al-Nodel and Hussainey, 2010). The 
CMA, since its establishment, has become responsible for regulating and reforming 
corporate governance practices and the stock market trading rules
3
 (Alshehri and Solomon, 
2012). As a consequence, the Saudi stock market has witnessed substantial growth in the 
last decade in terms of increasing the number of listed firms, market capitalisation, 
liquidity and visibility (Alshehri and Solomon, 2012). For example, listed firms increased 
in number from 77 firms in 2005 to 145 firms in December 2010, with a market 
capitalisation of about $353bn, representing nearly 44% of the total Arab stock market 
capitalisation (SFG, 2009; Hearn et al., 2011; Tadawul, 2012). 
                                                 
2
 The CMA prohibits foreign investors, whether they are individuals or institutions, from participating 
directly in the market. Following the 2006 market crash, the CMA has been keen to boost foreign investment. 
In August 2008, the CMA granted foreigners (resident or non-resident) the opportunity to indirectly buy 
Saudi shares through swap arrangements (SFG, 2009, p.6). The operation of swap arrangements involves a 
process whereby a CMA-approved and licensed Saudi local brokerage firm buys and holds shares on behalf 
of its foreign customers. Any profits, losses or dividends are then passed on to the foreign customers. Full 
permission and direct participation by foreign investors is still under discussion, as part of the general 
attempts to reform corporate governance and enhance the market for corporate control (Okaz, 2013). 
3
 As explained above and discussed in Chapter Two, the SAMA was responsible for regulating the stock 
market from 1984 to 2003. The Saudi Stock Exchange (also known as Tadawul) was established in 2003 and 
became responsible for operating the stock market under the CMA’s control. In 2007, the Saudi Council of 
Ministers approved the separation of the Tadawul from the CMA to make it an independent entity (Tadawul, 
2012). 
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As previously explained, although general governance reforms began in 2003 with 
the establishment of the CMA, internal corporate governance in Saudi Arabia was formally 
institutionalised by the publication of the SCGC in 2006 (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; 
Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012; Soliman, 2013a). A point worth noting is that the early 
and rapid growth in market capitalisation since 2004 diverted the CMA’s attention from 
introducing a corporate governance code upon its establishment in 2003 (SFG, 2009; 
Alshehri and Solomon, 2012). However, following about three years of sharp increases in 
share prices, the Saudi stock market experienced a dramatic decline in 2006. It lost about 
25% of its market value in just two months (in February and March of 2006), ultimately 
losing approximately 53% of its market value by December 2006. Specifically, the market 
index dropped from approximately 16,700 to 7,900 between the January 2006 and 
December 2006, losing over $480bn of its market value. This sudden crash in the Saudi 
stock market directly intensified the need to improve corporate governance legislation and 
enhance external corporate governance mechanisms (SFG, 2009; Tadawul, 2012). 
Thus, there was an urgent need for a governance code that could help improve 
corporate governance practices among Saudi listed firms (Alshehri and Solomon, 2012). 
Further, Al-Abbas (2009) argues that the market crash called into question whether the 
governance legislation in place at the time could effectively protect investors. In effect, the 
stock market crash accelerated the introduction of the SCGC in November 2006 with the 
aim of restoring confidence in the market and protecting investors (Al-Abbas, 2009). 
The SCGC addresses many corporate governance issues, including: (i) board of 
directors; (ii) disclosure and transparency; (iii) shareholders’ rights and the general 
assembly; and (iv) internal controls and risk management (CMA, 2010). Similar to the 
Companies Act, which was derived largely from the British Companies Act (see Hussainey 
and Al-Nodel, 2008) the SCGC is mostly extracted from the 1992 UK Cadbury Report 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Al-Abbas, 2009; Seidl et al., 2013). For example, the 
SCGC recommends an Anglo-American style. Specifically, the board of directors consists 
of executive and non-executive directors (unitary board of directors). Board of directors is 
primarily accountable to shareholders through a voluntary compliance and disclosure 
regime ‘comply or explain’. In addition, the CMA took an early initiative to release other 
governance legislation, such as the Market Law and Listing Rules in 2004. The CMA 
implemented such legislation to reform the internal corporate governance framework.  
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1.2 MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY 
The financial crisis in the South East Asian stock market in 1997/1998 is attributed 
to poor corporate governance, transparency and disclosure practices (Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006). In the past decades, the collapse of big companies in developed countries, such as 
Enron and WorldCom, is also partly attributed to weak corporate governance practices 
(Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a). Given the importance of corporate 
reforms, corporate governance has attracted much attention from policy-makers and 
academics (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). In light of this, this study aims to 
investigate the corporate governance reforms that have been pursued in Saudi Arabia for 
the following four main reasons. 
First, Saudi Arabia has institutional, regulatory and contextual characteristics 
similar to some other developing Islamic and Arab countries (Piesse et al., 2012). On the 
other hand, it is different from many developed and developing countries in a number of 
regulatory, institutional and contextual aspects. Specifically, Saudi Arabia is an Islamic 
state, where Shariah (Islamic) law is promulgated (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; 
Safieddine, 2009; Judge, 2010). The Saudi government emphasises that the constitution of 
Saudi Arabia is based on Shariah. Moreover, most formal statutory rules are strictly based 
on Islamic laws (Al-Matari et al., 2012). 
Therefore, Islamic principles fundamentally influence daily life in Saudi society, 
including in business, law, economics and politics, among other areas (Abu-Tapanjeh, 
2009; Kamla, 2009). Furthermore, Islamic governance characteristics are explicitly 
underpinned by these values, such as accountability, equality, fairness, generosity, 
morality, justice, philanthropy, social responsibility, transparency and truthfulness (Abdul-
Rahman, 1998; Sarker, 1999). Practices that contravene these values, such as exploitation, 
profiteering and gambling, are prohibited (Lewis, 2005; Choudhury and Hoque, 2006). As 
a corollary, implications of the commitment to those principles are reflected in corporate 
operations. This can create unique corporate governance challenges in terms of the agency 
problems (Safieddine, 2009; Vinnicombe, 2010). For example, Shariah prohibits ex-ante 
charging/offering of interest (riba or usury) (Lewis, 2005; Kamla et al., 2006). Thus, 
Islamic finance in different forms, such as ‘Mosharkah’ and ‘Murabaha’,4 is very common 
                                                 
4
 ‘Musharakah’ primarily operates like a joint-venture contract in which a bank and an entrepreneur make 
joint contributions of capital and management expertise into a business project. Any profit or loss emanating 
from the project is shared according to a pre-determined ratio (Kamla, 2009; Archer et al., 2010). In contrast, 
‘Murabaha’ contracts are profit-sharing agreements, in which the whole capital required to finance a project 
is provided by a bank. However, the counter-party provides the managerial expertise and labour. Any profit 
from the project is shared by both parties according to a pre-determined ratio; the losses (if any) are borne 
solely by the bank (Kamla, 2009; Archer et al., 2010). 
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among most Saudi listed companies (Kamla, 2009). This makes it highly interesting to 
explore the corporate governance practices in Saudi Arabia (Lewis, 2005; Safieddine, 
2009). 
Apart from Islamic governance characteristics, the Saudi corporate context has 
distinctive cultural features, which include strong hierarchical social norms (Al-Twaijry et 
al., 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Alshehri and Solomon, 2012). Specifically, the 
corporate context is greatly affected by informal social relations, such as family, tribal and 
personal relationships, which are highly socially valued (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008). 
A study by the Union of Arab Banks found that many listed firms in Arab countries are 
dominated by families (Baydoun et al., 2013). Family firms usually employ their relatives. 
This implies that individuals are not necessarily hired based on merit, but rather based on 
their linage, loyalty and informal/personal relationship with the owners of the firm. 
Arguably, such informal governance arrangements can impact negatively on internal 
governance mechanisms.  
In addition, Saudi Arabia has been under monarchical rule since its unification in 
1932. Specifically, the three main fundamental structures (powers) are the executive, 
legislature and judiciary structures, which are all under the direct control of the Saudi king 
(Al-Matari et al., 2012). Thus, political connections are considered to influence corporate 
governance practices, especially appointments to corporate boards (Hussainey and Al-
Nodel, 2008). For example, public companies are largely dominated by political 
appointments. This may have negative consequences for the composition and 
independence of corporate boards. Furthermore, government intervention may hinder the 
effectiveness of external corporate governance mechanisms in the Saudi stock market. 
Meanwhile, the current literature suggests that interest in studying and exploring 
corporate governance has been steadily growing in Islamic and Arab countries, including 
Saudi Arabia (Alsaeed, 2006; Kamla and Roberts, 2010; Baydoun et al., 2013). This is 
mainly due to the differences in religious, social and political systems in these countries 
compared to those of developed countries, where most studies have focused. Therefore, 
these important and distinctive regulatory, institutional and contextual differences can have 
significant implications for the effectiveness of corporate governance, disclosure, 
accountability and performance mechanisms.  
Second, Baydoun et al. (2013) report that ownership of Saudi corporations is highly 
concentrated. The implication is that such high ownership concentration in Saudi listed 
firms can exacerbate the agency problem because of limited distinction between ownership 
and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Baydoun et al. (2013) suggest that concentrated 
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ownership results in the appointment of close friends and relatives to corporate boards, 
which limits board independence among Middle Eastern firms. The World Bank’s report 
on the observance of standards and codes (ROSC) relating to corporate governance 
practices shows that ownership in Saudi listed firms tends to be concentrated in 
government and family holdings (ROSC, 2009). For example, and as discussed in Chapter 
Six, the government owns more than 70% of some firms’ equity, with an average of 42% 
of the stock market value. This may result in limited institutional investment, as well as 
limited foreign participation in the market (La Porta et al., 2002). It can also impact 
negatively on market efficiency and weaken the role of the market for corporate control as 
an external governance mechanism (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006; Ntim et al., 2012b).  
Additionally, despite the existence of concentrated ownership structures, the SCGC 
is voluntary and is based on the UK’s ‘comply or explain’ style (Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2009; Al-Abbas, 2009; Seidl et al., 2013), where corporate ownership in UK 
listed firms is relatively widely held (Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012). Hence, this raises 
the question of whether the voluntary Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) could 
effectively improve corporate governance standards among Saudi listed firms that 
explicitly suffer from high ownership concentration.   
Third, as discussed in Section 1.1, Saudi Arabia is an important emerging economy 
(Al-Filali and Gallarotti, 2012). Its stock market accounted for 44% of the total Arab 
market capitalisation and 25% of the total Arab GDP in 2010 (SFG, 2009; Hearn et al., 
2011). Since 2008, Saudi Arabia has achieved an important economic position at 
international level as a member of the G20 (Al-Matari et al., 2012). In addition, Saudi 
Arabia is one of the largest oil producers in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), accounting for 31% of the total OPEC production in 2010. Also, Saudi 
Arabia holds one quarter of the world’s oil reserves (OPEC, 2012).  
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia embraces extensive foreign investments; in addition, it 
invests significantly in both developed and developing countries
5
 (Al-Filali and Gallarotti, 
2012). This implies that any corporate governance failures in Saudi Arabia may have 
serious implications far beyond the Middle East and developing economies. For example, 
poor corporate governance practices may lead not only to losses to domestic shareholders, 
but also foreign shareholders. Also, the presence of weak corporate governance regime can 
exacerbates information asymmetry, which negatively affects the attractiveness of 
                                                 
5
 Foreign investment in Saudi Arabia reached about $170bn in 2011, invested by more than 50 countries 
(Alriyadh, 2011b). Furthermore, Saudi Arabia invests globally in the field of energy, petrochemicals and 
financial spread in a number of countries, such as in the US, Europe and Asia (MOF, 2011). 
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investment in Saudi Arabia. Baydoun et al. (2013) argue that despite the importance of 
Gulf countries, which are the main oil producers, led by Saudi Arabia, little attention has, 
however, been given to studying their commerce and finance activities.   
Fourth, although a number of countries have issued corporate governance codes
6
 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Samaha et al., 2012; ECGI, 2013), empirical studies 
mainly concentrated in a few developed countries (Baydoun et al., 2013; Bozec and Bozec, 
2012; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). However, due to the variation between countries in 
terms of the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms (Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2009), the legal system (Bozec et al., 2010) and cultural practices (Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006; Kamla and Roberts, 2010) as discussed above, the effects of corporate 
governance practices on voluntary disclosure and corporate performance can be expected 
to vary between developing and developed countries. Therefore, an investigation of 
corporate governance reforms in developing countries, where there is a lack of empirical 
evidence, is crucial in providing a complete understanding of the impact of corporate 
governance reforms on firm financial performance and voluntary disclosure practices.  
Moreover, the literature indicates that previous studies on Saudi Arabia have not 
investigated the governance reforms from an integrated perspective (Al-Nodel and 
Hussainey, 2010). This notwithstanding, however, there are a limited number of studies 
that have been conducted on Saudi Arabia that have focused on different aspects of 
corporate governance that need to be explicitly acknowledged. These studies can be 
classified into three groups. The first group consists of studies that statistically examine the 
level of compliance with corporate governance standards and also look at the factors 
influencing voluntary corporate governance disclosure (e.g., Alsaeed, 2006; Hussainey and 
Al-Nodel, 2008; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012; Al-Moataz and Lakhal, 2012; Al-Janadi 
et al., 2013). Generally, as discussed in Chapter Three, these studies show that there have 
recently been relative improvements in the level of compliance with corporate governance 
rules, as well as identifies a variety of factors that influence good corporate governance 
practices. The general limitation of these studies is that they were conducted based on a 
relatively small number of governance provisions, small samples, and unbalanced panel 
data. 
The second group of studies empirically examines the relationship between 
individual corporate governance and firm financial performance (e.g., Al-Abbas, 2009; 
Safieddine, 2009; Al-Nodel and Hussainey, 2010; Alzharani et al., 2011; Ezzine, 2011; 
                                                 
6
 After the publication of the UK’s Cadbury Report in 1992, many countries around the world began issuing 
their own governance codes (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). According to the European Corporate 
Governance Institute (ECGI), 91 countries had released their own codes by the middle of 2013 (ECGI, 2013). 
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Soliman, 2013a and b). With a focus on individual governance mechanisms related to 
board composition and ownership, these studies suggest that better governed firms, on 
average, tend to perform better than poorly governed firms. The current study extends the 
previous ones in two ways: (i) by examining the association between individual 
(equilibrium-variable model) governance mechanisms and corporate performance; and (ii) 
by investigating the link between the level of compliance (compliance-index model) with 
the SCGC and firm financial performance.  
The third and final group of prior studies comprises qualitative research 
investigating corporate governance practices in the Saudi corporate context, such as Al-
Twaijry et al. (2002), Al-Razeen and Karbhari (2004), Haniffa and Hudaib (2007), Piesse 
et al. (2012), Al-Matari et al. (2012), Alshehri and Solomon (2012) and Robertson et al. 
(2013). Using questionnaire and interview data, these studies generally explore 
stakeholders’ perceptions of corporate governance practices. It can be noted from the 
findings of these studies that there is strong stakeholder support for further corporate 
governance reforms in order to increase the protection of shareholders’ rights. 
To sum up, this study is different from previous studies conducted on Saudi Arabia 
in a number of ways. First, previous Saudi studies use either a quantitative approach (e.g., 
Alsaeed, 2006; Al-Abbas, 2009; Al-Moataz and Lakhal, 2012) or a qualitative approach 
(e.g., Al-Matari et al., 2012; Alshehri and Solomon, 2012; Piesse et al., 2012). However, 
this study employs a mixed-methods research design, potentially providing a more 
complete understanding of the effects of corporate governance reforms on corporate 
disclosure and performance (Zattoni et al., 2013). A central criticism of the findings from 
previous studies using quantitative data is that they do not provide sufficient interpretation 
of the results due to the excessive reliance on statistical data (Boyd et al., 2012). In 
contrast, in a mixed-methods study, it can be argued that data obtained from interviews can 
be helpful in explaining and interpreting the statistical findings obtained from the 
qualitative data (Boyd et al., 2012; Johl et al., 2012).  
Second, prior studies that have explored the level of compliance using a particular 
index have generally focused either on a small number of governance provisions (e.g., 
Alsaeed, 2006) or on one governance aspect. For example, Al-Moataz and Lakhal (2012) 
and Al-Janadi et al. (2013) focus heavily on board of directors’ provisions, while Al-
Razeen and Karbhari (2004) and Hussainey and Al-Nodel (2008) concentrate on firms’ 
information reporting. In contrast, this study constructed the Saudi Corporate Governance 
Index (SCGI), consisting of 65 provisions classified into four different sub-indices: (i) 
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board of directors and board sub-committees; (ii) disclosure and transparency; (iii) internal 
control and risk management; and (iv) shareholders’ rights and the general assembly. 
Third, most existing studies have not relied on the SCGC in constructing their 
index. For example, Alsaeed (2006) relied on ratings developed by other previous studies. 
Similarly, Hussainey and Al-Nodel (2008) and Al-Nodel and Hussainey (2010) reviewed 
previous literature to draw up disclosure items, while Piesse et al.’s (2012) index was 
guided by the principles set out in the OECD’s principles of corporate governance. This 
calls into question the ability of these studies to capture contextual governance challenges 
that have been discussed previously, and thus, the applicability or relevance of the findings 
from these studies to the Saudi corporate context. Therefore, this study employs a self-
constructed index derived from local governance legislation (the SCGC), which is arguably 
more applicable to the Saudi corporate context. 
Finally, previous studies use noticeably smaller sample sizes than this study. This 
study uses a balanced panel data over a longer period (2004-2010), while previous studies 
use unbalanced panel data over a relatively short period. Thus, this study can also be 
considered as an extension of previous studies with regard to sample size, research method 
and the balanced nature of panel data with a longer time horizon. Arguably, this improves 
the generalisability of the findings for Saudi listed corporations. 
 
 
1.3  RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
In this study, the central research question is: Has the publication of the Saudi 
Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) in 2006 helped in improving corporate governance 
practices and does it impact on corporate performance in Saudi listed firms? To answer this 
key question, the central research question is divided into six supplementary or sub-
questions. 
The first sub-question is: What is the level of compliance with the 2006 SCGC? 
This question examines to what extent Saudi listed firms comply with the SCGC. 
Following recent studies, a corporate governance index is constructed to examine the level 
of voluntary corporate governance disclosure among Saudi listed firms (e.g., Alsaeed, 
2006; Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a; Allegrini 
and Greco, 2013; Tariq and Abbas, 2013). The second sub-question is: Has the 
introduction of the 2006 SCGC improving Saudi corporate governance practices? This 
question aims to investigate whether the introduction of the Saudi code has helped in 
enhancing corporate governance practices by examining and comparing pre- and post-2006 
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levels of corporate governance disclosure. The third sub-question is: What are the factors 
that influence the level of compliance with the 2006 SCGC? In exploring this question, the 
study seeks to explore the factors influencing voluntary compliance with the SCGC. The 
literature on corporate governance suggests that board of directors’ characteristics and firm 
ownership structure are the main determinants of voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Chalevas, 2011; Samaha et 
al., 2012; Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Therefore, the most 
influential corporate governance and ownership structure variables, based on extensive 
review of the literature, were chosen and investigated.   
The fourth sub-question is: What is the association between individual corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm financial performance? The study uses the equilibrium-
variable model, as the traditional approach to answer this sub-question (e.g., Vafeas and 
Theodorou, 1998; Weir and Laing, 2000; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Mangena et al., 
2012). The fifth sub-question is: What is the relationship between compliance with the 
2006 SCGC and firm financial performance? The study employs the compliance-index 
model to answer this question. The compliance-index model involved an examination of 
the relationship between corporate governance as a set of provisions and firm financial 
performance, using the constructed index (e.g., Black, 2001; Gompers et al., 2003; 
Cremers and Nair, 2005; Morey et al., 2009; Bauer et al., 2010; Renders et al., 2010; 
Giroud and Mueller, 2011; Ammann et al., 2013; Munisi and Randoy, 2013; Tariq and 
Abbas, 2013; van Essen et al., 2013). These two different models help to explore the 
differences in findings and their implications. 
This research follows previous corporate governance studies in choosing an 
appropriate approach to answer the first five research questions using quantitative data. In 
particular, statistical techniques of data analysis are used to ensure that findings are valid 
and reliable (Collis and Hussey, 2009; Creswell, 2009). The data includes financial and 
non-financial information, mainly extracted from firms’ annual reports, which are reliable 
sources (Omar and Simon, 2011).  
The final sub-question is: What is the level of awareness and appreciation of the 
importance of good corporate governance practices in Saudi Arabia among key 
stakeholders following the corporate governance reforms? Qualitative data was used to 
answer this question by investigating the impact of corporate governance reforms within 
the Saudi corporate context. In addition, investigating this qualitative research sub-question 
provides a unique opportunity to further understand and explain the quantitative findings. 
As noted from descriptive studies on corporate governance, semi-structured interviews are 
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suitable for exploring corporate governance reforms (e.g., Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; 
Piesse et al., 2012; Soobaroyen and Mahadeo, 2012; Bailey and Peck, 2013). Therefore, 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with five different stakeholder groups, 
including boards of directors, key executive management, audit firm partners, regulators 
and shareholders.  
As explained in Chapter Four, this study uses a mixed-methods research approach. 
Recently, mixed-methods research has attracted much attention because it can help in 
achieving integration between quantitative and qualitative data/findings (Cassell et al., 
2005; Boyd et al., 2012; Johl et al., 2012; Zattoni et al., 2013). Molina-Azorin (2012, p.33) 
states: “mixed-methods research is becoming an increasingly popular approach in several 
areas, and it has long been called for as an approach for providing a better understanding 
of research problems”. Because of the importance of studying the behaviour of individuals 
and firms, management studies have paid close attention to mixed-methods research 
(Clarke, 1998; Cassell et al., 2005). Johl et al. (2012) note that the complexity of business 
management research has contributed to the use of mixed-methods in providing in-depth 
explanation and understanding of the governance phenomenon.  
 According to Creswell and Clark (2011), mixed-methods research uses two levels 
of integration between quantitative and qualitative data: the independent level and the 
interactive level. The current study uses the independent level to answer the quantitative 
and qualitative research questions separately, as well as for the data collection and 
analysis. To achieve integration, the findings from these two methods are discussed jointly 
at the after presenting and discussing the quantitative and qualitative findings individually.   
 As discussed further in Chapter Four, and in line with mixed-methods studies on 
corporate governance (e.g., Mengoli et al., 2009; Johl et al., 2012), the explanatory 
sequential design (two sequential stages) suggested by Creswell and Clark (2011) is 
employed. This study initially focuses on the quantitative data because of the nature of the 
research problem and research questions (see Morgan, 1998). Then, after obtaining the 
statistical findings, the study explores deep insights from interviews using a thematic 
analysis approach.
7
 The interview data helps in improving the quantitative findings of the 
study in the following three ways. First, the interviews provide additional scope for 
analysis to explore the impact of corporate governance reforms on actual governance 
practices (Boyd et al., 2012; Molina-Azorin, 2012). Second, they increase the robustness 
                                                 
7
 It is worthy to note that this is mainly a quantitative (senior) study, which is supplemented with a qualitative 
(junior) data to facilitate the interpretations, meanings, and implications of the quantitative findings. 
Arguably, this minimises the weaknesses that are often associated with prior studies that are purely 
quantitative in nature. 
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of the empirical findings obtained from the quantitative approach (Mengoli et al., 2009). 
Finally, the interviews provide close and more in-depth insights in the improvements 
achieved, and impediments that still needs to be addressed with respect to the corporate 
governance reforms pursued, which arguably cannot be developed through the analysis of 
quantitative data alone (Bailey and Peck, 2013). 
 
 
1.4  CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS STUDY 
The current study contributes to the corporate governance literature in several 
ways. First, it contributes by showing how the findings from quantitative and qualitative 
data can be integrated to examine corporate governance behaviour using mixed-methods 
research design. Quantitative research noticeably dominates business studies generally and 
corporate governance studies in particular (Boyd et al., 2012; Zattoni et al., 2013). Despite 
the importance of qualitative data in management behaviour research, little attention has 
been paid to corporate governance (Soobaroyen and Mahadeo, 2012; McNulty et al., 
2013). In this regard, Molina-Azorin (2012) reports that 77% of existing studies on 
business research are quantitative, whereas only 8% of existing studies use a qualitative 
research design.  
However, it has been argued that quantitative data by itself does not provide 
sufficient an explanation of findings obtained through statistical analysis (Zattoni et al., 
2013). More precisely, quantitative findings do not provide a detailed interpretation, and 
are less likely to shed light on ‘why’ a social phenomenon occurs (Morgan and Smircich, 
1980; Cohen et al., 2002; Creswell and Clark, 2011). Therefore, Zattoni et al. (2013) 
highlight the lack of agreement among results in the corporate governance literature 
derived from using statistical analysis. This serves as motivation for researchers to use 
interviews along with quantitative data to explore interaction among key stakeholders. 
Mengoli et al. (2009) argue that a qualitative method (interviews) also provides a 
mechanism for checking the robustness of quantitative data findings.    
Boyd et al. (2012) and Molina-Azorin (2012) argue that mixed-methods research 
generates more reliable and credible findings than any single method employed. Molina-
Azorin (2012) conducted a survey about the methodology used in studies published in the 
Strategic Management Journal from 1980 to 2006. He found that mixed-methods studies 
tend to be cited more often than studies using a single method. This indicates that studies 
using mixed-methods are highly valued by researchers (Boyd et al., 2012; McNulty et al., 
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2013; Zattoni et al., 2013).
8
 As discussed in Chapter Four, the study shows that it is 
empirically possible to employ a mixed-methods approach in a study on corporate 
governance reforms. Therefore, adopting a mixed-methods approach in this research paves 
the way for the application of this methodology by future researchers in the context of 
corporate governance. 
Second, the study contributes to the literature by adopting a multiple-theoretical 
framework to interpret the empirical findings and to understand corporate governance 
behaviour in depth. It has been noted that existing studies on corporate governance usually 
adopt agency theory despite the importance of using other complementary corporate 
governance theories (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009; Chalevas, 2011; Zattoni et al., 2013). 
Zattoni et al. (2013) suggest that the mixed findings obtained by corporate governance 
studies are a result of adopting only agency theory. Therefore, this study contributes by 
explain how to use multiple theories in interpreting the empirical findings. 
Third, to the best of this researcher’s knowledge, this study is the first to show 
evidence of the level of compliance with the Saudi Corporate Governance Code, as well as 
comparing compliance before and after the introduction of the code in 2006. More 
precisely, this study is the first attempt to investigate the relationship between the issued 
code and voluntary corporate governance disclosure in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the 
Saudi Corporate Governance Code is voluntary, adopting the UK’s ‘comply or explain’ 
style (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Al-Abbas, 2009; Piesse et al., 2012). Existing 
studies have suggested differences (as previously discussed) between the UK and Saudi 
Arabia in terms of effective governance mechanisms, legal systems and cultural practices 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Bozec et al., 2010; 
Kamla and Roberts, 2010). Therefore, the study also contributes to the literature by 
examining the possibility of adopting a UK-style governance regime in Saudi Arabia. The 
findings suggest that the introduction of the SCGC in 2006 has helped in improving 
corporate governance practices among Saudi listed firms. 
Fourth, the study contributes to the extant governance literature by providing 
empirical evidence on the factors determining good corporate governance practices in 
Saudi listed firms. The factors investigated include the board of directors’ characteristics 
and firm ownership structure. The results suggest that board size, audit firm size, the 
presence of a corporate governance committee, government ownership, institutional 
                                                 
8
 However, and as discussed in Chapter Four, mixed-methods research may be more costly and difficult to 
conduct because of: (i) the diversity of skills required (e.g., quantitative and qualitative data collection and 
analysis skills; (ii) multiplicity of data required (e.g., qualitative and quantitative data); and (iii) greater 
resource requirements (e.g., more time to collect data and travelling costs), amongst others. These can be 
impediment to the use of mixed methods research. 
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ownership and director ownership have a positive influence on the level of compliance 
with voluntary corporate governance disclosure, whereas the proportion of independent 
directors and block ownership are negatively correlated with the level of voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure. 
Fifth, this study contributes to and extends the extant literature by providing 
evidence on the influence of corporate governance practices on firm financial performance. 
Existing studies for both developed and developing countries that examine this relationship 
use either the equilibrium-variable model or the compliance-index model. However, this 
study contributes to the literature by adopting both of these approaches, thereby helping 
explore the influence of the chosen method on the findings. The evidence from the findings 
from the equilibrium-variable model indicate that CEO duality, proportion of independent 
directors, board sub-committees and director ownership are positively related to ROA. 
Also, the findings show that frequency of board meetings has no significant relationship 
with ROA, while board size is negatively associated with ROA. However, the proportion 
of independent directors, board size, the frequency of board meetings and director 
ownership are positively related with firm value, while CEO duality and board sub-
committees have no significant relationship with firm value. In contrast, the compliance-
index model suggests that good corporate governance practices are positively related to 
return on assets (ROA), but have no significant relationship with firm value, as measured 
by Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio). 
Sixth, the awareness and appreciation of good corporate governance practices 
among key stakeholders in Saudi Arabia was investigated in depth by conducting semi-
structured interviews. This study contributes to the corporate governance literature by 
providing insights about boardroom interactions, the behaviour of regulatory bodies, 
auditors’ influences and general stakeholders’ perceptions regarding the recent corporate 
governance reforms in Saudi Arabia. The findings suggest that there is a need to encourage 
small shareholders to exercise their rights in order to improve good corporate governance 
practices and enhancing accountability of management and board of directors to 
shareholders. Furthermore, there is a need for regulatory bodies in Saudi Arabia to further 
increase market depth, enhance institutional investment and allow more direct foreign 
investor participation in order to activate the market for corporate control as an external 
corporate governance mechanism. 
Seventh, to the researcher’s best knowledge, this study is innovative in the Saudi 
corporate business context because it employs a broad self-constructed index consisting of 
65 provisions derived from the local governance legislation. Most existing empirical 
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studies adopt subjective analysts’ ratings (ready-to-use) to explore the level of compliance. 
It can be argued that the differences in governance mechanisms and legal systems among 
countries are not taken into account when subjective analysts’ ratings are used (Renders et 
al., 2010). Moreover, subjective analysts’ ratings focus on certain provisions, such as 
board of directors’ and ownership structure (Ammann et al., 2013). Thus, this study 
contributes to the literature by providing a constructed index applicable to the Saudi 
context, which also opens up new avenues for future research. 
Eighth, the current literature suggests that studies on corporate governance focus 
heavily on developed countries (Bozec and Bozec, 2012; Baydoun et al., 2013; Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013). To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, to date, no study has 
investigated corporate governance reforms either in developed or developing countries 
using an integrated framework. Specifically, this study attempts to explore corporate 
governance reforms from three integrated perspectives: (i) voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure; (ii) financial performance; and (iii) the awareness and appreciation of good 
corporate governance practices using a qualitative research design. Therefore, the 
developed integrated framework provides new insights in studying corporate governance 
reforms. Thus, the findings of this study pave the way for the use of the integrated 
approach by establishing evidence of corporate governance reforms in Saudi Arabia.  
Finally, the findings of this study contribute to the extant literature by assessing 
corporate governance reforms for policy-makers and regulatory bodies. Additionally, the 
findings of this study may have practical importance to regulatory authorities and policy-
makers, such as the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Capital Market Authority and 
the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) in terms of enhancing the market for corporate 
control as an external governance mechanism.  
 
 
1.5 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
As shown in Figure 1.1 below, the thesis is organised into ten chapters 
investigating the corporate governance reforms in the Saudi business context and their 
influence on voluntary corporate governance disclosure and firm financial performance. 
Chapter One seeks to introduce the research objectives, discuss the background of the 
study, articulate the main motivation of the study, present the research questions and 
elaborate on the research contributions. The chapter concludes with a brief outline of the 
way in which the thesis is organised. Chapter Two presents a brief overview of corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia. It aims to explore the corporate governance framework that 
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helps make the corporate governance reforms model more understandable. More precisely, 
it sheds light on the external framework, including regulatory and supervisory bodies. It 
also discusses the internal framework, including governance legislation before and after the 
recent governance reforms in Saudi Arabia. Also, Chapter Two presents a review of the 
difficulties and challenges faced by the corporate governance regime in Saudi Arabia. 
Chapter Three presents a review of related theoretical and empirical studies on 
corporate governance. More specifically, the chapter is divided into three main sections. 
First, it reviews key theories associated with corporate governance, which include agency, 
stakeholder, stewardship, managerial signalling and resource dependence theories, by 
highlighting their implications within the Saudi context. Distinct from most prior studies a 
multiple-theoretical perspective is adopted instead of focusing only on agency theory. This 
provides a profound understanding of corporate governance behaviour and its predictions 
of the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure/financial performance (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Furthermore, 
reviewing these theories helps in incorporating them into a framework that can be used in 
interpreting and rationalising the empirical findings. Chapter Three also reviews empirical 
studies from both developed and developing countries that investigate the level of 
compliance with corporate governance codes and the determinants of voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure. Third, it reviews existing empirical literature examining the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial performance in 
both developed and developing countries.  
Chapter Four presents the research design and methods used in this research. The 
compatibility of the selected research design with the research objectives and questions is 
discussed. The chapter also addresses the challenges in using a mixed-methods research 
design. Following this, the next three chapters shed light on the quantitative data and 
discuss the findings relevant to the literature. In particular, Chapter Five discusses the 
quantitative research design, methodology and statistical analysis of data used in this study, 
and the justification of the chosen data and research design. Three statistical corporate 
governance models are employed: (i) the voluntary corporate governance disclosure 
model, which explores the level of compliance with the SCGC and the factors affecting 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure; (ii) the equilibrium-variable model, which 
investigates the link between a number of individual corporate governance mechanisms 
and firm financial performance; and (iii) the compliance-index model, which examines the 
relationship between the constructed SCGI and corporate financial performance.  
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In Chapter Six, the descriptive statistics of the constructed Saudi Corporate 
Governance Index (SCGI) are presented. This chapter presents the statistical summaries of 
the financial proxies, the explanatory variables and the control variables used in the 
developed models. Chapter Seven discusses the empirical findings obtained by running the 
multivariate regression model using
 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The tolerance values 
of the variables are used to examine: (i) the determinants of voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure; and (ii) the relationship between corporate governance practices 
and firm financial performance using both the equilibrium-variable model and the 
compliance-index model. The robustness of the results and the possible existence of any 
endogeneity problems are also examined by conducting a number of sensitivity analyses, 
including estimating a fixed-effects model and an instrumental variable model.  
The following two chapters then address the qualitative data and its analysis in this 
thesis. Specifically, Chapter Eight presents the theoretical framework that underlies the 
qualitative research method, the design of the semi-structured interviews and the process of 
data collection and data analysis using a thematic analysis approach. Chapter Nine presents 
an analysis of the semi-structured interviews that targeted five different internal and 
external key stakeholders groups, including boards of directors, executive management, 
audit firm partners, regulators and shareholders. In addition, Chapter Nine uses interview 
data to reveal the perceptions of the key stakeholders regarding their awareness and 
appreciation of good corporate governance practices. It also presents the results by 
comparing quantitative and qualitative findings. In addition, it checks the robustness of the 
quantitative findings by comparing and contrasting them with those of the qualitative 
research design (Mengoli et al., 2009; Johl et al., 2012). Finally, Chapter Ten presents a 
summary of the findings from the quantitative and qualitative data, and the implications of 
this study for policy-makers and practitioners. Additionally, it discusses the contributions 
of the study and sheds light on its limitations. The chapter concludes by explicitly offering 
suggestions for future research. 
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Figure 1.1: Thesis structure constructed by the researcher 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
IN SAUDI ARABIA 
 
2. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter generally seeks to provide a description (and, where appropriate, an 
evaluation) of the corporate governance framework in Saudi Arabia. Specifically, it 
presents information about the regulatory bodies and corporate governance legislation 
before and after the recent corporate governance reforms that have been pursued in Saudi 
Arabia. This is done by providing background information about corporate governance in 
Saudi Arabia. The external and internal corporate governance frameworks are then 
investigated. Since the study focuses on internal governance mechanisms and the 
construction of a compliance index, the chapter pays substantial attention to the internal 
corporate governance framework. In contrast, the external corporate governance 
environment is briefly addressed. The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. 
Section 2.1 presents background information relating to the Saudi corporate governance 
framework. Section 2.2 discusses the corporate governance model within the Saudi 
corporate context. Section 2.3 describes the Saudi external corporate governance 
framework. Section 2.4 investigates the Saudi internal corporate governance framework, 
whilst Section 2.5 presents the chapter summary. 
 
 
2.1 SAUDI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Until the early 1980s, there was no formally operated and well-developed equity 
market in Saudi Arabia. At that time, the stock market and regulations were weak, and thus 
unable to protect and attract shareholders and investors (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; 
Al-Nodel and Hussainey, 2010; Al-Matari et al., 2012). Operationally, the stock market 
had its informal beginnings in the 1930s with the establishment of the first joint stock 
company. By 1975, there were about 14 public companies. The rapid economic expansion 
facilitated by the oil boom in the 1970s led to an increase in the number of large public 
companies and banks (see Figure 2.1). However, the stock market remained informal until 
1985, when the government tasked the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) (Central 
Bank) with developing the stock market. From 1985, the SAMA was charged with 
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regulating and monitoring stock market trading, until the Capital Market Authority (CMA) 
was established in July 2003 (SFG, 2009; Tadawul, 2012). 
The Saudi Companies Act issued in 1965 is the only mandatory legislation 
concerned with monitoring the behaviour of corporations and their officers
9
 (Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2007; Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008). However, the Act does not widely address 
corporate governance mechanisms, apart from a limited number of mechanisms relating to 
board characteristics and the general assembly of shareholders. The literature suggests that 
Saudi Arabia is an important emerging economy (Al-Filali and Gallarotti, 2012). As shown 
in Table 2.1, the Saudi stock market accounted for 44% of the total Arab market 
capitalisation and 25% of the total Arab GDP in 2010 (SFG, 2009; Hearn et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has been a member of the G20 since 2008, largely due to the 
important nature of its emerging economy (Al-Matari et al., 2012).  
 
Figure 2.1: The Saudi stock market growth during the last two decades (Source: Tadawul). 
 
In the 2000s, the number of listed firms and the value of market capitalisation did 
not reflect the importance of the Saudi economy regionally and internationally (Al-Filali 
and Gallarotti, 2012). Therefore, there was a growing call by academics, investors and 
practitioners to reform the stock market and corporate governance regime in Saudi Arabia 
(SFG, 2009; Alshehri and Solomon, 2012). Their suggestions included: (i) increasing 
market capitalisation and the number of listed firms, and allowing the direct participation 
of foreign investors; (ii) releasing corporate governance regulations to protect 
shareholders’ rights; (iii) improving disclosure and transparency; and (iv) enhancing 
external corporate governance mechanisms, such as the market for corporate control. 
Moreover, international bodies, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), began 
                                                 
9
 As explained in Chapter One, the new Companies Act is still under study (Alriyadh, 2011a). 
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encouraging emerging countries, especially Saudi Arabia, to make corporate governance a 
priority and to introduce governance codes (Rwegasira, 2000; Clarke, 2004; ROSC, 2009). 
Consequently, the Saudi government began pursuing corporate governance reforms 
as part of general economic reforms in the early 2000s (Al-Matari et al., 2012). The Saudi 
government established new authorities, such as the Supreme Economic Council, the Saudi 
Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) and the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), 
in order to improve investment and enhance economic growth. Specifically, corporate 
governance reforms began in 2003, when the Capital Market Authority (CMA) was 
established (Al-Nodel and Hussainey, 2010).  
 
Table 2.1: Securitas markets of MENA countries – Middle East and North Africa. 
Market Established 
Market Value 
(US$ Bill) 
Market Value 
as % of GDP 
Stocks Traded, 
Turnover Ratio 
(%) 
Panel 1: Individual country statistics    
Saudi stock market 2003 157.31  73.35  10.08  
Kuwait stock exchange 1962 59.53  142.58  10.55  
Abu Dhabi securities 
market 
2000 30.36  37.85  0.46  
Egypt (Alexandria/Cairo) 1888/1903 27.85  39.26  1.81  
Doha securities market 1997 26.70  130.73  1.36  
Dubai financial market 2000 14.28  17.81  1.95  
Bourse de Casablanca 1929 13.05  29.48  4.31  
Amman stock exchange 1999 10.96  110.19  3.55  
Bahrain stock exchange 1989 9.70  100.99  0.27  
Muscat securities market 1988 7.25  33.56  1.49  
Khartoum stock exchange 1995 3.24  12.01  0.75  
Iraq stock exchange 2004 2.69  3.06  0.48  
Bourse de Tunis 1969 2.44  9.07  1.03  
Algeria stock exchange 2003 0.14  0.22  0.01  
Beirut stock exchange 1920 0.00099  0.01  0.60  
 
Panel 2: Regional statistics 
Middle East and North 
Africa 
100.00% 363.01   
Gulf Region (incl. Saudi 
Arabia) 
84.06% 305.13   
Saudi Arabia 43.33% 157.31   
North Africa 11.98% 43.48   
Source: Hearn et al. (2011, p.344). 
 
Since the establishment of the CMA, it has been responsible for re-regulating the 
stock market and corporate governance regime (Alshehri and Solomon, 2012). As a 
corollary, the Saudi stock market witnessed substantial growth in the number of firms, 
market capitalisation, liquidity and visibility (Alshehri and Solomon, 2012). For instance, 
as shown in Figure 2.1, there were 145 listed firms in December 2010, compared with 77 
listed firms in 2005. Also, the market capitalisation reached $353bn in 2010, representing 
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nearly 44% of the total Arab stock market capitalisation (SFG, 2009; Hearn et al., 2011; 
Tadawul, 2012). 
In early 2004, the Saudi stock market witnessed rapid increases in share prices. 
This trend of rapid market growth continued until February 2006, when the stock market 
experienced a dramatic drop in share prices; by December 2006, it had lost over $480bn, 
approximately 53% of its market value. The sudden market crash highlighted a serious 
need to improve corporate governance mechanisms within Saudi firms (SFG, 2009; 
Tadawul, 2012). The Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) was therefore introduced 
in November 2006 by the CMA as a direct response to the market crash, with the primary 
aim of restoring confidence in the market and protecting investors (Al-Abbas, 2009). 
 
 
2.2 THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL IN SAUDI ARABIA 
The corporate governance regime in Saudi Arabia mostly follows the Anglo-
American model, with particular emphasis on protecting shareholders’ interests (Alshehri 
and Solomon, 2012; Seidl et al., 2013). This stems from the fact that Saudi corporate law 
and legislation is derived primarily from British corporate law. For example, the 
Companies Act issued in 1965 was derived mainly from the British Companies Act 
(Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; Al-Matari et al., 2012). Similarly, as explained in Chapter 
One, the Saudi Corporate Governance Code is largely derived from the 1992 UK Cadbury 
Report (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Al-Abbas, 2009; Seidl et al., 2013). For 
instance, the Saudi code recommends adopting a unitary-style board of directors, 
consisting of executive and non-executive directors (NEDs), who are primarily 
accountable to shareholders through a voluntary ‘comply or explain’ compliance and 
disclosure regime. Subsection 2.4.1 presents a discussion of the similarities between the 
two codes.  
Despite the similarities, there are contextual differences, such as social norms, 
highly hierarchical social structure, and concentrated ownership structures, including state 
ownership, which may hinder the effectiveness of formal corporate governance 
mechanisms in Saudi Arabia (Al-Twaijry et al., 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; 
Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; ROSC, 2009; Baydoun et al., 2013). Chapter One 
discussed the characteristics of the Saudi corporate context. The remaining sections of this 
chapter discuss the external and internal corporate governance environment and the 
challenges facing the regulatory authorities.  
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The Saudi corporate governance environment consists of external and internal 
frameworks. The external framework consists of: (i) the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry (MCI), (ii) the Capital Market Authority (CMA); (iii) the Saudi Stock Exchange 
(Tadawul); and (iv) the Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA). 
The internal corporate governance mechanisms are made up of: (i) the Saudi Corporate 
Governance Code (SCGC); (ii) the listing Rules; and (iii) the Saudi Companies Act. In the 
next section, the external corporate governance mechanisms will be briefly discussed, 
followed by a detailed discussion of the internal corporate governance framework. 
 
    
2.3 THE SAUDI EXTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
Figure 2.2 shows the structure of the Saudi financial system, including corporate 
governance regulatory bodies. Recently, the Saudi government established: (i) the Capital 
Market Authority (CMA) in 2003; (ii) the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) in 2003; and 
(iii) the Saudi General Investment Authority (SAGIA) in 2000. The Saudi government 
founded the Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) in 1992. These 
authorities joined the existing authorities, including the Ministry of Finance, formed in 
1932, the Ministry of Commerce, formed in 1953, the Saudi Monetary Agency (SAMA), 
established in 1952, and the Public Investment Fund (PIF), founded in 1971, to constitute 
the external corporate governance framework in the country. Each of these external 
governance structures are discussed in the following subsections.  
 
2.3.1 Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) 
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) was established in 1953 with the 
responsibility to regulate listed firms’ activities. Specifically, until 2003, the MCI was the 
sole authority that regulated the affairs of listed firms and the organisation of the general 
assembly of shareholders. In 1965, the MCI issued the Companies Act, which featured a 
limited number of corporate governance provisions that sought to protect shareholders. In 
particular, the Act outlined the responsibilities and composition of the board of directors 
and the rights of shareholders. In 1990, the MCI released the Public Disclosure Standard in 
an effort to enhance voluntary disclosure and transparency. However, following the 2006 
corporate governance reforms, many supervisory duties of the MCI were transferred to the 
CMA (CMA, 2010).  
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2.3.2 Capital Market Authority (CMA) 
The establishment of the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in 2003 was a great step 
forward and by far the most important external corporate governance reform in Saudi 
Arabia (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; Al-Matari et al., 2012). The CMA reports to the 
Prime Minister directly. This has given the CMA power in regulating the stock market and 
accelerating corporate governance reforms.
10
 In total, the CMA has formulated seven rules 
relating to corporate governance practices, including the 2004 Market Law, the 2004 
Listing Rules, the 2005 Investment Funds Regulations, the 2005 Merger and Acquisition 
Regulations and the 2006 Saudi Corporate Governance Code. The CMA’s main 
responsibilities are to: (i) develop and regulate the Saudi stock market; and (ii) increase 
investors’ confidence and enhance transparency and disclosure in listed companies (CMA, 
2010).  
To improve the corporate governance practices in Saudi listed firms, the CMA has 
implemented three major corporate governance initiatives in three main phases (ROSC, 
2009). The first phase of governance initiatives was completed with the release of the 
Saudi Corporate Governance Code. Phase two of the governance initiatives is currently on-
going, and is geared towards increasing the awareness and appreciation of good corporate 
governance practices, with particular focus on listed firms. Phase three of the governance 
                                                 
10
 Although great benefits can be gained by the CMA through its association with the Prime Minister, there 
are also consequences to its ability to operate independently, some of which have been discussed in 
Subsection 2.3.5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: The broad external corporate governance framework in Saudi Arabia. Source: Researcher’s Construction. 
Ministry of 
Finance 
1932 
Tadawul 
2003 
 
CMA 
2003 
Saudi 
Monetary 
Agency 
(SAMA) 
1952 
Public 
Investment 
Fund 
 (PIF) 
1971 
SAGIA 
2000 
Saudi 
Organization 
for Certified 
Public 
Accountants 
(SOCPA) 
1992 
Chambers 
of 
Commerce 
1964 
 
Ministry of 
Commerce 
1953 
 
 
 
Council of Ministers 
 Supreme Economic Council 
 
41 
 
initiatives involves the revision of the Saudi Corporate Governance Code in order to 
enhance its effectiveness by bringing it up to date with international corporate governance 
standards and practices. In addition to seeking to improve the internal corporate 
governance mechanisms and regulations, the CMA has sought to enhance the effectiveness 
of the market for corporate control as an active external corporate governance 
mechanism.
11
 
 
2.3.3 Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) 
As discussed in Section 2.1, the operations of the Saudi stock market have been 
formalised since 1985 (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; Tadawul, 2012). Until 1985, 
however, the market operated informally in the 1930s, when the Arabian Automobiles 
Company was founded as the first joint stock company in Saudi Arabia (Tadawul, 2012). 
In 1975, the number of listed firms had increased to 14 public companies. The market 
remained informal until 1985, when the SAMA took responsibility for developing the 
stock market and regulating trading (SFG, 2009; Tadawul, 2012). As shown in Figure 2.1, 
the number of firms gradually increased to 57 in 1990 and 75 in 2000. Since its 
establishment in 2003, the CMA
12
 has sought to develop the stock market by setting up the 
Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) in 2003 (Tadawul, 2012). The Tadawul is a regulatory 
body that is responsible for organising the financial market. It is managed by a board of 
directors appointed by the Council of Ministers, including representatives of legislators, 
licensed Saudi local brokerage firms and listed firms. 
 
2.3.4 Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) 
 The accounting and auditing profession in Saudi Arabia is relatively young. It 
began in 1965, when a new law was passed requiring listed firms to have their financial 
statements audited by independent auditors in order to protect shareholders (SOCPA, 
2012). The first chartered accountants’ act was consequently issued in 1974. The 1974 Act 
remained very important in regulating the accountancy profession in Saudi Arabia under 
the supervision of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI). Until the early 1990s, 
the profession had not developed as desired, as there was no independent body to oversee 
its improvement (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). In 1992, the Saudi Organization for Certified 
Public Accountants (SOCPA) was established as a semi-independent authority (Alsaeed, 
                                                 
11
 Chapter Nine addresses the key stakeholders’ perceptions of the CMA’s efforts to improve corporate 
governance mechanisms among Saudi listed firms.  
12
 The Council of Ministers approved the conversion of the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) to the Joint 
Stock Company in 2007. The conversion led to the implementation of the Capital Market Law, which 
requires the stock market to be run as an independent body (Tadawul, 2012). 
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2006). It promotes the accounting and auditing profession in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, it 
was assigned to perform the following tasks: (i) re-organising audit firms; (ii) granting 
licenses; and (iii) monitoring the quality of audit firms’ performance. The 1974 Chartered 
Accountants’ Act was amended and revised in 1992 (SOCPA, 2012). The SOCPA finally 
obtained recognition by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) in 2006 
(SOCPA, 2012). Furthermore, out of sixteen bodies in total, the SOCPA was chosen by the 
IFAC to help develop the accounting and auditing profession (SOCPA, 2012). Alsaeed 
(2006) suggests that the SOCPA has helped enhance the quality of audit firms. It has also 
helped increase shareholders’ and investors’ confidence in corporate governance disclosure 
and the reliability of corporate annual reports. 
 
2.3.5 Difficulties and Challenges Facing the External Governance Framework  
The World Bank’s report on the observance of standards and codes (ROSC) 
relating to corporate governance practices in Saudi Arabia  has outlined a number of 
challenges and difficulties currently faced by regulators and supervisory authorities in 
Saudi Arabia (ROSC, 2009). These challenges include: (i) a lack of managerial 
independence among regulatory authorities; (ii) unnecessary government and political 
interference; (iii) low market deepening; and (iv) weak implementation and enforcement of 
corporate laws (Al-Abbas, 2009; ROSC, 2009; Al-Matari et al., 2012). Chapter Nine 
presented, in detail, a review of key stakeholders’ perceptions of those challenges. The 
following section briefly discusses some of the challenges facing the Saudi stock market.  
First, the CMA reports directly to the Council of Ministers. It acts as a government 
agency, with its board members appointed directly by the government. As such, its 
independence is impeded through excessive government interventions that affect its ability 
to effectively monitor and regulate corporate practices (Kantor et al., 1995; Al-Matari et 
al., 2012). The inability of foreigners to invest directly in the Saudi stock market and the 
absence of foreign listed firms are examples of the influence of the government on the 
stock market (Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012). In contrast, in developed countries, such 
as the US and the UK, securities markets are not subject to direct government intervention 
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992).  
Second, related to the above challenge, the CMA is not managerially independent 
from the Saudi government, which also increases opportunities for political interference, 
thereby impeding the effectiveness of its operations (Al-Matari et al., 2012). In addition, 
government intervention may lack the technical know-how in supervising modern complex 
financial architecture. Consequently, the CMA’s capacity to implement and enforce 
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corporate regulations is weak, often leading to low compliance with corporate laws, as well 
as poor transparency, disclosure and governance practices for some provisions (Alshehri 
and Solomon, 2012).   
Finally, as discussed in Chapter One, there is a lack of depth in the Saudi market. 
Despite the pursuance of recent reforms which sought to strengthen its stock market by 
increasing the number of listed firms (Alshehri and Solomon, 2012), the depth and breadth 
of the Saudi market is comparatively low; thus, the market requires further deepening. One 
of the reasons is that the Saudi stock market has not been able to attract any significant 
number of non-listed firms to be listed due to government restrictions (ROSC, 2009). For 
example, there were only 144 listed firms as of December 2010, which is not reflective of 
the size of the Saudi economy (Al-Filali and Gallarotti, 2012). In addition, 
investor/shareholder protection laws are relatively weak, often leading to insider dealings 
and manipulation, usually to the disadvantage of minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 
2002; Piesse et al., 2012). This is typified by the 2006 stock market crash (Al-Abbas, 
2009).  
 
 
2.4 THE SAUDI INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
As previously explained, until the early 2000s, corporate governance practices in 
Saudi listed firms were regulated by the 1965 Companies Act (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; 
Al-Abbas, 2009). Therefore, recent corporate governance reforms pursued in Saudi Arabia 
sought to directly improve the internal corporate governance mechanisms in Saudi firms. 
Among the objectives of this thesis is to investigate: (i) the determinants of voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure; and (ii) the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm financial performance, which involved the construction of a compliance index 
known as the Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI). As discussed in Chapter Five, 
the constructed compliance index was constructed based on the corporate governance 
provisions contained in the: (i) Saudi Corporate Governance Code; (ii) Tadawul’s Listing 
Rules; and (iii) Companies Act. The three regulations constitute the main internal 
corporate governance regulatory structures within the Saudi corporate context. Therefore, 
the internal corporate governance mechanisms proposed by these regulations are discussed 
in detail in the following subsections.  
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2.4.1 The Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) 
The Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) is considered to be a main driver 
in implementing good corporate governance practices across Saudi listed firms. As 
discussed in Chapter Five, the SCGC was the main source for constructing the compliance 
index used in this study. Therefore, this subsection reviews the SCGC and presents its 
provisions in detail. The SCGC mainly consists of four parts: (i) preliminary provisions; 
(ii) shareholders’ rights and the general assembly; (iii) disclosure and transparency; and 
(iv) board of directors. 
The first part presents the preliminary provisions by providing the necessary 
definitions and the relationship between the SCGC and other pieces of legislation. Article 1 
outlines the main purpose of releasing the SCGC, which is to regulate and improve 
compliance with corporate governance standards among Saudi firms. Article 1b indicates 
that the code constitutes the main guiding principle for all public firms listed on the Saudi 
stock market. To demonstrate the level of compliance with the code in annual reports, the 
regulator requires companies to explain any non-implemented provisions.  
The second part of the SCGC discusses shareholders’ rights and general assembly 
provisions. Specifically, the main issue concerning the rights of public shareholders is 
facilitating the exercise of their rights and access to information. Article 5a states that the 
general assembly should be held within six months of a company’s financial year end. The 
date, location and agenda of the general assembly meeting shall be announced at least 20 
days prior to the date of the meeting. Furthermore, an invitation to the meeting shall be 
published on the Saudi stock market’s website and also the website of the respective 
company. Article 5e requires the company’s management to facilitate the participation of 
the largest number of shareholders in the general assembly. However, shareholders have a 
right to appoint any other shareholder, who is neither a board member nor an employee of 
the company, to attend the general assembly on their behalf. Article 5f puts emphasis on 
the right of shareholders to participate in the formulation of the general assembly meeting 
agenda. Therefore, the board of directors shall discuss topics proposed by shareholders 
who own at least 5% of the company’s shares.  
To reduce asymmetric information, Article 4b asserts that the board and company 
management should ensure full access to information by shareholders, enabling them to 
exercise their rights properly. This information must be regularly provided and updated 
every six months. In doing so, the company must use the most effective ways of 
communicating with their shareholders (Article 4b). Article 5j indicates that the stock 
exchange shall be immediately informed of the results of the general assembly meeting 
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through the Tadawul website. Therefore, a company can be penalised if such 
announcements, especially price sensitive information, is delayed.  
In order to maximise the participation of small shareholders in making important 
decisions, such as the nomination of board members, the code recommends applying a 
one-share-one-vote policy
13
 (Article 6b). Similarly, the right of shareholders regarding 
receiving dividends is clearly stated in the SCGC. Moreover, Article 7 asserts that the 
dividends policy should be discussed with shareholders during the general assembly. It is 
noteworthy that the provisions relating to shareholders’ rights and general assembly were 
included in the constructed Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI), representing 12% 
of the total provisions (i.e., 8 out of a total of 65 corporate governance provisions).  
Part Three of the SCGC focuses specifically on enhancing corporate transparency 
and voluntary disclosure. It is noted that the provisions mentioned in this particular part are 
deemed complementary to the Tadawul’s Listing Rules (Article 8). To enhance the board’s 
independence, Article 9 requires that the board’s composition should be disclosed in a 
firm’s annual report. Specifically, it requires corporate annual reports to include a clear 
classification of board members into executive directors, non-executive directors and 
independent non-executive directors. Similarly, a brief description of the jurisdictions and 
duties of the board must be provided. The firm also has to disclose the board sub-
committees, such as audit, nomination and remuneration committees, indicating the names 
of their chairmen and members, and information about their meetings. The Saudi Code 
also considers the board’s compensation as an internal corporate governance mechanism. 
Article 9e requires listed firms to provide details of compensation and remuneration paid to 
each member of the board of directors and each of its top five executives, including the 
CEO and CFO. The SCGC does not put a ceiling on board compensation and 
remuneration. Article 17 points out that such payment may take the form of: (i) a fixed 
salary; (ii) an attendance allowance; and/or (iii) a certain percentage of the corporate 
profits.  
In order to disclose directors’ interests in other companies, Article 9b states that 
firms’ annual reports should include the names of other listed firms in which a director 
holds additional directorships. Also, Article 18 asserts that board members cannot 
participate in any activity that runs counter to the company’s interests. The SCGC also 
                                                 
13
 A number of developed countries apply a one-share-one-vote principle (e.g., the UK and the US). 
Theoretically, this may increase the opportunity of small shareholders to appoint their representatives to the 
board (Adams and Ferreira, 2008). In Saudi Arabia, the MCI issued a resolution in January 2012 to mandate 
listed firms to apply a one-share-one-vote principle during board elections (Al-jazirah, 2012).  
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requires companies to declare any punishment, penalty or preventive restriction imposed 
by the CMA or other regulatory, supervisory or judiciary body (Article 9). The code puts 
emphasis on the importance of firms’ internal control systems and evaluates the role of the 
system in enhancing corporate governance practices (Article 9g). The provisions discussed 
in this section represent about 34% (i.e., 22 out of the total of 65 corporate governance 
provisions) of the total corporate governance provisions contained in the constructed Saudi 
Corporate Governance Index.     
The fourth part of the SCGC focuses on corporate governance provisions relating to 
the board and directors. The primary role of a board of directors is to represent the interests 
of shareholders (Berle and Means, 1932; Davidson et al., 1996). As a result, the code 
extensively discusses the role of the board of directors in five subsections: (i) main 
functions of the board; (ii) responsibilities; (iii) composition; (iv) board sub-committees; 
and (v) board meetings. 
First, the code explains that the board’s main role is to reduce agency costs and 
maximise the firm’s value for shareholders. These functions include: (i) laying down a 
comprehensive strategy for the firm; (ii) establishing risk management policy and 
identifying areas of risk; and (iii) reviewing and updating corporate strategies and policies. 
Additionally, the board should supervise the implementation process and hold management 
accountable when objectives are not met. Article 10b recommends that listed firms draft 
their own corporate governance code, which should not contradict the provisions of the 
SCGC, in order to activate governance structures. In addition, Article 10e focuses on the 
behaviour of executives and employees, which should be monitored by the board to ensure 
adherence to proper professional and ethical standards. Furthermore, the code requires that 
public listed companies develop a written policy regulating their relationship with 
stakeholders in order to protect their rights.  
Second, the code has outlined the responsibilities of the board of directors. It 
suggests that representation of shareholders’ interests by the board is the most important 
responsibility of the board. It indicates that board members must strive to achieve whatever 
is required to ensure the general welfare of stakeholders, not just the interests of a minority 
of privileged shareholders. The board chairperson is expected to ensure equal and timely 
access to information by all board members. Most importantly, non-executive and 
independent board members must be enabled to have effective and complete access to 
information to perform their duties and responsibilities. It can be noted that the SCGC 
indicates that the responsibility for running the company ultimately rests with the board, 
even if some of its powers are delegated to appropriate board sub-committees or third 
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parties (Article 11a). Therefore, Article 11b states that responsibilities of board members 
must be clearly stated in the company’s articles of association. 
Third, the SCGC focuses on the composition of the board. In Article 12, the code 
recommends that the size of the board should be not less than three and not more than 
eleven members. On the other hand, the number of independent members of the board shall 
be not less than two members or one third of the members, whichever is greater. In 
addition, the majority of board members shall be non-executive directors. Board members 
are expected to be appointed by the general assembly, provided that the duration of the 
appointment does not exceed three years. Additionally, the general assembly holds the 
power to dismiss all or some of the board members. Also, when any member resigns from 
the board, the company shall promptly notify the CMA and Tadawul and specify the 
reasons for such resignation or termination (Article 12g).  
To enhance the role of the board in monitoring firm performance, the Saudi 
Corporate Governance Code recommends splitting the roles of CEO and chairperson. 
Specifically, Article 12d recommends that the board chairperson should be a non-executive 
director. To ensure that directors devote sufficient time to performing their roles, the code 
specifies that a board member shall not act as a board member of more than five listed 
firms at the same time (Article 12h). 
Fourth, the establishment of appropriate board sub-committees and their 
independence are also covered in the SCGC. In order to enable the board of directors to 
perform its duties successfully, a suitable number of committees shall be set up in 
accordance with the company’s requirements (Article 13). The code mandates listed firms 
to establish audit, nomination and remuneration committees. As the presence of non-
executive directors is important in corporate governance principles, the code requires the 
appointment of a sufficient number of non-executive directors in such committees. These 
committees shall notify the board of their performance, findings and decisions with 
transparency. In addition, the board shall follow up on committee activities to ensure that 
the committees are performing their roles as they should.  
According to the code, the audit committee shall have not fewer than three 
members, including a member who is professionally literate in financial and accounting 
matters. Similarly, executive board members are not eligible to be audit committee 
members. Article 14c determines that the main functions of the audit committee include 
the following: (i) to supervise the company’s internal audit and review the internal control 
system; (ii) to recommend the appointment and remuneration of the external auditor; and 
(iii) to review the auditor’s opinion on financial statements. 
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Table 2.2: The Key Corporate Governance Provisions of the UK Cadbury Report and the Saudi Code  
Corporate Governance Provisions 1992 Cadbury Report 2006 Saudi Code 
Board of Directors   
Board structure One-tier system One-tier system 
Board size Not specified Between three and eleven 
Board composition (classification) Executive and non-executive 
directors 
Executive, non-executive and 
independent directors 
Role duality Separate chairperson and CEO 
required 
Separate chairperson and CEO 
required 
Chairperson Non-executive director Non-executive director 
Non-executive A minimum of three directors A majority of directors 
Independent A minimum two directors At least one third of directors  
Information accessibility Ensure equal accessibility between 
members 
Ensure equal accessibility between 
members 
Directors’ training Provided, especially for newly-
appointed directors 
Provided, especially for newly-
appointed directors 
Frequency (number) of board 
meetings 
Not specified (regularly) Not specified (regularly) 
Board Sub-Committees   
Recommended committees Audit, remuneration and 
nomination committees 
Audit, remuneration and 
nomination committees 
Audi committee composition Formed by a minimum of three (at 
least two non-executive directors) 
Formed by a minimum of three (all 
non-executive directors) 
Remuneration committee  
composition 
 
Formed by the whole or a majority 
of non-executive directors 
Formed by a sufficient number of 
non-executive directors 
Nomination committee composition Formed by a majority of non-
executive directors 
Formed by a sufficient number of 
non-executive directors 
Disclosure and Transparency   
Board and management compensation Recommended to be disclosed Recommended to be disclosed 
Ownership structure Not covered Covered 
Dividends policy Not covered Covered 
Firms’ Social Contributions Not covered Covered, but limited in scope 
Narrative on Compliance/Non-
Compliance 
Recommended to be disclosed Recommended to be disclosed 
Internal Control and Risk 
Management 
  
Effectiveness of control system Provide statement Provide statement 
Risk management Not covered Covered, but limited in scope 
Narrative on the firm as a going 
concern 
Covered Covered 
Compliance or regulation Voluntary or self-regulation Voluntary or self-regulation 
Source: Compiled from the 1992 Cadbury Report and the 2006 Saudi Corporate Governance Code. 
 
In a similar vein, the duties of the nomination and remuneration committees are 
concentrated on: (i) ensuring, on an annual basis, the independence of directors; (ii) 
drawing up clear policies regarding the compensation and remuneration of board members 
and top executives; and (iii) determining the strengths and weakness in the board of 
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directors and recommending strategies compatible with the company’s welfare (Article 
15). 
Finally, the code addresses board meetings. It asserts that board members shall 
perform their duties, carry out their responsibilities and endeavour to attend all meetings 
(Article 16). Furthermore, the board shall hold ordinary meetings regularly. Also, the board 
shall document its meetings and prepare records of the deliberations and voting. As 
discussed above, the code heavily focuses on board of directors’ mechanisms due to their 
importance in corporate governance. As a corollary, the majority of the corporate 
governance provisions contained in the constructed Saudi Corporate Governance Index 
relate to the role and duties of the board, directors and their sub-committees. Specifically, 
54% (35 out of the total of 65 corporate governance provisions) of the SCGI provisions are 
related to the board of directors. 
 
2.4.2 Listing Rules and Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Since its establishment in 2003, the CMA has sought to establish and improve 
corporate governance regulations. The 2004 Tadawul’s Listing Rules represented an 
important step towards reforming corporate governance regulations in Saudi Arabia. 
Therefore, as explained previously, the Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) used to 
examine the level of compliance with corporate governance standards draws heavily on 
these rules. Part Six of the regulation, entitled ‘Continuing Obligations’, includes 15 
articles addressing the importance of disclosure and transparency in corporate annual 
reports.
14
 
First, the rules address disclosure and transparency in order to reduce asymmetric 
information. Article 25a stipulates that listed firms must notify the CMA and shareholders 
without delay of any major developments in their operations. The rules specify that the 
notification should be made on the Tadawul website at least two hours before the first 
trading period in the stock market. The objective is to inform stakeholders of any potential 
effect on the firm’s assets, liabilities or general course of business. Regarding financial 
performance, Article 26d points out that the company must announce its quarterly and 
annual financial results on the stock market website immediately following board approval. 
The CMA specifies that the financial results must be declared within 15 days in the case of 
quarterly results and 40 days for annual results. Moreover, the annual report must be 
                                                 
14
 It is noted that the Listing Rules also include the corporate governance provisions contained in the Saudi 
Corporate Governance Code.  
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approved by the board of directors and signed by the authorised directors, the CEO and the 
CFO prior to its publication and circulation to shareholders (Article 26a).  
Second, there are obligations relating to the contents of the annual board report. 
Article 27a requires listed firms to publish their annual report in the main national 
newspapers and also on the website of the Tadawul. Listed firms are required to review the 
company’s operations during the last financial year. In addition, they should include the 
relevant factors influencing the company’s business, which can help investors to assess the 
company’s future. As such, the board of directors’ report must contain the following 
details: (i) a description of the principal activities of the company; (ii) a description of the 
company’s significant plans, decisions, future prospects and any risks facing the company; 
(iii) a summary, in the form of a table or a chart, of the company’s assets, liabilities and 
business results for the last five financial years; (iv) an explanation of any significant 
differences between the operational results of the last financial year and the previous 
financial year; (v) a description of the company’s dividend policy; and (vi) a detailed 
report about the company’s loans and debt commitments.  
Third, as ownership structure is significant and closely associated with the agency 
problem, Article 27/10 directs companies to disclose the board’s report on the ownership 
structure, naming those shareholders who own 5% or more of the company’s shares. This 
ownership disclosure rule applies to directors, managers, outsiders and their associates. In 
addition, they have to inform shareholders about any changes to such interests and rights 
during the last financial year. For the purpose of increasing transparency in the companies’ 
contracts and not being exploited by insiders, Article 27/17 states that the board report 
must include detailed information regarding the related interests by any board director, the 
CEO, the CFO or their relative in commercial transactions and business contracts that the 
firm engages in. In order to show the board’s effectiveness, Article 27/16 indicates that the 
number of board meetings and the attendance record of each meeting should be included in 
the annual board report. 
 According to Article 27/22, the board report should be supplemented by statements 
confirming that: (i) a proper accounting system has been maintained; (ii) the internal 
control system is sound in its design and has been effectively implemented; (iii) there are 
no significant doubts concerning the company’s ability to continue as a going concern; and 
(iv) where the board of directors recommends that the external auditors should be changed, 
the reasons for such a recommendation are provided. 
Finally, according to managerial signalling theory, managers (agents or insiders) 
have more inside information than ordinary shareholders (principals) (Morris, 1987; 
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Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). Thus, Article 33 prohibits trading by agents within a 
reporting window. Specifically, directors, executive managers and their associates cannot 
trade in any securities of the company during the following periods: (ii) during the 10 days 
preceding the end of the financial quarter and until the date of the announcement of the 
quarterly results; and (ii) during the 20 days preceding the end of the financial year and 
until the date of the announcement of the company’s annual results. Further, in order to 
regulate the remuneration packages of executives and directors of listed firms, Article 36 
of the Listing Rules asserts that the company should provide a written policy for 
remuneration or compensation for the general assembly to vote on. 
 
2.4.3 Saudi Companies Act and Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
The first formal attempt to regulate corporate operations and activities was in 1965, 
when the Companies Act was introduced (Kantor et al., 1995). This Act was extensively 
amended in 1982 and 1985. Shinawi and Crum (1971) indicate that the primary source of 
the Saudi Companies Act is the 1948 British Companies Act (as cited by Hussainey and 
Al-Nodel, 2008). This 1965 Act briefly addresses some corporate governance mechanisms. 
Particularly, this Act focuses on board characteristics and provisions protecting 
shareholders. However, it does not address the detailed disclosure and transparency 
mechanisms that are contained in the SCGC and the Listing Rules and discussed above. 
Therefore, in this section, the internal corporate governance mechanisms contained in the 
Companies Act are explained briefly.  
First, the section on board structure contains provisions relating to: (i) board size; 
(ii) the CEO and chairperson’s relationship; (iii) the board’s power; (iv) the annual board 
report; and (v) the frequency of board meetings. Article 66 of the Companies Act stipulates 
that the company is managed by the board of directors. The size of the board is determined 
by the company’s articles of association, but must not be less than three members. The 
appointment of board members is part of the shareholders’ responsibilities in the general 
assembly, provided their tenure does not exceed three years. However, in contrast to the 
SCGC, the Companies Act does not address the board’s composition. For example, it 
neither specifies whether independent non-executive directors should be part of the board 
nor the number of independent or non-executive directors that should form a board. 
Therefore, firms can decide their own structure according to the articles of association. 
Article 79 allows companies to combine the chairperson’s and the CEO’s positions in one 
role. As discussed in Chapter Three, this is consistent with the predictions of stewardship 
theory, which suggest that it is appropriate to combine the positions of the CEO or the 
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managing director and the board chairperson. Similarly, despite the importance of board 
sub-committees in ensuring corporate governance practices, the Companies Act does not 
stipulate the role or the number of board sub-committees that a corporation should have. 
This was changed in 1994 when a resolution by the Prime Minister mandated companies to 
appoint an audit committee to oversee and improve internal control systems, with the aim 
of protecting shareholders.  
Second, Article 89 of the Act requires public listed companies to issue annual 
reports containing a board report, the main financial statements and an external auditor’s 
report. To ensure such information is available and accessible to the largest possible 
number of shareholders, the report must be published in any national newspaper issued in 
the same city as the company’s headquarters. Regarding the frequency of board meetings, 
Article 80 of the Act points out that the board of directors has to meet at the board 
chairperson’s invitation. However, regardless of any contrary provision in the company’s 
articles of association, the chairperson must call a meeting when requested by at least two 
directors. A board meeting shall be deemed valid if and only if attended by at least half of 
the board members, provided there are a minimum of three attendees. Directors who are 
unable to attend the board meeting have the right to delegate other members to vote on 
their behalf. 
In order to mitigate the potential conflict of interest between agents and principals, 
Article 69 points out that a contract or transaction between the company and directors must 
be authorised by the general assembly. Furthermore, if such contracts are more than one 
year in length, the authorization must be annually renewed. Also, members cannot vote on 
any issue in which they have a vested interest. However, the chairperson, in turn, is 
responsible for notifying the general assembly about any personal interest of board 
members. The Companies Act also outlines how directors should be remunerated. Article 
74 states that they should be paid a fixed bonus or a certain percentage of the profits, or 
may combine the two. However, the maximum annual compensation should be either 
about $53,000 for each director or 10% of the net profits, distributed between the 
members, whichever is lower. 
Finally, the Act also considers shareholders’ rights and how their investments can 
be protected. Article 87 clearly states that shareholders who own at least 20 shares have the 
right to attend general assembly meetings. Shareholders have the right to discuss issues 
relating to the company’s performance during the general assembly. Article 83 of the Act 
asserts shareholders’ right to appoint another shareholder (non-directors) to attend the 
general assembly meeting and vote on their behalf. Article 84 points out that the annual 
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general assembly meeting should be held at least once a year, during the six months 
following the end of the financial year. To ensure that information is accessible for all 
shareholders at the annual meeting, the Act states that the annual report must be made 
available at least 60 days before the meeting. 
In order to encourage shareholders to exercise their right to attend the general 
assembly meeting, Article 88 requests the publication of details of the meeting in a daily 
newspaper at least 25 days before the meeting. The meeting details should include the 
meeting agenda, date, time and location.  
 
2.4.4 Difficulties and Challenges Facing the Internal Governance Framework  
With the exception of the Companies Act, corporate governance regulations are 
still in their infancy, and their effectiveness has not been extensively examined empirically 
(ROSC, 2009; Al-Abbas, 2009). Consequently, there are a number of challenges that face 
regulatory authorities in their attempt to improve corporate governance practices in Saudi 
listed firms. The following section briefly discusses two of the main difficulties faced by 
the regulatory bodies in their attempt to develop an effective and efficient internal 
corporate governance framework.
15
  
First, as discussed in Chapter One, compliance with the Saudi corporate 
governance rules is voluntary in nature, which is modelled along the UK’s ‘comply or 
explain’ style voluntary compliance and disclosure regime (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2009; Al-Abbas, 2009; Seidl et al., 2013). As shown in Figure 2.3, Saudi listed firms suffer 
from high ownership concentration, including government ownership (ROSC, 2009), in 
contrast to the UK, where ownership is relatively more diffuse (Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 
2012). La Porta et al. (1999) suggest that controlling shareholders tend not to support good 
governance reforms, and thus the presence of large shareholders can lead to the 
exploitation of minority or small shareholders (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Ntim et al., 
2012a; Allegrini and Greco, 2013).  
Finally, as discussed in Section 2.2, the internal corporate governance framework 
has an Anglo-American orientation. This is reflected in the way that the Companies Act 
and the SCGC focus on protecting shareholders’ rights. However, some provisions relating 
to other stakeholders have not been clearly addressed, which can lead to misinterpretation 
by firms and practitioners. For example, the code requires companies to set policies that 
regulate the relationship between the firm and its stakeholders. However, it does not 
                                                 
15
 These difficulties discussed further in Chapter Nine with particular focus on analysing the perceptions of 
the key stakeholders regarding corporate governance reforms in Saudi Arabia. 
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explain clearly how these provisions can be implemented and/or measured. In addition, it 
fails to identify specifically the different types of other stakeholders that the firm should 
report to. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Government and block ownership between 2004 and 2010 (Source: PIF and Tadawul). 
 
 
                         
2.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
This chapter discussed the corporate governance regime in Saudi Arabia. First, it 
provided background information relating to the external and internal corporate 
governance environment. Specifically, it provided an overview of the Saudi stock market, 
its origins and subsequent developments.  
Second, the chapter discussed the corporate governance model in Saudi Arabia. 
The corporate governance regime in Saudi Arabia is based on the Anglo-American model. 
In particular, it focuses on protecting shareholders rather other stakeholders of the firm. 
This is due primarily to the fact that corporate law has been influenced largely by the 
British Companies Act, despite apparent differences in contextual characteristics, such as 
religion, social norms and the legal system. 
Third, the chapter investigated the external corporate governance framework in 
Saudi Arabia. The external framework is represented by the regulatory and supervisory 
bodies. Three regulators directly related to corporate governance are the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry (MCI), the Capital Market Authority (CMA) and the Saudi Stock 
Exchange (Tadawul). This chapter also discussed some of the difficulties and challenges 
faced by regulatory authorities in their attempt to enhance corporate governance practices 
in Saudi firms. Finally, the chapter discussed the internal corporate governance framework. 
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Specifically, it addressed the regulations relating to internal corporate governance 
practices. In particular, governance mechanisms contained in the Companies Act, the 
Listing Rules and the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) were discussed in detail. 
However, the main focus was on the Saudi code, since it was the main source used for 
constructing the broad Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) used to examine the 
level of compliance with the SCGC by Saudi listed companies.  
The next chapter presents a review of the relevant theoretical and empirical 
literature on corporate governance. Specifically, the chapter addresses three main issues. 
First, relevant corporate governance theories will be reviewed. Second, empirical literature 
relating to the determinants of voluntary corporate governance disclosure will be 
discussed, and hypotheses will be developed. Finally, empirical literature relating to the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm financial performance will be 
discussed, and hypotheses will be developed.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
3. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a review of the existing literature on corporate governance. 
Specifically, the chapter attempts to achieve the following three major objectives. First, it 
investigates the key theories associated with corporate governance. Second, the chapter 
discusses the empirical literature relating to compliance with, and disclosure of, corporate 
governance mechanisms. In addition, it sheds light on the factors influencing voluntary 
corporate disclosure. The rationale is to identify gaps in the empirical literature related to 
the potential determinants of voluntary compliance with, and disclosure of, corporate 
governance mechanisms that can be addressed by this study.  
Third, the chapter reviews empirical studies examining the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. Specifically, it traces the existing 
literature on corporate governance and financial performance. The relationship between 
corporate governance and financial performance is examined by using both the 
equilibrium-variable model and the compliance-index model. The equilibrium-variable 
model involves an examination of the association between individual corporate governance 
variables and financial performance. The compliance-index model involves an 
investigation of the relationship between a composite corporate governance index and firm 
financial performance. The review helps in developing an understanding of the empirical 
methods, data sources and findings, as well as in identifying gaps within the existing 
literature that a study on the Saudi context can contribute to. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 presents a discussion on the 
theoretical literature relating to voluntary corporate disclosure and financial performance. 
Section 3.2 investigates the existing empirical literature relating to compliance with 
corporate governance standards contained in different corporate governance codes. Section 
3.3 discusses the possible factors influencing voluntary corporate disclosure and develops 
appropriate hypotheses. Section 3.4 reviews empirical studies on the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance, and subsequently develops relevant 
hypotheses, whilst Section 3.5 provides a summary of the chapter.  
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3.1 THE THEORETICAL LITERATURE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AND DISCLOSURE 
 
This section examines corporate governance theories related to both voluntary 
corporate disclosure and financial performance. As discussed in Chapters One and Two, 
Saudi Arabia has recently pursued corporate governance reforms, with the aim of 
improving corporate governance practices and protecting shareholder interests (SCGC, 
2006; Al-Abbas, 2009; Al-Nodel and Hussainey, 2010; Alshehri and Solomon, 2012; Al-
Janadi  et al., 2013; Robertson et al., 2013). Corporate governance is related to different 
fields, including law, economics, finance, organisational behaviour, management, ethics 
and politics (Rwegasira, 2000; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010; Solomon, 2010). Therefore, 
it is difficult to rely on one theory, such as agency theory alone, in interpreting and 
explaining corporate governance behaviour (Chen and Roberts, 2010; Sharma, 2013).  
In this regard, Zattoni et al. (2013) indicate that several recent meta-analyses have 
revealed that existing studies adopting an agency-based perspective generally found mixed 
relationship between corporate governance behaviour and performance outcomes. They 
highlight that corporate governance studies must move away from agency theory and 
consider other theoretical frameworks. Nevertheless, a considerable number of previous 
studies have adopted only agency theory to interpret their empirical findings (Filatotchev 
and Boyd, 2009; Chalevas, 2011; Zattoni et al., 2013). Thus, similar to other studies 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Ntim et al., 2012a; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013), a multiple-
theoretical framework
16
 is adopted to examine the relationships among corporate 
governance mechanisms, voluntary disclosure and financial performance. Due to its 
dominance within the corporate governance and disclosure literature, however, agency 
                                                 
16
 The central motivation for adopting a multiple-theoretical framework is explained as follows. First, it has 
been suggested that any single corporate governance theory, including agency theory, has a limited ability to 
completely explain the relationship among corporate governance, voluntary disclosure and financial 
performance (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Sharma, 2013). In other words, on 
their own, these individual theories suffer from a number of weaknesses (Chen and Robin, 2010), but 
together they can complement each other and enhance their predictive power. Second, the corporate 
governance phenomenon is complex, relating to a variety of disciplines, such as law, economics, sociology, 
business and management (Rwegasira, 2000; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010), and is thereby inherently multi-
theoretically oriented. Third, it is a direct response to recent calls for the use of alternative or complementary 
theories in empirical corporate governance studies, which can enhance theoretical puralism (Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013; Zattoni et al., 2013). Fourth, as a direct response to recent calls for more mixed-methods 
research approaches in investigating corporate governance, this study employs a mixed-methods research 
design to examine the connections among corporate governance, disclosure and financial performance (Boyd 
et al., 2012; McNulty et al., 2013), which requires the use of complementary theories in order to achieve 
effective integration in the interpretation of the quantitative and qualitative findings (Chen and Roberts, 
2010; Johl et al., 2012). Finally, it is generally in line with existing studies that have adopted a multiple-
theoretical perspective (e.g., Nicholson and Kiel, 2007; Black, 2006b; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Conyon and 
He, 2011; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013), and thus can facilitate comparisons with the findings of these 
studies.  
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theory is adopted as the primary theoretical framework. Given the complexity of the 
corporate governance and disclosure phenomena, agency theory is supplemented with 
predictions from managerial signalling, stakeholder, stewardship and resource dependence 
theories. 
In the following subsections, agency, managerial signalling, stakeholder, 
stewardship and resource dependence theories are briefly reviewed. These theories are 
selected because they are powerful in explaining the relationships among corporate 
governance, voluntary disclosure and firm performance. 
 
3.1.1 Agency Theory  
 Agency theory is one of the most important theories in the context of corporate 
governance. As such, a large volume of studies in the literature are based on it (Filatotchev 
and Boyd, 2009). The agency contract has been described by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
as a contractual agreement between owners (principals) and managers (agents) to operate 
the firm in the interests of shareholders. This, however, does not suggest that Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) were the first to develop agency theory or suggest the possibility of 
agency conflicts between corporate owners and managers. In fact, economists such as the 
famous British economist Adam Smith have long identified the existence of such potential 
agency conflicts, often embedded in the separation of ownership (shareholding) and 
control (management) in modern corporations. Specifically, Smith (1776, p.606-607) 
described the agency problem in this way: “The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, 
however, being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot 
well be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which 
the partners in a private co-partnership frequently watch over their own.... Negligence and 
profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of 
such a company”.  
Later, Berle and Means (1932) elaborated on Smith’s view, whilst Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) explicitly developed the agency theory. In essence, agency theory seeks 
to reduce agency problems between shareholders and managers by aligning the interests of 
managers (agents) with those of shareholders (principals). Furthermore, it seeks to prevent 
the expropriation of shareholders’ wealth. The corporate governance literature provides 
examples as to how such wealth can be expropriated: (i) executive directors may exploit 
insider information for their own benefit (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Black 2006a; 
Chalevas, 2011); (ii) by executive directors awarding excessive pay to themselves in the 
form of salaries and bonuses (Berle and Means, 1932; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Bebchuk 
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and Fried, 2003; Ntim et al., 2012b); and (iii) managers can consume corporate resources 
through increased consumption of perquisites, such as enjoying larger offices and greater 
secretarial support (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
As a result, agency theory suggests that corporate governance mechanisms can be 
introduced to mitigate managerial opportunism, thereby minimising agency costs (Haniffa 
and Hudaib, 2006; Solomon, 2010). More specifically, agency theory calls for building an 
institution of governance structures through the establishment of a set of legal contracts by 
shareholders to monitor managers. First, it suggests a reduction in the number of executive 
board members; which could enhance the board’s independence (Berle and Means, 1932; 
Solomon, 2010; Chen, 2011; Al-Janadi et al., 2013). Also, this may help shareholders hold 
board members to account (Fama 1980; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010; Conyon and He, 
2011).  
Furthermore, board sub-committees, such as audit, nomination and remuneration 
committees, are important instruments to monitor managerial behaviour (Klein, 1998; 
Allegrini and Greco, 2013). Second, the establishment of an internal control system can 
help limit wealth expropriation by a firm’s management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011). Third, designing a compensation and managerial incentive 
system that is linked to financial performance can encourage top managers to improve their 
performance (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Chalevas, 2011; Ntim et al., 2014). This, in turn, 
may limit the exploitation of the firm’s resources by managers for their personal interest 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
In sum, agency theory suggests that good governance through the establishment of 
effective corporate governance mechanisms can lead to a net decrease in agency costs. In 
addition, it should mitigate monitoring and bonding costs, thereby leading to overall 
improvement in governance practices, voluntary disclosure and financial performance 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Siddiqui et al., 2013). This is the central rationale emphasised in 
the recommendations of a number of corporate governance codes in many countries (e.g., 
the 1992 Cadbury Report; the 2003 Combined Code; the 2002 King Report; the 2006 
SCGC).  
 
i) Agency Theory in the Saudi Corporate Environment 
 The Saudi government has taken a number of steps over the years to reform the 
corporate governance regime. The development of the 2006 Saudi Corporate Governance 
Code (SCGC) constitutes a cornerstone of the reforms (Al-Abbas, 2009; Al-Nodel and 
Hussainey, 2010; Robertson et al., 2013). Similar to other corporate governance codes, the 
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SCGC seeks to reduce agency conflicts between mangers and shareholders by improving 
transparency, accountability and responsibility of corporate boards of directors (ROSC, 
2009; Alshehri and Solomon, 2012). This is particularly important within the Saudi context 
due to the presence of high ownership concentration in Saudi listed firms (Al-Abbas, 2009; 
Al-Nodel and Hussainey, 2010). Such ownership concentration could adversely affect the 
rights of small shareholders (Baydoun et al., 2013); thus creating a conflict of interest 
between small shareholders and large shareholders. For example, large shareholders have 
the power to appoint their friends and relatives. The appointment of such directors could 
mean that they might look after the interests of large shareholders at the expense of small 
shareholders. In addition, politically well-connected individuals may be appointed to senior 
positions without due regard for their ability to perform those roles (Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2007; Boytsun et al., 2011). Such practices can have an adverse impact on voluntary 
corporate disclosure and financial performance. Thus, the application of an agency 
theoretical framework becomes even more important in the context of Saudi Arabia. 
 
3.1.2 Managerial Signalling Theory  
Managerial signalling theory is considered to be an extension of agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Buskirk, 2012). It was developed to explain the information 
asymmetry between managers and shareholders (Morris, 1987; Black et al, 2006a). The 
theory proposes that corporate insiders (i.e., managers and directors) have more 
information about the firm than outsiders, such as shareholders (Kapopoulos and 
Lazaretou, 2007; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). Therefore, agents could potentially 
exploit this information to maximise their personal interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Arguably, the origin of this problem is weak ethics and opportunistic behaviour within 
modern corporations (Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007; Conyon and He, 2011).  
To reduce information asymmetries and market uncertainty, companies are 
expected to adopt good corporate governance practices (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A 
reduction in information asymmetry could: (i) offer equal opportunities to both large and 
small shareholders in accessing information, which may help in reducing agency problems 
and the cost of capital (Morris, 1987; Hearn, 2011; Sharma, 2013); (ii) attract local and 
foreign investment and provide higher liquidity (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Chung and 
Zhang, 2011); and (iii) enhance the market as a corporate control mechanism, and in turn 
help create a highly efficient market (Klein et al., 2005). 
 
 
61 
 
i) Managerial Signalling Theory in the Saudi Corporate Environment 
Since its establishment in 2003, the Capital Market Authority (CMA) has sought to 
enhance transparency and disclosure and reduce asymmetric information (Al-Nodel and 
Hussainey, 2010). Specifically, the 2004 Listing Rules mandates listed firms to provide 
timely information to the stock market regarding any significant changes, whether related 
to performance, contracts, board structure or ownership structure. This has led to apparent 
improvement in terms of reporting financial and not-financial information in firms’ annual 
reports. Furthermore, through corporate governance reforms, Saudi regulatory authorities 
seek to strengthen the stock market as an external corporate governance mechanism by 
increasing the number of firms and enhancing institutional investment. As discussed in 
Chapter One and Two, the Saudi stock market has seen a significant increase in the number 
of listed firms since 2005. As these newly listed firms need to obtain external financing, 
improvement in voluntary corporate disclosure resulting from a decrease in information 
asymmetry can help attract investment and reduce the cost of financing (Morris, 1987; 
Hearn, 2011). 
 
3.1.3 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory represents a broader perspective of corporate governance. 
Freeman (1984) defines stakeholders as a wide range of individuals and groups who can 
affect, or are affected by, corporate activities. Solomon (2010, p.15) explains the 
theoretical basis of stakeholder theory as follows: “companies are so large, and their 
impact on society so pervasive, that they should discharge accountability to many more 
sectors of society than solely their shareholders .... Not only are stakeholders affected by 
companies, but they in turn affect companies in some way”. Unlike agency theory, 
stakeholder theory assumes that managers are accountable to all stakeholders (Chen and 
Roberts, 2010). 
The above explanation implies that the firm has to protect the interests of different 
stakeholders, including shareholders (Clarke, 1998; Solomon, 2010). Nonetheless, 
stakeholders’ expectations of a company differ. For example, shareholders expect a 
rewarding return, while employees expect a good income and job security. However, 
creditors expect the firm to have a strong financial position in order secure the safety of 
their investments, while policy-makers expect compliance with corporate governance 
regulations for stakeholders’ protection. 
Stakeholder theory emerged in the 1970s as a result of criticism of the shareholder 
model (Sternberg, 1997). However, the stakeholder model is less appreciated in countries 
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such as the UK and the US, where they adopt the Anglo-American orientation, which 
provides higher protection for shareholders at the expense of other stakeholders (Aguilera 
and Jackson, 2003; Solomon, 2010; Ntim et al., 2012b). In contrast, the stakeholder model 
is heavily favoured in countries that employ the Continental European model, such as 
Germany, France, Sweden and some Asian countries, like Japan (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 
2000; Letza et al., 2004). Firms’ boards of directors in these countries are designed to have 
a ‘two-tier board system’, typically consisting of both managing and supervisory members 
(Clarke, 1998; Conyon and He, 2011). This may help firms protect different stakeholders’ 
interests in countries that employ the Continental European-Asian governance model 
(Sharma, 2013). 
There are a number of assumptions underlying stakeholder theory. First,  
corporations should be operated not only for the financial benefit of their owners, but also 
for the interests of the relevant broader society (Mitchell et al., 1997; Chen and Roberts, 
2010). Second, executive directors are equally accountable to all stakeholders, not only the 
firm’s owners and creditors, but also other corporate stakeholders, such as employees, 
government, local community, customers and suppliers (Clarke, 1998). Third, stakeholder 
theory is strongly connected to notions of morality in business and corporate social 
responsibility (Letza et al., 2004; Westphal and Zajac, 2013).  
Although stakeholder theory has been widely embedded in governance codes 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009), it has been criticised from two perspectives 
(Sternberg, 1997): (i) the assumptions of stakeholder theory conflict with the central 
objective of the firm as seeking to maximise the wealth of shareholders; and (ii) it also 
conflicts with the agent-principal relationship, which suggests that managers are primarily 
accountable to shareholders. As such, stakeholder theory is arguably incompatible with the 
basic principles of corporate governance. Nevertheless, stakeholder theory remains a key 
corporate governance theory (Clarke, 1998; Solomon, 2010; Chen and Roberts, 2010). 
 
i) Stakeholder Theory in the Saudi Corporate Environment 
Despite the fact that the corporate governance regime in Saudi Arabia is based on 
the Anglo-American model of corporate governance (Alshehri and Solomon, 2012; Seidl et 
al., 2013), the 2006 SCGC does include some provisions related to the protection of 
stakeholders’ rights and social responsibility (see Article 10). Saudi corporations will be 
expected to not only pursue the interests of shareholders, but also advance the interests of 
other stakeholders, such as employees, local communities and governments. Also, the 
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Islamic value of ‘Zakat’17 encourages benevolence to society; therefore, it can be 
reasonably expected that corporations are more likely to be socially responsible. However, 
there may be a number of impediments that can hinder effective application of stakeholder 
theory within the Saudi corporate context. First, as previously explained, compliance with 
the governance provisions of the SCGC is voluntary (i.e., a ‘comply or explain’ regime), 
which operates smoothly within a corporate context in which ownership of corporations is 
relatively widely held. In contrast, ownership in Saudi listed firms is highly concentrated, 
primarily through high government and family shareholdings, which tend to prioritise large 
shareholders; thus, the interests of other stakeholders may be ignored. Second, the concept 
of good corporate governance from a broader perspective is still in its embryonic stage 
within the Saudi corporate context. In particular, as discussed in Chapter Nine, general 
awareness and appreciation of good corporate governance practices is still relatively low 
among key corporate stakeholders, which can impact negatively on the applicability of 
stakeholder theory within the Saudi corporate context.  
 
3.1.4  Stewardship Theory 
In contrast to predictions of agency theory, stewardship theory relies on the notion 
that managers are not motivated by individual interest, but instead by the objectives of 
principals (Davis et al., 1997). Therefore, the theory suggests that managers who run firms 
are trustworthy (Letza et al., 2004; Siebels and Knyphausen-Aufseb, 2012). Stewardship 
theory has been developed based on a number of assumptions, as follows. First, managers’ 
interests are aligned with owners’ interests (shareholders) (Davis et al., 1997). Second, as 
long as managers are trustworthy, CEO duality could be the most appropriate system to run 
a company (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Siebels and Knyphausen-Aufseb, 2012). 
Specifically, agents have access to information about the firm, which makes them highly 
capable of working towards the firm’s welfare (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). Finally, firms’ 
managers seek to employ the firms’ resources in the best possible way to maximise the 
firms’ value (Davis et al., 1997; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). This is because any 
misconduct in using these resources may affect their reputation and future career prospects 
(Conyon and He, 2011). Based on these arguments, stewardship theory can contribute to 
improving corporate governance.  
The above discussion shows how stewardship theory exists in contrast to agency 
theory, which assumes the existence of a conflict of interest between agents and principals 
                                                 
17
 ‘Zakat’ is Islamic social tax: every Muslim individual and company must pay 2.5% of their wealth towards 
a charitable cause, such as making donations to the poor and needy (Kamla et al., 2006).   
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(Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Stewardship theory suggests there is no agency problem 
because of the mutual trust between insiders and owners (Davis et al., 1997; Nicholson and 
Kiel, 2007).  
 
i) Stewardship Theory in the Saudi Corporate Environment 
The Saudi governance code recommends that a majority of the board of directors 
should be non-executive directors, and that at least one third of the directors should be 
independent (Article 12c and e). Moreover, the code stipulates the importance of 
separating the positions of the CEO and chairperson (Article 12d). Thus, the code’s aim is 
to improve the accountability of firms’ management by enhancing managerial supervision 
and monitoring. This is in direct contrast to the assumptions of stewardship theory, which 
suggest that managers are trustworthy individuals that may not need extensive monitoring 
of their management performance. Stewardship theory may be appropriate in the Saudi 
corporate context, because there are high levels of ownership by families, who typically 
appoint their own relatives as directors and executives. Thus, appointed CEOs and 
directors are likely to be considered trustworthy
18
 (Siebels and Knyphausen-Aufseb, 2012).  
 
3.1.5    Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence theory suggests that the board of directors is an essential link 
between the firm and the financial and non-financial resources that are crucial for the 
firm’s growth (Pfeffer, 1972; Pearce and Zahra, 1992). Chen and Roberts (2010, p.653) 
explain that “Organizations are not self-contained or self-sufficient, they rely on their 
environment for existence, and the core of the [resource dependence] theory focuses on 
how organizations gain access to vital resources for survival and growth”. Thus, the 
theory relies on two important assumptions.  
First, the board of directors not only performs a monitoring role, but also provides 
necessary critical resources, such as business contacts and contracts, knowledge, 
experience and expertise (Hillman and Dalzel, 2003; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007; Bouwman, 
2011; Chen, 2011). This can enhance financial performance and maximise shareholders’ 
wealth (Pearce and Zahra, 1992). Second, the board of directors has the capability to 
represent the interests of different stakeholders, such as local communities, government, 
employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, regulators and policy-makers (Hillman and 
                                                 
18
 It is noted that while the appointment of family members into executive management may reduce type I 
agency problem (i.e., the agency problem between agents/managers and shareholders/principals), it can 
exacerbate type II agency problems (i.e., the agency problem between minority/small and majority/large 
shareholders) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Chen et al., 2011). 
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Dalziel, 2003; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). Thus, the board of directors can help the firm to 
achieve competitive advantage by serving as a direct link between the firm and the 
environment within which it operates (Chen and Roberts, 2010). 
 
i) Resource Dependence Theory and the Saudi Corporate Environment  
The board of directors in Saudi listed firms plays an important role in securing 
financial resources. For example, state ownership of a number of listed firms has helped 
provide necessary funding from the government. Similarly, listed firms are controlled by 
families who typically seek to raise their own capital in order to maintain control. 
Although this ensures large financial sources with low costs, at the same time it may 
increase ownership concentration in Saudi listed firms. In this regard, Baydoun et al. 
(2013) point out that companies in Saudi Arabia deprive minority shareholders by issuing 
invitations to wealthy and influential families for the subscription of shares in new Initial 
Public Offering (IPOs). However, as discussed in Chapters One and Two, the market 
authority prevents direct foreign investment. This may impede the ability of companies to 
attract financial and non-financial resources, such as external financing, experience and 
transfer of knowledge from foreign investors. 
 
 
3.2 LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE WITH VOLUNTARY CORPORATE 
DISCLOSURE 
 
 As discussed in Chapter Two, the purpose of a corporate governance code is to 
improve voluntary corporate disclosure, corporate accountability and transparency 
(Goodstein et al., 1994; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Monks and Minow, 2011; 
Bouwman, 2011; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). Although 
corporate governance codes have been developed over the last two decades,
19
 there are 
regional, cultural and organisational differences in terms of the extent of implementation 
and compliance (see Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; 
Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010; Ntim et al., 2012a). Compliance with most corporate 
governance codes is voluntary ‘comply or explain’, such as the UK 1992 Cadbury Report, 
although compliance with a few, such as the US 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, is mandatory 
(‘comply or else’). Consequently, increasing research attention has been paid to measuring 
the level of compliance with corporate governance codes and their subsequent influence on 
                                                 
19
 As discussed in Chapter One, according to the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), 91 
countries had released their own codes by the middle of 2013 (ECGI, 2013). 
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financial performance (Werder et al., 2005; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010; Bozec and 
Bozec, 2012; McNulty et al., 2013). Given the importance of the level of compliance with 
corporate governance codes in improving corporate governance practices, this section 
seeks: (i) to discuss prior studies that explore the level of compliance with corporate 
governance rules; and (ii) to investigate the various factors influencing the level of 
compliance with corporate governance requirements.  
 
3.2.1 Compliance and Disclosure of Corporate Governance Rules 
  The level of compliance with corporate governance codes varies based on 
differences in firm- and country-level governance practices (MacNeil and Li, 2006; Judge, 
2011; Samaha et al., 2012). In recent years, there has been an apparent increase in the 
number of countries, whether developed (e.g., Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan 
and the UK) or developing (e.g., Brazil, China, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and 
Turkey), that have introduced corporate governance codes to enhance corporate 
governance standards among listed firms. Consequently, the corporate governance 
literature has paid close attention to investigating factors influencing voluntary corporate 
disclosure (Barako et al., 2006; Allegrini and Greco, 2013).  
 In the following section, the level of compliance with corporate governance codes 
in developed and developing countries is discussed. 
 
3.2.1.1  Level of Compliance in Developed Countries 
  Evidence from developed economies shows a high level of compliance with 
corporate governance codes. For instance, Conyon (1994) conducted a survey to 
investigate the level of compliance for the period 1988-1993. He finds that after the 
publication of the 1992 Cadbury Report, there was great improvement in corporate 
governance practices among listed firms in the UK. More specifically, 77% of the UK 
firms separated the role of CEO and chairperson after the implementation of the code, 
compared to 57% before the code was implemented. Also, there was a 50% increase in 
operating board sub-committees during the study period.  
Similarly, Conyon and Mallin (1997) review studies examining compliance with 
the Cadbury recommendations among UK firms. They find widespread adherence through 
an increasing number of non-executive members on boards and committees. In the same 
vein, Pass (2006) reports that 35% of UK firms complied fully with the corporate 
governance rules contained in the 2003 UK Combined. Also, 45% took action to comply or 
proffered ‘acceptable’ explanations for non-compliance. The study was conducted on a 
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small sample of 50 large listed firms. This may limit generalisation of the findings, as the 
study focused only on large firms and used a relatively small sample size (see Eisenberg et 
al., 1998). 
Werder et al. (2005) find that firms on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange showed a 
high level of compliance with good corporate governance practices contained in the 
German governance code. They use a 2003 sample of 408 German listed firms. Similarly, 
Cromme (2005) reports that 75% of German listed firms complied with good corporate 
governance principles contained in the German governance code in 2003. Hegazy and 
Hegazy (2010) find that the average degree of compliance with the 2003 Combined Code 
among UK firms is around 70%. They employ the content analysis technique to analyse 
annual reports for the year 2008 of firms in the FTSE 100.
20
  
Recently, Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012) use data for 130 UK listed non-financial 
firms from 2003 to 2009. They find a high level of compliance with the Corporate 
Governance Quotient (CGQ) index among UK listed firms. The findings of Hegazy and 
Hegazy and Hussainey and Al-Najjar suggest that firms in the UK generally comply with 
the UK Combined Code, thereby improving voluntary disclosure and governance practices. 
Allegrini and Greco (2013) construct an index consisting of 60 corporate governance 
provisions extracted from the 2007 Italian civil governance code. They find that Italian 
listed companies increased their level of governance practices and voluntary disclosure in 
their annual reports. Similarly, Salterio et al. (2013) examine the level of compliance with 
16 corporate governance recommendations imposed by the Canadian Securities 
Administrators using 742 Canadian listed firms. They find that, on average, 82% of the 
firms complied with some of the recommended good corporate governance practices, 
whilst 39% of the firms were completely compliant with all 16 good governance 
recommendations.    
In sum, developed countries generally show good compliance with corporate 
governance standards. This can be attributed to strong legal, economic and cultural systems 
present in those countries, which are helpful in establishing good corporate governance 
practices (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009; Toledo, 2010; 
Judge, 2011; Salterio et al., 2013).  
 
 
                                                 
20
 The London Stock Exchange (FTSE) is ranked as the active market for IPO for both domestic and foreign 
firms. In addition, it is considered one of the most attractive financial markets globally (Hegazy and Hegazy, 
2010). 
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3.2.1.2  Level of Compliance in Developing Countries  
 In developing countries, there is wide disparity in the level of compliance with 
corporate governance disclosure (Klapper and Love, 2004; Solomon, 2010). At the country 
level, empirical studies in developing countries find that the level of compliance varies 
according to the type of government in place (MacNeil and Li, 2006; Samaha et al., 2012). 
Generally, however, a number of studies find a weak level of compliance with codes of 
good governance in developing countries. For example, Ararat and Ugur (2003) provide an 
overview of the Turkish corporate governance system. They highlight that the 
shortcomings, including weak supervision and enforcement by the regulatory authorities, 
result in a low level of compliance with the corporate governance rules contained in the 
Turkish Corporate Governance Code among Turkish listed firms.  
Using a sample of 160 listed companies in 2002, Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros 
(2006) report that only a small minority of Cypriot listed firms complied with the 
provisions of the local corporate governance code. A possible explanation for the low level 
of compliance is the study period, which coincided with the release of the Cyprus 
Corporate Governance Code in 2002. This implies that the corporate governance reforms 
did not have sufficient time to result in improved corporate governance practices (Renders 
et al., 2010).  
Within the African corporate context, Tsamenyi et al. (2007) construct a corporate 
governance index to examine the level of compliance among 22 listed firms in Ghana from 
2001 to 2002. The average disclosure and transparency score is 52%. Samaha et al. (2012) 
find a low level of voluntary corporate disclosure among Egyptian firms using a 2009 
sample of 100 Egyptian listed firms. They use a disclosure index consisting of 53 
governance provisions. More recently, Schiehll et al. (2013) examine the degree of 
voluntary disclosure with Executive Stock Option (ESO) plans released in 2007 by the 
Brazilian stock market authority. Using 68 publicly traded firms, they find that the firms 
disclosed very limited information about the ESO plans. Specifically, on average, the firms 
complied with 10 out of 23 recommended provisions.  
 In contrast, other studies have found a relative improvement in the level of 
compliance in some developing countries following the release of a corporate governance 
code. For instance, Alves and Mendes (2004) report that the publication of the Portuguese 
Corporate Governance Code in 1999 led to a significant increase in the level of voluntary 
corporate disclosure. Similarly, when corporate governance principles were developed in 
Kenya in 1999, there was a gradual increase in the level of compliance by all 54 listed 
firms (Barako et al., 2006). In the same vein, Chalevas (2011) finds that compliance with 
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corporate governance standards improved among Greek companies from 2000 to 2003. 
Similarly, Ntim et al. (2012a) examine the influence of the King II Report on corporate 
governance practices in 169 South African listed firms. They construct an index consisting 
of 50 corporate governance provisions. Their results suggest that corporate governance 
standards have generally improved since the release of the report in 2002. More precisely, 
the level of compliance increased from 47% in 2002 to 69% in 2006.  
Apart from the studies focusing on a single country, there are a number of cross-
country studies. For instance, Patel et al. (2002) investigate the compliance levels of 354 
firms in 19 emerging markets
21
 from 1998 to 2000. They report that Asian and South 
African markets have significantly higher transparency and disclosure levels compared to 
Latin American, Eastern European and Middle Eastern markets. Additionally, Klapper and 
Love (2004) find a wide variation in firm-level governance disclosures in a sample of firms 
drawn from 14 developing countries in 2000, using the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia 
(CLSA) index. As discussed above in Section 3.2, the variances in level of compliance 
with corporate governance standards among countries can be attributed to the differences 
in the legal, economic, cultural and social systems in these countries (Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006; Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008; Ntim et al., 2012a).  
In conclusion, existing evidence generally suggests that there has been some 
improvement in the level of compliance with corporate governance practices in some 
countries following the issuance of a code of good corporate governance. Bozec et al. 
(2010) argue that developing countries generally suffer from weak legal systems, and 
therefore are more likely to adopt a code of good corporate governance practice in order to 
attract potential investors and reduce the cost of capital.  
 
3.2.1.3  Level of Compliance in Saudi Arabia 
 A number of studies have attempted to statistically examine the level of compliance 
with corporate governance standards in Saudi Arabia (e.g., Alsaeed, 2006; Hussainey and 
Al-Nodel, 2008; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012; Al-Moataz and Lakhal, 2012; Al-Janadi 
et al., 2013). In general, these studies report a relative improvement in the level of 
compliance after the corporate governance reforms. More specifically, before the 
establishment of the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in 2003, Naser and Nuseibeh (2003) 
examined 52 listed firms in 1998 and 1999. They report that the level of voluntary 
                                                 
21
 These countries are China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Turkey and South 
Africa. That study does not include any Arab countries, although they constitute the majority of Middle 
Eastern countries.  
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disclosure is relatively low. Similarly, Alsaeed (2006) finds that the level of compliance 
with voluntary corporate disclosure is 30%. He constructs a disclosure index consisting of 
20 provisions drawn from prior literature to assess the degree of compliance with 20 
provisions by 40 listed firms in 2003.  
Unlike Alsaeed (2006), who focuses on general voluntary disclosure, Hussainey 
and Al-Nodel (2008) examine the extent to which Saudi listed firms report information on 
their websites about good corporate governance practices. They find that the level of online 
reporting of corporate governance varied between sectors, with banks providing the highest 
level of voluntary information about their corporate governance practices. The key 
weakness of Hussainey and Al-Nodel’s study is that it focuses on online disclosure, which 
only represents one aspect of corporate governance disclosure.  
More recently, Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2012) and Al-Moataz and Lakhal (2012) 
use a similarly constructed corporate governance index consisting of nine corporate 
governance provisions to examine the level of compliance with good corporate governance 
practices in 52 and 48 listed firms, respectively. They find that the level of compliance 
with corporate governance standards is, on average, 53% in 2006 and 2007. Although Al-
Moataz and Hussainey (2012) and Al-Moataz and Lakhal (2012) employ a corporate 
governance index, it consist of a limited number of corporate governance provisions 
contained in the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC).  
In addition, they use small samples, and the study duration is limited to two years. 
Thus, the level of compliance found may not necessarily accurately represent the corporate 
governance practices among all listed firms. Similarly, Al-Janadi et al. (2013) construct a 
limited corporate governance index to examine the level of compliance with good 
corporate governance practices in 87 firms in 2006 and 2007. They report that 42% of 
Saudi listed firms disclosed information on their corporate governance practices. Al-Janadi 
et al. use an ordinal measure using three levels of disclosure (scored 2 if fully disclosed; 1 
if slightly disclosed; and 0 if not disclosed). This scoring approach, however, requires high 
levels of judgment in evaluating the level and quality of governance disclosures (Beattie et 
al., 2004; Hassan and Marston, 2010). The high levels of judgment and subjectivity 
involved in the scoring process can impact negatively on the replicability and reliability of 
the resulting governance disclosure index, and consequently the reliability and 
generalisability of the findings (Beattie et al., 2004).  
 As discussed in Chapter One, this study is distinct from previous studies conducted 
on Saudi Arabia in several ways. First, previous studies using a corporate governance 
index focus either on a small number of governance provisions (e.g., Alsaeed, 2006) or just 
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on one aspect of corporate governance. For example, Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2012) and 
Al-Moataz and Lakhal (2012) focus mainly on corporate governance provisions relating to 
the board and directors. Hussainey and Al-Nodel (2008) concentrate primarily on online 
reporting of firms’ governance information and practices. In contrast, this study 
investigates a larger set of 65 corporate governance provisions classified into four sub-
indices: (i) board of directors and board sub-committees; (ii) disclosure and transparency; 
(iii) internal control and risk management; and (iv) shareholders’ rights and the general 
assembly, with differences in the number of items based on the importance of each sub-
index. The governance information is also collected from different sources, including 
annual reports, firms’ websites, Ministry of Commerce and Industry’s archives and 
national newspapers. Arguably, the sources of data for this study are much richer than in 
previous studies.  
Second, most previous studies employing a corporate governance index do not 
necessarily follow the national corporate governance code when constructing their 
corporate governance index. For example, Alsaeed (2006) relies on ratings developed by 
other studies, while Hussainey and Al-Nodel (2008) draw their governance disclosure 
items mainly from prior literature. This raises questions regarding the applicability of those 
indices to the Saudi corporate context. This study employs a self-constructed governance 
index derived directly from the 2006 SCGC, which is more applicable to the Saudi 
corporate context. Finally, this study uses balanced panel data over a longer period (2004-
2010), whereas previous studies use noticeably smaller sample sizes and unbalanced panel 
data over a shorter period (e.g., Alsaeed, 2006; Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; Al-Moataz 
and Hussainey, 2012; Al-Moataz and Lakhal, 2012; Al-Janadi et al., 2013). This improves 
the generalisability of the findings for Saudi listed firms. 
The following subsection presents a discussion on the potential factors influencing 
voluntary corporate disclosure. 
 
 
3.3  DETERMINANTS OF VOLUNTARY CORPORATE DISCLOSURE  
 The literature on corporate governance shows that there are differences in the level 
of voluntary disclosure among listed firms (Weir and Laing, 2000; Bouwman, 2011). The 
evidence also suggests that board characteristics and corporate ownership structure are the 
main determinants of the level and quality of corporate governance disclosure (Ho and 
Wong, 2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; García-Meca and Sánchez-
Ballesta, 2010; Chalevas, 2011; Samaha et al., 2012; Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Ntim and 
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Soobaroyen, 2013). Until the 1990s, most studies empirically examine corporate 
governance and voluntary disclosure in American firms (Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010; 
Bozec and Bozec, 2012). Later, La Porta et al. (1997, 1999, 2002) led a large number of 
studies exploring different countries in order to make international comparisons (Bebchuk 
and Weisbach, 2010). Due to the limited number of studies done on developing countries, 
this study contributes to the corporate governance literature on developing countries by 
investigating the determinants of voluntary corporate disclosure in Saudi Arabia. 
The following subsection reviews the literature on the board of directors’ 
characteristics and ownership structures that can influence voluntary corporate disclosure. 
These are independent directors, board size, audit firm size, the presence of a corporate 
governance committee, government ownership, institutional ownership, block ownership 
and director ownership. The structure of the review is as follows. For each selected 
variable, the relevant theoretical literature will be briefly referred to. Second, the 
applicable international empirical literature relating to the variable will be discussed. 
Third, the relevant literature relating to Saudi Arabia will be discussed, with particular 
focus on highlighting the differences between existing studies and the current study. 
Finally, an appropriate hypothesis relating to the variable will be made. 
 
3.3.1  Board of Directors’ Characteristics 
The characteristics of the board of directors are important in determining voluntary 
corporate disclosure (Beasley, 1996; Davidson et al., 1996; Soobaroyen and Mahadeo, 
2012; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). In this study, the corporate governance mechanisms 
investigated include: (i) independent directors; (ii) board size; (iii) audit firm size; and (iv) 
the presence of a corporate governance committee. Both theoretical and empirical literature 
regarding the relationship between these mechanisms and corporate disclosure is, 
therefore, reviewed in the following subsections.  
 
3.3.1.1  Proportion of Independent Directors and Voluntary Corporate Disclosure  
In recent years, independent boards have received much attention from corporate 
governance regulations and academic research (Johanson and Ostergren, 2010; Chen et al., 
2011). Agency theory suggests that independent boards have a greater capacity to limit 
managerial opportunism (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Allegrini 
and Greco, 2013). An independent board has the capacity to protect shareholders and help 
reduce agency costs (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Chalevas, 2011). Agency theory also 
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predicts that the presence of independent directors can reduce information asymmetry (La 
Porta et al., 2002; Allegrini and Greco, 2013).  
Similarly, independent board membership can enhance good governance by 
providing a better representation of stakeholders’ interests (Clarke, 1998; Solomon, 2010). 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Barako et al. (2006) argue that independent directors can 
support the board and committees through their knowledge and experience. In addition, 
they are better able to monitor managers. In contrast, Bozec (2005) suggest that a high 
proportion of independent directors on the board may lead to excessive managerial 
monitoring, which could potentially hinder managerial initiatives. 
Empirical studies mainly indicate a positive association between the proportion of 
independent directors and voluntary corporate disclosure. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
examine a 1995 sample of 167 Malaysian companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur 
Exchange (KLSE). Their findings support the theoretical prediction that the presence of 
independent directors improves the accountability and transparency of the board. Similarly, 
García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta (2010) apply a meta-analysis to review 27 studies and 
find that board independence provides a high level of protection to shareholders. Similarly, 
Chau and Gray (2010) investigate the link between board independence and corporate 
governance disclosure in a sample of 273 Hong Kong listed firms in 2002. They find that 
independence of both the board and chairperson reduced exploitation by executives.  
Recently, and consistent with previous studies, Samaha et al. (2012) report that 
disclosure has significantly increased in 100 Egyptian listed firms with a higher proportion 
of independent directors. Similarly, Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012) use a Corporate 
Governance Quotient (CGQ) index with 130 listed UK firms from 2003 to 2009. They find 
that the independence of the board of directors is associated with corporate disclosure. 
Regarding corporate social responsibility disclosure, Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) report 
that a high percentage of independent directors positively influences good corporate 
governance practices. Their study is based on 75 large South African listed firms from 
2003 to 2009. Despite the importance of their study to corporate governance disclosure 
literature, the governance index used in their study represents one aspect of corporate 
governance, which is ‘social responsibility’ (see Ammann et al., 2013). However, Allegrini 
and Greco (2013) examine the relationship between independence of the board of directors 
and corporate governance practices among Italian listed firms. They find no significant 
relationship between the presence of independent directors and corporate governance 
disclosure. 
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The attention paid to independent directors in Saudi listed firms is relatively new 
(see Ezzine, 2011; Mahadeo et al., 2012). The 2006 SCGC recommends that the majority 
of board directors should be non-executive (Article 12). Also, the number of independent 
members should be not less than two or one third of the board, whichever is greater 
(Article 12). Al-Moataz and Lakhal (2012) and Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2012) examine 
the relationship between the presence of independent directors and good corporate 
governance practices in Saudi listed firms, using the same constructed corporate 
governance index containing only nine governance provisions.  
Al-Moataz and Lakhal use a sample of 48 listed firms from 2006 and 2007, while 
Al-Moataz and Hussainey use a sample of 52 listed firms from the same period. Al-Moataz 
and Lakhal report a weak relationship between independent directors and voluntary 
disclosure, while Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2012) find a negative relationship. As 
discussed in Subsection 3.2.1.3, these two studies use relatively small samples and are 
restricted to two years. In addition, Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2012) focus mainly on firm 
characteristics (financial variables) rather than corporate governance mechanisms. This 
may limit the applicability and generalisability of their findings to all Saudi listed firms. 
Since most of the theoretical and empirical literature suggests a positive relationship (e.g., 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Chau and Gray, 2010; Chen, 2011; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 
2012; Samaha et al., 2012; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013), the first hypothesis to be tested is 
formulated as follows:   
H1: There is a significant and positive relationship between the proportion of 
independent board members and the level of voluntary compliance with, and 
disclosure of, corporate governance practices.  
 
3.3.1.2  Corporate Board Size and Voluntary Corporate Disclosure  
From an agency theory perspective, shareholders expect a high level of disclosure 
from the board of directors, as they have been selected to represent their interests 
(Davidson et al., 1996). Agency theory proposes that board size is a crucial factor in 
monitoring management behaviour (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). 
Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) argue that increased managerial monitoring positively affects 
voluntary disclosure. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) indicate that the existence of experienced, 
knowledgeable and independent directors is related to board size. Thus, due to the 
complexity of their activities, large firms are more likely to have a larger number of 
directors in order to improve firm monitoring and control (Coles et al., 2008). 
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In contrast, increasing the number of directors may lead to poor communication, 
co-ordination and interaction among directors (Beasley, 1996; Yermack, 1996), which may 
adversely affect the accountability of the directors and management (Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992; Jensen, 1993). Similarly, Vafeas (1999a) argues that CEOs of large boards may be 
easily controlled by an overbearing CEO due to issues of poor communication and 
excessive director free-riding. 
Empirically, prior studies indicate a positive relationship between board size and 
voluntary corporate disclosure. Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) use an index developed by Meek 
et al. (1995) to investigate the extent of voluntary disclosure using a 2002 sample of 94 
Malaysian listed firms. They find that a larger board size is associated with more corporate 
governance disclosure. It can be noted that a limitation of their study is that it adopts Meek 
et al.’s index, which is constructed for studies that focus on developed countries. 
Therefore, Akhtaruddin et al. could not take into account the contextual differences 
between developed and developing countries, such as legal, cultural and economic systems 
(see Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Piesse et al., 2012; Kim and Lu, 
2013; Robertson et al., 2013).  
Ntim et al. (2012a) find that board size is a key determinant of voluntary corporate 
disclosure. More precisely, they report a positive and significant relationship between 
board size and voluntary corporate disclosure among 169 South African firms. Further, 
using a sample of 100 Egyptian companies, Samaha et al. (2012) report that Egyptian 
listed firms with larger boards are more likely to disclose more corporate governance 
information than their smaller counterparts. More recently, Schiehll et al. (2013) 
investigate the impact of board size on voluntary executive stock option plans. Using 68 
listed companies on the São Paulo Stock Exchange, their study finds that voluntary 
executive stock option disclosure practices in Brazilian firms are positively associated with 
board size. Similarly, Allegrini and Greco (2013) examine 177 listed companies on the 
Italian Stock Exchange in 2007. They report that larger boards tend to disclose more 
information about firms’ strategic objectives than smaller boards. In contrast, Hussainey 
and Al-Najjar (2012) find no significant relationship between board size and corporate 
disclosure among 130 listed firms in the UK. 
In the Saudi corporate context, the relationship between board size and voluntary 
corporate disclosure is not well documented. Al-Moataz and Lakhal (2012) find no 
significant relationship between board size and corporate governance practices. As 
discussed in the previous subsection, it is interesting to note that their study suffered from a 
number of limitations, including using a smaller sample size and focusing on a limited 
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number of governance provisions, as well as covering a short sample period. The SCGC 
specifies that corporate boards should have a minimum of three members and a maximum 
of eleven members. This gives firms some flexibility in composing a board of a suitable 
size. Given the positive impact of board size on voluntary disclosure found by previous 
studies (e.g., Meek et al., 1995; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Samaha et al., 2012; Ntim et al., 
2012a; Allegrini and Greco, 2013), the second hypothesis to be tested is formulated as 
follows:   
H2: There is a significant and positive relationship between board size and the 
level of voluntary compliance with, and disclosure of, corporate governance 
practices.  
 
3.3.1.3  Audit Firm Size and Voluntary Corporate Disclosure  
Although firms’ management is fully responsible for the content of disclosure, 
agency and stakeholder theories predict that audit firms can influence the level and quality 
of corporate governance disclosure (Barako et al., 2006). Audit firms are an external 
corporate governance mechanism important in monitoring managers by examining firm 
financial performance and disclosure (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Han et al., 2012). It can 
be argued that audit firms can limit agents’ opportunistic behaviour, which may help 
reduce agency conflicts (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Therefore, it can be argued that the 
quality of external auditing can improve the level of corporate governance disclosure (Eng 
and Mak, 2003). It is found that large audit firms (big-four) have better auditing 
performance standards than small audit firms (Depoers, 2000; Alsaeed, 2006). Therefore, 
large audit firms are more likely to have highly experienced, trained and qualified auditors 
(Barako et al., 2006).  
Arguably, large audit firms are expected to be more independent (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002). Also, big-four audit firms may require a high level of disclosure to protect 
themselves against shareholders who might damage their reputations (Depoers, 2000; 
DeAngelo, 1981). In contrast, due to potential financial constraints (e.g., the risk of losing 
a client), small audit firms may have a weaker capacity to negotiate for high-quality 
disclosures, including those relating to governance, than their larger counterparts (Alsaeed, 
2006).  
The empirical literature on the relationship between the quality of external auditing 
and voluntary corporate disclosure suggests either a positive or no significant relationship. 
Raffournier (1995) examines 161 industrial and commercial Swiss listed firms in 1992 to 
investigate this relationship. The study reports that audit firm size is positively related to 
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corporate governance disclosure. In the same vein, Ntim et al. (2012a) report that audit 
firm size is positively associated with the level of voluntary corporate disclosure among 
169 South African listed firms. Similarly, Schiehll et al. (2013) find that firms in Brazil 
audited by a big-four audit firm are more likely to increase voluntary executive stock 
option disclosure. 
However, Wallace et al. (1994) investigate the influence of audit firm size on 
corporate governance practices in Spain. Using a sample of 50 firms for the year 1991, 
they find no evidence that audit firm size significantly affects corporate governance 
disclosure. In addition to the one-year cross-sectional nature of their data, their study is 
conducted on both listed and unlisted firms. Using listed and unlisted firms may 
understandably lead to mixed results. This is because listed firms are subject to different 
rules and requirements than unlisted firms (El Mehdi, 2007). Hossain et al. (1995) report 
that firms audited by large audit firms did not disclose significantly more than their non-
big-four audited counterparts, using a sample of 55 publicly listed firms in New Zealand. 
They suggest that their results could have been affected by the multicollinearity between 
audit firm size and some of the other explanatory variables in their model. Additionally, 
Barako et al. (2006) report that audit firm size does not have a significant relationship with 
the level of corporate governance disclosure using a sample of Kenyan listed companies. 
In Saudi Arabia, Alsaeed (2006) finds that audit firm size has no significant impact 
on the level of corporate governance disclosure. This study suffers from a number of 
weaknesses, including: (i) the disclosure index focuses mainly on corporate transparency 
provisions, with little attention paid to other corporate governance aspects, such as board 
composition, board sub-committees and shareholders’ provisions; and (ii) the number of 
observations is relatively small, consisting of only 40 firm-year observations. In contrast, 
the current study employs a corporate governance index consisting of 65 corporate 
governance provisions drawn from the SCGC. In addition, it considers 80 listed firms over 
a seven-year sample period (resulting in a total of 560 firm-year observations). Since 
agency and stakeholder theories suggest a positive relationship between audit firm size and 
voluntary corporate disclosure, previous empirical studies also found a positive 
relationship (e.g., Raffournier, 1995; Ntim et al., 2012a; Schiehll et al., 2013), the third 
hypothesis to be tested is formulated as follows:   
H3: There is a significant and positive relationship between audit firm size and 
the level of voluntary compliance with, and disclosure of, corporate governance 
practices.   
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3.3.1.4   The Presence of a Corporate Governance Committee and Voluntary 
Corporate Disclosure 
 
 The presence of a corporate governance committee is one of the recommendations 
recently made by a number of corporate governance codes. The main purpose of the 
committee is to help implement corporate governance standards, which can increase 
voluntary corporate disclosure (Ntim et al., 2012a). Stakeholder theory is based on the 
notion that the role of corporate governance is to protect stakeholders and shareholders 
equally (Clarke, 1998; Solomon, 2010). Thus, the presence of a corporate governance 
committee can further protect stakeholders’ rights. Furthermore, the presence of a 
corporate governance committee can reduce variations in information, sending a signal to 
the market about the company’s commitment to good corporate governance practices 
(Akhtaruddin et al., 2009).  
The empirical literature on corporate governance shows a general lack of studies 
examining the relationship between the presence of corporate governance committees and 
voluntary corporate disclosure (Ntim et al., 2012a). The only exception is a study by Ntim 
et al. (2012a). Ntim et al. (2012a) use a sample of 169 listed firms in South Africa and find 
that the establishment of a corporate governance committee is positively associated with 
voluntary disclosure of corporate governance practices.   
In Saudi Arabia, no study on the impact of a corporate governance committee on 
voluntary corporate disclosure has yet been conducted; this provides an opportunity to 
contribute to the international literature by extending the evidence to the Saudi corporate 
context. Given the positive impact of corporate governance committees on voluntary 
disclosure found by Ntim et al. (2012), the fourth hypothesis to be tested is formulated as 
follows:   
H4: There is a significant and positive relationship between the presence of a 
corporate governance committee and the level of voluntary compliance with, 
and disclosure of, corporate governance practices. 
 
3.3.2 Ownership Structure and Voluntary Corporate Disclosure  
 Ownership structure is found to be an important determinant of better governance 
practices (La Porta et al., 1999; Konijn et al., 2011). The theoretical expectation is that 
large shareholders have the ability to monitor managers, which can enhance governance 
practices, including voluntary disclosure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Edmans and Manso, 
2011). For example, institutional ownership can lead to an improvement in corporate 
governance practices, including disclosure, in order to further attract foreign investors 
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(Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín, 2011). However, empirical studies on the 
relationship between ownership structure and voluntary corporate disclosure are 
inconclusive (Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). The discussion in this subsection focuses on 
four types of ownership structure within Saudi listed firms: (i) government ownership; (ii) 
institutional ownership; (iii) block ownership; and (iv) board ownership. 
  
3.3.2.1  Government Ownership and Voluntary Corporate Disclosure 
 From a stakeholder theory perspective, state (government) ownership is a key 
factor influencing corporate governance disclosure, particularly in emerging countries 
where concentrated ownership structures are widespread (Shleifer, 1998; Cornett et al., 
2010; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012). Eng and Mak (2003) argue that agency problems 
are more likely to arise with large ownership, such as government ownership. In addition, 
it has been argued that government ownership normally leads to intervention by the 
government in the running of the firm, which can lead to poor corporate governance 
practices (e.g., Bolton and Thadden, 1998; Konijn et al., 2011). For example, a 
government can use its power to appoint directors and CEOs, regardless of the individuals’ 
qualifications and experience (Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Cornett et al., 2010).  
In contrast, stewardship theory predicts that CEOs and executive directors may not 
be affected by government ownership because their interests are aligned with those of 
every corporate owner (Davis et al., 1997; Siebels and Knyphausen-Aufseb, 2012). 
Specifically, CEOs seek to improve firm performance with the aim of improving their own 
future job opportunities, as well as protecting their own reputations (Donaldson and Davis, 
1991; Conyon and He, 2011). From a resource dependence theory perspective, however, 
government ownership may grant access to critical resources, such as finance, government 
contracts and tax subsidies , which can improve firm performance and disclosure 
(Nicholson and Kiel, 2007; Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2012).  
Empirically, the relationship between government ownership and corporate 
governance disclosure has not been extensively examined (Eng and Mak, 2003; Ntim et 
al., 2012a), and thus remains a fertile area of research, where a contribution can be made to 
the international literature. The findings of a considerable number of studies suggest a 
positive relationship. Eng and Mak (2003) examine the association between government 
ownership and voluntary disclosure using a 1995 sample of 158 firms listed on the 
Singapore Stock Exchange. They find that large government ownership is positively 
related to voluntary corporate disclosure. In a similar vein, Conyon and He (2011) find that 
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state ownership enhanced corporate governance practices in a large sample consisting of 
1,342 Chinese firms over the 2001-2005 period. Similarly, Ntim et al. (2012a) report that 
government ownership is positively related to voluntary corporate disclosure among 169 
South African listed firms.  
As discussed in Chapter Six, the Saudi government has high ownership stakes in a 
considerable number of firms, representing an average of 42% of the total value of the 
Saudi stock market. Apart from Al-Moataz and Lakhal (2012), however, no study has 
explored the impact of government ownership on voluntary corporate disclosure. Al-
Moataz and Lakhal (2012) find that state ownership improved voulantry corporate 
governance disclosure in Saudi listed firms. Their study uses a corporate governance index 
consisting of only nine provisions, and a small sample consisting of 42 listed firms. The 
current study seeks to contribute to the literaure by expanding and improving on the 
evidence of Al-Moataz and Lakhal (2012). Given the positive relationship found in prior 
studies (e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Conyon and He, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012a; Al-Moataz 
and Lakhal, 2012), the fifth hypothesis to be tested is formulated as follows: 
H5: There is a significant and positive relationship between government 
ownership and the level of voluntary compliance with, and disclosure of, 
corporate governance practices. 
 
3.3.2.2 Institutional Ownership and Voluntary Corporate Disclosure  
 Institutional investors are capable of monitoring firms and helping to improve 
corporate governance disclosure (Barako et al., 2006; Aggarwal et al., 2011). Agency 
theory predicts that monitoring is useful in reducing conflicts of interest between directors 
and investors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Solomon, 2010). Chung and Zhang (2011) 
suggest that institutional investors have a much stronger incentive to protect their 
investment, especially if exit is costly. Therefore, the presence of institutional shareholders 
ensures that a degree of accountability exists between shareholders and top management 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, Aggarwal et al., 2011). This suggests that the presence of 
institutional ownership can reduce agency costs. 
Healy and Palepu (2001) and Ntim et al. (2012a) suggest that improvement in 
voluntary disclosure may lead to a higher share price and increased firm value. Thus, 
institutional shareholders can help reduce information asymmetry and improve firm value 
(Aggarwal et al., 2011). This is consistent with Chung and Zhang’s (2011) argument that 
the proportion of institutions holding a firm’s shares increases with the quality of 
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governance. On the other hand, Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín (2009 and 2011) argue 
that institutional investors are not necessarily an influential factor in improving the level of 
transparent disclosure. More precisely, they may play a weak role in motivating good 
corporate governance practices as a result of a short-term focus of their investment. 
 According to empirical studies, a positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and voluntary corporate disclosure exists (e.g., Barako et al., 2006; Aggarwal et 
al., 2011; Chung and Zhang, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012a). Using a small sample of 53 Kenyan 
listed firms, Barako et al. (2006) find that the level of institutional ownership had a 
positive and significant effect on a firm’s transparency. Similarly, Bushee et al. (2010) find 
evidence that high institutional ownership improves corporate governance practices. The 
sample used in their study consists of firms from the Investor Responsibility Research 
Centre database between 1995 and 1997. Using a large sample consisting of 12,093 firm-
year observations from 2001 to 2006,
22
 Chung and Zhang (2011) investigate institutional 
investor preferences in the US financial market. They find that firms with high voluntary 
corporate governance compliance are highly attractive to institutional investors.  
Similarly, Ntim et al. (2012a) examine 169 listed firms in South Africa during the 
period 2002-2006. They report that firms with higher institutional ownership disclosed 
considerably more than firms with lower institutional ownership. Hussainey and Al-Najjar 
(2012) find a positive relationship between institutional ownership and corporate 
governance using 130 UK firms from 2003 to 2009. Additionally, the findings of a number 
of cross-country studies support the positive association found in previous studies on a 
single country. For example, Aggarwal et al. (2011) study a sample of 23 countries
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during the period 2003-2008. They suggest that corporate governance practices are better 
in firms with higher institutional ownership. Thus, it seems that there is consensus among 
most existing studies on the positive role of institutional ownership in the promotion of 
voluntary corporate disclosure.  
In the Saudi corporate context, the relationship between institutional ownership and 
voluntary corporate governance has not yet been examined. Therefore, the current study 
offers, for the first time, evidence on this particular relationship in Saudi listed firms. 
Despite the importance of institutional ownership as an external corporate governance 
                                                 
22
 The study sample includes all stocks which are listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the 
American Stock Exchange (AMEX). The data sources are both the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) and the NYSE’s Trade and Quote (TAQ) database. The accounting data was obtained from Standard 
& Poor’s (S&P’s). 
23
 Countries under study are dispersed over more than one continent, as follows: the US, Canada, the UK, 
France, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, 
Greece, Austria, Ireland, Portugal, Japan, Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore and New Zealand. 
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mechanism, the Saudi stock market is still dominated by individual investors (ROSC, 
2009). With respect to corporate governance regulations, the SCGC has recommended that 
institutional investors should disclose information about their investment policies (Article 
6). It also encourages institutional investors to exert pressure on corporations to engage in 
corporate governance disclosure and good corporate governance practices. Evidence from 
both developed and developing economies indicates a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and voluntary corporate disclosure (e.g., Barako et al., 2006; 
Aggarwal et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2012a; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012). Thus, the sixth 
hypothesis to be tested is formulated as follows: 
H6: There is a significant and positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and the level of voluntary compliance with, and disclosure of, 
corporate governance practices. 
 
3.3.2.3 Block Ownership and Voluntary Corporate Disclosure  
 From a stakeholder theory perspective, block holders
24
 have a powerful influence 
on voluntary corporate disclosure (Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Konijn et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 
2014). Conyon and He (2011) and Konijn et al. (2011) argue that outside block holders, 
due to their considerable power, can limit excessively large compensation. In this regard, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) explain that block shareholders have an advantage over small 
shareholders in their ability to discipline managers and limit their opportunistic behaviour, 
which can reduce agency costs. Similarly, Konijn et al. (2011) suggest that large 
shareholders, due to their significant interests, have higher incentives to monitor 
managerial performance, thereby reducing free-rider problems. In the same vein, block 
holders have the financial ability to fund the firm’s needs to improve firm performance 
(Chen et al., 2009). However, Ntim et al. (2014) indicate that large shareholders may 
connive with managers in order to expropriate corporate resources, to the disadvantage of 
small or minority shareholders. 
Empirical studies on the relationship between block ownership and level of 
corporate governance disclosure suggest either a negative or no significant relationship. 
For example, Barako et al. (2006) and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) find a negative 
association between block ownership and voluntary disclosure. However, Konijn et al. 
(2011) examine a sample of US firms representing 3,722 firm-year observations during the 
period 1996-2001. They find no explicit relationship between block holders’ presence and 
                                                 
24
 Corporate governance literature generally defines block holders as shareholders owning 5% or more of a 
firm’s stocks (Mitton, 2002; Konijn et al., 2011). 
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shareholders’ rights. It is argued that the variation in the findings of past studies may be 
attributed to contextual differences (Salterio et al., 2013, Robertson et al., 2013). Whereas 
developing countries generally suffer from weak legal systems (Bauwhede and Willekens, 
2008), developed economies have an effective external governance mechanism, such as an 
active market for corporate control that can enhance voluntary corporate disclosure 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
In Saudi Arabia, Alsaeed (2006) examines the level of disclosure in 40 Saudi listed 
firms in 2003 by constructing a disclosure index consisting of 20 voluntary provisions. He 
reports that some firm characteristics, such as block ownership, are not significantly 
associated with voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, block holders are not statistically 
related to corporate governance practices in Saudi listed firms. However, Alsaeed’s 
findings are subject to a number of limitations, including using a limited sample of firms, 
thus impeding generalisability of the findings. Consistent with the findings of a number of 
empirical studies in a number of developing countries, which suggest a negative 
relationship between block ownership and voluntary disclosure (e.g., Barako et al., 2006; 
Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013), the seventh hypothesis to be tested is formulated as follows: 
H7: There is a significant and negative relationship between block ownership 
and the level of voluntary compliance with, and disclosure of, corporate 
governance practices. 
 
3.3.2.4  Director Ownership and Voluntary Corporate Disclosure  
 The importance of director ownership stems from the significant role that the board 
of directors plays regarding corporate governance disclosure policies (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Eng and Mak, 2003; Chalevas, 2011). From an agency theory perspective, 
the relationship between director ownership and voluntary corporate disclosure is not 
conclusive (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). McConnell and Servaes (1990) argue that directors 
may seek to maximise their wealth by using inside information only in matters where their 
own interest is served, and not necessarily for the best interests of the firm. However, if 
director ownership is low, this can reduce directors’ incentives to improve performance, 
and can consequently lead to lower corporate governance disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983). Shareholders can monitor board behaviour to mitigate agency 
problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), but this may increase monitoring costs. Therefore, 
voluntary disclosure may be considered as an alternative to directly monitoring directors, 
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which can equally improve corporate governance practices (Eng and Mak, 2003; Allegrini 
and Greco, 2013). 
In contrast, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that director ownership results in 
similar protection for directors and outside shareholders. This is due to an alignment of 
interests between directors and shareholders (Samaha et al., 2012). This implies that 
directors seek to enhance corporate transparency and disclosure in order to increase firm 
value. 
    Empirical studies on director ownership suggest a negative relationship between 
director ownership and corporate governance disclosure. For instance, in 158 Singaporean 
listed firms, Eng and Mak (2003) report that lower board ownership is associated with a 
high level of disclosure. On a cross-country level, Bauwhede and Willekens (2008) 
examined 130 firms from 14 European countries in 2000. They find that the percentage of 
shares closely held by insiders is negatively related to corporate governance practices. 
More recently, Samaha et al. (2012) examine the board ownership-disclosure relationship 
among a sample of 100 Egyptian listed firms. Their result does not generally support the 
hypothesis of a positive relationship between director ownership and voluntary disclosure. 
Similarly, Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012) find a negative relationship of managerial 
ownership with corporate disclosure, proxied by a corporate governance index, among 130 
firms in the UK.    
In Saudi listed firms, the association between director ownership and voluntary 
corporate disclosure has not yet been investigated. A large proportion of listed firms’ 
shares are owned by families, who thus control membership of boards (ROSC, 2009; 
Soliman, 2013a and b). This is expected to have an impact on corporate governance 
practices. Based on previous studies that suggest a negative relationship between director 
ownership and voluntary corporate disclosure (e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Bauwhede and 
Willekens, 2008; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012), the eighth hypothesis to be tested is 
formulated as follows: 
H8: There is a significant and negative relationship between board ownership 
and the level of voluntary compliance with, and disclosure of, corporate 
governance practices. 
The previous section presented a review of compliance with corporate governance 
codes and determinants of voluntary corporate disclosure in developed and developing 
countries, including Saudi Arabia. The determinants of voluntary corporate disclosure were 
also examined to investigate the differences among corporate governance practices. These 
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determinants included independent directors, board size, audit firm size, presence of a 
corporate governance committee and ownership structure.  
The next section of this chapter investigates the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm financial performance. Two different approaches are 
used to explore this particular relationship: the equilibrium-variable model and the 
compliance-index model. 
 
 
3.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, FIRM FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE AND 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
 
As discussed in Section 3.1, governance theories, particularly agency theory, 
suggest that enhancement of corporate governance mechanisms improves firm financial 
performance. The empirical literature investigating the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm financial performance either uses the equilibrium-
variable model (e.g., Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Weir and Laing, 2000; Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006; Chalevas, 2011; Mangena et al., 2012) or the compliance-index model (e.g., 
Black, 2001; Gompers et al., 2003; Cremers and Nair, 2005; Morey et al., 2009; Bauer et 
al., 2010; Renders et al., 2010; Giroud and Mueller, 2011; Black and Kim, 2012; Ammann 
et al., 2013; Munisi and Randoy, 2013; Tariq and Abbas, 2013; van Essen et al., 2013). 
The equilibrium-variable model helps to explore the influence of individual corporate 
governance mechanisms on firm financial performance. In contrast, the compliance-index 
model involves an examination of the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance using a broad composite Saudi governance index containing 65 corporate 
governance provisions. 
The remaining parts of this chapter are organised as follows. Subsection 3.4.1 
reviews empirical studies that use the equilibrium-variable model, whereas Subsection 
3.4.2 reviews the literature on the compliance-index model. 
 
3.4.1 The Equilibrium-Variable Model and Firm Financial Performance 
The board of directors is an essential part of corporate governance which can 
influence firm performance (Goodstein et al., 1994; Monks and Minow, 2011; Westphal 
and Zajac, 2013). Six characteristics of a board of directors are reviewed based on relevant 
prior literature. These are CEO duality, the proportion of independent directors, board size, 
the frequency of board meetings, board sub-committees and director ownership. These 
board characteristics were selected because of their important effect on board effectiveness 
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(Solomon, 2010; Monks and Minow, 2011; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). Moreover, the 
Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) considers these mechanisms to be central to 
good corporate governance practices.  
To investigate each of the six mechanisms, four main elements are considered: (i) a 
review of the theoretical literature on the association between a particular corporate 
governance mechanism and firm performance; (ii) a review of empirical studies conducted 
in developed countries; (iii) a review of studies on developing countries; and (iv) a review 
of studies on Saudi listed firms and related corporate governance rules in Saudi Arabia. 
Finally, on the basis of these reviews, hypotheses are developed. 
 
3.4.1.1  CEO Duality 
i) The theoretical association between CEO duality and firm financial performance 
CEO duality is considered an important corporate governance mechanism due to 
the sensitive nature of the relationship between agents and principals (Davis et al., 1997; 
Krause et al., 2014). Agency theory suggests that CEOs should run the firm in the best 
interest of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Chen et al., 2011). Jensen (1993) and 
Blackburn (1994) argue that combining the roles of chairperson and CEO may undermine 
the board’s monitoring power. As discussed in Section 3.1, weak monitoring may lead to 
expropriation of a firm’s resources by self-serving managers by, for example, awarding 
themselves compensation packages regardless of their performance (Berle and Means, 
1932). Also, because they tend to have access to better information relating to the 
operations of the firms than non-executive directors, CEOs can exploit such information to 
their advantage (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Black et al., 2006a; Chalevas, 2011). Lipton 
and Lorsch (1992) and Mashayekhi and Bazaz (2008) suggest that role duality can offer 
opportunities for self-serving CEOs to dominate board meetings, which can impact 
negatively on corporate financial performance. 
In contrast, stewardship theory suggests that CEOs tend to work in the best interests 
of shareholders (Davis et al., 1997). This is because the interests of the CEO and those of 
shareholders are aligned. Furthermore, CEOs seek to maintain their reputation and future 
job opportunities (Conyon and He, 2011). Thus, they tend to make good use of firms’ 
resources, and thus can lead to an increase in the value of the firm (Davis et al., 1997; 
Nicholson and Kiel, 2007; Siebels and Knyphausen-Aufseb, 2012).  
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ii) The empirical association between CEO duality and firm financial performance 
in developed economies 
Existing empirical studies show mixed evidence about the relationship between 
CEO duality and financial performance in developed countries. A negative relationship is 
observed by a number of studies. For example, Dahya et al. (1996) report a positive 
association between separating the roles of chairperson and CEO and financial 
performance. Specifically, they use a sample of 124 UK companies from 1989 to 1992 and 
find an improvement in firm performance in the year following separation of the roles of 
CEO and board chairperson. 
Similarly, Daily and Dalton (1994) use a sample of matching pairs of 57 bankrupt 
and surviving firms in the US from 1972 to 1982. They find that CEO duality was a 
significant factor for the firms that faced bankruptcy. Daily and Dalton’s finding supports 
the importance of splitting the CEO and chairperson positions in monitoring and 
controlling the firm’s management (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Blackburn, 1994). In 
addition, Dey et al. (2011) report that splitting the roles of CEO and chairperson is 
positively associated with returns for a sample of 760 firms between 2001 and 2009. 
Christensen et al. (2014) find that the separation of the roles of CEO and chairperson is 
significantly associated with higher earnings quality among 660 Australian companies 
from 2001 to 2004. 
On the other hand, some studies show a positive relationship between CEO duality 
and firm financial performance. Donaldson and Davis (1991) examine a cross-sectional 
sample of 321 firms in the US from 1985 to 1987. They report that return on equity (ROE) 
is higher in companies with CEO duality. Similarly, using 192 US firms’ data between 
1980 and 1984, Boyd (1995) finds evidence that return on investment (ROI) is higher in 
firms with CEO duality. In the same vein, Brickley et al. (1997) investigate a 1988 sample 
of 737 US listed firms. They find that CEO role duality impacts positively on financial 
performance.  
Finally, a number of studies indicate that CEO duality does not affect firm financial 
performance. For example, using data from 375 US listed firms from 1980 to 1991, Baliga 
et al. (1996) find that the US stock market return is not affected by CEO duality. Similarly, 
Daily and Johnson (1997) examine 100 US firms between 1987 and 1990 and find that 
CEO duality had an insignificant impact on firm performance, as measured by ROE and 
ROI. In addition, Bozec (2005) finds no statistical impact of CEO duality on firm 
performance in a sample of 25 Canadian firms between 1976 and 2000. More recently, 
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Castaner and Kavadis (2013) examine a small sample of 59 French corporations from 2000 
to 2006. They find no statistical relationship between CEO duality and firm performance.  
 
iii) The empirical association between CEO duality and firm financial performance 
in developing economies 
Prior empirical studies have reported mixed evidence about the impact of CEO 
duality on firm performance in developing countries. The findings of one stream of studies 
suggest a negative relationship between CEO duality and firm financial performance. For 
example, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) examine 347 Malaysian listed firms from 1996 to 
2000 to investigate the link between CEO duality and firm performance. They report that 
CEO duality had a negative association with ROA. Similarly, Jackling and Johl (2009) find 
that CEO duality had a detrimental effect on market value, as measured by Tobin’s Q, 
among a sample of 180 Indian listed firms in 2006. Hearn (2011) finds that splitting the 
roles of CEO and chairperson improved firm value. Hearn’s study examines a small 
sample of 37 listed firms across West Africa between 2000 and 2009.  
Mangena and Chamisa (2008) report no association between CEO duality and 
suspended firms among 81 South African listed firms from 1999 to 2005. Similarly, 
Mashayekhi and Bazaz (2008) find no association between leadership structure and firm 
performance in 240 Iranian listed firms from 2005 to 2006.  
 
iv) Studies on Saudi Arabia and Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations 
Al-Abbas (2009) examines the influence of CEO duality on shareholders’ returns. 
Using data of 78 listed firms in 2005, 2006 and 2007 (a total of 106 firm-year 
observations), he finds no evidence of improvement in the performance of firms that split 
CEO and chairperson positions. However, Ezzine (2011) finds a negative relationship 
between CEO duality and stock price performance using 96 firm-year observations in 
Saudi Arabia between 2006 and 2008. Both Al-Abbas and Ezzine use unbalanced panel 
data from a small sample. As discussed in Chapter Five and Seven, endogeneity problems 
arising from potential unobserved firm-level heterogeneity may be exacerbated by the use 
of unbalanced panel data (Henry, 2008; Guest, 2009; Ntim et al., 2012b). The relatively 
small sample size can also limit generalisability of their findings for Saudi listed firms. 
Unlike their studies, this study involves both cross-sectional and time-series observations 
using a balanced and larger sample of 80 listed firms over seven years (i.e., giving a total 
of 560 firm-year observations).  
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The SCGC recommends splitting CEO and chairperson positions to enhance the 
accountability of a firm’s management. Since agency theory suggests a negative 
relationship between CEO duality and firm financial performance, and most empirical 
studies also found a negative relationship (e.g., Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Jackling and 
Johl, 2009; Dey et al., 2011; Christensen et al., 2014), the ninth hypothesis to be tested is 
formulated as follows: 
H9: There is a significant and negative relationship between CEO duality and firm 
financial performance, as measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
 
3.4.1.2  Proportion of Independent Directors 
i) The theoretical association between the proportion of independent directors and  
firm financial performance 
A multiple-theoretical approach is adopted to investigate the relationship between 
proportion of independent directors and firm performance. Agency theory indicates that, 
owing to the conflict of interest between agents and principals, the presence of independent 
directors may act to reduce the agency problem (Berle and Means, 1932; Fama, 1980; 
Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). For instance, executives’ and CEOs’ performance can be 
reasonably assessed by an independent chairperson and directors (Fama, 1980; Weir and 
Laing, 2000; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Chalevas, 2011). In addition, the presence of 
independent board members can improve board decisions (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Chen 
et al., 2011).   
Furthermore, non-executives
25
 are deemed to be additional resources in terms of 
expertise, knowledge, prestige and contacts (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Nicholson and 
Kiel, 2007; Chen, 2011; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Consequently, this can help the 
board of directors in improving the competitive advantage of the company (Chen and 
Roberts, 2010). Additionally, from a managerial signalling theory perspective, the presence 
of independent members (non-executives) on the board can serve as a signal of the 
existence of fewer agency problems (Black et al., 2006b).  
In contrast, Weir and Laing (2000) indicate that independent directors tend to have 
limited knowledge about the nature of a firm’s operations and activities. In this regard, 
                                                 
25
 An independent director is a member of a board of directors with complete independence. The SCGC 
points out some cases in which the independency of a director is compromised, such as: (i) owning a 
controlling stake in the company and/or its subsidiaries; (ii) having been an executive of the company or one 
of its subsidiaries during the last two years; and (iii) being a close relative of any of the members of the board 
of directors or the executive management. A non-executive director is a member of the board of directors that 
does not work for the company on a full-time basis. On the other hand, non-executive members work part-
time, but still have an interest in the company, (i.e. hold shares). 
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Goodstein et al. (1994) suggest that a high number of independent directors may increase 
monitoring, which may restrict managerial performance. This may have a negative impact 
on firm profitability. Independent members may not have adequate time to exercise their 
role effectively, which may adversely affect firm performance (Jiraporn et al., 2009). 
 
ii) The empirical association between the proportion of independent directors and  
firm financial performance in developed economies 
 
The link between independent directors and firm financial performance in 
developed countries has generally been mixed. A positive relationship is noted by Millstein 
and MacAvoy (1998). They examine the influence of board independence on returns and 
investment among 154 listed firms in the US. They report that firms with a higher 
proportion of independent board members show a better ROI. Similarly, using 311 UK 
firms in 1996, Weir et al. (2002) find that the presence of independent directors in a 
board’s structure attracts investors and increases the firm’s value, as measured by Tobin’s 
Q. In the same vein, Gupta and Fields (2009) investigate a sample of 744 US firms 
between 1990 and 2003 and examine the independent directors’ resignations. They suggest 
that the resignation of an independent director adversely affected the firms’ value. 
Similarly, Upadhyay et al. (2014) find a positive relationship between independent 
directors and Q-ratio among 660 Australian firms from 2001 to 2004.  
 Other studies showed a negative relationship between independent directors and 
firm performance in developed countries. For example, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) 
examine a sample of about 400 large US firms in 1987 using Tobin’s Q, as a market-based 
measure. They report that the percentage of independent directors is negatively related to 
firm value. Additionally, Bozec (2005) examines a sample of 25 Canadian firms between 
1976 and 2000 with different performance measures: ROA, return on sales and Tobin’s Q. 
He finds that firm profitability and productivity were lower in companies that had a board 
dominated by independent board members. This is in line with the theoretical prediction 
that non-executive directors interact less with a firm’s management and are often less 
knowledgeable about the firm’s operations (e.g., Davis et al., 1997; Bozec, 2005; 
Nicholson and Kiel, 2007).  
 The final stream of research suggests that independent directors have no influence 
on firm performance. Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) investigate the relationship between 
independent directors and firm value. They use a sample of 250 UK firms for 1994 and 
find that ROA had no significant relationship with board independence. Similarly, Klein 
(1998) suggests that there is no effect of independent directors on financial performance in 
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486 US firms between 1992 and 1993 using both accounting- and market-based 
performance measures. Recently, Christensen et al. (2014) show that there is generally no 
significant relationship between independent directors and ROA or earnings quality 
variables.  
 
iii) The empirical association between the proportion of independent directors and  
financial performance in developing economies 
In developing countries, the results regarding the relationship between independent 
board members and firm performance are similar to those in developed economies, 
suggesting mixed results. A positive relationship is suggested by El Mehdi (2007), who 
analyses 24 Tunisian listed firms between 2000 and 2005. El Mehdi (2007) finds that the 
presence of independent directors is positively associated with firm value. Similarly, 
Mangena and Tauringana (2007) examine unbalanced data from Zimbabwe for 2002 and 
2003 with samples of 51 and 67 firms, respectively. They report that the proportion of 
independent members is significantly and positively associated with an increase in foreign 
investment in the sampled firms. This implies that foreign investors are attracted to firms 
that have a higher proportion of independent board members.  
Similarly, Mangena and Chamisa (2008) find that the likelihood of a firm being 
suspended from the South African Stock Exchange is lower in public firms with a higher 
proportion of non-executives, using a sample of 81 South African firms. Similarly, Conyon 
and He (2011) employ a large sample of 1,342 Chinese firms from 2001 to 2005 to 
investigate the relationship between independent directors and firm performance. They 
report a positive relationship between independent directors and ROA. Hui (2012) 
examines 318 Chinese small and medium sized firms for three years from 2006 to 2008. 
He finds that ROE is negatively related to the proportion of independent directors. 
Similarly, Mahadeo et al. (2012) find that the proportion of independent directors is 
negatively associated with firm performance in Mauritius. They examine a small sample of 
42 firms in 2007. They suggest that the concept of board independence is very recent in 
developing countries which recently adopted corporate governance reforms, leading to a 
negative relationship. 
On the other hand, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) find no significant relationship 
between independent directors and firm performance, as measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
They employ a sample of 347 Malaysian firms between 1996 and 2000. Similarly, Sanda et 
al. (2010) analyse a sample of 93 Nigerian firms from 1996 to 1999. Using different 
performance proxies (ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q and PE ratio), they find that independent 
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directors do not have a significant relationship with firm performance. This implies that 
having independent directors on a board does not necessarily lead to good financial 
performance.   
 
iv) Studies on Saudi Arabia and Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations 
Al-Abbas (2009) examines the effect of independent directors on firm performance 
in Saudi listed firms. The study finds no significant relationship between firm performance 
and proportion of independent directors. Similarly, Ezzine (2011) reports no evidence of an 
association between board independence and firm value using Saudi listed firms. As 
discussed in Subsection 3.4.1.1, these studies by Al-Abbas and Ezzine have limitations in 
terms of methods and samples, which can limit the generalisability of their findings for 
Saudi listed firms. Regarding the corporate governance rules, Article 12 of the SCGC 
recommends that: (i) a majority of board members in listed firms should be non-executive 
directors; (ii) two members or one third of the board should be independent, whichever is 
greater; and (iii) committees should be composed of a sufficient number of independent 
members. Given the positive relationship found in previous studies (e.g., El Mehdi, 2007; 
Mangena and Tauringana, 2007; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; Gupta and Fields, 2009; 
Upadhyay et al., 2014), the tenth hypothesis to be tested is formulated as follows: 
H10: There is a significant and positive relationship between the proportion of 
independent directors and firm financial performance, as measured by ROA 
and Tobin’s Q. 
 
3.4.1.3   Corporate Board Size 
i) The theoretical association between board size and firm financial performance 
Theoretically, the relationship between board size and firm performance in general 
remains inconclusive (Upadhyay et al., 2014). Specifically, agency theory suggests that a 
larger board may increase managerial costs and thus adversely affect firm profitability 
(Yawson, 2006). For example, a large board may increase board expenses, such as annual 
remuneration, bonuses, travel and other allowances (Vafeas, 1999a). This can lead to an 
increase in agency costs and a reduction in firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Similarly, a large number of directors may lead to communication and coordination 
problems, which can negatively affect firm performance (Beasley, 1996; Yermack, 1996).  
On the other hand, resource dependence theory indicates a positive relationship 
between board size and financial performance. Pearce and Zahra (1992) and Goodstein et 
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al. (1994) suggest that when a board is large, firm financial performance can be improved 
because critical resources are more easily secured, such as finance and business contracts. 
Similarly, Yawson (2006) and Dalton et al. (1998) demonstrate that larger boards can 
attract more qualified members, which could improve the board’s decisions. Similarly, the 
presence of a large board can help establish effective board sub-committees that improve 
firm performance (Jiraporn et al., 2009). In addition, large boards can mean that 
stakeholders are better represented in the board of directors (Pfeffer, 1973; Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013). 
 
ii) The empirical association between board size and firm financial performance in 
developed economies 
A review of the empirical literature presents no consistent direction of a 
relationship between board size and firm performance in developed countries. A negative 
relationship is documented by a number of studies. For example, Yermack (1996) 
examines a sample of 452 large industrial firms in the US between 1984 and 1991. They 
find a negative relationship between board size and firm value. Eisenberg et al. (1998, 
p.36) criticise Yermack’s use of a sample consisting of only large firms. Consequently, 
Eisenberg et al. use a sample of 879 small and medium sized Finnish firms from 1992 to 
1994 to examine the relationship between board size and firm value. They find that ROA is 
negatively related to board size, which is consistent with Yermack’s result. The finding of 
Eisenberg et al. shows that there is no difference in the result regardless of whether a 
sample of large or small companies is used to investigate the influence of board size on 
financial performance.  
Guest (2009) presents evidence from a large sample of 2,746 UK firms from 1981 
to 2002. Guest’s study reports that board size has a significantly negative impact on 
profitability, Tobin’s Q and share returns. Another important study is by Cheng (2008), 
who investigates a large sample of 2,980 US firms between 1996 and 2004. He finds that 
firms with larger boards have lower annual accounting returns on assets. Recently, 
Upadhyay et al. (2014) find a negative relationship between board size and each of Q-ratio 
and ROA using a US sample from 2000 to 2003.  
In contrast to studies focusing on a single country, Conyon and Peck (1998) analyse 
a sample of five European countries
26
 to examine the relationship between board size and 
ROE. Their finding indicates that larger boards impact negatively on firm growth and 
financial performance. These studies showing a negative impact of a large board of 
                                                 
26
 Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK are examined in this study. 
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directors on financial performance are consistent with the theoretical prediction that 
smaller boards of directors are more capable of running a firm successfully. It is interesting 
to note that a possible explanation could be that interaction among directors in small firms 
is more meaningful than that of a large board of directors (e.g., Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; 
Jensen, 1993; Yawson, 2006).   
In contrast to the studies finding a negative relationship, Haleblian and Finkelstein 
(1993) report that firms with larger boards and management teams performed better than 
their smaller counterparts. They examine 47 US firms from 1978 to 1982 in gas and 
computer industries. In addition to using a small sample, another key problem with their 
study is that it is restricted to the two sectors. Thus, the sample is not completely 
representative of all industries, which can lead to sample selection bias (see Eisenberg et 
al., 1998). Similarly, Kiel and Nicholson (2003) analyse cross-sectional data from 348 
large Australian publicly-owned companies in 1996. They find that larger boards are 
helpful in improving both firm value and performance, as measured by ROA and Tobin’s 
Q.  
In addition, Coles et al. (2008) report a positive relationship between board size and 
Tobin’s Q in a sample of 8,165 firm-year observations from 1992 to 2001 in the US. 
Recently, Wang (2012) uses unbalanced panel data from 1,618 firms from 1992 to 2004 to 
investigate the impact of board size on financial performance. Wang finds that firms with 
smaller boards invest more heavily in risky assets. These results suggest a positive impact 
of larger boards on firm performance. This is in line with the theoretical expectation that 
larger boards are better than smaller boards at strategic decision-making (e.g., Dalton et al., 
1998; John and Senbet, 1998).  
 
iii) The empirical association between board size and firm financial performance in 
developing economies 
There are a limited number of studies on emerging economies that have 
investigated the relationship between board size and financial performance (Mangena and 
Chamisa, 2008). The findings from developing countries suggest a positive, a negative or 
no significant relationship. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) find a positive relationship between 
board size and ROA using 347 Malaysian listed firms. Similarly, Jackling and Johl (2009) 
find that Indian firms with large boards performed better. This is because large firms have 
a high level of access to financial resources. 
  Mashayekhi and Bazaz (2008) report that larger boards impact negatively on firm 
value. Specifically, they examine a sample of 240 Iranian firms for 2005 and 2006, and 
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find that large boards have lower ROA, EPS and ROE. Similarly, Sanda et al. (2010) 
examine the relationship between board size and firm performance among a sample of 93 
listed firms in the Nigerian stock market from 1996 to 1999. They find that larger boards 
impact negatively on firm performance. Recently, Hui (2012) finds that ROE is negatively 
related to board size in a sample consisting of 318 Chinese listed firms. Finally, Mangena 
and Chamisa (2008) find that there is no significant relationship between board size and 
firm performance. They examine the effect of board size on suspended listed firms in 
South Africa. They use a sample of 81 firms suspended between 1999 and 2005, and find 
no significant relationship between suspended companies and board size.  
 
iv) Studies on Saudi Arabia and Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations  
Al-Nodel and Hussainey (2010) examine the relationship between board size and 
firm performance in Saudi listed firms. Using a small sample of 37 listed firms between 
October 2005 and January 2006, they find that board size is positively related to debt-to-
equity ratio. Al-Nodel and Hussainey (2010) highlight a number of limitations: (i) using a 
small sample; and (ii) focusing only on one year of cross-sectional data, amongst others. In 
contrast, the current study examines a balanced and large sample of 560 firm-year 
observations over seven years. Furthermore, it uses mainly annual reports, a highly reliable 
source of corporate governance information (Botosan, 1997; Alsaeed, 2006; Omar and 
Simon, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012). The SCGC recommends that boards 
should have between three and eleven members, depending on the size of a firm. Based on 
the findings from most of the reviewed studies that show a negative relationship between 
board size and financial performance (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Mashayekhi and Bazaz, 2008; 
Hansson et al., 2011; Hui, 2012), the eleventh hypothesis to be tested is formulated as 
follows: 
 H11: There is a significant and negative relationship between board size and 
firm financial performance, as measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
 
3.4.1.4   Frequency of Board of Directors’ Meetings  
i) The theoretical association between frequency of board meetings and firm 
financial performance 
The theoretical association between the frequency of board meetings and financial 
performance is mixed. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2013) 
argue that frequent board meetings are positively associated with financial performance. In 
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other words, regular board meetings grant directors opportunities to discuss firm 
performance. Monitoring of the firm’s operation is a key board responsibility (Soobaroyen 
and Mahadeo, 2012; Siddiqui et al., 2013). Hence, frequent board meetings make it easier 
to monitor managers (Vafeas, 1999a). Therefore, frequent board meetings can improve 
firm performance by mitigating agency problems (Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach, 2013).  
In contrast, stewardship theory suggests that executive directors are trustworthy 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Letza et al., 2004; Siebels and Knyphausen-Aufseb, 2012), 
which means that more frequent board meetings may not improve firm performance. This 
argument supports the notion that the board of directors should limit their participation in 
day-to-day activities of the firm (Monks and Minow, 2011). This is also supported by 
Jensen (1993), who argues that frequent board meetings are only required in difficult 
times. Similarly, Vafeas (1999a) points out that a high frequency of board meetings can 
increase agency costs, such as meeting expenses, allowances and travel expenses, which 
can impact negatively on firm performance (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
 
ii) The empirical association between frequency of board meetings and firm 
financial performance in developed economies 
Empirical studies conducted in developed countries show mixed results for the 
impact of board meetings on firm financial performance. A considerable number of studies 
showed a positive impact of frequent board meetings on firm performance. For example, 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) report that frequent board meetings help improve earnings 
forecasts in US firms. They use a sample of 275 large firms between 1995 and 2000. This 
implies that firms with effective boards are likely to improve their decision-making. 
Recently, Chen and Chen (2012) examine a large US sample of 22,366 firm-year 
observations. They find that capital allocation is highly efficient in firms with frequent 
board of directors’ meetings. Also, Upadhyay et al. (2014) report a positive association 
between the frequency of meetings and firm performance using a sample of US firms.  
Some studies have reported a negative relationship between the frequency of board 
meetings and firm financial performance. Vafeas (1999a) examines 307 US listed firms 
from 1990 to 1994. He finds that an increase in the number of board meetings is inversely 
related to firm value. Similarly, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) report that frequency of board 
meetings impacts negatively on firm performance. They use a sample of 508 US listed 
firms from 1989 to 1995. A recent study by Christensen et al. (2014) also finds a negative 
impact of the frequency of board meetings on Q-ratio in large Australian firms.  
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iii) The empirical association between frequency of board meetings and firm 
financial performance in developing economies 
Few studies have examined the effect of the frequency of board meetings on 
financial performance in developing countries (Black et al., 2006a; Mangena and Chamisa, 
2008). The results from existing studies suggest mixed findings. A negative relationship is 
reported by Jackling and Johl (2009), who find that an increase in board meetings reduced 
firm value in a sample of 180 Indian firms in 2005-2006. This supports the idea that the 
frequency of board meetings on its own is not enough to improve firm performance 
(Vafeas, 1999a). Finally, El Mehdi (2007) finds that the frequency of board meetings has 
no effect on firm performance, using a small sample of 24 Tunisian listed firms between 
2000 and 2005. It can be noted that the generalisability of this finding to other developing 
countries generally and Arab countries in particular is limited because of the small sample 
used by El Mehdi (2007).  
 
iv) Studies on Saudi Arabia and Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations  
The effect of the frequency of board meetings on firm financial performance has 
not yet been examined in Saudi Arabia. The SCGC does not recommend a specific number 
of board meetings in a year. Article 16 points out that the board shall convene its ordinary 
meetings as requested by the board chairperson. In addition, the chairperson must call the 
board for a meeting following unforeseen developments, especially if a written request is 
made by at least two board members. Similarly, the Saudi Companies Act does not 
stipulate the number of board meetings that a company should have in a year. Based on the 
finding of a positive relationship between the frequency of board meetings and firm 
performance by a number of prior studies (e.g., Mashayekhi and Bazaz, 2009; Chen and 
Chen, 2012; Upadhyay et al., 2014), the twelfth hypothesis to be tested is formulated as 
follows: 
H12: There is a significant and positive relationship between frequency of board 
meetings and firm financial performance, as measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
3.4.1.5  Presence of Board Sub-committees 
i) The theoretical association between board sub-committees and financial 
performance 
The separation between ownership and management in modern corporations creates 
agency problems (Upadhyay et al., 2014). A major way in which shareholders can 
minimise such agency problems is to establish board sub-committees that can closely 
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assess and monitor managerial actions and behaviour (Harrison, 1987; Main and Johnston, 
1993; Klein, 1998; Jiraporn et al., 2009). From an agency theory perspective, board sub-
committees can improve internal control systems (Harrison, 1987; Klein, 1998). This 
suggests that companies that have effective board sub-committees should perform better 
financially (Upadhyay et al., 2014). Harrison (1987) argues that audit committees are 
supposed to support external auditors in assessing the effectiveness of the internal control 
system, thereby helping to improve the quality of financial information. Similarly, Sun and 
Cahan (2009) suggest that remuneration committees have a positive effect on financial 
performance by limiting managerial compensation.  
However, Vafeas (1999a) argues that establishing board sub-committees can 
increase costs, including travelling costs and sitting allowances, and thus impact negatively 
on performance. In the same vein, Conger et al. (1998) indicate that the establishment of 
board sub-committees can lead to excessive managerial monitoring, which can limit 
managerial initiative, and thus impact negatively on firm profitability. 
 
ii) The empirical association between board sub-committees and firm financial 
performance in developed economies 
Literature examining the relationship between the presence of board sub-
committees and firm financial performance in developed countries suggests either a 
positive or no significant relationship. Wild (1994) finds a positive relationship between 
the establishment of an audit committee and share returns using a sample of 260 US firms 
between 1966 and 1980. Similarly, Vafeas (1999b) examines 606 US listed firms and finds 
that the presence of a nomination committee helps in improving the quality of a board’s 
decisions. In the same vein, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) use a sample of 275 US listed 
firms in 1995 and find that the presence of board sub-committees is likely to improve 
corporate governance practices and thereby impact positively on firm performance. 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) find that the presence of a remuneration committee led 
to a reduction in executive compensation among 865 US firms from 2000 to 2005.  
Other studies suggest that there is no significant relationship between the presence of 
a board sub-committee and financial performance. For example, Vafeas and Theodorou 
(1998) report that there is no significant relationship between board sub-committees and 
firm profitability among 250 UK listed firms in 1994. Similarly, Klein (1998) finds that 
board sub-committees played a marginal role in improving firm performance among a 
sample of 486 US firms between 1992 and 1993. Additionally, Dulewicz and Herbert 
(2004) report that audit and remuneration committees did not have a statistically significant 
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impact on financial performance among 86 UK firms. Recently, Christensen et al. (2014) 
examine two samples of large and small Australian firms. They find that audit committees 
had no significant relationship with Q-ratio in both large and small firms.  
 
iii) The empirical association between board sub-committees and firm financial 
performance in developing economies 
Empirical studies investigating the relationship between board sub-committees and 
financial performance in developing countries report mixed findings. Mangena and 
Chamisa (2008) find that the presence of an audit committee reduces the likelihood of 
being suspended for South African listed firms. This evidence supports agency theory, 
which suggests board sub-committees are an important monitoring mechanism (Harrison, 
1987; Main and Johnston, 1993; Klein, 1998; Jiraporn et al., 2009). However, Hearn 
(2011) finds that the presence of board sub-committees does not help in improving firm 
valuation, using data from 37 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) of firms across West Africa. 
     
iv) Studies on Saudi Arabia and Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations 
The relationship between board sub-committees and firm performance has not been 
statistically examined within the Saudi corporate context. The SCGC recommends listed 
firms establish at least audit, nomination and remuneration committees to help the board of 
directors perform its tasks successfully. Given the positive relationship between the 
presence of board sub-committees and firm performance as reported by previous studies 
conducted in developed and developing countries (e.g., Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; 
Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; Upadhyay et al., 2014), the thirteenth hypothesis to be tested 
is formulated as follows: 
H13: There is a significant and positive relationship between the existence of board 
sub-committees (audit, remuneration and nomination) and firm financial 
performance, as measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
 
3.4.1.6  Director Ownership 
 
i) The theoretical association between director ownership and financial 
performance 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that inside and outside shareholders may have 
conflicting interests. Thus, director ownership may exacerbate agency problems. Similarly, 
directors holding a high proportion of shares make a company more vulnerable to collusion 
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between directors and the firm’s management (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Konijn et al., 
2011). However, Piesse et al. (2012) argue that a high proportion of director ownership 
motivates boards of directors to improve firm performance. In contrast, managerial 
signalling theory suggests that directors have more information about the firm than outside 
shareholders (Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). Therefore, 
directors might be more likely to exploit insider information to the disadvantage of outside 
shareholders (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), which can have a negative impact effect on 
financial performance and firm value (Chung and Zhang, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012b). 
 
ii) The empirical association between director ownership and firm financial 
performance in developed economies 
A number of empirical studies examine the relationship between director ownership 
and firm performance. A non-linear relationship is reported by Morck et al. (1988). Using 
a sample of 371 US firms in 1980, they find that a low level of director ownership had a 
positive effect on firm value. Similarly, McConnell and Servaes (1990) analyse a large 
sample of more than 1,000 US firms. They report a significant and positive curvilinear 
relationship between the proportion of common stock owned by directors and Q-ratio.  
No significant relationship between director ownership and firm performance has 
been reported by Vafeas and Theodorou (1998). They use a sample of 250 publicly traded 
companies in the UK in 1994. Their results show no significant relationship between 
director ownership and ROA. Similarly, Davies et al. (2005) find no significant 
relationship between proportion of director ownership and Q-ratio among UK firms in 
1996 and 1997. Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Short and 
Keasey (1999) also find no significant relationship between director ownership and Q-
ratio.  
Another stream of studies finds a negative relationship between director ownership 
and financial performance. Konijn et al. (2011) examine a sample of 3,722 firm-year 
observations from 1996 to 2001 in the US. They find that firm value measured by Tobin’s 
Q is negatively correlated with high director shareholding. Recently, Upadhyay et al. 
(2014) find a significant and positive relationship between director shareholding and ROA 
among US firms between 2000 and 2003.  
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iii) The empirical association between director ownership and firm financial 
performance in developing economies  
 
Studies examining the relationship between director ownership and firm 
performance in emerging countries suggest mixed findings. Kapopoulos and Lazaretou 
(2007) find that concentrated ownership (i.e., director ownership) is positively related to 
higher firm profitability in 175 Greek listed firms. Similarly, Mangena and Tauringana 
(2007) report that director ownership in Zimbabwean firms is positively related to both 
ROE and liquidity ratios. On the other hand, studies that find a negative relationship 
between director ownership and performance include Ho and Williams (2003), Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006) and Sanda et al. (2010). Ho and Williams (2003) find a negative 
relationship between board ownership and corporate performance using a cross-country 
sample of 84 South African listed firms. Similarly, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) report a 
negative relationship between director ownership and ROA in 347 Malaysian listed firms. 
Recently, Sanda et al. (2010) use four different performance measures (ROA, ROE, 
Tobin’s Q and PE ratio) to examine the influence of high director ownership among 93 
Nigerian firms. They find that high director ownership had a negative relationship with all 
four performance measures. Finally, El Mehdi (2007) finds no significant relationship 
between director ownership and firm value for Tunisian firms. 
 
iv) Studies on Saudi Arabia and Corporate Governance Regulations 
The relationship between director ownership and firm performance has not been 
tested in Saudi Arabia. As discussed in Chapter Two, the 2004 Listing Rules stipulate that 
firms should disclose board and director ownership in their annual reports. Given the 
negative relationship between director ownership and firm performance reported by 
previous studies (e.g., Ho and Williams, 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Kapopoulos and 
Lazaretou, 2007; Sanda et al., 2010; Upadhyay et al., 2014), the fourteenth hypothesis to 
be tested is formulated as follows: 
H14: There is a significant and positive relationship between director ownership 
and firm financial performance, as measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q.  
In sum, the last subsection attempted to review the theoretical and empirical 
literature relating to the relationship between individual corporate governance mechanisms 
(also known as the equilibrium-variable model) and firm financial performance. The 
corporate governance mechanisms examined are CEO duality, proportion of independent 
directors, board size, frequency of board meetings, presence of board sub-committees and 
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director ownership. Using the equilibrium-variable model, empirical studies on both 
developed and developing countries showed mixed findings for the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial performance.  
The next subsection presents a review of prior literature relating to the compliance-
index model, which involves an examination of the relationship between a broad 
composite Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) and financial performance. Studies 
conducted on both developed and developing countries will be reviewed. 
 
3.4.2 The Compliance-Index Model and Firm Financial Performance 
As discussed in Section 3.4, the findings of recent studies suggest that the 
relationship between composite corporate governance indices (compliance-index model) 
and firm performance is generally mixed (e.g., Black, 2001; Gompers et al., 2003; Cremers 
and Nair, 2005; Morey et al., 2009; Bauer et al., 2010; Renders et al., 2010; Giroud and 
Mueller, 2011; Black and Kim 2012; Ammann et al., 2013; Munisi and Randoy, 2013; 
Tariq and Abbas, 2013; van Essen et al., 2013). As previously explained, the compliance-
index model involves an examination of the relationship between a composite corporate 
governance index and firm financial performance.  
The remainder of this chapter presents a review of studies that examine the 
relationship between corporate governance indices and financial performance in developed 
and developing countries, as well as cross-country studies. Specifically, Subsection 3.4.2.1 
presents evidence relating to North America (i.e., the US and Canada). Subsection 3.4.2.2 
investigates studies conducted in Western Europe and other developed countries. 
Subsection 3.4.2.3 reviews the literature relating to emerging countries. Subsection 3.4.2.4 
examines cross-country studies. Subsection 3.4.2.5 discusses the differences among the 
empirical findings, while Subsection 3.4.2.6 presents an overview of the study’s 
constructed compliance-index model and indicates the related hypothesis. 
 
3.4.2.1 The Compliance-Index Model and Firm Financial Performance in the US and 
Canada  
 Table 3.1 contains a summary of the findings of previous studies that were 
conducted in the US and Canada. Generally, the findings from studies conducted in the US 
and Canada are relatively similar. This may be due to the comparatively similar nature of 
the countries’ external corporate governance mechanisms, such as the effectiveness of the 
market for corporate control and the legal system (Bozec and Bozec, 2012). The findings 
of a number of prior studies contained in Table 3.1 suggest mixed relationship between 
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corporate governance and financial performance (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Cremers and 
Nair, 2005; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Bauer et al., 2010; Giroud and Mueller, 2011; 
Jiraporn et al., 2011; Gordon et al., 2012; Jayachandran et al., 2013). 
 Gompers et al. (2003) is considered to be a pioneering study investigating the 
relationship between a composite corporate governance index and firm performance 
(Bauer et al., 2010). They construct the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick index (GIM), 
consisting of 24 governance provisions extracted from the Investor Responsibility 
Research Centre (IRRC). Using a sample of 1,500 large US firms from 1990 to 1999, 
Gompers et al. (2003) find that good corporate governance practices improve firm value, 
profitability and sales growth. Subsequently, a number of studies adopted the GIM index to 
further investigate the governance-performance relationship among US listed firms (e.g., 
Cremers and Nair, 2005; Core et al., 2006; Lehn et al., 2007; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; 
Bebchuk et al., 2009; Giroud and Mueller, 2011). For example, Brown and Caylor (2006) 
find a significant and positive link between the constructed governance index and Tobin’s 
Q among 1,868 US firms. 
 Similarly, Bauer et al. (2010) adopt a Corporate Governance Quotient index 
(CGQ)
27
 consisting of 61 provisions to examine its relationship with financial 
performance, using a sample of about 210 US firms from 2003 to 2005. They find a 
significant and positive relationship between CGQ index and financial performance. 
Giroud and Mueller (2011) and Jiraporn et al. (2011) use governance ratings of GIM and 
ISS, respectively, to examine the relationship for US firms. They find that weak corporate 
governance practices lead to lower equity returns, poor operating performance, lower firm 
value and lower propensity to pay dividends. Recently, Gordon et al. (2012) find that 
financial performance measured by Q-ratio is positively related to a constructed corporate 
governance index in a small sample of Canadian firms. Interestingly, Jayachandran et al. 
(2013) examine the impact of corporate social performance
28
 on firm performance among 
518 US firms and find that corporate social performance had a strong positive impact on 
firm value. These findings are consistent with the theoretical expectation that a high level 
of compliance with corporate governance standards can help reduce agency costs and 
increase shareholders’ returns (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). 
                                                 
27
 The CGQ index is provided by the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). It is based on public disclosure 
documents, which are used to collect data on 61 different governance provisions in the following categories: 
(i) board of directors; (ii) audit; (iii) charter and bylaw provisions; (iv) anti-takeover provisions; (v) executive 
and director compensation; (vi) progressive practices; (vii) ownership; and (viii) director education. 
28
 The corporate social performance index consists of seven major areas, including community, corporate 
governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights and product lines. 
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Table 3.1: Summary of existing studies on the relationship between corporate governance index and firm performance: Empirical studies in the US and Canada 
Direction of 
Relationship 
Authors Country Sample  Governance Measure Empirical Findings Performance 
Measure(s) 
Positive Gompers et al. 
(2003) 
US 1,500 large firms 
from IRRC 
1990 – 1999 
Constructing GIM index extracted 
from IRRC 
Significant positive relationship with 
firm value and financial performance 
Tobin’s Q 
Net profit margin 
ROE 
Sales growth 
 
 Foerster and 
Huen (2004) 
Canada 270 largest public 
listed firms 
2002 
Using ROB index constructed by 
the Globe and Mail Report on 
Business  
 
Corporate governance (CG) statistically 
and significantly linked to firm 
performance 
 
Stock returns 
 Cremers and 
Nair (2005) 
US 1,500 firms per year 
1990 – 2001 
Adopting GIM index and 
constructing Takeover Protection 
Index (ATI) 
 
Positive relationship with abnormal 
returns and firm value 
Tobin’s Q 
Stock returns 
 Brown and 
Caylor (2006) 
US 1,868 firms 
February 2003  
Constructing Gov-Score based on 
provisions provided by ISS  
 
 Significant and positive association with 
firm value 
Tobin’s Q 
 
 
 
 
 
Bauer et al. 
(2010) 
US 509 firm-year 
observations 
2003 – 2005 
Using CGQ index provided by 
ISS based on public disclosure 
documents  
Significant and positive relation with 
firm value and financial performance 
Tobin’s Q 
ROA, ROE, net profit 
margin and sales 
growth  
 
 Giroud and 
Mueller (2011) 
US 3,241 firms from 
IRRC  
1990 – 2006 
Using GIM index (Gompers, Ishii 
and Metrick 2003) 
CG positively related to financial 
performance and firm value 
Tobin’s Q 
ROA, ROE, and net 
profit margin  
 Jiraporn et al. 
(2011) 
US All firms in ISS 
(16,013 
observations) 
2001 - 2004 
 
Using broad-based governance 
metrics provided by ISS 
Positive relationship with dividends paid  Ratio of dividends to 
total assets and net 
income 
 Gordon et al. 
(2012) 
Canada Small listed firms 
2004 
Constructed CG index consisting 
of 14 provisions of Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSX) guidelines 
 
CG is significantly correlated with firm 
value 
Tobin’s Q 
 
 Jayachandran et 
al. (2013) 
US 518 firms from 
Domini 400 Social 
Index and S&P 500 
Using Kinder, Lydenberg 
and Domini (KLD) rating 
consisting of seven major areas 
 
Corporate Social Performance (CSP) has 
a stronger positive impact on firm value 
Tobin’s Q 
 
Negative Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein 
(2007) 
 
US 312 firms 
2001 – 2002 
Self-constructed CG index  Negative association with abnormal 
returns in large firms. 
Stock returns 
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Table 3.1(Continued): Summary of existing studies on the relationship between corporate governance index and firm performance: Empirical studies in the US and 
Canada 
Direction of 
Relationship 
Authors Country Sample  Governance Measure Empirical Findings Performance 
Measure(s) 
 Bebchuk et al. 
(2009) 
US IRRC firms 
1990 – 2003 
Constructing Entrenchment Index 
(E-Index) followed by the IRRC  
E-Index negatively associated with firm 
value and abnormal returns 
 
Tobin’s Q 
Stock returns  
No Relation Koehn and 
Ueng (2005) 
US 106 large firms from 
Forbes 500  
2004 
 
Using CG scores generated by 
ISS  
No significant positive correlation with 
high-quality earnings 
 
Earning Quality (EQ) 
 Klein et al. 
(2005) 
Canada 263 firms  
2002 
Adopting ROB index constructed 
by the Globe and Mail Report on 
Business  
 
No evidence that the overall governance 
index affects firm value 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
 Lehn et al. 
(2007) 
US 1,500 firms from 
IRRC  
between 1990 - 2002 
 
Using both GIM index and BCF 
index (Bebchuk, Cohn, and Ferrel 
2004) 
 
No significant relation exists with firm 
value 
Market to book ratio 
 Epps and 
Cereola (2008) 
US 230 firms from the 
S&P 500  
2002 - 2004 
 
Using CGQ rating created by 
Institutional Shareholders 
Services ISS 
No statistical evidence supporting a 
relationship with operating performance  
ROA 
ROE 
 Daines et al. 
(2010) 
US 6,827 firms from 
GMI, ISS, TCL and 
AGR databases   
2005 - 2007 
 
Using four commercial 
governance indices: CGQ, GMI, 
TCL and AGR  
 
No predictive ability to enhance firms’ 
performance 
Tobin’s Q 
ROA 
Stock returns 
 Gupta et al. 
(2009) 
Canada 158 firms 
2002 – 2005 
Using ROB index constructed by 
the Globe and Mail Report on 
Business 
No association with financial 
performance and firm value 
Tobin’s Q 
ROA 
Market to book ratio 
 
Mixed Relation Core et al. 
(2006) 
US 9,917 firm-year 
observations  
1990 - 1999 
 
Using GIM index (Gompers, Ishii 
and Metrick 2003) 
Positive relationship with operating 
performance and no significant 
relationship with stock returns 
ROA 
Stock returns 
 Bhagat and 
Bolton (2008) 
US Varies with sample 
period 
1990 – 2004 
Using seven different governance 
measures  
 
Mixed relationship with different 
financial measures 
 
Tobin’s Q 
ROA 
Stock returns 
 
 Bozec et al. 
(2010) 
Canada 188 firms 
2001 – 2005 
Using ROB index published by 
the Globe and Mail  
Positively related with financial 
performance and no relation with firm 
value  
Tobin’s Q 
Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) 
Sources: Compiled by the researcher. 
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In contrast to the findings of previous US studies reviewed above, Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein (2007) find a negative relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance. They construct a governance index of five main provisions to examine a 
sample of 312 US firms in 2001 and 2002. Similarly, Bebchuk et al. (2009) find that there 
is a negative relationship between a composite corporate governance index (Entrenchment-
Index ‘E-Index’) and firm value. This negative relationship may imply that the costs of 
implementing good corporate governance practices possibly outweigh the associated 
benefits (see Ammann et al., 2011). 
However, other studies conducted in the US and Canada suggest that there is no 
significant relationship between corporate governance indices and firm performance (e.g., 
Klein et al., 2005; Koehn and Ueng, 2005; Lehn et al., 2007; Gupta et al., 2009; Epps and 
Cereola, 2008; Daines et al., 2010). Lehn et al. (2007) use both GIM and Bebchuk, Cohen 
and Ferrel’s (BCF)29 indices to examine 1,500 firms in a six-year window from 1990 to 
2002. They report that there is no significant relationship between corporate governance 
practices and firm performance, as measured by market-to-book ratio. Similarly, Epps and 
Cereola (2008) find no statistically significant evidence to support the correlation between 
CGQ index and firms’ operating performance, as measured by ROA and ROE among 230 
US listed firms from 2002 to 2004. In Canada, Klein et al. (2005) and Gupta et al. (2009) 
use the Report on Business index (ROB), and both find no evidence of overall governance 
mechanisms helping to improve firm performance. Interestingly, Daines et al. (2010) use 
four corporate governance indices, CGQ, GMI, AGR and TCL,
30 
to study a large sample of 
6,827 US listed firms. They find no significant relationship between compliance with good 
corporate governance practices and firm value.  
 Finally, a number of studies report mixed findings. For example, Core et al. (2006) 
use the GIM index to investigate the relationship between corporate governance practices 
and firm performance for 9,917 firm-year observations from 1990 to 1999. They find that 
firms complying with shareholders’ rights had lower operating performance, as measured 
by ROA. However, they also find no evidence of the effect of corporate governance 
practices on abnormal stock returns. Bozec et al. (2010) adopt the Report on Business 
(ROB) index
31
 to examine the effect of corporate governance behaviour on firm 
performance in 188 Canadian firms from 2001 to 2005. Overall, their results suggest that 
                                                 
29
 The BCF index is constructed by Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2004). 
30
 AGR is Accounting and Governance Risk ranking and TCL is The Corporate Library. 
31
 The ROB index is constructed by summing four sub-indices: (i) board composition; (ii) shareholding and 
compensation policies; (iii) policies relating to shareholders’ rights; and (iv) disclosure policies. The ROB 
developed the measures based on best practices and the recommendations of US and Canadian corporate 
governance regulators. 
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firms with a high level of compliance with governance provisions perform better 
financially. However, they find that Tobin’s Q is not related to corporate governance 
practices. Importantly, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) use seven different corporate governance 
indices and measures
32
 to investigate whether results are different based on the employed 
indices. The study shows different signs of the relationship based on the type of corporate 
governance index and financial performance measures used.     
 
3.4.2.2 The Compliance-Index Model and Firm Financial Performance in Western 
Europe and Other Developed Countries  
 Table 3.2 provides of the findings of studies conducted in Western Europe/other 
developed countries on the relationship between composite governance indices and firm 
performance. Generally, and in contrast to the mixed results observed in the studies on the 
US and Canada, evidence from Western Europe and other developed countries suggests a 
positive relationship between corporate governance and financial performance. For 
instance, Drobetz et al. (2004) construct a broad corporate governance rating index (CGR) 
consisting of 30 governance provisions. Using a sample of 91 publicly traded German 
firms in 2002, they find that firms with better corporate governance showed good financial 
performance.  
 In the UK, Clacher et al. (2008) find a positive relationship between the level of 
compliance with corporate governance and Tobin’s Q/ROA for a sample of 63 firms from 
2003 to 2005. To investigate this relationship, they develop a corporate governance index 
derived from the main recommendations by the London Stock Exchange (2003 UK 
Combined Code). Their finding is consistent with agency theory’s prediction that high 
compliance with corporate governance principles enhances shareholders’ wealth. 
   Beiner et al. (2006) and Toledo (2010) develop indices consisting of 38 governance 
provisions of the Swiss code and 25 governance provisions of the Spanish code, 
respectively. These two studies use Tobin’s Q and market-to-book ratio as proxies for 
market-based performance measures. Both find that firms with higher corporate 
governance standards received higher market valuation. Similarly, Bauer et al. (2008) find 
a positive relationship between corporate governance and firm performance among 315 
Japanese firms in 2004. They employ the Metrics Institutional Index consisting of six 
different governance dimensions for their study. Henry (2008) constructs a self-regulated 
governance index extracted from local governance regulations to examine 116 Australian 
                                                 
32
 These seven governance measures include GIM by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), BCF by Bebchuk, 
Cohen and Ferrell (2004), Gov-Score by Brown and Caylor (2006), TCL by The Corporate Library, board 
independence, board ownership and CEO duality. 
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firms from 1992 to 2002. He finds that firm value, as proxied by Tobin’s Q, is positively 
associated with good governance practices.  
 
3.4.2.3 The Compliance-Index Model and Firm Financial Performance in Emerging 
Countries  
  A number of studies have examined the link between governance compliance 
indices and financial performance in emerging economies (e.g., Black, 2001; Bai et al., 
2004; Black et al., 2006a and b; Cheung et al., 2007; Garay and Gonzalez, 2008; Price et 
al., 2011; Black et al., 2012; Munisi and Randoy, 2013; Tariq and Abbas, 2013). Table 3.3 
offers a summary of the findings of previous studies that were conducted in emerging 
countries on the relationship between composite corporate governance indices and firm 
financial performance. Generally, the evidence in Table 3.3 suggests that the findings of 
the majority of previous studies conducted in emerging economies show a positive 
association with firm financial performance. Black’s (2001) study is one of the first studies 
conducted in a developing country that constructed a compliance-index model to examine 
the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. Black analyses data 
from 21 major Russian firms in 1999 and adopts the Brunswick Warburg Investment Bank 
index. He finds that corporate governance practices impacted positively on firm value. 
Similarly, Black et al. (2006b) investigate the same relationship for a sample of Russian 
firms. Their study consists of a sample of 99 firms for a seven-year period from 1999 to 
2005. They find a significant relationship between corporate governance and firm value, 
which is consistent with Black (2001).   
 Similarly, Bai et al. (2004) report a positive effect of corporate governance on firm 
value, as measured by Tobin’s Q, among 1,051 Chinese listed firms from 1999 to 2001. In 
the same context, Cheung et al. (2007) analyse 168 large Hong Kong firms and construct a 
corporate governance index based on the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) standards and the Hong Kong Code. They find a positive 
governance-performance relationship using the market-to-book ratio.  
 Garay and Gonzalez (2008) construct a corporate governance index of 17 
provisions using 46 Venezuelan listed firms in 2004. They report a positive effect of 
governance on performance. Recently, Black et al. (2012) find that good corporate 
governance practices have a positive impact on firm value, as measured by Q-ratio, among 
Brazilian firms.  
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Table 3.2: Summary of existing studies on the relationship between corporate governance index and firm performance: Empirical studies in Western Europe and 
other developed countries 
Direction of 
Relationship 
Authors Country Sample  Governance Measure Empirical Findings Performance 
Measure(s) 
Positive Drobetz et al. 
(2004) 
 
Germany 91 public firms 
2002 
Constructing a broad CG index 
(CGR)  
CG is highly correlated with operating 
performance and market valuation 
Tobin’s Q 
Market to book ratio 
Historical returns 
Dividends yields 
Sales and assets growth 
 
 Fernandez-
Rodrignez et al., 
(2004) 
Spain 57 listed firms  
1998 – 2000 
Constructing CG index extracted 
from  the Spanish Code of Best 
Practices  
 
The market reacts positively to 
announcements of compliance with CG 
 
Daily abnormal returns  
 Beiner et al. 
(2006) 
Switzerland 109 firms 
2002  
Constructing CG index extracted 
from the Swiss Code of Best 
Practices 
 
High CG standards receive higher market 
valuations 
Tobin’s Q 
Market to book ratio 
 Clacher et al. 
(2008) 
UK 63 firms from FTSE 
100 
2003 – 2005 
Constructing governance index 
derived explicitly from the 2003 
Combined Code  
 
Compliance with the Combined Code 
positively impacts firm value and 
performance  
Tobin’s Q 
IAROA 
(Industry Adjusted 
Return on Assets) 
 
 Henry (2008) Australia 116 firms (1,127 
observations) 
1992 – 2002 
 
Adopted  CG index, extracted from 
Australian regulations 
Positive relationship with market value 
 
Tobin’s Q 
Tobin’s Q adjusted 
 
 Bauer et al. 
(2008) 
Japan 315 firms  
2004 
Employing Governance Metrics 
Institutional Index  
Positive and significant association with 
firm performance 
Stock returns 
 Toledo (2010) 
 
Spain 106 firms 
2007 
Constructing GOV-I index based on 
the Spanish Code of Best Practices 
An overall positive impact on firm value Tobin’s Q 
Market to book ratio 
 
Sources: Compiled by the researcher. 
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Table 3.3: Summary of existing studies on the relationship between corporate governance index and firm performance: Empirical studies in emerging countries 
Direction of 
Relationship 
Authors Country Sample  Governance Measure Empirical Findings Performance Measure(s) 
Positive Black 
(2001)  
Russia 21 major firms 
1999 
Using governance index developed by 
the Brunswick Warburg Investment 
Bank 
CG behaviour has a powerful positive 
effect on market value 
Market to book value.  
 Bai et al. 
(2004) 
China 1,051 Listed firms  
1999 - 2001 
 
Self-constructed CG index  CG mechanisms positively affect 
market value 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
 Black et al. 
(2006b) 
Russia 99 firms (964  
observations) 
1999 – 2005 
Using six governance indices: 
Brunswick, Troika Dialog, S&P 
Governance, S&P Disclosure, ICLG 
and RID 
 
Positive and significant relationship 
with market value 
 
Tobin’s Q 
Market to book ratio 
Market to sales ratio 
 
 Cheung et 
al. (2007) 
Hong Kong 168 largest listed 
firms  
2002 
 
Constructing CG index based on the 
OECD principles and Hong Kong Code 
Positive and significant association with 
market value 
 
Market to book ratio 
 Garay and 
Gonzalez 
(2008) 
Venezuela 46 listed firms from 
CSE 
2004 
Constructing CG index extracted from 
Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2005) 
 
Positive impact on market valuation Tobin’s Q 
Dividend Payout Ratio  
Price to book ratio 
  
 Tariq and 
Abbas 
(2013) 
Pakistan 119 firms 
2003 – 2010 
Constructing CG index extracted from 
Pakistani CG Code issued in 2002 
Positive relationship between CG and 
different financial measures 
  
ROA 
ROE 
ROCE 
No Relation Price et al. 
(2011) 
Mexico 107 firms (518 
observations) 
2000 – 2004 
Constructing CG index based on 
Mexico Code of Best Practices 
No association with firm performance 
 
ROA 
Tobin’s Q 
Sales growth  
Stock market returns 
 
Mixed Relation Black et al. 
(2006a) 
Korea 515 firms 
2001 
Constructing  governance index KCGI  Positive correlation with market value 
and no significant relationship with 
financial performance 
 
Tobin’s Q 
Market to book ratio 
Market to sales ratio 
Ordinary income 
EBIT 
EBITPA 
Sources: Compiled by the researcher. 
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Tariq and Abbas (2013) examine the relationship between corporate governance 
practices and firm performance among 119 listed firms from 2003 to 2010. Using a multi-
dimensional performance framework, they find a significantly positive impact of 
compliance on firm performance. Findings obtained from previous studies by Black 
(2001), Black et al. (2006b), Bai et al. (2004), Cheung et al. (2007), Black et al. (2012) 
and Tariq and Abbas (2013) suggest that good corporate governance practices impact 
positively on firm performance.  
In contrast to the evidence of a positive effect of good corporate governance on 
firm performance reported by studies conducted in developing countries, Price et al. (2011) 
find that firm performance is not affected by good corporate governance practices among a 
sample of Mexican listed firms. Specifically, they study 107 Mexican firms from 2000 to 
2004 using firm and market performance measures.  
 
3.4.2.4 The Compliance-Index Model and Firm Financial Performance in Cross-
Country Studies  
 The findings from cross-country studies are largely consistent with the single-
country studies conducted in Western Europe and emerging markets. Table 3.4 contains a 
summary of the findings of previous cross-country studies on the link between composite 
corporate governance indices and firm financial performance. Generally, the findings in 
Table 3.4 suggest a positive relationship between better governance practices and firm 
performance (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Chen et al., 2009; 
Morey et al., 2009; Bruno and Claessens, 2010; Renders et al., 2010; Ammann et al.,  
2011; Ammann et al., 2013; Munisi and Randoy, 2013; Krafft et al., 2013).  
The literature on cross-country studies can be divided into three main groups, 
including studies conducted in: (i) developed countries; (ii) developing countries; and (iii) 
both developed and developing countries. Ammann et al. (2013) use a sample of about 852 
firms from 14 European countries
33
 from 2003 to 2007. They construct a corporate 
governance index based on the Governance Metrics International Index (GMI), consisting 
of 64 governance attributes divided into six sub-sections. They report a positive link 
between good corporate governance practices and firm performance. Similarly, Ammann 
et al. (2011) use the same dataset and sample adopted by Ammann et al. (2013). They use 
three indices named CG1, CG2 and CG3
34
 and find a significant and positive relationship 
                                                 
33
 The 14 EU countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. 
34
 Ammann et al. (2011) derived the three alternative additive corporate governance indices of the GMI index 
used in Ammann et al. (2013), consisting of 64 provisions. 
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with firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q. However, Ikaheimo et al. (2011) investigate 
Nordic countries and find that improvement in governance behaviour is negatively 
correlated with firm value, but positively influences ROE and the profit margin. 
 Other cross-country studies on developing countries find a positive relationship 
between compliance with good governance standards and firm performance. The Credit 
Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) index is a commercial governance rating index that has 
been adopted in many cross-country studies conducted in emerging economies (e.g., 
Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Chen et al., 2009). The CLSA 
governance index consists of 57 provisions covering seven broad categories: (i) 
management discipline; (ii) transparency; (iii) independence; (iv) accountability; (v) 
responsibility; (vi) fairness; and (vii) social awareness. Using the CLSA governance index, 
Klapper and Love (2004) examine the association between good governance practices and 
firm value using a sample of 374 listed firms from 14 emerging economies for the years 
1998 and 1999. They show that corporate governance, as proxied by the CLSA index, is 
closely related to better operating performance and firm value, as measured by ROA and 
Tobin’s Q, respectively.  
Similarly, Durnev and Kim (2005) use the CLSA index to investigate the influence 
of corporate governance on firm performance in 27 emerging countries from 1999 to 2000. 
They find that firms with higher governance rankings have higher market valuation than 
those with lower governance rankings. Additionally, Munisi and Randoy (2013) study the 
relationship between good governance standards and financial performance using data on 
firms from Sub-Saharan African countries from 2005 to 2009. They find a positive 
association between good governance practices and firm financial performance. 
There are a few cross-country studies whose samples are from both developed and 
developing economies. Bruno and Claessens (2010) construct three indices, Board-
Committee Index, Board-Entrenchment Index and Board-Independence Index, to examine 
the association between good governance practices and firm value in a large cross-country 
sample of 2,350 firms from 2003 to 2005. This large sample represents firms from 23 
developed and developing countries.
35
 Using different performance proxies, including 
Tobin’s Q and ROA, the study reports that, in general, the relationship between 
governance indices and firm financial performance is statistically significant and positive.
                                                 
35
 The 23 countries are from Europe, Asia and the US. More specifically, the sample included Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the 
US. 
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36
 These countries are Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey. 
37
 The 27 emerging countries are from different continents, including Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America. 
38
 The 21 countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, South 
Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela. 
39
 The 23 countries include European and Asian countries and the US. More specifically: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. 
40
 These countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.  
Table 3.4: Summary of existing studies on the relationship between corporate governance index and firm performance: Cross-country empirical studies  
Direction of Relationship Authors Country Sample  Governance Measure Empirical Findings Performance 
Measure(s) 
Positive Klapper and 
Love (2004) 
Cross-country 
(14 emerging 
countries 36) 
 
374 firms from 
CLSA  
1998 – 1999 
Using Credit Lyonnais Securities 
Asia Index (CLSA)  
Significant positive correlation 
with operating performance and 
market valuation 
Tobin’s Q 
ROA 
 
 Durnev and 
Kim (2005) 
Cross-country 
(27 emerging 
countries37) 
 
859 firms from 
CLSA   
1999 – 2000 
Using CLSA index  Positive association with market 
value 
Tobin’s Q 
 
 Chen et al. 
(2009) 
Cross-country 
(17 emerging 
countries) 
 
559 firm-year  
observations from 
CLSA  
2001 - 2002 
 
Using CLSA index, excluding 
social responsibility category 
CG has a significantly positive 
effect on the low cost of equity  
Estimating the ex ante of 
equity 
 Morey et al. 
(2009) 
Cross-country 
(21 emerging 
countries38) 
200 firms (390 
observations) 
2001 – 2006 
Using governance index compiled 
by AllianceBernstein  
Positive link with firm value Positive link with firm 
value 
 Bruno and 
Clsessens 
(2010) 
Cross-country 
(23 countries39) 
 
2,350 firms from 
ISS  
2003 – 2005 
Constructing three CG indices, 
including committee, independence 
board and Entrenchment index 
 
Positive relationship with firm 
performance 
Tobin’s Q 
ROA 
Market to book ratio 
 Renders et al. 
(2010) 
Cross-country 
(14 European  
countries) 
 
240 firms from the 
FTSEurofirst 300 
(1,199 observations)  
1999 - 2003 
 
Using Deminor index based on 
provisions comprising over 300 
criteria  
CG leads to better financial 
performance and market value 
Tobin’s Q 
ROA 
ROE 
Market to book ratio 
 
 Ammann et al. 
(2011) 
Cross-country 
( 22 developed 
countries40) 
6,663 firm-year 
observations from 
GMI 
2003 – 2007 
Constructing three CG indices from 
GMI  
Positive relationship with market 
value 
Tobin’s Q 
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41
 The 15 European countries include: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. 
42
 The sample includes all Sub-Saharan countries, excluding South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. 
       
Table 3.4 (Continued): Summary of existing studies on the relationship between corporate governance index and firm performance: Cross-country empirical 
studies  
Direction of Relationship Authors Country Sample  Governance Measure Empirical Findings Performance 
Measure(s) 
 Ammann et al. 
(2013) 
Cross-country 
(14 European 
countries)  
 
3,102 firm-year 
observations from 
GMI  
2003 – 2007 
Constructing CG index based on 
Governance Metrics International 
Index (GMI)  
CG significantly increases firm 
value and capital expenditures 
 
Tobin’s Q 
Capital expenditures 
 Krafft et al. 
(2013) 
Cross-country 
(24 continental 
countries) 
8,487 firm-year 
observations  
2003 – 2008 
Corporate Governance Quotient 
(CGQ) index from 
RiskMetrics/Institutional 
Shareholder Services 
CGQ significantly improves firm 
value  
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
Mixed Relation Bauer et al. 
(2004) 
Cross-country 
(15 European 
countries41) 
260 firms from 
FTSE Euro top 300 
1996 – 2001 
Using Deminor index  Positive relationship with firm 
value and negative relationship 
with financial performance  
Tobin’s Q 
REO 
Net profit margin 
 
 Ikaheimo et al.  
(2011) 
Cross-country 
(Nordic 
countries) 
545 firms (3,277 
observations) 
1999 – 2004 
Using governance index extracted 
from GIM  
Positive influence on operating 
performance, negative impact on 
firm value and no effect on stock 
return 
 
Tobin’s Q  
Net sales growth 
REO 
Net profit margin 
 Munisi and 
Randoy (2013) 
Sub-Saharan 
African42 
273 and 307 firm-
year observations 
2005 - 2009  
Constructed CG index of 39 
provisions consisting of four sub-
indices 
Positive relationship with firm 
profitability and negative 
relationship with firm value  
Tobin’s Q 
ROA 
 
Sources: Compiled by the researcher. 
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  Similarly, Renders et al. (2010) study 14 European economies and adopt the 
Deminor Governance Index. They examine a sample of 240 firms from 1999 to 2003. 
Their findings show that improvement in corporate governance ratings is associated with 
better performance. Similarly, Krafft et al. (2013) examine the association between 
corporate governance and performance using a sample of continental data consisting of 24 
countries from 2003 to 2008. They find a positive association between good corporate 
governance practices and firm value. 
 
3.4.2.5 Variations among Results using the Compliance-Index Model   
 As the above discussion suggests, the evidence on the relationship between 
corporate governance indices and firm performance using the compliance-index model is 
generally mixed and there are noticeable differences. Specifically, North American (US 
and Canada) studies have mixed results. Regarding Western Europe and other developed 
countries, the majority of studies report a positive effect of good governance practices on 
financial performance. The relationship between good governance standards and firm 
value in emerging markets and cross-country studies is positive. 
  While there are some observable variations in the evidence, especially the US 
evidence, limited studies have focused on the factors that may explain the mixed findings. 
Variability in results may, however, be explained by a number of factors. First, the 
relationship may be affected by econometric problems, such as endogeneity, selection bias 
and a lack of statistical power (Renders et al., 2010). In addition, there are differences 
among findings based on the performance measure used, such as ROA and ROE (Bozec et 
al., 2010).  
Second, differences in the effectiveness of the market for corporate control, the 
implementation and enforcement of the law, economic development and the cultural 
environment explain differences in governance quality and performance (Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009; Toledo, 2010; Judge, 2011; Black et 
al., 2012; Salterio et al., 2013). For example, studies employing samples from emerging 
economies show a positive correlation (e.g., Black, 2001; Black et al., 2006a; Cheung et 
al., 2007; Garay and Gonzalez, 2008; Tariq and Abbas, 2013) despite the legal 
requirements and market behaviour being generally weak in these countries (Klapper and 
Love, 2004). Bozec et al. (2010) explain that developing countries seek to attract potential 
investors and reduce the cost of capital by adopting good corporate governance practices. 
However, in some developed countries, such as the US and Canada, governance 
mechanisms are mainly adopted on a mandatory basis, ‘comply or else’, which leads to 
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convergence of governance standards at the firm level. The statistical implication is that 
there is limited variability in governance that explains differences in financial performance 
at firm level. Thus, any additional improvement in governance may not necessarily 
translate into a noticeable improvement in performance (Bozec and Bozec, 2012).  
 Third, using different indices can create mixed findings. Ammann et al. (2011) 
shed light on the fact that despite an increase in the use of the compliance-index model, 
there is no consensus on how to construct corporate governance indices. This problem is 
apparent, given the different indices used in the literature and whether local/global or self-
constructed/analysts’ ratings governance indices are appropriate to be used.  
 Consequently, corporate governance indices used in the literature are subject to 
criticism (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Daines et al., 2010; Ammann et al., 2013). First, some 
corporate governance ratings, such as the Corporate Governance Rating (CGR) index used 
by Drobetz et al. (2004), are developed based on surveys. These may be biased, as firms 
might overestimate the quality of their governance or might not respond properly if they 
have poor governance (Bozec and Bozec, 2012). Second, proxy-advising institutions that 
provide a ‘ready-to-use’ governance index, such as the CLSA, GMI and ROB, are confined 
to the largest public firms (e.g., Klein et al., 2005; Koehn and Ueng, 2005; Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein, 2007; Epps and Cereola, 2008; Chen et al., 2009). Therefore, limiting the 
data to large firms and neglecting small and medium firms may impair the generalisability 
of the resulting findings.  
 
3.4.2.6  The Compliance-Index Model and the Saudi Corporate Governance Index 
(SCGI)  
As discussed in Subsection 3.4.1, the compliance-index model is a relatively new 
approach. Therefore, it has not yet been used in studies conducted in Saudi Arabia. 
Consequently, the current study seeks to contribute to the existing literature on developing 
countries generally and Saudi Arabia particularly by examining the association between 
governance practice and corporate financial performance among Saudi listed firms. In 
order to examine the governance-performance relationship in Saudi listed firms, the Saudi 
Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) is constructed of 65 provisions.
43
 The SCGI consists 
of four broad corporate governance sections (sub-indices), including: (i) the board of 
directors and board sub-committees; (ii) disclosure and transparency; (iii) the internal 
control system; and (iv) the rights of shareholders and general assembly.   
                                                 
43
 The Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) is discussed in detail in Chapter Five in terms of its 
sources, provisions, validity and reliability. 
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As the empirical evidence from emerging economies mainly suggests a positive 
relationship between good corporate governance indices and firm performance (e.g., Black, 
2001; Bai et al., 2004; Cheung et al., 2007; Garay and Gonzalez, 2008; Black et al., 2012; 
Tariq and Abbas, 2013), the fifteenth and final hypothesis to be tested is formulated as 
follows: 
H15: There is a significant and positive relationship between the SCGI and firm 
financial performance, as measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q.  
 
3.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented a review of theoretical and empirical literature on the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm financial performance. To review the 
relevant studies, the chapter was divided into three main sections: (i) a relevant and critical 
review of corporate governance theories; (ii) investigation of the level of compliance with 
and determinants of voluntary corporate governance disclosure; and (iii) investigation of 
the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial 
performance. The first section examined corporate governance theories related to both 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure and corporate financial performance. This study 
adopts a multiple-theoretical framework to conduct the research analysis. Agency theory is 
primarily considered, while managerial signalling, stakeholder, stewardship and resource 
dependence theories are also reviewed. This helps develop an understanding of corporate 
governance behaviour and also helps in the subsequent interpretation of the empirical 
results.  
In the second section, the level of compliance with corporate governance codes and 
determinants of voluntary corporate governance disclosure were investigated. The 
evidence suggests that developed countries comply with corporate governance codes better 
than developing countries. This can be attributed to differences in the development and 
effectiveness of the legal, economic and cultural systems between developed and 
developing countries. The evidence from both developed and developing countries showed 
that there are a number of governance mechanisms that determine the level of compliance 
with good corporate governance codes, such as ownership structure, independence of 
directors, board size and audit firm size.  
The third section examined the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and financial performance. The existing literature showed that empirical 
studies on both developed and developing countries use two different models: the 
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equilibrium-variable model and the compliance-index model. Both models were reviewed. 
The equilibrium-variable model helps explore the influence of individual corporate 
governance mechanisms on financial performance. In contrast, the compliance-index 
model involves an examination of the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance. Generally, existing studies have failed to establish conclusive results on the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm financial performance, either in 
developed and developing countries.   
The next chapter sheds light on the research design, including the mixed-methods 
research approach used in this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
119 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4. INTRODUCTION  
 An appropriate research approach is vital in developing and conducting a research 
project. The importance of the selection of the research method stems from its role in 
achieving reliable results. Thus, this chapter presents the research design and methods used 
in this study. It specifically seeks to achieve three main objectives. First, this chapter 
explores the philosophical assumptions of the research paradigms that underpin the study. 
Second, it presents the compatibility of the selected research design with the research 
objectives and questions. Third, this chapter addresses the challenges in using a mixed-
methods research design in the current study. The remaining part of the chapter is 
organised as follows. Section 4.1 presents the theoretical assumptions underlying each 
research paradigm. Section 4.2 presents a discussion on the selection of the research design 
used in this research. Section 4.3 addresses the challenges of using a mixed-methods 
design, while Section 4.4 presents the chapter summary. 
 
 
4.1 THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE RESEARCH 
PARADIGMS  
 Collis and Hussey (2009) define a research paradigm as a framework that guides 
how research is conducted, based on individual philosophies, perceptions, attitudes and 
assumptions about the world and the nature of knowledge. They review the history of 
research paradigms and state that there has been only one research paradigm for hundreds 
of years, because the scientific method of conducting research referred to a single approach 
only. Later, with the initiation of industrialisation and capitalism, researchers realised the 
importance of distinguishing between natural sciences and social sciences. Thus, the 
emergence of the social sciences opened up space for other research paradigms (Morgan 
and Smircich, 1980). 
 Two main research paradigms have emerged: positivism and interpretivism, which 
are mostly used in management research (Bryman, 2012). Positivists support scientists’ 
view that the nature of knowledge is based on realism. On the other hand, interpretivists 
rely on the principles of idealism, and explore the understanding of social phenomena. The 
following subsection presents the details of each paradigm and its assumptions. 
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4.1.1 Positivism  
 The positivism paradigm was developed in the late eighteenth century in the work 
of some of the early positivists; for example, August Comte, Mill, Durkheim and Locke 
(Creswell, 2009). Positivists believe that reality is independent of social norms and 
assumptions, and develop theories based on empirical research, such as observation and 
experimentation (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2011). Walliman (2005) indicates that 
positivism generates knowledge that is based on scientific logic and mathematical proof. 
Collis and Hussey (2009, p.56) explain positivism in management research thus: “Today, 
researchers conducting business research under a paradigm that stems from positivism 
still focus on theories to explain and/or predict social phenomena”. Thus, positivists still 
work with logical reasoning, precision and objectivity based on evidence and observation 
rather than subjectivity and intuitive interpretations.  
Positivists explain causal relationships between variables that can help in 
developing theories from the findings. Furthermore, positivists are of the view that social 
phenomena can be measured, and thus they can be interpreted using quantitative methods 
of analysis (Bryman, 2012; Saunders et al., 2007). In this regard, Creswell and Clark 
(2011) suggest that researchers can make claims to knowledge based on: (i) determinism or 
cause-and-effect thinking; (ii) reductionism, by narrowing and focusing on selecting 
variables to interrelate; and (iii) detailed observations and measurement of the variables. 
The positivist paradigm is used in the current research to examine the empirical 
relationship among corporate governance mechanisms, voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure and firm financial performance.  
 
4.1.2 Interpretivism  
Interpretivism is based on the principles of idealism and social reality not being 
objective. Rather, interpretation of social phenomena is highly subjective and shaped by 
individuals’ perceptions and beliefs (Morgan and Smircich, 1980; Collis and Hussey, 
2009). Following an increase in attention to social phenomena, some scholars, such as 
Dilthey, Weber and Kant, advocated for interpretivism and began a countermovement to 
the positivist tradition in the late nineteenth century (Creswell, 1994). 
However, Morgan and Smircich (1980) and Collis and Hussey (2009) argue that 
interpretivism was developed in response to the perceived inadequacy of positivism in 
meeting the needs of social scientists. They identified criticisms of the positivism 
paradigm, which raised the following ideas about the interpretive paradigm: (i) it is 
impossible to separate people from the social contexts in which they exist; (ii) people 
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cannot be understood without examining the perceptions they have of their own activities; 
(iii) a highly structured research design imposes constraints on the results and may ignore 
other relevant findings; (iv) research is not an objective activity, but part of what 
researchers observe; and (v) capturing complex phenomena with a single measure is 
misleading. For example, a positivist cannot measure perceptions and beliefs in the depth 
required to explore the social issues of a phenomenon. Thus, the interpretive paradigm 
opens up the social world in innovative ways. 
 
While positivists focus on measuring social phenomena, interpretivism suggests 
exploring the complexity of social phenomena to develop an understanding (Bryman, 
2012). Creswell and Clark (2011) point out that the interpretivism paradigm tends to 
explore, explain and develop an understanding in order to clarify or illustrate the meaning 
of terms. This paradigm does not relate to the quantitative measures of phenomena that 
occur logically (scientifically) in the social world. As the interpretive paradigm is usually 
associated with the qualitative approach, this study uses semi-structured interviews in 
addition to the statistical analysis of quantitative data. Therefore, the interviews are useful 
in filling the gaps of the quantitative analysis of data, comparing and supporting the results 
from two methods (Saunders et al., 2007), and helping develop a deep understanding of the 
empirical results (Saunders et al., 2007; Boyd et al., 2012). Section 4.2 presents details of 
the fundamental reasons for using each paradigm. 
Panel A of Table 4.1 shows common terms of these two paradigms. Panel B 
presents a summary of the features of each paradigm, including sample size, hypotheses, 
theories, data, reliability, validity and generalisability of data. 
 
Table 4.1: Approaches within the two main paradigms 
Panel A: Common terms used to describe the paradigms  
Positivism Interpretivism 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Objective Subjective 
Scientific Humanist 
Traditionalist Phenomenological 
Panel B: Features of the paradigms 
Positivism Interpretivism 
Large sample is involved Used with small samples  
Concerned with hypothesis testing Helpful in generating theories 
Produces precise, objective and quantitative data Produces ‘rich’ subjective and qualitative data  
Produces results with high reliability but low 
validity 
Produces findings with low reliability but high 
validity 
Allows results to be generalised from the sample to 
the population 
All findings can be generalised from one setting to 
another setting 
Source: Collis and Hussey (2009, pp.58, 62). 
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4.1.3 Criteria for Selecting Paradigms 
Creswell (2009) suggests that there are four areas one must look at when selecting a 
research paradigm. These are: (i) the researcher’s worldview; (ii) the researcher’s 
experience; (iii) the researcher’s psychological attributes; and (iv) the nature of the 
problem. Table 4.2 presents the criteria for choosing a positivist or interpretivist research 
paradigm. First, researchers bring a certain worldview to the research, an outlook that 
favours either the positivist or the interpretivist paradigm regarding ontological, 
epistemological, axiological, rhetorical and methodological assumptions. In this regard, 
some researchers see reality as subjective, while others may take a more objective stance, 
using surveys or an experimental approach. Second, training and experience may be related 
to the first factor. A research paradigm can be selected according to the skills that 
researchers possess, such as quantitative and qualitative data analysis, writing and 
computer skills.  
 
 Third, psychological attributes are very important in deciding which research 
paradigm to select. Creswell and Clark (2011) indicate that positivism is a traditional mode 
of research, with carefully worked-out procedures and rules. In contrast, an interpretive 
research design requires more time because procedures are flexible.  
Fourth, the nature of the research problem is another important factor. Creswell and 
Clark (2011) suggest that if the nature of the problem calls for: (i) the identification of 
factors that influence an outcome; (ii) the utility of an intervention; or (iii) an 
understanding of the best predictors of an outcome, then the positivism paradigm is more 
Table 4.2: Criteria for selecting a paradigm 
Criteria Positivism Interpretivism 
Researcher’s worldview A researcher’s comfort with the 
ontological, epistemological, 
axiological, rhetorical and 
methodological assumptions of the 
positivism paradigm. 
A researcher’s comfort with the 
ontological, epistemological, 
axiological, rhetorical, and 
methodological assumptions of 
the interpretivism paradigm. 
Training and experience of 
researcher 
Technical writing skills, computer 
statistical skills, library skills. 
Literary writing skills, 
computer text-analysis skills, 
library skills. 
Researcher’s psychological 
attributes 
Comfort with rules and guidelines for 
conducting research, low tolerance for 
ambiguity and time for a study of short 
duration. 
Comfort with a lack of specific 
rules and procedures for 
conducting research, high 
tolerance for ambiguity and 
time for lengthy study. 
Nature of the problem Previously studied by other researchers 
so that a body of literature exists, along 
with known variables and existing 
theories. 
 
Exploratory research, variables 
unknown, context important, 
may lack a theoretical base for 
study. 
Source: Creswell (1994, p.9). 
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desirable and beneficial. On the other hand, interpretivism is more appropriate than 
positivism for exploring any social phenomena that have not been previously researched. 
 
4.1.4 Paradigms and Application to the Study 
Johnstone (2004) and Bryman (2012) suggest five types of philosophical 
assumptions that underpin these two paradigms. As shown in Table 4.3, these are 
ontological, epistemological, axiological, rhetorical and methodological assumptions. First, 
ontology is concerned with the nature of reality (Saunders et al., 2007). Collis and Hussey 
(2009) point out that positivists consider social reality as objective and external to social 
factors. Also, quantitative research measures objectivity using statistical analysis (Molina-
Azorin, 2012). In contrast, interpretivists believe that social reality is subjective because it 
is constructed in a social context. Therefore, multiple realities exist in a situation, such as 
the researcher’s and the interviewee’s (Creswell, 1994).  
This study is conducted in the particular business context and culture of Saudi 
Arabia. This environment contains an integrated framework including regulators, 
legislations, firms and stakeholders. One key aspect of this study is to consider the 
corporate governance practices in the Saudi corporate context. Therefore, a quantitative 
approach is used to measure the level of corporate governance disclosure and firm 
financial performance. In contrast, key stakeholders’ perceptions are required to interpret 
the statistical findings through investigating the level of awareness and appreciation of the 
importance of corporate governance. This also implicates multiple realities experienced by 
the practitioners. Therefore, semi-structured interviews are an appropriate choice to 
support the quantitative findings. 
 Second, the epistemological issue concerns the question of what is (or should be) 
acceptable knowledge in a discipline (Bryman, 2012). Epistemological research examines 
the relationship between the researcher and what is being researched. In this regard, 
Creswell (2009) states that the researcher should be independent of what he/she researches 
in this paradigm. Therefore, quantitative researchers attempt to reduce bias by using an 
appropriate sampling approach, and seek to be objective in carrying out the research 
process, for example during data collection and analysis.  
In contrast, interpretivism limits the distance between the researcher and that being 
researched (Collis and Hussey, 2009). Thus, qualitative research is different from 
quantitative research because it allows for closer interaction with human beings in the 
social context, or observing social phenomena over a long period of time (see Table 4.2). 
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 In this study, corporate governance practices in Saudi Arabia are examined 
empirically using the firms’ annual reports. This allows the researcher to be independent of 
what is being researched. In contrast to testing corporate governance disclosure and firm 
financial performance, exploring the effects of corporate governance reforms requires 
interaction with practitioners. Therefore, the interpretivist paradigm suggests semi-
structured interviews to develop a researcher’s interaction with interviewees. 
 Third, the axiological assumption underpins the role of values in this study. 
Saunders et al. (2007) argue that researchers demonstrate axiological skills to express these 
values as a foundation for making judgments about the research they are carrying out and 
how they set about doing it. Positivists consider the subjects under study unaffected by 
their research activities, but there may be some effect after the study is conducted. 
However, interpretivists believe that researchers should exhibit ethical and moral values 
(Collis and Hussey, 2009). Therefore, qualitative research is more value-laden and 
considers research ethics substantially more than quantitative research (Creswell, 2009).  
This study constructed a corporate governance index to evaluate firms’ compliance 
with the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) and its impact on financial 
performance. Thus, the results of this evaluation are expressed in numbers. Other parts of 
the study investigate the level of awareness and appreciation of good corporate governance 
practices among key stakeholders; they are not expressed in numbers, but through a 
descriptive assessment of interviewees. 
Fourth, the rhetorical assumption focuses on the language used in the research. 
Each paradigm has different rhetorical perspectives. The positivism paradigm is usually 
expressed in impersonal and formal language based on accepted terms, such as 
relationships and comparisons between variables, where concepts and variables are clearly 
defined (Creswell, 2009). In contrast, Collis and Hussey (2009) suggest that the 
interpretive design prefers a writing style reflecting the immediacy of the research and the 
researcher’s involvement.  
Fifth, the methodological assumption is concerned with how research should be 
undertaken, including the theoretical and philosophical framework and its implications for 
the chosen methods (Saunders et al., 2007). As shown in Table 4.3, positivism uses a 
deductive process to test hypotheses based on a cause-and-effect relationship. 
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Table 4.3: Positivism and  interpretivism paradigm assumptions 
Assumption Concept Positivism Interpretivism 
Ontological  The nature of 
reality. 
Reality is objective and 
singular, separate from the 
researcher. 
Reality is subjective and multiple, 
as seen by participants. 
Epistemological The relationship 
of the researcher 
to that being 
researched.  
Researcher is independent from 
that being researched. 
Researcher interacts with that 
being researched. 
Axiological The role of 
values. 
Research is value-free and 
unbiased. 
Researcher acknowledges that 
research is value-laden and biases 
are present. 
Rhetorical The language of 
research. 
Researcher writes in a formal 
style and uses the passive voice, 
accepted quantitative words and 
set definitions.  
 
Researcher writes in an informal 
style and uses the personal voice, 
accepted qualitative terms and 
limited definitions.  
 
Methodological 
 
The process of 
research. 
Deductive process 
Study of cause and effect with 
static design (categories are 
isolated beforehand) 
Research is context-free 
Generalisations leading to 
prediction, explanation and 
understanding 
Results are accurate and reliable 
through validity and reliability. 
Inductive process 
Study of mutual simultaneous 
shaping of factors with emerging 
design (categories identified 
during research process) 
Research is context-bound 
Patterns and/or theories are 
developed for understanding 
Findings are accurate and reliable 
through verification. 
 
Source: Creswell (1994, p.5) and Collis and Hussey (2009, p.58). 
 
Before conducting the study, positivists determine the concepts, variables and 
hypotheses. In the positivist approach, the methodology seeks to develop generalisability 
that contributes to finding clear predictions, explanations and understandings of some 
phenomena (see Table 4.3). This requires that the information and instruments remain 
valid and reliable (Johl et al., 2012). However, interpretivists use an inductive approach 
where information is generated from groups within data. This provides rich information 
and theories which help in interpreting social phenomena (Liew, 2007; Collis and Hussey, 
2009; Johl et al., 2012). 
This study employs both deductive and inductive approaches to explore the 
influence of corporate governance reforms in Saudi Arabia. Through the deductive 
process, corporate governance theories, such as agency, managerial signalling, stakeholder 
and resource dependence theories, are tested. The study also developed hypotheses to 
explain corporate governance practices. On the other hand, it was necessary to supplement 
an interpretative part of the study that explores corporate governance in the Saudi 
corporate context. This helps in developing an understanding of the statistical results. 
Thus, the qualitative part of this study employs an inductive approach using semi-
structured interviews. 
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4.2 THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
 This section discusses mixed-methods research, including quantitative and 
qualitative methods, according to the research objectives and questions. Therefore, this 
section sheds light on mixed-methods and why this approach was chosen.  
 
4.2.1 Mixed-Methods Research Design 
Saunders et al. (2007) define mixed-methods as using both quantitative and 
qualitative data in one study at the same time (parallel) or one after the other (sequential). 
This type of research has been welcomed because it achieves integration through analysing 
quantitative and qualitative data (Cassell et al., 2005; Boyd et al., 2012; Johl et al., 2012). 
An examination of previous mixed-methods studies suggests that mixed-methods research 
is beneficial in developing an understanding of corporate governance reforms and their 
relationship with voluntary corporate governance disclosure and firm financial 
performance (e.g., Boyd et al., 2012; Molina-Azorin, 2012; Johl et al., 2012; McNulty et 
al., 2013; Zattoni et al., 2013).  
Mixed methodology appeared in the late 1980s, when a number of publications 
focused on explaining what is now known as mixed-methods research design (Molina-
Azorin, 2012). This approach initially emerged in Western English-speaking countries, 
especially the US and the UK, in a number of disciplines, such as sociology, management 
and education (Creswell and Clark, 2011). 
Collis and Hussey (2009) point out that social science researchers mostly used only 
positivism or interpretivism paradigms before mixed-methods achieved popularity in the 
field of social sciences. For that reason, researchers in the middle of the 19
th
 century had 
no mechanism for dealing with a mix of quantitative and qualitative data in the same study. 
Creswell and Clark (2011) state that Campbell and Fiske first raised the idea of using two 
different types of data in one study in 1959. In particular, they discuss the inclusion of 
multiple sources of quantitative information to validate psychological traits. From that 
time, mixed-methods appeared in social science to enable researchers to deal with both 
quantitative and qualitative data. Thus, the importance of mixed-methods research has 
grown during the past twenty years (Molina-Azorin, 2012). 
Creswell and Clark (2011) suggest reasons for choosing mixed-methods as a 
research methodology. They explain that a mixed-methods approach helps overcome the 
deficiencies in a study if only a quantitative or qualitative approach is used. For example, 
quantitative research is less likely to answer ‘why’ a social phenomenon happens. 
Moreover, a quantitative approach does not provide detailed interpretation of the obtained 
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results (Cohen et al., 2002). Morgan and Smircich (1980) and Johl et al. (2012) argue that 
a qualitative approach alone provides less reliable and less credible findings. Thus, a 
mixed-methods design provides in-depth explanation and understanding of phenomena 
(Johl et al., 2012; Bryman, 2012).  
In recent years, management studies have paid close attention to mixed-methods 
designs because of the excessive attention given to the behaviour of individuals and firms 
(Clarke, 1998). It is widely agreed that mixed-methods designs generate more reliable and 
credible findings than any single method used in a study (Boyd et al., 2012; Molina-
Azorin, 2012). Molina-Azorin (2012) find that mixed-methods articles published in the 
Strategic Management Journal from 1980 to 2006 tend to be cited more often than single 
method articles. This means that mixed-methods studies are appreciated by researchers. 
Therefore, the mixed-methods design in this study makes a valuable contribution to 
corporate governance literature and studies on emerging economies (Mengoli et al., 2009; 
Johl et al., 2012; Molina-Azorin, 2012; McNulty et al., 2013; Zattoni et al., 2013).  
Quantitative approaches are the most popular approaches in corporate governance 
work (Skinner et al., 2000; Cassell et al., 2005; Boyd et al., 2012). For example, the 
literature on voluntary corporate governance disclosure (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; 
Alsaeed, 2006; Ntim et al., 2012a; Allegrini and Greco, 2013), the relationship between 
corporate governance and financial performance (e.g., Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Al-
Abbas, 2009; Ntim et al., 2012b; Munisi and Randoy, 2013; Tariq and Abbas, 2013), and 
ownership structure (e.g., Davies et al., 2005; Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007; 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009; Soliman, 2013a and b) rely extensively on quantitative 
data. Also, the literature suggests that few corporate governance studies use qualitative 
methods (Boyd et al., 2012).  
Cassell et al. (2005) claim that qualitative research in management studies is 
deficient for two main reasons. First, there is a lack of knowledge and expertise in using 
qualitative methods in business studies. This is because most of the research to date has 
used quantitative methods (Skinner et al., 2000; Boyd et al., 2012). Also, Cassell et al. 
(2005, p.5) argue that “... it is crucial that management researchers in both policy and 
academic areas have opportunities to be able to develop skills in the area of qualitative 
research, and be aware of the different assessment criteria available to evaluate the 
validity of qualitative research in the field”. Second, the inappropriate assessment criteria 
used by the reviewers of journals in qualitative business research hinders the expansion of 
research in this area (Cassell et al., 2005). Some reviewers demand that research articles 
using qualitative methods have to use high level of analysis of qualitative data and 
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excellent descriptive writing. Therefore, there is inadequate research into business studies 
that uses qualitative data (Soobaroyen and Mahadeo, 2012).  
 
4.2.2 Principles for Designing Mixed-Methods Research 
Creswell and Clark (2011) suggest key principles for designing mixed-methods 
research. First, the level of interaction between the quantitative and qualitative methods is 
an important principle. There are two levels of interaction: (i) the independent level; and 
(ii) the interactive level. The independent level relies on separating the quantitative and 
qualitative research questions and the processes of data collection and data analysis. The 
independent approach mixes the two methods in the study’s conclusion. The interactive 
approach happens at different stages during the study, usually before the final 
interpretation of the results. Thus, one research method depends on the other, or follows 
the other, during the data collection and analysis processes.  
Second, the researcher has to make sure that the methods used are appropriate for 
meeting the research objectives and research questions of the study (Morgan, 1998). The 
researcher needs to determine explicitly which method is more important (Greene et al., 
1989; Morgan, 1998). Creswell and Clark (2011) suggest three possible options to weight 
mixed-methods designs: equal priority, quantitative priority and qualitative priority. Third, 
the timescale of the research is another key principle. Timing within the mixed-methods 
design can be in one of three forms: concurrent, sequential or a multiphase combination.  
The current study initially focuses on the quantitative method because of the nature 
of the research problem, objectives and questions. This approach is desirable in examining 
the effect of issuing the Saudi governance code on voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure and financial performance. Also, the study employs the two methods separately 
at the independent level, initiating the quantitative method and drawing insight from the 
qualitative method later. In doing so, the study uses sequential timing by collecting and 
analysing quantitative data first. 
The importance of mixed-methods design was fundamental in designing the 
framework for this study. Creswell and Clark (2011) point out that there are four main 
mixed-methods designs: (i) the convergent parallel design; (ii) the explanatory sequential 
design; (iii) the exploratory sequential design; and (iv) the embedded design (see Figure 
4.1). 
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Figure 4.1: Prototypical versions of the four major research designs 
(a) The convergent parallel design 
 
 
(b) The explanatory sequential design 
 
(c) The exploratory sequential design 
 
(d) The embedded design 
 
Source: Creswell and Clark (2011, p.69). 
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 First, the convergent parallel design relies on conducting quantitative and 
qualitative methods simultaneously (see Figure 4.1.a). In this design, the researcher 
processes the methods equally and keeps them independent throughout data analysis, and 
then mixes the results to interpret them overall. Second, the explanatory sequential design 
depends on two distinct interaction phases (see Figure 4.1.b). Researchers use sequential 
timing, starting with the quantitative design, to collect and analyse data. Then, the 
qualitative method follows the empirical results to interpret the initial findings; for 
example, if a researcher conducts interviews to gain in-depth insights from quantitative 
results (e.g., Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Johl et al., 2012).  
Third, the exploratory sequential design is the opposite of the explanatory 
sequential design. It starts with qualitative data in the first phase (see Figure 4.1.c). Fourth, 
the embedded design occurs when the researcher collects and analyses quantitative and 
qualitative data within a traditional quantitative or qualitative design (see Figure 4.1.d). For 
example, the researcher may add a quantitative method to a qualitative one, such as a case 
study, or add a qualitative method within a quantitative one, such as an experiment. 
This study employs the explanatory sequential design. The rationale for using this 
design (two sequential stages) is summarised as follows. First, the qualitative method 
(interviews) provides additional analysis to explore the effect of corporate governance 
reforms on actual practices (Boyd et al., 2012; Molina-Azorin, 2012). Second, it seeks to 
increase the robustness of the empirical findings (Mengoli et al., 2009). Third, it aims to 
shed light on corporate governance reforms that are not developed in the quantitative 
analysis (Mengoli et al., 2009). 
 The explanatory sequential design is considered the most straightforward mixed-
methods design (Creswell and Clark, 2011). As discussed above, this design is conducted 
in two phases. In the current study, the first phase started with the quantitative method, 
through collecting and analysing quantitative data. In the second phase, some of the 
quantitative findings needed additional explanation (see Mengoli et al., 2009; Johl et al., 
2012). Therefore, these results were used to develop the qualitative method. More 
precisely, the quantitative results were used to develop some of the qualitative research 
questions, interview process and data collection procedures.  
To sum up, although the literature on mixed-methods research on corporate 
governance is limited, this study offers new insights into corporate governance research. 
Thus, the mixed-methods approach is desirable in achieving the research objectives and 
examining the research questions, as discussed in the following section.  
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Table 4.4: Association of research methods with research objective and questions 
Research Objectives Research Questions Methods 
1- Exploring the level of compliance 
with the SCGC among Saudi listed 
firms  
1- What is the level of compliance 
with the 2006 SCGC?  
Quantitative data 
obtained from firms’ 
annual reports 
2- Investigating whether the 
introduction of the SCGC has 
improved corporate governance 
practices  
2- Has the introduction of the 2006 
SCGC improving corporate 
governance practices? 
Quantitative data 
obtained from firms’ 
annual reports 
3- Attempting to explore the factors 
affecting voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure  
3- What are the factors that 
influence the level of compliance 
with the 2006 SCGC?  
Quantitative data 
obtained from firms’ 
annual reports 
4- Estimating the link between a 
number of individual corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm 
financial performance using 
equilibrium-variable model 
4- What is the association between 
individual corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm financial 
performance? 
Quantitative data 
obtained from firms’ 
annual reports 
5- Investigating the relationship 
between the level of compliance with 
the SCGC and firm financial 
performance using compliance-index 
model  
5- What is the relationship 
between compliance with the 2006 
SCGC and firm financial 
performance? 
Quantitative data 
obtained from firms’ 
annual  
6-Examining the level of awareness 
and appreciation of good corporate 
governance practices among key 
internal and external stakeholders of 
firms in Saudi Arabia by employing a 
qualitative research design. In addition, 
using a qualitative research design 
provides a unique opportunity to 
further understand and explain the 
quantitative findings 
6- What is the level of awareness 
and appreciation of importance of 
good corporate governance 
practices in Saudi Arabia among 
key stakeholders following 
corporate governance reforms? 
Qualitative data obtained 
from 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Source: Chapter One of the thesis. 
 
4.2.3 The Research Objectives and the Chosen Method 
As discussed in Chapter One, Saudi Arabia embarked upon corporate governance 
reforms in 2003, and the Capital Market Authority (CMA) released the SCGC in 2006. As 
shown in Table 4.4, the study seeks to achieve a number of objectives to explore the effect 
of such reforms in the Saudi corporate context. The study explores quantitatively the level 
of compliance with the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) and the ability of the 
code, as a voluntary regulation, to improve corporate governance practices in Saudi 
Arabia. Also, it aims to determine the factors influencing good corporate governance 
practices among Saudi listed firms. Furthermore, the study provides empirical evidence 
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from Saudi Arabia, as an emerging economy, to explain the relationship between 
compliance with the corporate governance code and firm financial performance.  
This study seeks to explore the impact of corporate governance reforms on key 
stakeholders’ awareness and appreciation of good governance practices. Semi-structured 
interviews are used to achieve this purpose. This enriches interpretation of the empirical 
results and exploration of corporate governance reforms in Saudi Arabia (Clarke, 1998; 
Johl et al., 2012). The next subsection discusses the methods used to answer each research 
question individually. 
 
4.2.4 The Quantitative and Qualitative Research Questions  
The research questions, to a large extent, motivated the choice of methodology. As 
presented in Chapter One, the central research question in the current study is: Has the 
publication of the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) in 2006 helped in improving 
corporate governance practices and does it impact on corporate performance in Saudi listed 
firms? The central question is divided into six sub-questions. The study reviewed the 
literature on corporate governance in choosing an appropriate approach to answer the sub-
questions. As shown in Table 4.4, the first five sub-questions are answered using 
quantitative data. In order to answer these questions, statistical analysis techniques are used 
to ensure results that are accurate, valid and reliable (Creswell, 2009; Collis and Hussey, 
2009).  
The first sub-question: What is the level of compliance with the 2006 SCGC? The 
second sub-question is: Has the introduction of the 2006 SCGC improving corporate 
governance practices? These two sub-questions attempt to investigate to what extent Saudi 
listed firms comply with the Saudi code, and whether introducing the Saudi code led to 
good corporate governance practices. The study follows prior literature by constructing a 
corporate governance index to examine the level of compliance among Saudi listed firms 
(Alsaeed, 2006; Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Ntim et al., 2012a; Allegrini and Greco, 2013).  
The third sub-question is: What are the factors that influence the level of 
compliance with the 2006 SCGC? In exploring this question, the study provides evidence 
of factors influencing compliance with the corporate governance code. As suggested by the 
corporate governance literature, board of directors’ characteristics and firm ownership 
structure are the main determinants of voluntary corporate governance disclosure (e.g., 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Chalevas, 2011; Samaha et al., 2012; 
Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). This sub-question is answered by 
exploring a cause-and-effect relationship. Specifically, board of directors’ characteristics 
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and firm ownership are explanatory variables, and the Saudi Corporate Governance Index 
(SCGI) is the dependent variable. 
The fourth sub-question is: What is the association between individual corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm financial performance? This model is also known as the 
equilibrium-variable model, and is the traditional approach (e.g., Vafeas and Theodorou, 
1998; Weir and Laing, 2000; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Mangena et al., 2012).The fifth 
sub-question is: What is the relationship between compliance with the 2006 SCGC and 
firm financial performance? The study constructed a compliance-index model to answer 
this question
44
. In line with recent studies (e.g., Black, 2001; Gompers et al., 2003; 
Cremers and Nair, 2005; Morey et al., 2009; Bauer et al., 2010; Renders et al., 2010; 
Giroud and Mueller, 2011; Ammann et al., 2013; Munisi and Randoy, 2013; Tariq and 
Abbas, 2013), the compliance-index model involved an examination of the association 
between a composite corporate governance index and firm financial performance. 
The sample used to answer the first five sub-questions represents 80 Saudi listed 
firms over seven years (560 firm-year observations). The corporate governance and firm 
financial performance variables are manually extracted from firms’ annual reports, 
obtained from Tadawul’s websites, companies’ websites, national newspapers and the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry archives, which are reliable sources of data (Omar and 
Simon, 2011). 
The other part of the study investigates the impact of corporate governance reforms 
on the Saudi corporate environment. Therefore, the sixth sub-question is: What is the level 
of awareness and appreciation of the importance of good corporate governance practices in 
Saudi Arabia among key stakeholders following the corporate governance reforms? In 
addition, investigating this qualitative research question provides a unique opportunity to 
improve the ability to understand and explain the quantitative findings. This sub-question 
is answered using qualitative data. Fifteen semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
five different stakeholder groups. As seen in descriptive studies on corporate governance 
(e.g., Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Cohen et al., 2002; Lambert and Sponem, 2005; Liew, 
2007; Johl et al., 2012; Piesse et al., 2012), semi-structured interviews are desirable in 
exploring the impact of corporate governance reforms on key stakeholders.  
 To sum up, mixed-methods are considered appropriate for answering the research 
questions. Moreover, quantitative and qualitative methods are beneficial in providing a 
clear representation of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. Chapters Five and Eight 
present the details on the quantitative and qualitative methods used, respectively. 
                                                 
44
 Section 3.4 in Chapter Three discusses the differences between these two approaches.  
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4.3 THE CHALLENGES OF USING MIXED-METHODS RESEARCH 
Despite the increased attention given to mixed-methods research, it poses some 
challenges (Bryman, 2007; Johl et al., 2012). Creswell and Clark (2011) argue that mixed-
methods may not be able to overcome all research problems. Also, using solely 
quantitative or qualitative methods does not necessarily mean diminish the value of a 
study.  
This section addresses the challenges in using mixed-methods research. These 
challenges are: (i) the absence of an agreed philosophical framework; (ii) achieving 
integration between the quantitative and qualitative methods; and (iii) issues related to 
practical considerations. The first challenge is the absence of an agreed philosophical 
framework for mixed-methods research designs and mixed-methods as a research 
paradigm (Smith and Heshusius, 1986; Morgan, 1998). Bryman (2004, p.453) evaluates 
the quantitative and qualitative approaches as paradigms that are not inextricable, but 
intertwined in terms of epistemological assumptions, values and methods. Morgan (1998) 
argues that prior literature ignores the absence of the mixed-methods paradigm.  
Molina-Azorin (2012) indicates that mixed-methods design is relatively new 
compared to using a single method in research. Creswell and Clark (2011, p.15) suggest 
that “One way to help convince others of the utility of mixed-methods is to locate 
exemplary mixed-methods studies in the literature on a topic or in a content area and 
share studies to educate others”. Thus, people need education to understand the value of 
mixed-methods, because mixed-methods are a novel approach. 
The second challenge is to achieve integration between quantitative and qualitative 
research. Bryman (2007) suggests that the development of mixed-methods studies collides 
with the inability of researchers to integrate the findings of quantitative and qualitative 
results. Greene et al. (1989) examine this problem by reviewing 57 mixed-method studies 
to examine the level of integration between quantitative and qualitative approaches. Their 
findings indicate that 44% of the studies achieved no integration between the two methods. 
However, 32% featured integration when they interpreted the findings, while only five 
studies (about 9%) achieved integration during the analysis and interpretation.  
Bryman (2007) indicates two reasons for this lack of integration. First, the 
integration of quantitative and qualitative findings may not always be intended. For 
instance, when researchers use mixed-methods, each approach is designed in isolation 
from the other, and integration may not be the priority of the researcher. Second, there are 
gaps in the literature in terms of analysis and interpretation of mixed-methods research 
(Cassell et al., 2005; Bryman, 2007). The other challenge involves practical considerations 
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in conducting mixed-methods research. Creswell and Clark (2011) point out a number of 
important issues that should be taken into account before conducting such research. For 
example, mixed-methods research demands certain skills, time and resources for extensive 
data collection and analysis. 
Data analysis for mixed-methods research requires certain skills. Creswell and 
Clark (2011) argue that mixed-methods design is a realistic approach if researchers have 
the requisite skills. Therefore, researchers must have in-depth understanding of quantitative 
and qualitative approaches separately before designing mixed-methods research (Morgan, 
1998). Also, researchers should develop an understanding of data collection and analysis 
techniques for each method. More specifically, Collis and Hussey (2009) indicate that 
researchers using quantitative methods should be aware of the logic of hypothesis testing 
and should have the ability to perform statistical analysis. In addition, they should be 
familiar with important issues such as reliability and validity (see Chapters Five and 
Eight). As well, there are certain skills required to conduct qualitative data collection and 
data analysis. For example, researchers should be familiar with the process of conducting 
semi-structured interviews (Molina-Azorin, 2012). In addition, other skills, such as coding 
qualitative data and developing terms and descriptions based on these codes, are also 
necessary. 
These skills alone are not sufficient to conduct mixed-methods research. It is 
necessary to ensure that mixed-methods research can be done within the specific timeframe 
of the research (Creswell and Clark, 2011). Also, it is argued that mixed-methods data 
collection is demanding in terms of time and effort, which is a limitation of this approach. 
Data collection takes time because different data is used in the different approaches 
(Morgan, 1998). Furthermore, the cost of data collection is another important issue, where 
mixed-methods may entail a greater cost than a single method (Creswell, 2009). For 
example, an interviewer may need to travel to conduct interviews, which may be 
financially costly. In contrast, the researcher may obtain quantitative data directly from 
websites at a lower cost. These are the important issues to consider before choosing a 
mixed-methods approach.   
 
 
4.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
This chapter introduced the mixed-methods research that appears in this study 
examining corporate governance reforms and their influence on voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure and firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia. This chapter 
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discussed the research design used. First, it discussed the philosophical assumptions of the 
research methodology. This study employs positivist and interpretivist paradigms. These 
research paradigms were selected because of their suitability for the nature of the research 
problem, the research questions, the researcher’s worldview and the researcher’s 
psychological attributes. Also, this chapter presented an explanation of positivism and 
interpretivism and their applications within the context of the study.  
Second, the chapter presented a discussion of the mixed-methods research design 
and explained why this approach was chosen. There are four reasons for choosing mixed-
methods: (i) it helps overcome the weaknesses of a single method; (ii) it provides a 
detailed understanding of the research problem; (iii) it is appropriate to answer the research 
questions; and (iv) mixed-methods improve the reliability of the findings in corporate 
governance studies, as they examine the behaviour of individuals and firms alike. The 
explanatory sequential mixed-methods design was chosen in this study. The study uses 
sequential timing, first using a quantitative design for collecting and analysing data. Then, 
qualitative data from semi-structured interviews follows the statistical results.  
This chapter shed light on the use of quantitative and qualitative research methods 
to answer the research questions. Finally, the chapter discussed the difficulties in using a 
mixed-methods research design, including: (i) the absence of a philosophical framework; 
(ii) achieving integration between quantitative and qualitative research; and (iii) the 
resulting expense in terms of time and resources. 
The next chapter discusses the quantitative research design, the empirical data, the 
sample selection and the method of analysis to examine voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure and firm financial performance. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
5. INTRODUCTION  
 As discussed in Chapters One and Four, this study uses a mixed-methods research 
design, involving quantitative and qualitative data. This chapter presents the research 
design, methodology and data used in the quantitative part of this study to answer the first 
five research sub-questions. As discussed in Chapters One and Four, these questions aim to 
examine the relationship among corporate governance mechanisms, voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure and firm financial performance. The chapter is structured according 
to the following four objectives. First, it explains the data, variables, data sources and 
research methodology used in conducting the quantitative part of the study. Second, it 
presents a justification of the rationale behind the chosen data and research design. Third, it 
discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the chosen data and methodology. The 
remaining part of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.1 presents the details of the 
quantitative data and the selected sample. Section 5.2 discusses the quantitative research 
methodology used in the current study. Section 5.3 explains the voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure model. Section 5.4 discusses the models used to examine the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial performance, 
while Section 5.3 provides a summary of this chapter. 
 
 
5.1 DATA COLLECTION  
This section explains the population, data sources and the sample selected to 
conduct the quantitative analysis in the current study. This section is divided into three 
subsections: Subsection 5.1.1 discusses population and Saudi listed firms. Subsection 
5.1.2 addresses the data sources for this study, while Subsection 5.1.3 sheds light on the 
study sample and selected data.  
 
5.1.1 Sample Population and Saudi Listed Firms  
  The sample used to investigate the relationship among corporate governance 
mechanisms, voluntary corporate governance disclosure and financial performance is 
selected from Saudi listed firms. A total of 145 firms were listed on the Saudi Stock 
Exchange (Tadawul) as of 31 December, 2010. Table 5.1 provides insight into the sample 
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selection mechanism. Panel A of the table presents Saudi listed firms (population) on 
Tadawul as of the 31
st
 of December, 2010, classified by industry.
45
 More than 69% of the 
listed firms fall into three industries: consumer services, consumer goods and financials. 
However, other industries, including basic materials, industrials, telecommunications and 
utilities, represent about 31% of the total listed firms. The final sample includes all the 
industries in the Tadawul’s database.  
 
Table 5.1: Summary of the sample selection  
Panel A: Industrial composition of firms listed on the 
Tadawul available to be sampled as of 31/12/2010 
No. in each 
industry 
Percentage 
of  sample 
Basic Materials 14 9.66  
Consumer Goods 27 18.62 
Consumer Services 31 21.38 
Financials  42 28.97 
Industrials 25 17.24 
Telecommunications 4 2.76 
Utilities 2 1.38 
Total firms available to be sampled  145 100.0 
  Less:  Suspended and merged firms    4  
            Firms with no yearly data available    34  
            Firms listed recently (2009 to 2010)    27  
                                   Total excluded firms 65 44.8 
Final selected sample 80 55.2 
Panel B: Industrial composition of sampled firms with 
full data 
No. in each 
industry 
Percentage 
of sample 
Basic Materials 8 10.00  
Consumer Goods 11 13.75 
Consumer Services 22 27.50 
Financials  11 13.75 
Industrials 23 28.75 
Telecommunications 3 3.75 
Utilities 2 2.50 
 Final selected sample 80 100.0 
Source: The Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul).  
 
Despite the fact that existing studies exclude financial firms, the present study 
incorporates them for four reasons. First, both financial and non-financial firms are subject 
to similar disclosure requirements by the Capital Market Authority (CMA). More 
precisely, corporate governance regulations in Saudi Arabia, including the Listing Rules, 
the Companies Act and the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC), are applicable to 
all companies (Companies Act, 1965; Listing Rules, 2004; SCGC, 2006). Therefore, it was 
anticipated that there would be general convergence regarding the content of disclosure 
across all industries. Second, most existing studies on corporate governance, especially in 
the US, focus on few industries, for example manufacturing firms (Ammann et al., 2013). 
                                                 
45
 The firms have been classified according the Tadawul’s industry classification, which is driven by the 
nature of their operations and activities.  
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Therefore, the current study seeks to examine all sectors (both financial and non-financial) 
to fill this gap in corporate governance literature (Ammann et al., 2013).  
Third, studies that exclude financial firms were conducted in developed countries and the 
US in particular, where there are a large number of firms. In contrast, there are far fewer 
listed firms in emerging countries, including Saudi Arabia. Therefore, excluding financial 
firms from studies on developing countries would limit the sample size. Furthermore, 
incorporating both financial and non-financial firms is consistent with a number of studies 
in the corporate governance literature
46
 (e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Kouwenberg, 2006; 
Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Al-Moataz and Lakhal, 2012; Ammann et al., 2013). As discussed 
in Subsection 5.1.3 below, Panel B of Table 5.1 shows the final sample, consisting of 80 
listed firms that met all the sample selection criteria. 
 
5.1.2 Data Sources 
To investigate the relationship among corporate governance mechanisms, voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure and financial performance, two different types of data 
were used: (i) corporate governance variables; and (ii) firms’ financial and market 
performance. First, the corporate governance variables were manually extracted from 
firms’ annual reports47 using content analysis. These annual reports were collected from 
different sources: (i) the Tadawul database, in electronic format from 2005 to 2010, 
constituting 480 reports (80 firms over six years each), which represents 86% of the total 
reports; and (ii) company website, national newspapers and the archives of the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry (MCI), as the source of 2004 annual reports which were not 
available on the Tadawul’s website. Eighty annual reports were collected directly from the 
aforementioned sources, constituting 14% of the total sampled firms. Second, firm 
financial performance variables were obtained from audited firms’ financial statements, 
which were obtained from the Tadawul’s database. The firms’ market information was 
obtained from the Tadawul’s Annual Statistical Reports.  
 
 
                                                 
46
 The findings in Chapter Six show that the level of compliance of financial firms is not the best; the firms in 
telecommunications, utility and basic materials industries do better. In addition, models for a sample 
excluding financial firms were estimated. The results obtained are similar to the results for the whole sample. 
There is no evidence of significant differences according to whether financial firms are included or excluded. 
Barber and Lyon (1997) and Eng and Mak (2003) conduct further analyses for non-financial firms to 
investigate corporate governance practices. Their findings indicate similar results whether financial firms are 
included or excluded. 
47
 Where appropriate, annual report data is supplemented with data available on company websites, the 
Tadawul’s websites, national newspapers and the MCI’s archives.  
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5.1.3 Study Sample and Selected Data  
This study selected the final sample based on two criteria: (i) the firm’s annual 
reports have to be available for all seven years from 2004 to 2010, either in Tadawul’s 
website, the MCI’s archives, the firm’s website or national newspapers; (ii) the availability 
of firms’ financial statements and firms’ stock market information for the seven-year 
period. These important criteria were set for many reasons. First, the criteria helped to 
satisfy the requirements of balanced panel data analysis (Henry, 2008; Ntim et al., 2012a). 
Using balanced panel data has a number of advantages, including: (i) having both cross-
sectional and time-series observations; (ii) improving degrees of freedom; (iii) minimising 
the effect of multicollinearity problems (Gujarati, 2003; Ntim et al., 2012a); (iv) helping 
ascertain whether cross-sectional association among corporate governance practices, 
voluntary governance disclosure and financial performance hold over time (Ntim et al., 
2012b); and (v) helping minimise the potential endogeneity problems that may arise from 
potential unobserved firm-level heterogeneity (Henry, 2008; Guest, 2009; Ntim et al., 
2012b).  
 Second, in line with Chen and Zhang (2014), the sample period spans both pre- 
and post-2006, the year in which the SCGC was released. This helps in assessing whether 
the introduction of the SCGC has helped in improving corporate governance standards in 
Saudi Arabia. Third, using cross-sectional and time-series data is consistent with the 
literature on corporate governance (e.g., Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Henry, 2008; Chalevas, 
2011; Ntim et al., 2012a), which also facilitates comparison of the results with those of 
previous studies.  
All Saudi listed firms’ annual reports became publicly accessible in 2004 after the 
establishment of the CMA. This allowed the researcher to collect data from 2004. Also, 
starting from 2004 helped the researcher in comparing the level of corporate governance 
compliance before and after the release of the 2006 Saudi governance code. The sample 
ends in 2010 because this is the most recent year for which data is available, as the data 
collection occurred between April 2011 and September 2011. Thus, the final sample 
consists of 80 out of 145 firms. The overall sample represents about 55% of all the Saudi 
firms listed on the Tadawul as of 31 December, 2010, and provides 560 firm-year 
observations from seven major industries.  
Regarding the 65 excluded firms, as shown in Panel A of Table 5.1, two firms were 
suspended and another two firms were merged into one firm between 2006 and 2009. Of 
the remaining 61 excluded firms, the data for 34 firms was not available for all seven 
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years. The remaining 27 firms were listed between 2009 and 2010, with insufficient data. 
Details of the names and industries of the selected firms are provided in Appendix 1. 
The sample size used in the present study is comparatively larger than those used in 
existing Saudi studies (e.g., Alsaeed, 2006; Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; Al-Abbas, 
2009; Al-Nodel and Hussainey, 2010; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012; Al-Moataz and 
Lakhal, 2012; Al-Janadi et al., 2013). For instance, Alsaeed (2006) investigates the level of 
compliance with corporate governance principles using a sample of 40 firms in 2003 (i.e., 
40 firm-year observations). Similarly, Hussainey and Al-Nodel (2008) use one-year cross-
sectional data consisting of 64 observations, and examine the extent to which Saudi listed 
firms disclose information online. Similar to these studies, Al-Nodel and Hussainey (2010) 
use a very small sample of 37 firms in 2005 to investigate the association between 
corporate governance and financial performance. Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2012) and Al-
Moataz and Lakhal (2012) use the same data for about 50 listed firms over two years. Al-
Abbas (2009) and Al-Janadi et al. (2013) employ samples consisting of 78 and 87 
observations, respectively. Consequently, the sample size used in this study is another 
improvement on previous Saudi studies.     
In addition, the study includes size variables to classify firms as large, medium or 
small. This is unlike prior studies, which focus on only a few firms. Eisenberg et al. (1998) 
argue that analysing one size alone can impair the generalisability of the research findings. 
The literature on corporate governance provides reasons why firm size might be an 
important factor in voluntary corporate governance disclosure: (i) the cost of compliance, 
which is more likely to be higher for small firms than large firms (MacNeil and Li, 2006); 
(ii) large firms have multiple lines of operations and activities, which inherently leads to 
greater disclosure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eng and Mak, 2003); and (iii) large firms 
have more complex capital structure, and thus are more likely to need to engage in high 
levels of voluntary corporate governance disclosure in order to reduce information 
asymmetry (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002).  
 
 
5.2 THE QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This section discusses the quantitative research methodology used to answer the 
third, fourth and fifth research sub-questions, including: (i) What are the factors that 
influence the level of compliance with the 2006 Saudi Corporate Governance Code 
(SCGC)?; (ii) What is the association between individual corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm financial performance?; and (iii) What is the relationship between 
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compliance with the 2006 SCGC and firm financial performance? In particular, it discusses 
the three main models examining the relationship among corporate governance 
mechanisms, voluntary corporate governance disclosure and financial performance. The 
remaining sections of the chapter are organised as follows. Section 5.3 investigates the 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure model, which analyses the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and voluntary corporate governance disclosure. Section 
5.4 presents the models that examine the association between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm financial performance. Two main corporate governance models are 
employed for this particular relationship, the equilibrium-variable model, in Subsection 
5.4.1, and the compliance-index model, in Subsection 5.4.2.  
 
 
5.3 THE VOLUNTARY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE 
MODEL 
This model seeks to examine the determinants of voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure in Saudi listed firms. Table 5.2 contains a summary of variables used in this 
model, while the following three subsections discuss the regression model. Specifically, 
Subsection 5.3.1 explains the dependent variable: the Saudi Corporate Governance Index 
(SCGI). Subsection 5.3.2 presents the explanatory variables, while Subsection 5.3.3 
discusses the control variables.  
Table 5.2: Summary of variables used for the voluntary corporate governance disclosure model  
Dependent variables 
  SCGI Corporate governance (CG) compliance and disclosure index consisting of 65 provisions 
from the SCGC, which take a value of 1 if each corporate governance provision is 
disclosed, and 0 otherwise; scaled to have a value between 0% and 100%. 
Independent Variables 
  INDD% Percentage of independent director members on the board of directors.  
  BSZ The number of board members at the end of the financial year. 
  AFZ 1, if a firm is audited by a big-four audit firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, 
Ernst & Young and KPMG), and 0 otherwise. 
  CGC 1, if a firm has set up a corporate governance committee, and 0 otherwise. 
  GONR% Percentage of shares held by government shareholders. 
  IONR% Percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders. 
  BONR% Percentage of shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total company 
shareholdings. 
  DONR% Percentage of shares held by director shareholders. 
Control Variables 
  FSZ Natural log of the book value of a firm’s assets. 
  SGR% Current year’s sales minus last year’s sales to last year’s sales. 
  LVG% Ratio of total debt to total assets.  
  CEXC% Percentage of total capital expenditure to total assets. 
   DV 1, if a firm paid dividends during the financial year, and 0 otherwise. 
  INDU A dummy variable for each industry on the stock market (classified to seven industries). 
  YDU A dummy variable for each year of the sample period (seven years) from 2004 to 2010, 
inclusive. 
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5.3.1 The Dependent Variable: The Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) 
The Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) is used to explore the level of 
compliance with the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC). Also, the SCGI is the key 
variable used to examine the factors influencing voluntary corporate governance disclosure 
among Saudi listed firms. In addition, the SCGI is used to investigate the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial performance using the 
compliance-index model. As shown in Table 5.3, the SCGI contains 65 corporate 
governance provisions covering four broad aspects (sub-indices), namely: (i) the board of 
directors and board sub-committees; (ii) disclosure and transparency; (iii) internal control 
and risk management; and (iv) the rights of shareholders and the general assembly.  
The main source for constructing the index is the 2006 SCGC. However, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, the 2004 Listing Rules and the 1965 Companies Act are also 
used as additional sources for developing the index. As discussed in Section 2.4 of Chapter 
Two, Saudi listed firms are required to comply with these corporate governance 
regulations or provide justification for non-compliance, as part of the ‘comply or explain’ 
regime (SCGC, 2006, p.8). A definition and source of each provision included in the SCGI 
is provided in Appendix 2.  
Using a corporate governance index is consistent with recent studies on developed 
countries (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Gupta et al., 
2009; Bozec et al., 2010; Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Al-Janadi et al., 2013) and emerging 
countries (e.g., Black, 2001; Price et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012; 
Munisi and Randoy, 2013; Tariq and Abbas, 2013). These studies use either self-
constructed indices based on national codes (e.g., Fernandez-Rodriguez et al., 2004; Price 
et al., 2011; Allegrini and Greco, 2013) or use analysts’ ratings, such as the Credit 
Lyonnais Securitas Asia Index (CLSA), the Report on Business index (ROB) and the index 
provided by Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS), which are based on general 
governance principles (e.g., Cheung et al., 2007; Clacher et al., 2008; Henry, 2008; 
Toledo, 2010). In line with previous studies (e.g., Ntim et al., 2012a; Allegrini and Greco, 
2013), the provisions of the SCGI are dominated by the most important corporate 
governance mechanisms, especially board of directors and board sub-committees (see 
Table 5.3). These provisions constitute about 54% of the total provisions (35 out of 65). 
The relationship between the SCGI and voluntary corporate governance disclosure 
is examined by a set of explanatory variables: independent directors, board size, audit firm 
size, presence of a corporate governance committee, government ownership, institutional 
ownership, block ownership and director ownership. 
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The remaining part of this subsection discusses the issues related to the 
construction of the SCGI. Specifically, Subsection (i) investigates corporate governance 
disclosure and the SCGI sources. Subsection (ii) addresses the critical issues related to 
corporate governance indices and reasons behind the use of a self-constructed index. 
Subsection (iii) discusses the SCGI coding process and weighting schemes. Subsection (iv) 
examines the reliability and validity of the SCGI, while Subsection (v) explains the 
limitations of sampling and the constructed index. 
 
i) Corporate Governance Disclosure and the SCGI Sources 
There are a number of sources of information about corporate governance 
disclosure.
48
 Knutson (1992, p.22) indicates that “the annual report is the major reporting 
document and every other report is in some respect subsidiary or supplementary to it”. In 
the current study, the SCGI relied largely on firms’ annual reports as the main source for 
several reasons. First, as discussed in Section 2.4 of Chapter Two, the Companies Act 
(Article 89) and the Listing Rules (Article 27) mandate listed firms to issue annual reports 
at the end of the financial year, including the board of directors’ report and financial 
statements. Because these reports are obligatory and are followed up by the supervisory 
and regulatory bodies, such as the CMA and the MCI, this makes them a highly reliable 
source for corporate governance disclosure (Botosan, 1997; Alsaeed, 2006; Omar and 
Simon, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012a; Tariq and Abbas, 2013).  
Second, firms’ annual reports are mainly directed at shareholders (Alsaeed, 2006), 
to whom the directors are accountable. This increases the reliability of the annual reports 
(Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Samaha et al., 2012). Third, the annual reports provide both 
financial and non-financial information, and listed firms are obliged to publish their annual 
reports formally on the Tadawul website. This provides full accessibility to the required 
data and helps in using balanced panel data. This also minimises missing data. Finally, 
consistent with previous studies conducted either in Saudi Arabia (e.g., Alsaeed, 2006; Al-
Abbas, 2009; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012; Al-Janadi et al., 2013) or in other countries 
(e.g., Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Samaha et al., 2012; Allegrini and Greco, 2013), the 
use of annual reports improves comparability. 
 
 
 
                                                 
48
 Botosan (1997), Botosan and Plumlee (2002) and Omar and Simon (2011) argue that firms’ annual reports 
are considered to be a formal and comprehensive source of corporate governance disclosure. Quarterly and 
interim information and firms’ websites are additional sources.  
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ii) Analysts’ Ratings versus Self-Constructed Indices 
As discussed in Subsection 5.3.1, investigation of corporate governance disclosure 
can be done either by using analysts’ ratings or self-constructed indices. The analysts’ 
ratings approach may be influenced by the subjectivity of the analysts evaluating the 
corporate governance disclosure (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Bozec and Bozec, 2012; 
Ammann et al., 2013). Predominantly, such evaluations are provided by proxy-advising 
institutions, such as Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS), and are widespread in 
developed nations that introduced governance principles earlier (e.g., the 1992 Cadbury 
Report in the UK; the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US). In the case of the self-
constructed index approach, researchers often develop their own corporate governance 
indices by extracting provisions directly from firms’ annual reports (Beattie et al., 2004; 
Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a; Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Tariq and 
Abbas, 2013).  
Using analysts’ ratings has several advantages. First, the providers of these ratings 
are professionally experienced and knowledgeable, which may not be the case with all 
researchers adopting self-constructed indices (Hassan and Marston, 2010). Second, these 
analysts’ ratings are constructed based on a wide range of disclosure sources; for example, 
firms’ websites, quarterly reports and firms’ announcements (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; 
Alsaeed, 2006). Third, as shown in Chapter Three, a considerable number of studies use an 
analysts’ rating index; this facilitates comparing the results with existing studies.   
Although analysts’ ratings have the aforementioned advantages, the current study 
adopts a self-constructed index for a number of reasons. First, unlike most of the analysts’ 
rating indices that cover certain corporate governance aspects, such as board characteristics 
(e.g., Yermack, 1996) and ownership structure (e.g., Chung and Zhang, 2011), the SCGI is 
designed to include most corporate governance aspects using a broadly constructed index 
consisting of 65 provisions, categorised into board of directors and board sub-committees, 
disclosure and transparency, internal control system, and rights of shareholders and the 
general assembly. Consequently, this may help fully assess corporate governance practices 
among the listed firms. 
Second, the selected provisions for analysts’ rating can be affected by analysts’ 
views (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Bozec and Bozec, 2012; Ammann et al., 2013). 
However, using a local governance code to select the provisions makes the SCGI more 
reliable and objective (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Omar and Simon, 2011). Furthermore, 
some analysts’ ratings were developed based on surveys, such as the Corporate 
Governance Rate (CGR) developed by Drobetz et al. (2004). These ratings may be biased 
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due to firms overestimating or under-reporting the quality of their governance (Bozec and 
Bozec, 2012). In contrast, the SCGI is coded manually by the researcher and is directly 
extracted from the firms’ annual reports, which arguably offer a more reliable source (see 
Omar and Simon, 2011). 
Third, indices provided by proxy-advising institutions, such as CLSA and ROB, are 
confined to certain industries, and focus on the largest publicly traded firms (e.g., Klein et 
al., 2005; Koehn and Ueng, 2005; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Epps and Cereola, 
2008; Chen et al., 2009). On the other hand, adopting a self-constructed index with firms 
of different sizes avoids the possibility of sample bias and improves the generalisability 
(Omar and Simon, 2011). Additionally, all industries are embedded to ensure low cross-
sectional variation in corporate governance disclosure (Ntim et al., 2012a). 
Fourth, prior studies that use analysts’ ratings do not take into account the variances 
in the external governance mechanisms and legal systems among countries (Bauer et al., 
2004; Klapper and Love, 2004; Renders et al., 2010; Piesse et al., 2012; Kim and Lu, 
2013; Robertson et al., 2013). Therefore, using the Saudi governance code illustrates how 
the SCGI considers these relevant. Furthermore, as most analysts’ ratings were constructed 
on developed countries (Ammann et al., 2011), it may not be appropriate to use their 
provisions in the Saudi context; for example, the US adopts a ‘comply or else’ regime. In 
addition, the CLSA rating, which includes a number of Asian countries, may not be 
feasible to adopt in Saudi Arabia because of cultural and institutional differences. Finally, 
analysts’ ratings are not frequently updated according to the ongoing developments in 
corporate governance across countries (Hassan and Marston, 2008).  
 
iii) The SCGI Scoring and Weighting Schemes  
There are two widely-used approaches for scoring voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure indices (Beattie et al., 2004). These are binary coding and weighted scoring. A 
simple binary coding scheme is often adopted for scoring a corporate governance 
disclosure index extracted from firms’ annual reports (Beattie et al., 2004; Ntim et al., 
2012a). A large number of studies use this approach, whether these are conducted on 
developed countries (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Ammann et al., 2013) or developing 
countries (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012). This 
method relies on examining the presence or absence of corporate governance provisions. 
The provision is scored 1 if it is disclosed in the firm’s annual report and 0 otherwise. 
Weighted corporate governance provisions distinguish the influence of each item and 
assign a different weight based on the importance of the provisions. Weightings of 
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corporate governance provisions can be developed by surveys of expert analysts and 
specialists (Beattie et al., 2004; Hassan and Marston, 2010).  
The current study adopts the binary scoring scheme despite criticism of this 
approach, including: (i) unlike weighted scoring, binary coding does not allow for 
assessing the quality of disclosed information (Beattie et al., 2004; Allegrini and Greco, 
2013; Tariq and Abbas, 2013); and (ii) the binary scoring method does not pay attention to 
variation in the importance of provisions (Hassan and Marston, 2010). There are six main 
reasons that justify using the binary scoring scheme rather than weighted coding. First, as 
shown in Table 5.3, the provisions of the SCGI are generally tested by asserting their 
existence or absence. Therefore, using the binary scoring scheme seems to be appropriate 
to examining the level of compliance with the SCGC’s provisions. Appendix 3 presents a 
sample of coded provisions (first 10 out of 65) for the first five firms in alphabetical order. 
This shows the procedure of coding corporate governance provisions for all 560 firm-year 
annual observations (80 firms over seven years).  
Second, in line with Ntim et al. (2012a), the coding mechanism in this study is 
designed to measure the qualitative differences in corporate governance information across 
the firms’ annual reports. Some studies (e.g., Barako et al., 2006; Tsamenyi et al., 2007; 
Samaha et al., 2012) assign a point if a firm has board sub-committees, such as an audit 
committee. However, the developed index seeks to measure other corporate governance 
mechanisms associated with the board sub-committees. More precisely, the company gains 
one point if the audit committee exists, and gets another point if the chairperson of the 
committee is independent. Furthermore, it is given another point if the majority of 
committee members are non-executive (see Table 5.3).  
Third, different from weighted coding, binary scoring is often less biased, given 
that it does not need the researcher’s judgement to give weight to the provisions (Beattie et 
al., 2004; Hassan and Marston, 2010). Therefore, this helps in constructing an objective 
index. More precisely, there are two critical issues related to the use of weighted coding: 
(i) the required a lot of subjectivity and judgment, but the skill required that junior 
researchers may not have, and thus can put the reliability the resulting constructed index 
into question; and (ii) constructing a weighted index requires the use of experts opinion, 
which can be costly in terms of time and finance (Beattie et al., 2004). 
Fourth, for the weighted index, there is no theoretical base to measure the weight of 
the provisions and give different weights to each provision (Barako et al., 2006). To 
overcome the problem of weighting the index, the study has taken a number of steps: (i) 
the corporate governance index is extended to 65 provisions, which reduces the disparity 
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between the weight of the provisions (Beattie et al., 2004); and (ii) the study classified the 
65 provisions into four sub-sets. Specifically, the index consists of board of directors and 
board sub-committees (35 provisions, 54%), disclosure and transparency (16 provisions, 
25%), internal control system (6 provisions, 9%), and rights of shareholders and general 
assembly (8 provisions, 12%). Finally, using an un-weighted index is consistent with most 
corporate governance disclosure studies (e.g., Alsaeed, 2006; Barako et al., 2006; Ntim et 
al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012), which improves the comparability of the findings with 
these studies.   
 
Table 5.3: Full list of the Saudi Arabian corporate governance disclosure index provisions based on the 
SCGC 
Corporate governance disclosure index (SCGI) 
SCGI theme/type SCGI item  
Range 
of 
scores 
Total 
score 
per 
them 
(i) Board of 
Directors and 
Board Sub-
Committees 
 
 Board of directors  
35 
1. Whether the roles of chairperson and CEO are split 0-1 
2. Whether the chairperson is an independent  0-1 
3. Whether the majority of directors are non-executive 0-1 
4. Whether directors are clearly classified into executive, NED and 
independent. 
0-1 
5. Disclosure of directors’ biography  0-1 
6. Drafting policies of board and committees appointment 0-1 
7. Whether directors’ membership on other firms’ boards is disclosed 0-1 
8. Whether board of directors are not act as a member of board of 
directors of more than five listed firms 
0-1 
9. Whether the board of directors’ meetings are disclosed 0-1 
10. Whether individual directors’ meeting records are disclosed 0-1 
 Audit committee  
11. Whether the committee has been established 0-1 
12. Whether the committee’s jurisdiction is disclosed 0-1 
13. Whether the committee is composed of a sufficient number of non-
executives 
0-1 
14. Whether the committee chairperson is disclosed 0-1 
15. Whether the committee chairperson is independent 0-1 
16. Whether the committee comprises at least three members 0-1 
17. Whether the committee members are disclosed 0-1 
18. Whether the committee meetings are disclosed 0-1 
19. Whether the committee meetings record is disclosed 0-1 
 Nomination committee  
20. Whether the committee has been established 0-1 
21. Whether the committee’s jurisdiction is disclosed 0-1 
22. Whether the committee is composed of a sufficient number of non-
executives 
0-1 
23. Whether the committee chairperson is disclosed 0-1 
24. Whether the committee chairperson is independent 0-1 
25. Whether the committee members are disclosed 0-1 
26. Whether the committee meetings are disclosed 0-1 
27. Whether the committee meetings record is disclosed 0-1 
 Remuneration committee  
28. Whether the committee has been established 0-1 
29. Whether the committee’s jurisdiction is disclosed 0-1 
30. Whether the committee is composed of a sufficient number of non-
executive members 
0-1 
31. Whether the committee chairperson is disclosed 0-1 
32. Whether the committee chairperson is independent 0-1 
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Table 5.3: Full list of the Saudi Arabian corporate governance disclosure index provisions based on the 
SCGC 
Corporate governance disclosure index (SCGI) 
SCGI theme/type SCGI item  
Range 
of 
scores 
Total 
score 
per 
them 
33. Whether the committee members are disclosed 0-1 
34. Whether the committee meetings are disclosed 0-1 
35. Whether the committee meetings record is disclosed 0-1 
(ii) Disclosure 
and 
 Transparency 
36. Whether the firm’s ownership structure is disclosed 0-1 
16 
37. Whether the firm’s directors own at least 1,000 firm shares 0-1 
38. Whether the board’s detailed compensation is disclosed 0-1 
39. Whether the board’s compensation exceeds the maximum 0-1 
40. Whether the CEO’s compensation is disclosed 0-1 
41. Whether the top management’s compensation is disclosed 0-1 
42. Whether the firm’s operation performance is disclosed 0-1 
43. Whether the firm’s loans are disclosed 0-1 
44. Whether the performance of five-year are compared 0-1 
45. Whether the firm’s strategies and objectives are disclosed 0-1 
46. Whether the principal activities of the firm are disclosed 0-1 
47. Whether the policy of dividends is disclosed 0-1 
48. Whether the related party transactions are disclosed 0-1 
49. Whether the firm is subjected to punishment by a supervisory body 0-1 
50. Whether a narrative as a going concern is provided 0-1 
51. Whether a narrative regarding compliance/non-compliance with 
SCGC is provided 
0-1 
(iii) Internal 
Control 
and Risk 
Management 
52. Whether the result of auditing the effectiveness of the internal 
control system is disclosed 
0-1 
6 
53. Whether the firm has clear control procedures for risk management 0-1 
54. Whether the risks facing the firm are disclosed 0-1 
55. Whether the financial reports are approved by the board of 
directors, CEO and CFO 
0-1 
56. Whether the firm provides a statement about not departing from the 
accounting standards  
0-1 
57. Whether the firm drafted a corporate governance code 0-1 
(iv) Rights of 
Shareholders 
and General 
Assembly (GA) 
58. Whether the GA meets at least once a year 0-1 
8 
59. Whether the GA meeting agenda was disclosed on the Tadawul 
website 
0-1 
60. Whether the shareholders have the right to appoint others to attend 
the GA on their behalf 
0-1 
61. Whether the firm applies a one vote one share policy 0-1 
62. Whether the firm announces a GA meeting at least 20 days prior to 
the date of the meeting 
0-1 
63. Whether the firm immediately informs the Stock Exchange website 
about the results of the GA meeting 
0-1 
64. Whether the GA convenes within six months following the end of 
the firm’s financial year 
0-1 
65. Whether the firm discloses social contributions 0-1 
Total 65 SCGI  65 
Source: Constructed by the researcher. 
 
 
iv) Reliability and Validity of the Constructed Index  
Two particular concerns regarding measuring the quality of the instrument are 
reliability and validity (Sekaran, 2003; Saunders et al., 2007; Omar and Simon, 2011; 
Allegrini and Greco, 2013). These two important issues are discussed in this subsection. 
Reliability is defined as “the ability of a measurement instrument to reproduce consistent 
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results on repeated measurements” (Hassan and Marston, 2010, p.24); in other words, the 
ability of an instrument to measure consistently. In this context, two related issues are 
discussed to assess the reliability of the coding procedure: stability and consistency 
(Sekaran, 2003).  
Stability refers to the ability of the measurement to be repeated, with the results 
sustained over time. For example, the constructed index is stable if it can be repeated by 
the same researcher over time (Sekaran, 2003). Consistency, on the other hand, is the 
extent to which all subparts of a measurement instrument are measuring the same thing 
(Hassan and Marston, 2010).  
There are three common ways of examining the reliability of the disclosure index: 
(i) inter-coder reliability; (ii) test-retest; and (iii) internal consistency (Sekaran, 2003; 
Hassan and Marston, 2010). Inter-coder reliability is when the coding results are similar 
after coding has been performed by more than one coder. Test-retest reliability is used to 
ensure the stability of the measuring instrument, and internal consistency measures 
consistency in reliability. In the current study, the developed disclosure index, test-retest 
and internal consistency methods were employed to improve the reliability of the 
developed disclosure index. However, inter-coder reliability could not be employed 
because this study was carried out by a single researcher. 
Three steps were followed to ensure the stability of the scoring when using the test-
retest form. First, the entire contents of the annual reports of each firm from 2004 to 2010 
were read before starting the coding procedure. This assisted in identifying the applicable 
and non-applicable items in the annual reports (Omar and Simon, 2011). Second, seven 
years worth of data was coded for each firm respectively. This method made it easier to 
read the annual reports constantly and accurately. The first round of coding lasted five 
months, from April to August 2011. Third, after scoring the annual reports of all firms (560 
observations), re-reading the annual reports ensured no relevant corporate governance 
information was missed (Omar and Simon, 2011). Highlighting the captured corporate 
governance provisions in the annual reports during the first round of coding facilitated re-
reading and thus maximised the scoring accuracy. The second round of coding involved re-
reading all 560 annual reports. The second round of coding lasted for six weeks in August 
and September 2011. In general, the results of the second round showed largely similar 
results with the first round, which proves the stability of the coding procedure. 
Internal consistency is another popular technique for assessing the reliability of a 
measurement (Hassan et al., 2009). The common statistical measure to examine internal 
consistency is Cronbach’s alpha, which shows whether the different items (groups/indices) 
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complement each other in constructing a reliable measurement (Hassan and Marston, 
2010). The Cronbach’s alpha value falls between 0 and 1; the higher the coefficient value 
of alpha obtained, the higher the reliability. An alpha value over 0.80 suggests that the 
entire test is internally consistent (Allegrini and Greco, 2013). In line with Lapointe-
Antunes et al. (2006), Hassan et al. (2009) and Allegrini and Greco (2013), the current 
study uses Cronbach’s alpha test for measuring the reliability of the constructed index 
using SPSS software. As shown in Table 5.4, the Cronbach’s alpha value is about 83%, 
indicating high reliability of the disclosure index. Furthermore, as shown in the table, the 
values of “Cronbach's alpha if item deleted” show that excluding/deleting any part of the 
index (sub-indices) can significantly harm the reliability of the index. 
 
Validity is also a very important issue in measuring quality of the instrument. 
Validity is defined as: “the extent to which data collection methods accurately measure 
what they were intended to measure” (Saunders et al., 2007, p.614). In other words, the 
index is valid if it exhibits the same thing that the researcher intends (Marston and Shrives, 
1991; Omar and Simon, 2011). There are generally three issues related to validity: (i) 
criterion-related validity; (ii) content validity; and (iii) construct validity (Saunders et al., 
2007; Hassan and Marston, 2010). Criterion-related validity “is established when the 
measure differentiates individuals on a criterion it is expected to predict” (Sekaran, 2003, 
p.206). Content validity indicates that the measure is adequate and representative of the set 
of items (Sekaran, 2003). Construct validity is the validity of inferences that are actually 
represented by measurement instrument (Sekaran, 2003). 
In this study, the validity of the corporate governance disclosure index was 
improved using three methods. First, the corporate governance disclosure index was 
constructed by the researcher instead of using analysts’ ratings. This enables the index to 
reflect accurately on the corporate governance practices among Saudi listed firms. 
Table 5.4: Cronbach’s alpha for reliability test  
Sub-indices 
of SCGI 
No. of 
provisions 
Corrected item 
– Total 
correlation 
Cronbach’s 
alpha value 
Cronbach's 
alpha if item 
deleted 
1-Board of Directors and   
Board Sub-Committees 
35 0.813 
0.827 
0.702 
  2-Disclosure and 
 Transparency 
16 0.804 0.706 
  3-Internal Control 
and Risk Management 
6 0.722 0.749 
 4-Rights of Shareholders 
and General Assembly (GA) 
8 0.340 0.891 
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Furthermore, the main sources of the index are the Saudi corporate governance regulations. 
These improve the content validity of the constructed index.  
Second, the disclosure index was developed to enhance the construct validity by 
paying close attention to the board of directors’ provisions. This is also consistent with 
many corporate governance disclosure studies (e.g., Barako et al., 2006; Tsamenyi et al., 
2007; Ntim et al., 2012a). In this constructed index, about 54% of the items cover the 
board of directors and board sub-committee structures. Third, the checklist was improved 
through revising the draft twice before making it final, to enhance the criterion and content 
validity. These two revisions were conducted in two stages: (i) the draft governance 
provisions were discussed in annual doctoral conferences,
49
 where comments were 
received from experienced researchers in the field of corporate governance and disclosure; 
and (ii) the draft governance provisions were also carefully revised based on comments 
and discussions with the researcher’s experienced supervisors.  
 
v) The Limitations of Sampling and the Constructed Index 
Despite attempts to improve the reliability and validity of the constructed corporate 
governance disclosure index, a number of limitations were identified. First, the constructed 
index uses a binary coding method that considers all corporate governance provisions as 
equally important. Therefore, the validity of the developed index could have been 
improved if a weighted index had been used. Second, the reliability of the disclosure index 
could have been improved if the index was re-coded by another researcher, using the inter-
coder consistency form (Hassan and Marston, 2010). Inter-coder consistency could not be 
implemented because this study was conducted by a single researcher.  
Third, despite the final sample of 80 Saudi listed firms over a seven year period 
being large compared with other studies conducted on Saudi Arabia (e.g., Alsaeed, 2006; 
Al-Abbas, 2009; Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; Al-Nodel and Hussainey, 2010; 
Alzharani et al., 2011; Ezzine, 2011; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012; Al-Moataz and 
Lakhal, 2012; Al-Janadi et al., 2013), the generalisability of the findings could be 
improved if all of the 145 firms listed in December 2010 were used. As discussed in 
Subsection 5.1.3, a number of criteria determined the final sample of 80 listed firms. 
Fourth, in line with prior literature, the current study relied mainly on firms’ annual reports 
to obtain corporate governance information (e.g., Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Ntim et al., 
2012a; Samaha et al., 2012). However, there are other sources, such interim reports, which 
                                                 
49
 Presentations were made at the 2011 Welsh Accounting and Finance Workshop, the 2011, 2012 and 2013 
British Accounting and Finance Doctoral Colloquia, and the 2012 Scottish Doctoral Colloquia.  
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could provide additional data for coding the disclosure index (Beattie et al., 2004; Hassan 
and Marston, 2010; Omar and Simon, 2011). Finally, the designed disclosure index does 
not involve measuring stakeholders’ behaviour, such as interactions between the board of 
directors and management, or between the board of directors and shareholders. This is 
because firms’ annual reports do not include such information. 
 
5.3.2 The Main Explanatory Variables: Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
As suggested by corporate governance literature, board of directors’ characteristics 
and ownership structure represent the main factors influencing the level and quality of 
corporate governance disclosure (Ho and Wong, 2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Eng and 
Mak, 2003; García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010; Chalevas, 2011; Allegrini and 
Greco, 2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Therefore, in line with these studies, this model 
employed two main sets of variables as explanatory variables: corporate board structure 
and ownership structure (see Table 5.2).  
The corporate board of directors’ characteristics variables include: independent 
directors (INDD), board size (BSZ), audit firm size (AFZ) and presence of corporate 
governance committee (GCC). The current study follows previous studies to define and 
measure these explanatory variables (see Table 5.2). The second set of explanatory 
variables constitutes ownership structure. These variables consist of four types of 
ownership: government ownership (GONR), institutional ownership (IONR), block 
ownership (BONR) and director ownership (DONR). These ownership structures are 
defined and measured according to previous empirical studies that examine voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure (see Table 5.2). Both theoretical and empirical literature 
regarding the relationship between these mechanisms and corporate governance disclosure 
are, therefore, reviewed in Section 3.3 in Chapter Three. 
 
5.3.3 The Control Variables: Firm Characteristics  
This study employed a number of control variables to reduce potential omitted 
variables bias (Ntim et al., 2012a and b). These variables are firm size (FSZ), firm growth 
(SGR), leverage (LVG), capital expenditure (CEXC), Dividends (DV), industry dummies 
(INDU) and year dummies (YDU). Table 5.2 shows definitions and how control variables 
are measured. The variables were chosen based on theoretical expectation, and are in line 
with previous empirical studies examining the relationship among corporate governance, 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure and firm performance. Arguably, there may be 
other variables that can influence voluntary corporate governance disclosure and financial 
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performance, which are not included in the used model. More precisely, there are three 
reasons for limiting the study to these variables: (i) some variables lack a theoretical link 
with voluntary corporate governance disclosure and financial performance; (ii) non-
availability of data, which limits the use of other variables; and (iii) it is in line with prior 
studies that widely use these specific variables, which can facilitate comparison of the 
findings with those of previous studies.  
The next subsection discusses the theoretical basis for selecting the control 
variables and the empirical evidence from previous studies. 
 
i) Firm Size (FSZ)  
Firm size is an important factor influencing good corporate governance practices 
and firm financial performance (Eisenberg et al., 1998; Samaha et al., 2012). Larger firms 
have greater agency problems due to the complexity of their capital structure (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). Therefore, they are more likely to 
improve voluntary corporate governance disclosure in order to reduce information 
asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eng and Mak, 2003). However, Klapper and Love 
(2004) argue that smaller firms tend to improve corporate governance practices due to the 
greater potential for growth and to obtain external financing. 
Empirically, prior studies have indicated a positive relationship between firm size 
and voluntary corporate governance disclosure (e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Alsaeed, 2006; 
Omar and Simon, 2011; Elzahar and Hussainey 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 
2012; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). Thus, it is hypothesised that there is a positive 
relationship between firm size (FSZ), as proxied by the natural log of the book value of a 
firm’s assets, and corporate governance practices/firm financial performance. 
 
ii) Firm Growth (SGR) 
Theoretically, the growth of a firm is accompanied by an increase in its business 
activities (Henry, 2008). Consequently, growth in firms implies an increased need for 
external capital (Beiner et al., 2006; Chung and Zhang, 2011). To reduce financing costs, 
growing firms may need to improve their corporate governance practices (Klapper and 
Love, 2004; Bozec et al., 2010). Furthermore, the growth of a firm is usually accompanied 
by the presence of a good management team and an active board of directors that attracts 
potential investors (Chen, 2011). Those investors may demand an increase in voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure to protect their investments (Eng and Mak, 2003; 
Allegrini and Greco, 2013).  
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Empirically, existing studies support the above argument and find a positive and 
significant relationship among firm growth, voluntary corporate governance disclosure and 
firm performance (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Henry, 2008; 
Laidroo, 2009; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Therefore, it is hypothesised that the 
relationship between firm growth (SGR), as proxied by the growth of sales, and corporate 
governance disclosure/firm performance is expected to be positive. 
  
iii) Leverage (LVG) 
Agency theory suggests that a higher level of debt raises the ‘free cash flows’ that 
may increase the agency problem (Jensen,1986). Haniffa and Cooke (2002) argue that 
firms’ existing debt may help the board of directors in their monitoring role. More 
precisely, banks prefer to lend to firms that have high levels of accountability and 
transparency. Similarly, borrowing firms may seek to increase their disclosure and enhance 
transparency to reduce financing costs (Klapper and Love, 2004; Bozec et al., 2010). Thus, 
firms with higher leverage are more likely to disclose corporate governance information to 
legitimise their actions to creditors (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013).  
 Empirical studies find mixed results in examining the relationship between leverage 
and voluntary corporate governance disclosure. Some studies suggest a positive 
relationship (e.g., Alsaeed, 2006; Barako et al., 2006; Omar and Simon, 2011). However, 
other studies find that the impact of leverage on voluntary corporate disclosure is weak 
(e.g., Ho and Wong, 2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Ntim et al., 
2012a; Samaha et al., 2012; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). Other studies suggest a negative 
relationship between leverage and firm financial performance (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; 
Jackling and Johl, 2009; Mangena et al., 2012). After looking at the mixed findings, it is 
hypothesised that there is a statistical relationship between leverage (LVG), as proxied by 
percentage of the increasing debt used to finance firms’ assets, and voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure/firm performance.    
 
iv) Capital Expenditure (CEXC) 
The corporate governance literature suggests that capital expenditure is related with 
firm growth (Pfeffer, 1972; Pearce and Zahra, 1992). Because of the existence of firm 
growth, it appears that there is a need to increase expenditure. This requires more 
monitoring by the board of directors and enhanced accountability to protect shareholders’ 
wealth (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007; Conyon and He, 2011). Therefore, theoretically, an 
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increase in capital expenditure may improve corporate governance practices and firm 
financial performance.  
Empirically, prior literature suggests the existence of a weak relationship between 
capital expenditure and voluntary corporate governance disclosure (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 
2013). On the other hand, mixed findings appear upon examining the relationship between 
capital expenditure and firm performance. Weir et al. (2002), Hossain et al. (2001) and 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) find a positive relationship between capital expenditure and 
firm performance. However, Jackling and Johl (2009) and Mangena et al. (2012) find a 
negative relationship. Thus, it is hypothesised that there is a statistical relationship between 
capital expenditure (CEXC), as proxied by the percentage of total capital expenditure to 
total assets, and corporate governance practices/firm financial performance. 
 
v) Dividends (DV) 
Adjaoud and Ben-Amar (2010) argue that firms with high dividends may disclose 
more corporate governance information. Agency and managerial signalling theories 
provide three forms of empirical support: (i) to justify the payment of compensation, 
managers of profitable firms may increase disclosure (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013); (ii) to 
display the firm’s financial ability and contribution to society (Ntim et al., 2012a); and (iii) 
to gain shareholders’ confidence and attract potential investors (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). 
Empirically, some corporate governance studies support the positive relationship between 
dividends and good governance practices (e.g., Archambault and Archambault (2003); 
Adjaoud and Ben-Amar (2010). Therefore, it is hypothesised that there is a statistically 
significant association between dividends and corporate governance practices/firm financial 
performance. Firm dividends is measured by a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a 
firm paid dividends during the financial year, and 0 otherwise. 
 
vi) Industry Dummies (INDU) 
The level of compliance with corporate governance standards and firm performance 
differs among firms based on industry (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 
2008). This variation can be attributed to differences in financing structure, ownership 
structure and business nature (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008). Moreover, there is variation 
in the regulations between industries, where some are subject to additional rules (Tsamenyi 
et al., 2007). For example, some firms whose operations have the potential to damage the 
environment, such as oil and gas, are obliged to disclose more information about their 
operations (Arcay and Vazquez, 2005).  
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Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Barako et al., 2006; 
Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012), this study includes industry dummies as control 
variables to capture potential and unobserved industry type heterogeneity. The designed 
model includes six industry dummies so that the dummy variable trap could be avoided. 
 
vii) Year Dummies (YDU) 
The literature indicates that voluntary corporate governance disclosure and firm 
performance vary across firms over years (e.g., Conyon, 1994; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; 
Chalevas, 2011). For instance, Conyon conducted a survey of 400 UK listed firms and 
found firms complied more in some years than others. This positive relationship is 
supported by Chalevas (2011), who suggests that the level of voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure among Greek listed firms improved over the four years from 2000 
to 2003. Similarly, Ntim et al. (2012a) conduct a study on 169 South African listed firms 
between 2002 and 2006, and find that compliance with King II is related to time. 
Furthermore, the global economy may has an impact on a firm’s voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure and performance. For example, the profits of many 
international firms were affected negatively by the economic global recession in 2008. 
This led them to disclose more about the repercussions of the crisis on their firm’s 
performance (Mangena et al., 2012). Therefore, year dummy variables are included in the 
model to capture potential unobserved firm-level heterogeneity over the seven-year period 
from 2004 to 2010 (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Barako et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2012a; 
Samaha et al., 2012). Six year dummy variables are included in the model to avoid the 
dummy variable trap.  
Following prior literature, and assuming that all relations are linear, OLS regression 
is employed to investigate whether variations in the SCGI are explained or predicted (i.e., 
to answer the third research sub-question) by the above variables, as follows: 
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Where  
SCGI               The constructed Saudi Corporate Governance Disclosure Index 
   Constant term 
INDD Independent directors 
BSZ Board size 
AFZ Audit firm size 
CGC Presence of corporate governance committee 
GONR Government ownership 
IONR Institutional ownership 
BONR Block ownership 
DONR Director ownership 
CONTROLS Control variables for firm size (FSZ), firm growth (SGR), capital 
expenditure (CEXC), leverage (LVG), dividends (DV), industry 
dummies (INDU) and year dummies (YDU) 
  Error term or residual 
 
The following section describes the details of two models exploring the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial performance (i.e., to answer 
the fourth and fifth research sub-questions). 
 
 
5.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS AND FIRM FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE MODELS 
This section investigates the constructed models to examine the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial performance. Two models 
are adopted to examine this particular association: the equilibrium-variable model, to 
answer the fourth research sub-question, and the compliance-index model, to answer the 
fifth research sub-question.
50
 This section is organised as follows. Subsection 5.4.1 
discusses the variables used in the equilibrium-variable model, and Subsection 5.4.2 
investigates the developed compliance-index model.   
 
 
 
                                                 
50
 Section 3.3 of Chapter Three discusses the differences between these two models. A number of studies use 
the equilibrium-variable model to examine the relationship between individual corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performance (e.g., Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Weir and Laing, 2000; Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006; Mangena et al., 2012). In contrast, some recent studies adopt the compliance-index model as a 
set of provisions to examine this particular relationship (e.g., Black, 2001; Gompers et al., 2003; Cremers 
and Nair, 2005; Morey et al., 2009; Bauer et al., 2010; Renders et al., 2010; Giroud and Mueller, 2011; 
Black and Kim, 2012; Ammann et al., 2013; Munisi and Randoy, 2013; Tariq and Abbas, 2013; van Essen et 
al., 2013). Thus, the two different models assist in exploring the differences in findings and their 
implications. 
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5.4.1 The Equilibrium-Variable Model  
5.4.1.1 The Dependent Variables: Financial Performance  
To examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
financial performance, two different financial performance measures are used: return on 
assets (ROA), as an accounting-based measure, and Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio), as a market-based 
measure. Table 5.5 describes the variables used in the model.   
The current study adopts two different measures for three main reasons. First, there 
appears to be a lack of consensus in the literature about the optimal measurement to 
evaluate firm financial performance (Mangena et al., 2012). Therefore, this study focuses 
on ROA and Q-ratio, as they are more widely used in corporate governance studies (e.g., 
Klapper and Love, 2004; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Bhagat 
and Bolton, 2008; Gupta et al., 2009; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Bruno and Claessens, 2010; 
Renders et al., 2010; Price et al., 2011; Mangena et al., 2012; Munisi and Randoy, 2013). 
Second, these two measures were adopted to improve comparability with existing studies. 
Third, using the accounting and market-based measures provides a robustness check for 
the results (see Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Mangena et al., 2012; Ntim et al., 2012b). 
Therefore, ROA and Q-ratio, as firm performance proxies, help in measuring the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms on both accounting and market performance. 
ROA is used to measure how a firm’s profitability is relative to its total assets (the 
efficiency of management in using assets to generate earnings) (Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006). It is calculated as the operating profit divided by the value of total assets (Yermack, 
1996; Munisi and Randoy, 2013). From an agency theory perspective, higher ROA 
indicates effective use of company assets in achieving the greatest return for shareholders 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
 Using the ROA ratio has a number of advantages. Lev and Sunder (1979) argue 
that financial performance expressed in the form of ratios act as control for the systematic 
effect of size on the variables under examination. Also, Mangena et al. (2012) argue that 
ROA is a more powerful operating financial measure than other accounting measures, such 
as return on equity (ROE), because ROA possesses distributional properties. For example, 
a firm’s total assets are strictly positive, but equity can be negative or zero. This measure is 
also commonly used as a dependent variable in previous corporate governance studies 
(e.g., Haniffa and  Hudaib, 2006; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Price et al., 2011; Mangena et 
al., 2012; Ntim et al., 2012b; Munisi and Randoy, 2013). Despite the aforementioned 
advantages of ROA, it can be noted that ROA has received some criticism for: (i) being 
dependent on the estimated value of a firm’s assets; (ii) the use of ROA as a measure has 
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been criticized because the value of assets can change based on changes in accounting 
policies (i.e., depreciation rates); and (iii) the possibility of being manipulated by 
companies’ management (Lev and Sunder, 1979). 
Tobin’s Q indicates the ratio of a firm’s market value to its replacement cost 
(Ammann et al., 2011 and 2013). Following prior studies and as shown in Table 5.5, it is 
calculated as (a firm’s total assets minus total book value of equity plus total market value) 
divided by total assets (e.g., Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Mangena et al., 2012). Tobin’s Q 
helps measure the impact of corporate governance practices on improving shareholders’ 
market returns (Klapper and Love, 2004; Gupta et al., 2009). 
 
Although Tobin’s Q is a commonly used measure of financial performance in 
corporate governance studies (e.g., Cremers and Nair, 2005; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; 
Renders et al., 2010; Mangena et al., 2012; Ntim et al., 2012b; Ammann et al., 2013), it 
has faced some criticism. For example, just because a company has a high market value 
does not necessarily mean that its directors are efficient in managing the firm’s assets 
(Beattie and Thomson, 2007). Consequently, speculation about certain companies may 
lead to some of them being overvalued. As with ROA, Q-ratio is also affected by unfair 
assessment of a firm’s assets (Lev and Sunder, 1979). Moreover, the market value of firms 
is closely associated with the status of the global economy; a recession may adversely 
influence financial markets (Mangena et al., 2012). To overcome these limitations in both 
proxies, the current study uses a set of control variables that take into account the 
influences of industry, time, leverage and growth on firm financial performance.  
Table 5.5: Summary of variables used for the equilibrium-variable model  
Dependent variables 
   ROA Percentage of operating profit to total assets value. 
  Tobin’s Q Ratio of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity to total assets. 
Independent Variables 
   BDUAL 1 if the roles of chairperson and CEO of the firm are split; 0 otherwise. 
   INDD% Percentage of independent directors on the board of directors. 
   BSZ Number of board members at the end of the financial year. 
   BFM Number of board meetings during the current financial year. 
   BCOM 1 if a firm has three board sub-committees, including audit, remuneration and nomination; 0 
otherwise. 
   DONR% Percentage of shares held by director shareholders. 
Control Variables 
  FSZ Natural log of the book value of a firm’s assets. 
  SGR% Current year’s sales minus last year’s sales to last year’s sales. 
  LVG% Ratio of total debt to total assets.  
  CEXC% Percentage of total capital expenditure to total assets 
   DV 1if a firm paid dividends during the financial year; 0 otherwise. 
  INDU A dummy variable for each industry on the stock market (classified to seven industries). 
  YDU A dummy variable for each year of the sample period (seven years) from 2004 to 2010, 
inclusive. 
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5.4.1.2  The Explanatory Variables: Individual Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
As discussed in Chapter Three, an effective board of directors is essential to firm 
financial performance (Goodstein et al., 1994; Monks and Minow, 2011; Chen and Chen, 
2012). Therefore, the selected explanatory variables include CEO duality (BDUAL), 
proportion of independent directors (INDD), corporate board size (BSZ), frequency of 
board meetings (BFM), presence of board sub-committees (BCOM) and director ownership 
(DONR). These variables are defined and measured in line with existing studies, as shown 
in Table 5.5. Section 3.4 in Chapter Three discusses both theoretical and empirical 
literature regarding the relationship between these mechanisms and firm financial 
performance. 
 
5.4.1.3 The Control Variables: Firm Characteristics 
The control variables used in the equilibrium-variable model to examine the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial performance are 
firm size (FSZ), firm growth (SGR), leverage (LVG), capital expenditure (CEXC), 
dividends (DV), industry dummies (INDU) and year dummies (YDU). Subsection 5.3.3 
explains the rationale for selecting these particular variables. Following prior corporate 
governance studies, it is assumed that all relationships are linear; OLS regression is 
employed to investigate whether firm financial performance is explained (i.e., to answer 
the fourth research sub-question) by the above variables using the equilibrium-variable 
model, as follows: 
Model 2  
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Where  
FP               Firm financial performance measured by return on assets (ROA), as an 
accounting-based measure, and Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio), as a market-based measure  
   Constant term 
BDUAL Role duality 
INDD Independent directors 
BSZ Board size 
BFM Frequency of board meetings 
BCOM Board sub-committees 
DONR Director ownership 
CONTROLS Control variables for firm size (FSZ), firm growth (SGR), leverage (LVG), 
capital expenditure (CEXC), dividends (DV), industry dummies (INDU) and 
year dummies (YDU) 
  Error term or residual 
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5.4.2 The Compliance-Index Model 
5.4.2.1 The Dependent Variables: Financial Performance 
The proxies for financial performance used in this model are the same as those 
adopted for the equilibrium-variable model. These are return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s 
Q (Q-ratio), as an accounting-based measure and a market-based measure, respectively. 
Table 5.6 presents a summary of the variables used in this model. 
 
5.4.2.2 The Explanatory Variable: The Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI)  
 The main independent variable used in the compliance-index model is the Saudi 
Corporate Governance Index (SCGI). Unlike the equilibrium-variable model, which 
examines corporate governance mechanisms individually, the compliance-index model 
adopts the SCGI. The SCGI contains 65 provisions extracted mainly from the 2006 Saudi 
Corporate Governance Code (SCGC). 
 
5.4.2.3 The Control Variables: Firm Characteristics 
The control variables used in the compliance-index model are the same as those 
employed in Model 1 and 2 (equilibrium-variable model). These control variables are firm 
size (FSZ), firm growth (SGR), leverage (LVG), capital expenditure (CEXC), dividends 
(DV), industry dummies (INDU) and year dummies (YDU). The rationale for selecting 
these particular variables is explained in Subsection 5.3.3. Table 5.6 shows the definitions 
and how the control variables are measured. 
Following prior corporate governance literature, it was anticipated that all of the 
variables follow linear relationships. Therefore, OLS regression is employed to examine 
Table 5.6: Summary of variables used for the compliance-index model  
Dependent variables 
   ROA Percentage of operating profit to total assets value. 
  Tobin’s Q Ratio of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity to total assets. 
Independent Variables 
  SCGI Corporate governance (CG) compliance and disclosure index, consisting of 65 provisions 
from the SCGC that take a value of 1 if each corporate governance provision is disclosed, 
and 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0% and 100%. 
Control Variables 
  FSZ Natural log of the book value of a firm’s assets. 
  SGR% Current year’s sales minus last year’s sales to last year’s sales. 
  LVG% Ratio of total debt to total assets.  
  CEXC% Percentage of total capital expenditure to total assets. 
  DV  1 if a firm paid dividends during the financial year, 0 otherwise. 
  INDU A dummy variable for each industry on the stock market (classified to seven industries). 
  YDU A dummy variable for each year of the sample period (seven years) from 2004 to 2010, 
inclusive. 
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whether firm financial performance is explained (i.e., to answer the fifth research sub-
question) by the above variables using the compliance-index model, as follows: 
Model 3  
         it
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10                                                       (3)                                                                       
Where  
FP               Firm financial performance measured by return on assets (ROA), as an 
accounting-based measure, and Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio), as a market-based measure  
   Constant term 
SCGI The constructed Saudi Corporate Governance Disclosure Index 
CONTROL  Control variables for firm size (FSZ), firm growth (SGR), leverage (LVG), capital 
expenditure (CEXC), dividends (DV), industry dummies (INDU) and year 
dummies (YDU) 
  Error term or residual 
 
 
5.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the details of the data and methodology used in the 
quantitative part of the study to answer the first five research sub-questions. Specifically, it 
attempted to address three main issues related to examining the relationship among 
corporate governance mechanisms, voluntary corporate governance disclosure and firm 
financial performance. First, the chapter attempted to describe the quantitative data sources 
and the methodology used in the study. There are two main types of data used in the 
current study: (i) corporate governance variables; and (ii) firm financial and market 
performance. The data was mainly collected from the Tadawul database and the MCI 
archives. The firms’ corporate governance and financial performance data were extracted 
mainly from the firms’ annual reports. The firms’ market information was obtained from 
the Tadawul Annual Statistical Report. Complete data was collected for 80 firms out of 
145 firms listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) as of 31 December, 2010. The 
final sample covers seven years of data, from 2004 to 2010, resulting in a total of 560 firm-
year observations (80 firms over seven years).  
Second, this chapter further explained the rationale behind the choice of 
quantitative methods used. It discussed the rationale for the selection of data, sources of 
obtaining data and the sampling procedure. In addition, the chapter explained the three 
different models employed: the voluntary corporate governance disclosure model, the 
equilibrium-variable model and the compliance-index model. The voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure model investigates the determinants of corporate governance 
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disclosure, while the equilibrium-variable and compliance-index models examine the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial performance. In 
addition, the chapter discussed the validity and reliability of the constructed governance 
index. Third, this chapter discussed the strengths and limitations of the selected 
quantitative methods. Specifically, this discussion shed light on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the data, data sources, models employed and measurement of the dependent, 
independent and control variables. 
The next chapter explains the summary descriptive statistics of the three statistical 
models used in the study. More precisely, it presents the descriptive statistics of the 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure model, including the Saudi Corporate 
Governance Index (SCGI), corporate governance mechanisms and control variables. 
Furthermore, it discusses the summary descriptive statistics of the firm financial 
performance models, including dependent, explanatory and control variables. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SAUDI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX 
AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
6.  I NTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
regression analysis. More precisely, this chapter seeks to achieve the following objectives. 
First, it presents the descriptive statistics of the constructed Saudi Corporate Governance 
Index (SCGI). It reports the analyses of the level of compliance with the constructed SCGI 
from the complete sample to answer the first two research sub-questions. Furthermore, it 
presents the analyses of the level of compliance based on sub-indices, firm size, audit firm 
size and industry type. The rationale is to explore the potential factors influencing the 
variation in the level of compliance with the SCGC among the sampled firms. Second, the 
chapter seeks to determine whether the introduction of the Saudi Corporate Governance 
Code (SCGC) has helped improve corporate governance practices in the Saudi corporate 
context. Third, this chapter reports the descriptive statistics of the financial proxies, 
corporate governance mechanisms and control variables used in the empirical models. 
The rest of the chapter is divided into four sections. Section 6.1 addresses 
descriptive statistics of the level of compliance with the SCGC. Section 6.2 reports the 
statistical summaries of the explanatory and control variables used in the voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure model. Section 6.3 presents the dependent and 
explanatory variables employed in the models that examine the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial performance, while Section 6.4 
presents a summary of this chapter.      
 
 
6.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE CONSTRUCTED SAUDI 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX (SCGI)  
This section presents a detailed descriptive analysis of the level of compliance with 
the SCGC to answer the following research sub-questions: (i) What is the level of 
compliance with the 2006 SCGC?; and (ii) Has the introduction of the 2006 SCGC 
improving corporate governance practices? Also, the corporate governance literature 
argues that firm characteristics, such as firm size, auditor quality and industry type, 
influence the level of compliance with corporate governance standards (Haniffa and 
166 
 
 
Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; Samaha et al., 2012; Allegrini 
and Greco, 2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Therefore, in line with the literature, this 
study carried out a detailed analysis of the effect of firm characteristics on the level of 
corporate governance compliance. To achieve this objective, and in line with prior studies, 
a number of proxies for firm size, audit firm size and industry type are selected (e.g., 
Werder et al., 2005; Bauer et al., 2008). These variables help to determine whether 
corporate governance scores can be explained by firm characteristics. The remainder of 
this section develops as follows. Subsection 6.1.1 reports statistical analysis for the SCGI 
based on the complete sample. Subsection 6.1.2 presents the descriptive statistical 
summary of the level of compliance based on the sub-indices. Subsection 6.1.3 explains 
the descriptive statistical summary of the level of compliance based on firm size. 
Subsection 6.1.4 presents the descriptive summaries based on audit firm size, and 
Subsection 6.1.5 presents the descriptive statistical summary based on industry type. 
 
6.1.1 Descriptive Statistics of the SCGI based on the Full Sample  
 As discussed in Chapter Five, the current study developed a corporate governance 
index to examine the level of compliance among a balanced sample consisting of 80 Saudi 
listed firms from 2004 to 2010. The SCGI consists of 65 corporate governance provisions, 
which were derived mainly from the SCGC. As shown in Figure 6.1, the level of 
compliance has improved over the sample period. For example, as shown in Panel A of 
Table 6.1, the aggregate corporate governance score for the SCGI is 17% in 2004, and 
significantly increased up to 73% in 2010 (a 56% improvement), with an average level of 
compliance over the seven years of 44%. This percentage is consistent with the finding of 
Al-Moataz and Lakhal (2012). They report that the level of compliance with corporate 
standards among Saudi listed firms is 53%.  
 
             Figure 6.1: Level of compliance with the SCGC between 2004 and 2010 using computed means 
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Also, this result is consistent with studies conducted in other emerging countries. 
For example, Tsamenyi et al. (2007) report a level of compliance with voluntary corporate 
governance standards of 52% among Ghanaian listed firms. Similarly, Garay and Gonzalez 
(2008) and Price et al. (2011) find that 40% of Venezuelan and 46% of Mexican listed 
firms complied with the local corporate governance codes. In addition, Ntim et al. (2012a) 
report that 61% of South African firms complied voluntarily with the King II Report.  
The improvement in the level of compliance over the sample period can be traced 
to corporate governance reforms in Saudi Arabia.
51
 The introduction of the SCGC 
improved corporate governance disclosure and brought about a reduction in information 
asymmetry (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; Al-Abbas, 2009; Al-Nodel and Hussainey, 
2010; Alshehri and Solomon, 2012). Nevertheless, some studies cast doubt on the ability of 
a voluntary compliance regime to improve corporate governance practices in developing 
countries (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). This improvement may prove the 
feasibility of adopting a UK style ‘comply or explain’ of corporate governance in the Saudi 
context.  
In line with Chen and Zhang (2014), Panel B in Table 6.1 reports results of the 
paired sample t-test to examine voluntary corporate governance disclosure pre- and post-
2006, when the SCGC was introduced. It has been found that the null hypothesis 
suggesting equality of the average of compliance among listed firms pre and post 
introducing the governance code is rejected at the 1% level of significance. However, the 
average corporate governance scores for 2009 and 2010 are higher than the averages for 
2006 and 2007, which is consistent with theoretical expectation. In this regard, Ntim et al. 
(2012b) argue that corporate governance reforms, such as introducing the SCGC, take time 
to reflect in good corporate governance practices.            
 Conyon (1994) investigates 400 UK listed firms during the period 1988-1993. He 
reports that the level of compliance improved over the study period. Similarly, Alves and 
Mendes (2004) find that the level of compliance with governance standards increased after 
the Portuguese Corporate Governance Code was released in 1999. In the same vein, Ntim 
et al. (2012a) examine the influence of the King II Report on good corporate governance 
practices using 169 South African listed firms from 2002 to 2006. They report that the 
level of compliance generally improved over the five years examined. Specifically, the 
level of compliance increased from 47% in 2002 to 69% in 2006.  
                                                 
51
 As discussed in detail in Chapter Two, Saudi Arabia started corporate governance reforms in 2003, when 
the Capital Market Authority (CMA) was established. The CMA released the important corporate 
governance regulation known as the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) in 2006, which encouraged 
firms to improve corporate governance standards.   
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Table 6.1: Summary descriptive statistics for the Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) 
 All 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Panel A:SCGI for all firm years      
Mean 44.61 17.08 21.29 34.10 46.13 55.52 64.98 73.15 
Median 66.44 16.92 20.00 35.38 46.15 53.85 66.92 73.85 
STD 44.33 4.86 7.04 11.29 13.82 12.21 10.93 8.39 
Min 3..3 3.08 7.69 6.15 10.77 16.92 40.00 47.69 
Max 7..99 33.85 38.46 61.54 83.08 87.69 90.77 90.77 
Panel B: All Firm Years before Releasing the SCGC All Firm Years after Releasing the SCGC 
Average Years 04-05   Years 06-07 Years 09-10 
Mean  19.18     40.12   69.07  
Median  19.23     41.15   69.23  
T-test       18.14***   47.95***  
STD  5.40     11.37   8.53  
Min  7.69     9.23   46.92  
Max  33.85     63.85   90.77  
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics of the aggregate levels of compliance with SCGI based on the complete sample 
from 2004 to 2010. In Panel B, the paired sample t-test is used for equality of mean. A mean difference with *** (1% 
significant level) indicates that the null hypothesis can be rejected assuming equality of means. 
 
 Table 6.2 shows the level of compliance with the SCGC. The comparison between 
the provisions shows that each provision has a range between 0% and 100%. A provision 
that reported 100% indicates perfect compliance by all 80 firms, for example measuring 
the right of shareholders to appoint directors (SCSA)
52
 over the sample period. However, a 
provision reporting 0% implies no compliance by any of the sampled firms during the 
study period, for example drafting board policies and appointing committee members 
(BDPA).  
Table 6.2 shows that there are 13 provisions with relatively high levels of 
compliance (70% or more). This indicates that about 70% of the sampled firms complied 
with these provisions; for example, the majority of the board is non-executive (BMBD), 
frequency of board meetings (BFBM), existence of an audit committee (AEX), disclosure 
of operation performance (DOP), disclosure of the principle activities (DPA) and 
disclosure of policy of dividends (DPD) all have compliance levels above 70%.  
However, 24 of the provisions had compliance scores of 30% or less. Thus, 30% of 
the sampled firms complied with the provisions, such as the drafting of board policies and 
appointing committee members (BDPA), disclosure of ownership structure (DOS), 
disclosure of CEO compensation (DCEOC), narrative on compliance/non-compliance with 
the SCGC (DCNC), disclosure of firm’s risk (IFR), setting control procedures for company 
risk management (ICRM) and one-share-one-vote policy (SGAV). Also, Table 6.2 indicates 
that compliance with 78% of the provisions (51 out of 65) improved significantly during 
the sample period. It can be noted from the table that there was slight improvement in 12% 
of the provisions. In contrast, there is no change observed for about 10% of them.  
                                                 
52
 The definitions of all corporate governance provisions included in the SCGI are presented in Appendix 2. 
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There are three possible reasons for the variation in the level of compliance with 
the SCGC among the listed firms. First, the provisions with high scores are required by the 
1965 Companies Act as well as recommended by the SCGC. For example, the frequency 
of general assembly meetings (SGFM), which is required to be held at least once a year 
(SGFM), scored 93%, 95%, 100%, 100%, 98%, 98% and 98% during the years from 2004 
to 2010, respectively, and the right of shareholders to appoint directors (SGSA) scored 
100% for the entire sample period.  
Second, most of the provisions gradually improved over the sample period due to 
the impact of introducing the corporate governance code in 2006 (e.g., Conyon, 1994; 
Allegrini and Greco, 2013). Predominantly, the sampled firms’ compliance with the 
provisions is low during 2004 and 2005, and improved from 2006 onwards. As shown in 
Table 6.2, the average compliance before the introduction of the governance code for 
directors’ classification (BDCL), disclosure of directors on other firms’ boards (BMOB) 
and individual directors’ meeting attendance (BDMA) are 1.25%, 2.25% and 8.13%, 
respectively. In contrast, compliance with these particular provisions increased after the 
release of the code, to averages of 81%, 86% and 83%, respectively.  
Third, there was a low level of compliance with some of the provisions over the 
sample period; for example, the disclosure of CEO compensation (DCEOC), one-share-
one-vote policy (SGAV) and drafting policies of board and appointing committee members 
(BDPA). The low level of compliance with these governance mechanisms may be 
explained by: (i) weak implementation and enforcement by regulatory bodies, such as the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) and the Capital Market Authority (CMA) (see 
La Porta et al., 1999; Ararat and Ugur, 2003; Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008; ROSC, 
2009); and (ii) unwillingness by firms to comply with some corporate governance 
provisions. For example, some of the firms pointed out in their annual reports that they are 
not able to apply a one-share-one-vote policy (SGAV) due to its incompatibility with their 
articles of association. Furthermore, weakness in external corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as the market for corporate control, appears to be behind the level of 
compliance with some governance provisions (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Bozec and 
Bozec, 2012).  
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Table 6.2: The level of compliance with the SCGC provisions among the sampled firms (%)                 
    Pre-2006    Post-2006 (i.e., after SCGC was released) Avg. of 
7 Years   Saudi Corporate Governance Index (65 Provisions) 2004 2005 Average  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
  Yearly Average of level of Compliance  17.08 21.29 19.18   34.10 46.13 55.52 64.98 73.15 54.78 44.61 
  1- Board of Directors and Board Sub-Committees                       
1 Role duality (BDUAL) 51 48 49.38   55 69 84 88 90 77.00 69.11 
2 Board chairperson classification (BCP) 9 9 8.75   18 24 31 36 40 29.75 23.75 
3 Majority of board is non-executive (BMBD) 50 50 50.00   58 78 93 98 100 85.00 75.00 
4 Directors’ classification (BDCL)  1 1 1.25   53 69 88 96 100 81.00 58.21 
5 Disclosure of directors’ biography (BDB) 0 0 0.00   0 0 1 1 1 0.25 0.54 
6 Drafting policies of board and appointing committee members (BDPA) 0 0 0.00   0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
7 Disclosure of directors on other firms’ boards (BMOB) 3 3 2.50   66 78 91 96 99 86.00 62.14 
8 Number of membership of directors in other boards’ firms (BMBN) 3 3 2.50   66 78 90 96 99 85.75 61.96 
9 Frequency of board meetings (BFBM) 80 81 80.63   84 94 98 100 100 95.00 90.89 
10 Individual directors’ meetings attendance (BDMA) 3 14 8.13   43 79 95 99 100 83.00 61.61 
11 Existence of audit committee (AC) (AEX) 20 43 31.25   83 91 96 99 98 93.25 75.54 
12 Description of the jurisdictions & duties of AC (ADJD) 3 6 4.38   34 48 64 75 89 61.75 45.36 
13 Majority of AC is non-executive (ACOM) 1 3 1.88   20 28 33 41 48 33.75 24.64 
14 Identify AC's chairperson (ACP) 1 4 2.50   20 20 29 40 44 30.50 22.50 
15 AC's chairperson is independent (can)  6 16 11.25   59 71 78 91 94 78.50 59.29 
16 AC's members are three or more (ACNM) 6 26 16.25   73 84 86 94 95 86.25 66.25 
17 Disclosure of AC members' names (ADM) 6 26 16.25   66 80 90 99 96 86.25 66.25 
18 Frequency of AC meetings (AFM) 5 9 6.88   46 65 79 95 96 76.25 56.43 
19 Individual AC members’ meeting attendance (AMMA) 0 0 0.00   5 15 23 35 40 23.50 16.79 
20 Existence of nomination committee (NC) (NEX) 0 0 0.00   3 28 45 69 94 47.50 33.93 
21 Description of the jurisdictions & duties of NC (NDJD) 0 0 0.00   3 16 28 53 84 36.50 26.07 
22 Majority of NC is non-executive (NCOM) 0 0 0.00   0 10 20 33 56 23.75 16.96 
23 Identify NC's chairperson (NCP) 0 0 0.00   0 4 5 19 28 11.00 7.86 
24 NC's chairperson is independent (NCN)    0 0 0.00   3 25 36 56 84 40.75 29.11 
25 Disclosure of NC members' names (NDM) 0 0 0.00   3 25 41 68 93 45.75 32.68 
26 Frequency of NC meetings (NFM) 0 0 0.00   1 11 26 60 79 35.50 25.36 
27 Individual NC members’ meeting attendance (NMMA) 0 0 0.00   0 5 13 25 35 15.50 11.07 
28 Existence of remuneration committee (RC) (REX) 3 3 2.50   5 29 45 69 94 48.25 35.18 
29 Description of the jurisdictions & duties of RC (RDJD) 0 0 0.00   3 18 29 53 84 37.00 26.43 
30 Majority of RC is non-executive (RCOM) 0 0 0.00   0 10 20 33 56 23.75 16.96 
31 Identify RC's chairperson (RCP) 0 0 0.00   0 4 5 19 28 11.00 7.86 
32 RC's chairperson is independent (RCN)    1 1 1.25   5 26 36 56 84 41.50 30.00 
33 Disclosure of RC members' names (RDM) 1 1 1.25   5 26 41 68 93 46.50 33.57 
171 
 
 
Table 6.2 (Continued): The level of compliance with the SCGC provisions among the sampled firms (%)       
  Pre-2006    Post-2006 (i.e., after SCGC was released) Avg. of 
7 Years  Saudi Corporate Governance Index (65 Provisions) 2004 2005 Average  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
34 Frequency of RC meetings (RFM) 0 0 0.00   3 13 28 60 79 36.25 25.89 
35 Individual RC members’ meeting attendance (RMMA) 0 0 0.00   0 5 13 25 35 15.50 11.07 
  2- Disclosure and Transparency                       
36 Disclosure of ownership Structure (DOS) 1 1 1.25   5 19 24 34 40 24.25 17.68 
37 Director ownership (DBO) 0 1 0.63   9 45 65 78 84 56.00 40.18 
38 Detailed disclosure of board’s compensation (DBC) 66 69 67.50   80 88 95 98 99 91.75 84.82 
39 Value of board’s compensation (DVBC) 51 54 52.50   69 70 68 74 73 70.50 65.36 
40 Disclosure of CEO/MD/GM compensation (DCEOC) 1 5 3.13   9 10 15 13 15 12.25 9.64 
41 Disclosure of top management compensation (DTMC) 0 0 0.00   24 34 86 93 99 67.00 47.86 
42 Disclosure of operation performance (DOP) 65 65 65.00   84 93 100 100 100 95.25 86.61 
43 Disclosure of the firm’s loans (DFL) 16 33 24.38   48 66 75 81 88 71.50 58.04 
44 Comparison of five years performance (DPFY) 19 48 33.13   63 89 96 98 100 89.00 73.04 
45 Disclosure of strategies and objectives (DSO) 29 36 32.50   58 73 76 84 90 76.00 63.57 
46 Description of the principal activities (DPA) 45 50 47.50   63 83 86 88 90 81.75 71.96 
47 Disclosure policy of dividends (DPD) 40 51 45.63   71 88 98 96 98 90.00 77.32 
48 Disclosure of related party transactions (DRP) 9 24 16.25   46 75 86 90 96 78.75 60.89 
49 Retraction/Punishment by supervisory body (DSP) 1 5 3.13   16 35 50 58 71 46.00 33.75 
50 Narrative on the firm as a going concern (DGC) 4 23 13.13   45 76 89 90 95 79.00 60.18 
51 Narrative on compliance/non compliance with SCGC (DCNC) 1 3 1.88   8 24 36 58 68 38.50 28.04 
  3- Internal Control and Risk Management                       
52 Effectiveness of internal control system (ICEF) 1 14 7.50   21 29 39 59 71 43.75 33.39 
53 Control procedures for company risk management (ICRM) 3 3 2.50   6 9 16 18 24 14.50 11.07 
54 Disclosure of firm’s risks (IFR) 1 3 1.88   3 25 49 61 69 41.25 30.00 
55 Firm’s financial report approved (IFRA) 4 16 10.00   28 36 48 56 61 45.75 35.54 
56 Applicable of accounting standards (ICAS) 0 9 4.38   21 43 56 65 76 52.25 38.57 
57 Drafting firms’ corporate governance code (ICGC) 1 1 1.25   3 6 9 19 30 13.25 9.82 
  4- Rights of Shareholders and General Assembly GA            
58 Frequency of GA meetings (SGFM) 93 95 93.75   100 100 98 98 98 98.50 97.14 
59 GA meeting agenda announced before meeting (SGMA) 48 48 47.50   53 50 53 54 53 52.25 50.89 
60 Right of shareholders to appointment directors (SGSA) 100 100 100.00   100 100 100 100 100 100.00 100.00 
61 One share one vote policy (SGAV) 0 0 0.00   0 0 0 1 4 1.00 0.71 
62 GA meeting announced 20 days in advance (SGMN) 68 83 75.00   88 90 95 95 99 93.25 88.04 
63 GA meeting results announced immediately (SGMR) 91 95 93.13   98 99 98 99 98 98.00 96.61 
64 GA meeting within six months of year end (SGMT) 90 93 91.25   100 99 98 96 98 98.00 96.07 
65 Firms’ social contributions (SFSC) 11 16 13.75   25 28 33 35 44 32.75 27.32 
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6.1.2 Descriptive Statistics of the SCGI based on the Sub-Indices 
 This subsection presents the descriptive statistical summaries of the level of 
compliance with the SCGC based on the sub-indices. As shown in Table 6.2, and in line 
with existing studies (e.g., Munisi and Randoy, 2013), the provisions that constitute the 
SCGI consist of four sub-indices, which are: board of directors and board sub-committees 
(BOD), with 35 provisions, disclosure and transparency (DAT), with 16 provisions, 
internal control and risk management (IRM), with 6 provisions, and rights of shareholders 
and general assembly (ROS), with 8 provisions.  
  
 
   Figure 6.2: A comparison of the level of compliance with the SCGC between firms based on the SCGI sub- indices 
using   computed means. 
 
 As shown in Figure 6.2, and in line with Ntim et al. (2012a) there are variations in 
the aggregated level of compliance based on the sub-indices. The key observations can be 
summarised as follows. First, the sampled firms show greater compliance with the 
provisions related to the rights of shareholders. Specifically, 70% of the listed firms 
complied with the rights of shareholders’ provisions, whilst 55% complied with the 
provisions relating to disclosure and transparency. However, the level of compliance with 
the provisions relating to the board of directors and board sub-committees is 37%, whilst 
the level of compliance with the internal control provisions is 26%. As discussed in 
Subsection 6.1.1, the high level of compliance with the rights of shareholders provisions 
relates to the nature of these provisions, which have been imposed by regulatory bodies, 
such as the MCI, to protect shareholders’ interests (Al-Twaijry et al., 2002). For example, 
the level of compliance with the frequency of general assembly meetings (SGFM), the 
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right of shareholders to appoint others (SGMA) and general assembly meeting within six 
months of the end of year (SGMT) are 97%, 100% and 96%, respectively. 
 In contrast, the low level of compliance with the board of directors and board sub-
committees’ provisions is due to the absence of good corporate governance practices prior 
to governance reforms. As shown in Table 6.3, the average compliance scores for 2004 and 
2005 are low compared with the average for the years between 2006 and 2010, which 
witnessed the introduction of the code. 
Table 6.3: Summary descriptive statistics of levels of compliance with the SCGC and sub-indices (%) 
 All 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Panel A: SCGI      
Mean 44.61 17.08 21.29 34.10 46.13 55.52 64.98 73.15 
Median 66.44 16.92 20.00 35.38 46.15 53.85 66.92 73.85 
STD 44.33 4.86 7.04 11.29 13.82 12.21 10.93 8.39 
Min 3..3 3.08 7.69 6.15 10.77 16.92 40.00 47.69 
Max 7..99 33.85 38.46 61.54 83.08 87.69 90.77 90.77 
Panel B:Board of directors and committees      
Mean 37.30 7.18 9.82 25.07 37.75 47.86 61.14 72.25 
Median 34.29 5.71 8.57 28.57 37.14 42.86 65.71 74.29 
T-test 6.95*** 6.40** 1.40 4.94*** 4.37*** 4.00*** 4.90*** 6.19*** 
STD 27.31 5.82 8.04 15.20 18.66 18.77 17.35 12.91 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.71 31.43 34.29 
Max 94.29 34.29 34.29 62.86 88.57 94.29 94.29 91.43 
Panel C:Disclosure and transparency      
Mean 54.93 21.80 29.14 43.44 60.31 71.56 76.80 81.48 
Median 56.25 18.75 31.25 43.75 62.50 75.00 81.25 81.25 
T-test 18.80*** 17.30*** 10.55*** 12.57*** 12.31*** 14.07*** 11.36*** 10.24*** 
STD 25.60 9.11 13.52 15.85 17.57 11.85 11.94 9.30 
Min 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.25 43.75 43.75 43.75 
Max 100.00 50.00 62.50 81.25 100.00 100.00 93.75 100.00 
Panel D:Internal control and Risk Management     
Mean 26.40 1.67 7.50 13.54 24.58 36.04 46.25 55.21 
Median 16.67 0.00 0.00 16.67 16.67 33.33 50.00 50.00 
T-test         
STD 25.14 5.03 12.41 14.30 18.75 19.20 20.88 20.98 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.67 
Max 100.00 16.67 50.00 50.00 66.67 83.33 100.00 100.00 
Panel E:Rights of shareholders       
Mean 69.60 62.50 66.09 70.31 70.63 71.56 72.19 73.91 
Median 75.00 62.50 62.50 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 
T-test 36.73*** 32.84*** 28.23*** 29.07*** 19.81*** 14.18*** 10.26*** 7.31*** 
STD 11.85 15.79 13.81 10.02 8.46 11.25 8.66 9.16 
Min 12.50 12.50 12.50 37.50 50.00 12.50 50.00 37.50 
Max 87.50 87.50 87.50 87.50 87.50 87.50 87.50 87.50 
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics of the aggregate levels of compliance with SCGI based on sub-indices 
from 2004 to 2010. The t-test values in Panel B, C, and E are the independent sample t-test for equality of mean. A 
mean difference with ***, ** (1% and 5% significant level) indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected indicating the 
equality of means. 
  
Second, unlike the provisions relating to the rights of shareholders’ sub-index, the 
level of compliance with board of directors, disclosure and transparency, and internal 
control sub-indices have improved gradually over the sample period. More precisely, the 
scores of board of directors and board sub-committees’ provisions increased from 7% in 
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2004 to 72% in 2010, whereas the scores for the disclosure and transparency sub-index and 
the internal control sub-index improved from 21% and 2% in 2004 to 81% and 55% in 
2010, respectively. Furthermore, the scores for the rights of shareholders sub-index 
improved slightly over the study period, from 62% in 2004 to 74% in 2010. This can be 
interpreted as a result of the corporate governance reforms in Saudi Arabia (see Al-Matari 
et al., 2012). As shown in Panels B, C and E in Table 6.3, independent sample t-test values 
show that the mean aggregate level of compliance of the internal control sub-index is 
significantly different from the three sub-indices at the 1% significance levels. 
 
6.1.3 Descriptive Statistics of the SCGI based on Firm Size  
 Firm size is an important factor to consider in exploring good corporate governance 
practices (Eisenberg et al., 1998; Samaha et al., 2012; Tariq and Abbas, 2013). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) suggest that firm size is positively associated with voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure. Consistent with the corporate governance literature (e.g., Werder et 
al., 2005; Bauer et al., 2008), the complete sample is divided into two sub-samples based 
on firm size. This analysis assists in explaining the differences in levels of compliance 
among the sampled firms.  
For comparison, the complete sample is split into 40 large and 40 small firms based 
on the firms’ total assets. Figure 6.3 shows that large firms complied more with corporate 
governance standards than small firms. The average level of compliance by large firms is 
46%; that of small firms is 41%. This finding is supported by the corporate governance 
literature. For example, Alsaeed (2006), using a Saudi sample in 2003, indicates that large 
firms comply more with corporate governance standards. Similarly, Elzahar and Hussainey 
(2012), Ntim et al. (2012a), Samaha et al. (2012) and Allegrini and Greco (2013) find a 
positive relationship between large firms and the level of compliance with good corporate 
governance practices. 
 
Figure 6.3: A comparison of the level of compliance with the SCGC between large and small firms using computed 
means 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 All 
M
ea
n
 o
f 
S
C
G
I 
%
 
Large firms 
Small firms 
All firm years 
175 
 
 
From Table 6.4, the independent sample t-test value indicates that the aggregate 
means are significantly different at the 1% level. However, the difference in mean is not 
significant in 2009 and 2010 as compared to 2004 to 2008. The differences in the level of 
compliance among large and small firms can be explained as follows. First, large firms are 
more likely to obtain external capital than small firms (Eng and Mak, 2003; Bozec et al., 
2010). Therefore, large firms tend to improve their voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure with a view to reducing cost of capital (Klapper and Love, 2004; Chen et al., 
2009). Second, agency problems are predominantly greater in larger firms than small firms 
due to the complexity of their capital structure (Chung and Zhang, 2011). This implies that 
large firms are more determined to comply with corporate governance codes to mitigate 
such agency problems (Laidroo, 2009). 
 
Table 6.4: Summary descriptive statistics of levels of compliance with the SCGC and samples based 
on firm size (%)  
 All 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Panel A:SCGI      
Mean 44.61 17.08 21.29 34.10 46.13 55.52 64.98 73.15 
Median 66.44 16.92 20.00 35.38 46.15 53.85 66.92 73.85 
STD 44.33 4.86 7.04 11.29 13.82 12.21 10.93 8.39 
Min 3..3 3.08 7.69 6.15 10.77 16.92 40.00 47.69 
Max 7..99 33.85 38.46 61.54 83.08 87.69 90.77 90.77 
Panel B:All small firms       
Mean 41.70 15.22 19.14 29.44 41.87 52.20 62.39 71.64 
Median 41.79 15.67 19.40 32.09 43.28 52.24 62.69 71.64 
T-test         
STD 22.48 4.62 6.33 11.02 15.06 12.55 10.95 7.80 
Min 1.49 1.49 5.97 4.48 8.96 16.42 38.81 52.24 
Max 88.06 28.36 37.31 44.78 74.63 85.07 88.06 88.06 
Panel C:All large firms       
Mean 46.10 17.92 22.62 37.77 49.04 57.23 65.65 72.46 
Median 46.92 18.46 22.31 37.69 49.23 53.85 67.69 72.31 
T-test 2.37*** 2.43** 2.25** 3.52*** 2.40** 1.89* 1.35 0.44 
STD 21.57 5.27 7.44 10.14 11.52 11.33 10.66 8.78 
Min 6.15 6.15 9.23 20.00 26.15 38.46 43.08 47.69 
Max 86.15 33.85 36.92 61.54 83.08 83.08 83.08 86.15 
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics of the aggregate levels of compliance with SCGI based on firm size 2004 
to 2010. The t-test values in Panel C are the independent sample t-test for equality of mean. A mean difference with 
***, **, * (1%, 5%, and 10% significant level) indicates that the null hypothesis can be rejected assuming equality of 
means. 
 
Third, the variation can be attributed to the cost of implementing corporate 
governance standards. Ammann et al. (2011) indicate that large firms are more capable of 
affording the cost of compliance than smaller firms. Finally, this variation can also be seen 
as an indication of ‘adoption timing’ in the sense that larger firms adopted the SCGC out of 
their own volition earlier than smaller firms. In other words, corporate governance 
practices in some large firms were established before the release of the governance code in 
2006.  
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Table 6.4 presents comparisons from 2006 to 2010. First, the level of compliance 
with the SCGC is not high for either large or small firms in 2004 and 2005 (before the 
corporate governance code was introduced in 2006). Second, the level of compliance has 
significantly increased since 2006 for both larger and smaller firms. Third, the increase in 
the levels of compliance for larger and smaller firms is consistent with the improvement in 
the whole sample (see Figure 6.3). This suggests that there has been improvement in the 
firms’ corporate governance standards regardless of firm size. 
 
6.1.4 Descriptive Statistics of the SCGI based on Audit Firm Size 
The literature on corporate governance argues that quality of compliance with 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure differs among firms based on audit firm size 
(Barako et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2012a). Haniffa and Cooke (2002) suggest that audit 
firms act as mechanisms for limiting agents’ opportunistic behaviour. According to an 
agency theory perspective, audit firm size can be considered a determinant of the level of 
compliance with some of the SCGI provisions, such as a firm’s going concern (DGC) and 
effectiveness of internal control system (ICEF). Consequently, the impact of audit firms on 
the level of compliance is examined by dividing the full sample into two groups, firms 
audited by one of the big-four audit firms (Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG and 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers) and those audited by a non-big-four audit firm. 
Figure 6.4 shows the aggregate level of compliance based on the type of audit firm 
from 2004 to 2010. There are three key observations. First, the level of compliance of the 
firms audited by the big-four is higher than that of non-big four audit firms, which is in line 
with past studies (e.g., Raffournier, 1995; Ntim et al., 2012a; Schiehll et al., 2013). As 
shown in Table 6.5, the level of compliance of the sampled firms audited by the big-four is 
46%, compared with 42% for firms audited by non-big-four firms. Second, similar to the 
level of compliance based on firm size, the first two years’ scores are low; for example, in 
2004, 17% and 16% of the large and small firms were audited by big-four firms, 
respectively.  
Third, the improvement in the level of compliance over the sample period is 
consistent with the improvement of the complete sample (see Figure 6.4). From Panel B in 
Table 6.5, independent sample t-test values show the mean for firms audited by big-four 
and non-big-four audit firms are significantly different from each other at the 5% level of 
significance. On a yearly basis, 2005, 2007 and 2008 showed significant differences at the 
5% level of significance, while the means of 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2010 show no 
differences. 
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   Figure 6.4: A comparison of the level of compliance with the SCGC between firms audited by big-four and non-big-
four audit firms using computed means. 
   
 There are two possible explanations for the slight variation in compliance levels 
with corporate governance standards based on audit firm size. First, big-four audit firms 
exhibit a higher level of independence because they have to maintain their reputations 
(DeAngelo, 1981; Depoers, 2000). Second, the big-four are financially more able to 
provide high-quality auditing (Alsaeed, 2006). In other words, they can attract qualified 
staff and can easily train them adequately. Therefore, firms audited by the big-four can be 
expected to be more compliant with corporate governance provisions. 
 
Table 6.5: Summary descriptive statistics of levels of compliance with the SCGC and samples based on 
audit firm size (%) 
 All 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Panel A:SCGI      
Mean 44.61 17.08 21.29 34.10 46.13 55.52 64.98 73.15 
Median 66.44 16.92 20.00 35.38 46.15 53.85 66.92 73.85 
STD 44.33 4.86 7.04 11.29 13.82 12.21 10.93 8.39 
Min 3..3 3.08 7.69 6.15 10.77 16.92 40.00 47.69 
Max 7..99 33.85 38.46 61.54 83.08 87.69 90.77 90.77 
Panel B:All firm audited by big-four      
Mean 46.40 17.51 22.89 35.93 49.85 58.53 66.30 73.77 
Median 46.15 16.92 23.08 36.92 49.23 55.38 67.69 75.38 
T-test 2.07** 1.30 2.34** 1.57 2.64** 2.40** 1.14 0.70 
STD 22.52 5.83 7.80 10.74 13.64 11.95 11.90 8.55 
Min 4.62 6.15 6.15 4.62 12.31 40.00 40.00 47.69 
Max 90.77 33.85 38.46 60.00 83.08 87.69 90.77 90.77 
Panel C:All large firms non-audited by big-four      
Mean 42.49 16.03 19.27 31.98 41.94 52.19 63.52 72.47 
Median 43.08 16.92 19.23 33.08 44.62 53.08 64.62 73.08 
T-test         
STD 22.17 4.13 5.76 11.75 13.14 11.75 9.69 8.28 
Min 1.54 1.54 9.23 12.31 9.23 16.92 40.00 52.31 
Max 86.15 26.15 30.77 61.54 66.15 76.92 80.00 86.15 
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics of the aggregate levels of compliance with SCGI based on audit firm size 
2004 to 2010. The t-test values in Panel C are the independent sample t-test for equality of mean. A mean difference 
with *** and ** (1% and 5% significant level) indicates that the null hypothesis can be rejected assuming equality of 
means. 
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6.1.5 Descriptive Statistics of the SCGI based on Industry Type 
 Industry type is one factor that can influence levels of corporate governance 
disclosure (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Krafft et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2014). Hussainey and 
Al-Nodel (2008) find that firms in the financial sector are more compliant with the 
disclosure requirements in Saudi Arabia. To examine the level of compliance with the 
SCGC among the sampled firms, and to determine whether the variation can be attributed 
to industry type, the full sample is classified into seven industries, as provided by the Saudi 
Stock Exchange (Tadawul). These include: industrials, consumer services, financials, 
consumer goods, basic materials, telecommunications and utilities industries.  
 
 
Figure 6.5: A comparison of the level of compliance with the SCGC between firms based on industry type using      
computed means.   
 
Figure 6.5 shows the levels of compliance with the SCGC based on industry. There 
are three main observations. First, there is a convergence in terms of the level of 
compliance with corporate governance standards among sampled firms over the period. 
The level of compliance is higher in telecommunications and utilities firms, at 48%. After 
that, financials and basic materials industries each scored 46%. Industrial firms scored 
44%, while consumer goods and services each scored 43%. Second, in line with the full 
sample, the level of compliance of all industries increased over the sample period. For 
example, as shown in Table 6.6, the levels of compliance by the sampled firms in 
industrials, financials, telecommunications and utilities firms are 17%, 19%, 17% and 
18%, respectively, in 2004, compared with 72%, 76%, 70% and 83% in 2010. 
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Table 6.6: Summary descriptive statistics of levels of compliance with the SCGC and sampled based on 
industry type (%) 
 All 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Panel A:SCGI      
Mean 44.61 17.08 21.29 34.10 46.13 55.52 64.98 73.15 
Median 66.44 16.92 20.00 35.38 46.15 53.85 66.92 73.85 
STD 44.33 4.86 7.04 11.29 13.82 12.21 10.93 8.39 
Min 3..3 3.08 7.69 6.15 10.77 16.92 40.00 47.69 
Max 7..99 33.85 38.46 61.54 83.08 87.69 90.77 90.77 
Panel B:All industrials firms       
Mean 44.28 17.39 21.20 33.44 44.21 56.32 64.75 72.64 
Median 43.08 18.46 20.00 33.85 46.15 55.38 64.62 73.85 
T-test 0.36 0.93 0.58 0.24 0.43 0.31 0.39 0.27 
STD 22.22 3.75 5.16 10.74 15.45 13.08 10.38 8.27 
Min 10.77 10.77 10.77 13.85 18.46 32.31 40.00 52.31 
Max 83.08 23.08 30.77 52.31 83.08 83.08 80.00 83.08 
Panel C:All consumer services       
Mean 43.32 15.87 19.86 32.45 44.41 55.10 63.50 72.03 
Median 44.62 16.92 19.23 34.62 45.38 56.15 64.62 73.85 
T-test         
STD 22.70 6.72 8.57 13.40 15.16 13.05 11.27 6.89 
Min 1.54 1.54 6.15 4.62 9.23 16.92 40.00 55.38 
Max 83.08 33.85 38.46 61.54 66.15 75.38 80.00 83.08 
Panel D:All financial firms        
Mean 45.79 19.02 25.45 35.24 45.59 53.71 65.03 76.50 
Median 44.62 20.00 30.77 35.38 44.62 52.31 67.69 76.92 
T-test 0.79 1.55 1.65 0.57 0.23 0.32 0.35 1.90* 
STD 21.27 5.43 9.67 11.31 8.03 9.34 12.96 5.24 
Min 6.15 6.15 10.77 21.54 30.77 40.00 43.08 69.23 
Max 84.62 26.15 36.92 60.00 58.46 69.23 83.08 84.62 
Panel E:All consumer goods       
Mean 43.70 15.80 20.42 30.21 44.90 53.99 66.85 73.71 
Median 443.08 16.92 23.08 32.31 46.15 53.85 64.62 73.85 
T-test 0.17 0.10 0.22 0.50 0.07 0.27 0.80 0.54 
STD 23.55 4.19 6.27 11.74 15.35 14.16 11.74 10.91 
Min 10.77 10.77 10.77 13.85 13.85 33.85 52.31 53.85 
Max 90.77 26.15 29.23 43.08 75.38 87.69 90.77 90.77 
Panel F:All basic materials firms       
Mean 45.82 15.77 18.27 38.46 52.31 56.35 68.46 71.15 
Median 48.46 16.15 17.69 37.69 52.31 53.08 68.46 71.54 
T-test 0.69 0.08 0.58 1.20 1.40 0.24 1.15 0.30 
STD 21.88 3.46 3.63 5.58 8.22 9.23 7.31 7.70 
Min 9.23 9.23 13.85 32.31 41.54 47.69 53.85 56.92 
Max 80.00 20.00 23.08 46.15 67.69 75.38 78.46 80.00 
Panel J:All telecommunications firms       
Mean 48.21 16.41 21.03 42.56 58.97 63.08 65.64 69.74 
Median 46.15 16.92 20.00 44.62 60.00 60.00 67.69 78.46 
T-test 0.91 0.19 0.18 1.25 1.54 0.95 0.29 0.43 
STD 24.17 8.47 3.20 9.40 18.48 18.65 18.55 19.24 
Min 7.69 7.69 18.46 32.31 40.00 46.15 46.15 47.69 
Max 83.08 24.62 24.62 50.77 76.92 83.08 83.08 83.08 
Panel H:All utilities firms        
Mean 48.13 18.46 27.69 43.08 51.54 54.62 58.46 83.08 
Median 51.54 18.46 27.69 43.08 51.54 54.62 58.46 83.08 
T-test 0.42 0.72 1.25 1.10 0.65 0.05 0.62 2.20** 
STD 20.50 2.18 4.35 2.18 1.09 1.09 2.18 4.35 
Min 16.92 16.92 24.62 41.54 50.77 53.85 56.92 80.00 
Max 86.15 20.00 30.77 44.62 52.31 55.38 60.00 86.15 
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics of the aggregate levels of compliance with SCGI based on industry type 2004 
to 2010. The t-test values in Panel B, D, E, F, J, and H is the independent sample t-test values for equality of mean. A mean 
difference with ** and * (5% and 10% significant level) indicates that the null hypothesis can be rejected assuming the 
equality of means. 
 
Third, the compliance levels of all of the industries are low (average 20%) in the 
first two years, 2004 and 2005. However, the scores increased steadily from 2006, to an 
average of 75% in 2010. As discussed in Subsection 6.1.1, this is because the corporate 
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governance reforms in Saudi Arabia enhanced corporate governance practices. Table 6.6 
indicates that independent sample t-test values examine whether the means of level of 
compliance of the other industries are significantly different from consumer services firms. 
It shows that there are no significant differences between the mean values among the 
industries. Thus, the null hypothesis is not rejected. This finding differs from Hussainey 
and Al-Nodel (2008), who find that there is a variation in governance disclosure among 
industries. This difference can be attributed to Hussainey and Al-Nodel because: (i) using a 
small sample; (ii) focusing only on one year cross-sectional data; and (iii) using online 
disclosure as a source of data. In contrast, this study examines a balanced and large sample 
of 560 firm-year observations over seven years. Also, it uses mainly annual reports as a 
highly reliable source of corporate governance information (Botosan, 1997; Alsaeed, 2006; 
Omar and Simon, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012). 
Table 6.7 shows an analysis of the level of compliance with the 65 individual 
corporate governance provisions that form the SCGI. There are differences among 
industries in terms of which provisions they comply with. For instance, the level of 
compliance with disclosure of ownership structure (DOS) by utilities firms is 43%. In 
contrast, only 9% of firms in the basic materials industry complied with this provision. 
Similarly, the level of compliance with disclosure of CEO compensation (DCEOC) is 21% 
and 0% for utilities and telecommunications firms, respectively. In the same vein, 
compliance levels with drafting the firms’ corporate governance code (ICGC) is 43% and 
0% for telecommunications and utilities industries. 
 Ten provisions out of the 65 (15% out of 65) scored over 70% among all industries. 
However, 11 provisions (17%) were complied with by fewer than 30% of all sampled 
firms. Moreover, 44 provisions (68%) were varied in the level of compliance among 
industries. Utilities firms had the highest scores of all industries. More precisely, the 
utilities industry achieved the highest level of compliance with 25 provisions out of 65, 
followed by the telecommunications industry, with 16 provisions; the other industries 
achieved compliance with fewer than seven provisions. 
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Table 6.7: The average level of compliance with the SCGC provisions among the sampled firms based on industry type (%) 
  Saudi Corporate Governance Index (65 Provisions) 
Indust-
rials  
Con. 
Services  
Financ-
ials  
Con. 
Goods  
Basic 
Materials 
Teleco. Utilities 
  Average of level of Compliance  44.33 43.42 45.87 43.76 45.85 48.28 48.13 
  1- Board of Directors and Board Sub-Committees               
1 Role duality (BDUAL) 71 61 77 74 55 90 86 
2 Board chairperson classification (BCP) 31 12 49 26 5 14 0 
3 Majority of board is non-executive (BMBD) 75 73 70 69 93 76 79 
4 Directors’ classification (BDCL)  57 58 56 52 71 62 64 
5 Disclosure of directors’ biography (BDB) 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 Drafting policies of board and appointing committee members (BDPA) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 Disclosure of directors on other firms’ boards (BMOB) 59 58 65 61 75 71 71 
8 Number of membership of directors in other boards of listed firm (BMBN) 59 58 68 60 71 71 71 
9 Frequency of board meetings (BFBM) 94 87 91 86 96 100 93 
10 Individual directors’ meetings attendance (BDMA) 60 62 60 56 68 67 93 
11 Existence of audit committee (AC) (AEX) 74 73 88 71 75 67 93 
12 Description of the jurisdictions & duties of AC (ADJD) 39 45 58 44 43 43 71 
13 Majority of AC is non-executive (ACOM) 14 23 30 34 38 24 43 
14 Identify AC's chairperson (ACP) 16 19 29 35 18 29 36 
15 AC's chairperson is independent (ACN)  58 58 68 51 71 48 57 
16 AC's members are three or more (ACNM) 66 64 81 52 71 67 79 
17 Disclosure of AC members' names (ADM) 66 69 60 62 70 67 79 
18 Frequency of AC meetings (AFM) 58 53 60 49 63 57 71 
19 Individual AC members’ meeting attendance (AMMA) 24 14 10 13 20 19 14 
20 Existence of nomination committee (NC) (NEX) 35 37 34 29 36 33 14 
21 Description of the jurisdictions & duties of NC (NDJD) 25 24 29 27 29 33 14 
22 Majority of NC is non-executive (NCOM) 14 18 19 19 18 19 14 
23 Identify NC's chairperson (NCP) 4 7 10 13 5 19 14 
24 NC's chairperson is independent (NCN)    28 35 30 19 32 29 14 
25 Disclosure of NC members' names (NDM) 34 37 29 29 36 29 14 
26 Frequency of NC meetings (NFM) 24 30 26 18 27 29 14 
27 Individual NC members’ meeting attendance (NMMA) 16 9 10 9 4 24 7 
28 Existence of remuneration committee (RC) (REX) 34 39 34 29 36 48 14 
29 Description of the jurisdictions & duties of RC (RDJD) 25 24 29 27 29 43 14 
30 Majority of RC is non-executive (RCOM) 14 18 19 19 18 19 14 
31 Identify RC's chairperson (RCP) 4 7 10 13 5 19 14 
32 RC's chairperson is independent (RCN)    27 37 30 19 32 43 14 
33 Disclosure of RC members' names (RDM) 33 39 29 29 36 43 14 
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Table 6.7 (Continued): The average level of compliance with the SCGC provisions among the sampled firms based on industry type (%)  
 Saudi Corporate Governance Index (65 Provisions) 
Indust-
rials  
Con. 
Services  
Financ-
ials  
Con. 
Goods  
Basic 
Materials 
Teleco. Utilities 
34 Frequency of RC meetings (RFM) 24 30 26 18 27 43 14 
35 Individual RC members’ meeting attendance (RMMA) 16 9 10 9 4 24 7 
  2- Disclosure and Transparency               
36 Disclosure of ownership Structure (DOS) 18 10 35 17 9 14 43 
37 Director ownership (DBO) 43 45 29 44 34 19 50 
38 Detailed disclosure of board’s compensation (DBC) 82 77 91 91 93 100 86 
39 Value of board’s compensation (DVBC) 78 59 29 66 88 81 79 
40 Disclosure of CEO/MD/GM compensation (DCEOC) 11 11 9 12 2 0 21 
41 Disclosure of top management compensation (DTMC) 48 47 45 45 54 52 50 
42 Disclosure of operation performance (DOP) 88 81 88 88 86 95 100 
43 Disclosure of the firm’s loans (DFL) 72 54 40 71 41 57 36 
44 Comparison of five years performance (DPFY) 70 71 71 77 82 71 79 
45 Disclosure of strategies and objectives (DSO) 52 72 43 82 66 76 93 
46 Description of the principal activities (DPA) 59 75 74 94 59 86 93 
47 Disclosure policy of dividends (DPD) 83 72 83 70 71 81 93 
48 Disclosure of related party transactions (DRP) 56 61 69 58 68 62 57 
49 Retraction/Punishment by supervisory body (DSP) 30 36 35 32 36 29 43 
50 Narrative on the firm as a going concern (DGC) 59 60 57 57 64 71 71 
51 Narrative on compliance/non compliance with SCGC (DCNC) 29 25 25 26 34 29 57 
  3- Internal Control and Risk Management               
52 Effectiveness of internal control system (ICEF) 25 24 61 36 34 43 43 
53 Control procedures for company risk management (ICRM) 7 4 44 12 2 0 7 
54 Disclosure of firm’s risks (IFR) 28 30 12 40 36 48 50 
55 Firm’s financial report approved (IFRA) 31 35 47 34 39 33 29 
56 Applicable of accounting standards (ICAS) 40 38 51 27 36 10 79 
57 Drafting firms’ corporate governance code (ICGC) 6 8 17 8 9 43 0 
  4- Rights of Shareholders and General Assembly GA               
58 Frequency of GA meetings (SGFM) 99 97 99 92 96 95 100 
59 GA meeting agenda announced before meeting (SGMA) 81 47 0 44 46 67 50 
60 Right of shareholders to appointment directors (SGSA) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
61 One share one vote policy (SGAV) 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 
62 GA meeting announced 20 days in advance (SGMN) 86 87 88 87 93 90 100 
63 GA meeting results announced immediately (SGMR) 99 95 99 91 96 95 100 
64 GA meeting within six months of year end (SGMT) 99 95 99 88 96 95 100 
65 Firms’ social contributions (SFSC) 24 18 51 27 36 29 7 
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To sum up, this section showed that the aggregate level of compliance is consistent 
with the level of compliance in other emerging countries. Corporate governance standards 
have improved over the study period from 2004 to 2010. An obvious improvement is noted 
following the introduction of the SCGC in 2006. At the provision level, the findings 
suggest variation in the level of compliance according to sub-indices. Consistent with 
existing literature, larger firms and firms audited by big-four audit firms are found to have 
better compliance with the SCGC. However, the analysis finds that industry type does not 
influence level of compliance with corporate governance.  
 
 
6.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE VOLUNTARY GOVERNANCE 
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE MODEL 
This section presents the descriptive statistics of the voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure model. Also, it reports the descriptive summaries of the explanatory 
and control variables. Subsection 6.2.1 discusses the presence of extreme values. 
Subsection 6.2.2 reports the explanatory variables, divided into two main sets, board 
characteristics and ownership structure. Board of directors characteristics include 
independent directors (INDD), board size (BSZ), audit firm size (AFZ) and the presence of 
a corporate governance committee (GCC). The second set of explanatory variables consists 
of ownership structure mechanisms, including: government ownership (GONR), 
institutional ownership (IONR), block ownership (BONR) and director ownership (DONR). 
Finally, Subsection 6.2.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the control variables, which 
include firm size (FSZ), firm growth (SGR), leverage (LVG), capital expenditure (CEXC) 
and dividends (DV).  
 
6.2.1 Extreme Values in Financial Performance Proxies and Control Variables  
The financial performance proxies and control variables contain extreme values. 
For example, the maximum value of ROA is 47%, whereas the minimum value was -31%. 
Similarly, Tobin’s Q maximum and minimum values were 14 and 0.66, respectively, 
which indicates very large variation between the highest and lowest values. The control 
variables also show extreme values. For instance, it can be observed that the highest value 
of firm growth (SGR) is 832% and the lowest value is -87%. In addition, the maximum and 
minimum values of leverage (LVG) are 88% and 0%. Capital expenditure (CEXC) also 
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shows high variation between the sampled firms, where the highest expenditure is 265% 
and the lowest is 0%. 
There are two reasons behind the emergence of the outliers: (i) the sample contains 
large, medium and small firms in order to improve generalisibility of the findings, which 
generated variation in the distribution of the variables (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1998); and (ii) 
some firms were affected by the 2007-2008 global economic recession (Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006; Mangena et al., 2012). As shown in Table 6.8, the mean values of capital 
expenditure dropped to 7% and firm growth dropped to -1.4% in 2009, while they were at 
10% and 15% in 2008. 
These extreme values can lead to bias in the findings and can potentially violate the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) assumptions (Brown and Tucker, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012a). 
To minimise the impact of the outliers, and in line with the literature on corporate 
governance (e.g., Black, 2006; Ammann et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2012a; Ammann et al., 
2013), the financial proxies and control variables are winsorised at 5% and 95% levels. 
These variables are ROA, Tobin’s Q, leverage, firm growth, firm size and capital 
expenditure. The entire sample (80 firms over seven years) is ordered from the highest 
value to the lowest. Thus, the 28 highest and 28 lowest values are replaced with the 29
th
 
and 532
nd
 values, respectively. Therefore, the descriptive statistics for these variables are 
investigated as winsorised values. 
 
6.2.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Explanatory Variables   
Panels B, C, D and E of Table 6.8 contain the analysis of board characteristics 
variables. Specifically, Panel B shows that the proportion of independent directors among 
Saudi corporate boards ranges between 100% and 0%, with an average of 67%. The mean 
shows a steady increase over the sample period. It is noteworthy that it is 64% in 2004 and 
increases to 73% in 2010. This implies that the corporate governance reforms as well the 
launch of the corporate governance code in Saudi Arabia in 2006 assisted in increasing the 
independence of corporate boards. Al-Abbas (2009) reports that the proportion of 
independent directors is 81% among Saudi listed firms, which is relatively higher than the 
current findings. One reason may be Al-Abbas’s use of an unbalanced small sample (78 
observations from 2005 to 2007).  
Despite Al-Abbas’s different findings, the result of this study is consistent with 
some of the literature on corporate governance in emerging countries. For example, 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find that independent directors constituted 45% of Malaysian 
firms’ boards of directors. Similarly, Samaha et al. (2012) report that the proportion of 
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independent directors is 65% in Egyptian listed firms. However, some prior studies show 
relatively low representation for independent directors. For instance, Henry (2008) and 
Chen (2011) report that independent directors make up 25% and 10% of the boards of 
directors in Australia and Taiwan, respectively.  
Panel C of Table 6.8 shows analysis of board size variable as measured by the 
number of directors on firms’ boards. The board size among the sampled firms ranges from 
4 to 13 members, with an average of 8.42 members. This average is in line with the Saudi 
Corporate Governance Code (SCGC), which recommends in Article 12 that the board of 
directors should be between three and eleven members. Furthermore, it is in line with the 
findings of Al-Abbas (2009), Al-Nodel and Hussainey (2010) and Al-Janadi et al. (2013), 
who report that the board size in Saudi firms is about 8.3, 7.9 and 8.4, respectively. It is 
also consistent with other corporate governance literature.  
According to Henry (2008), Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) and Schiehll et al. (2013), 
the average number of directors on firms’ boards is 8.06, 7.97 and 7.40 in Australia, 
Malaysia and Brazil, respectively. However, Ntim et al. (2012a) and Samaha et al. (2012) 
report relatively higher numbers in South Africa and Egypt, of 11.31 and 10.4. Finally, 
Panels D and E in Table 6.8 report the descriptive statistics of audit firm size and the 
presence of a corporate governance committee. These two categorical variables use a 
binary scoring scheme. As shown in Table 6.8, 58% of the firms are audited by a big-four 
audit firm; however, only 10% of the firms have a corporate governance committee.  
The second set of variables includes corporate ownership structure. Panel F of 
Table 6.8 shows that government ownership as a percentage of the total number of shares 
ranges between 0% and 84%, with an average of 42%. As shown in Table 6.8, government 
ownership is characterised by relatively stable conditions during the sample period, where 
it was 44% in 2004 and decreased slightly to 40% in 2010. This high government 
ownership in listed firms is consistent with studies conducted on Saudi Arabia by Al-
Abbas (2009) and Al-Nodel and Hussainey (2010). However, Al-Moataz and Lakhal 
(2012) and Al-Janadi et al. (2013) find that government ownership in Saudi listed firms is 
10.8% and 11.2%, respectively. Their results might be different from the finding of this 
study because: (i) the sample used by these two studies covers the same period (only two 
years – 2006 and 2007); and (ii) their studies used fewer than 90 observations.  
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Table 6.8:  Summary descriptive statistics of variables of the voluntary corporate governance disclosure 
model 
Variables All 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Dependent variable 
Panel A: SCGI         
Mean 44.61 17.08 21.29 34.10 46.13 55.52 64.98 73.15 
Median 66.44 16.92 20.00 35.38 46.15 53.85 66.92 73.85 
STD 44.33 4.86 7.04 11.29 13.82 12.21 10.93 8.39 
Min 3..3 3.08 7.69 6.15 10.77 16.92 40.00 47.69 
Max 7..99 33.85 38.46 61.54 83.08 87.69 90.77 90.77 
Explanatory variables 
Panel B: Independent directors (%)      
Mean 67.31 64.00 63.91 64.11 65.12 68.63 72.15 73.28 
Median 64.49 62.50 61.25 62.50 63.64 66.67 71.43 73.86 
STD 37.43 21.31 21.31 21.04 20.34 17.99 16.21 16.63 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.22 25.00 33.33 33.33 
Max 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Panel C:Board size      
Mean 8.42 8.31 8.33 8.39 8.46 8.46 8.46 8.53 
Median 9.00 8.00 8.00 8.50 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 
STD 3.94 1.80 1.81 1.83 1.76 1.77 1.73 1.71 
Min 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
Max 13.00 13.00 13.00 13.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 
Panel D: Audit firm size (%)       
Mean 58.00 51.00 55.00 59.00 59.00 61.00 59.00 59.00 
Median 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
STD 49.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 49.00 50.00 50.00 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Panel E: presence of Corporate governance committee (%)      
Mean 10.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 6.00 9.00 19.00 30.00 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
STD 30.00 11.00 11.00 16.00 24.00 28.00 39.00 46.00 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Panel F: Government ownership (%)     
Mean 42.17 44.76 44.25 44.29 42.10 41.22 40.52 40.35 
Median 42.22 45.00 44.00 44.00 42.00 41.00 41.00 40.00 
STD 37.47 19.25 19.25 19.40 19.71 20.03 20.35 20.42 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 83.69 81.15 81.15 82.30 82.61 83.28 83.69 83.69 
Panel G: Institutional ownership (%)     
Mean 6.98 5.82 5.70 5.90 6.66 7.86 7.84 7.84 
Median 7.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 
STD 33..3 10.75 10.75 10.75 11.24 11.34 11.36 11.36 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 
Panel H: Block ownership (%)     
Mean 61.96 61.57 61.13 61.47 61.33 62.45 62.60 62.51 
Median 62.00 62.00 61.00 61.00 61.00 62.00 63.00 63.00 
STD 46.33 24.57 24.58 24.75 25.23 25.20 25.11 25.08 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 
85.21 84.76 84.76 85.19 85.21 83.28 83.69 83.69 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
187 
 
 
Table 6.8 (Continued):  Summary descriptive statistics of variables of the voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure model 
Variables All 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Panel I: Director ownership (%)      
Mean 13.06 11.23 11.43 11.53 12.84 13.61 14.46 14.56 
Median 13.00 11.00 11.00 12.00 13.00 14.00 14.00 15.00 
STD 34.34 17.05 17.06 17.06 16.77 16.79 16.88 16.73 
Min 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Max 71.60 71.60 71.60 71.60 68.63 68.77 67.03 66.60 
Control variables 
Panel J:Firm Size       
Mean 21.42 21.21 21.35 21.47 21.65 21.74 21.79 21.82 
Median 21.36 21.05 21.13 21.27 21.47 21.54 21.59 21.61 
STD 8.84 8.74 8.77 8.79 8.83 8.89 8.9 8.9 
Min 18.61 18.61 18.61 18.61 18.61 18.61 18.61 18.61 
Max 25.53 25.53 25.53 25.53 25.53 25.53 25.53 25.53 
Panel K: Firm growth (%)        
Mean 14.54 15.21 23.80 20.59 14.25 14.82 -1.46 10.31 
Median 9.32 11.95 18.90 13.48 10.44 12.06 -3.03 3.40 
STD 29.62 27.08 30.96 25.50 28.21 26.51 28.57 33.92 
Min -37.62 -37.62 -37.62 -19.15 -37.62 -37.62 -37.62 -37.62 
Max 89.66 89.66 89.66 89.66 89.66 89.66 89.66 89.66 
Panel L: Leverage (%)        
Mean 21.46 18.71 20.09 20.23 23.00 25.27 25.25 23.93 
Median 8.85 7.12 7.14 6.97 11.85 14.87 11.19 10.17 
STD 27.27 26.88 26.98 26.62 27.09 27.63 27.97 27.94 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 84.15 84.15 84.15 84.15 84.15 84.15 84.15 84.15 
Panel M: Capital expenditure (%)       
Mean 8.57 8.46 9.68 9.26 9.70 9.88 6.95 6.05 
Median 5.87 5.10 7.14 5.89 7.04 7.67 5.00 3.82 
STD 8.25 8.71 8.63 8.55 9.23 8.11 6.78 6.87 
Min 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Max 28.83 28.83 28.83 28.83 28.83 28.83 28.83 28.83 
Panel N: Paid dividends (%)        
Mean 65.00 68.00 58.00 64.00 69.00 68.00 64.00 66.00 
Median 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
STD 48.00 47.00 50.00 48.00 47.00 47.00 48.00 48.00 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Notes: the details of the variables is as follows: the Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI), independent directors 
(INDD), board size (BSZ), audit firm size (AFZ), presence of a corporate governance committee (CGC), government 
ownership (GONR), institutional ownership (IONR), block ownership (BONR), director ownership (DONR), firm size (FSZ), 
leverage (LVG), firm growth (SGR), capital expenditure (CEXC) and paid dividends (DV). Chapter Five presented 
definitions of all the variables used. 
 
 Panel G shows the institutional ownership in Saudi listed firms that measured by 
shares held by institutional shareholders. Over the 560 observations, the maximum and 
minimum values are 40% and 0%, with an average of 6%. There is an apparent decrease in 
institutional ownership in the capital structure of Saudi listed firms, which is consistent 
with some studies on corporate governance. For example, Aggarwal et al. (2011) indicate 
that the average institutional ownership in Greece, Hong Kong and New Zealand is 8%, 
8% and 9%, respectively. In contrast, Barako et al. (2006), Chung and Zhang (2011) and 
Ntim et al. (2012a) report high levels of institutional ownership (over 50%) in Kenya, the 
US and South Africa. As discussed in Chapter Nine, the apparent low level of institutional 
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investment in the Saudi stock market can be attributed to the dominance of individuals’ 
investments. 
Panel H shows the statistical analysis for the block ownership variable that is used 
as a proxy for the ownership of major shareholders who own 5% or more. The maximum 
percentage of shares owned by large shareholders is 85% and the minimum is 0%; the 
average is 62%. This average is consistent with the findings from other emerging 
countries. Barako et al. (2006), Ntim et al. (2012a) and Samaha et al. (2012) report that 
block shareholders constitute 72%, 62% and 57% of firms’ capital structure in Kenya, 
South Africa and Egypt, respectively. Regarding director ownership, Panel I in Table 6.8 
shows that the highest percentage of director ownership is 71%, while the lowest 
percentage is 0%. Also, the analysis shows that the average director ownership over the 
complete sample is 15%. This low average is in line with both developed and developing 
countries; for instance, Eng and Mak (2003) report that the percentage of shares held by 
directors is 14% in Singapore. Similarly, Samaha et al. (2012) find that director ownership 
made up only 9% of total shares in Egyptian firms. However, Yermack (1996) and Henry 
(2008) report that director ownership constitutes 9% and 6% of ownership in US and 
Australian firms, respectively.      
        
6.2.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Control Variables 
 Panel J of Table 6.8 presents the analysis of firm size measured by the natural log 
of firms’ total assets. The range of the firm size variable is between 25.53 ($33 bn) and 
18.61 ($32 ml), with an average of 21.42 ($613 ml). The mean of firm size slightly 
increases over the sample period. Panel K shows that the firms’ growth, proxied by sales 
growth, is a maximum of 89% and a minimum of -37%, with a mean of 15%. The average 
value of the firm growth of the sampled firms reveals high levels of variation. Specifically, 
the mean is 15.21% in 2004, and drops dramatically to -1.46% in 2009, then increases to 
10.31% in 2010. As discussed in Subsection 6.2.1, a possible explanation for this 
fluctuation is the repercussions of the global economic recession in 2008 (Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006; Mangena et al., 2012).  
Panel L of Table 6.8 reports that, overall, the leverage among Saudi listed firms is 
21%, with a maximum value of 84% and a minimum value of 0%. Also, Alsaeed (2006), 
Al-Abbas (2009) and Al-Nodel and Hussainey (2010) find leverage values of 25%, 18% 
and 25%, respectively, which is consistent with the findings from the current study. 
In other emerging economies, the leverage ratio is comparable with the finding 
from the current study. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Barako et al. (2006) report that the 
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leverage ratio is 20% and 27% among Malaysian and Kenyan firms, respectively. Panel M 
shows a summary of the capital expenditure, measured by capital expenditure to total 
assets. The maximum value is 28.83% and the minimum is 0.11%, with an average of 
8.57%. This average value is almost consistent with Ntim et al. (2012a), who report capital 
expenditure among South African firms of 13%. Similar to firm growth, the capital 
expenditure for 2009 decreased in comparison with 2008 by 30%, which provides evidence 
of the impact of the global economic recession in 2008.   
    The next section presents the descriptive statistics for the firm financial 
performance models. In particular, it presents the descriptive summaries of the financial 
proxies and the individual corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
 
6.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE FIRM FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE MODELS 
As discussed in Chapter Five, two different models are adopted to examine the 
relationship between good corporate governance practices and firm financial performance: 
the equilibrium-variable model and the compliance-index model. In both models, the 
dependent variables (financial proxies) are return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q (Q-
ratio). The equilibrium-variable model employs a number of corporate governance 
mechanisms as explanatory variables. However, the SCGI is used as an explanatory 
variable in the compliance-index model. The control variables for both models are similar 
to those used in the voluntary corporate governance disclosure model presented in 
Subsection 6.2.3.  
Given that the analyses of the SCGI and the control variables have been discussed 
in the above sections, the following presents the analysis of the financial proxies (ROA and 
Q-ratio) and explanatory variables used in the equilibrium-variable model, including: CEO 
duality (BDUAL), proportion of independent directors (INDD), corporate board size (BSZ), 
frequency of board meetings (BFM), presence of board sub-committees (BCOM) and 
director ownership (DONR). 
 
6.3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Financial Proxies  
Panel A of Table 6.9 shows the descriptive statistics of ROA as defined by the 
operation profit to the total assets. The aggregated ROA ranges between 23% and -3%, 
with an average of 6.7%. Focusing on the yearly analysis, an increase can be observed in 
the mean values between 2004 and 2006, followed by a decrease between 2008 and 2010. 
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This can be ascribed to the effect of the economic recession in 2008 (Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006; Mangena et al., 2012).  
 
Table 6.9:  Summary descriptive statistics of variables of the firm financial performance models 
Variables All 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Dependent variable 
Panel A: Return on Assets ROA (%)        
Mean 6.71 6.85 7.08 7.75 7.62 6.76 5.58 6.00 
Median 4.84 4.56 5.11 5.90 5.20 5.55 3.72 4.56 
STD 8.27 7.43 7.40 7.16 7.04 6.67 6.82 6.38 
Min -3.44 -3.44 -3.44 -3.44 -3.44 -3.44 -3.44 -3.44 
Max 23.31 23.31 23.31 23.31 23.31 23.31 23.31 23.31 
Panel B: Tobin’s Q         
Mean 2.63 2.71 4.90 2.55 2.71 1.41 1.71 1.61 
Median 1.88 2.37 5.36 2.10 2.29 1.19 1.33 1.32 
STD 2.01 1.21 1.67 1.23 1.29 0.66 0.99 0.93 
Min 0.94 0.94 1.54 1.03 1.08 0.94 0.94 0.94 
Max 6.49 6.49 6.49 6.49 6.49 4.85 5.90 5.79 
Explanatory variables 
Panel C: CEO duality (%)     
Mean 31.00 49.00 52.50 45.00 31.25 16.25 12.50 10.00 
Median 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 00.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
STD 46.00 50.03 50.25 50.00 47.00 37.12 33.28 30.20 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Panel D: Independent directors (%)      
Mean 67.31 64.00 63.91 64.11 65.12 68.63 72.15 73.28 
Median 64.49 62.50 61.25 62.50 63.64 66.67 71.43 73.86 
STD 37.43 21.31 21.31 21.04 20.34 17.99 16.21 16.63 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.22 25.00 33.33 33.33 
Max 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Panel E: Board size      
Mean 8.42 8.31 8.33 8.39 8.46 8.46 8.46 8.53 
Median 9.00 8.00 8.00 8.50 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 
STD 3.94 1.80 1.81 1.83 1.76 1.77 1.73 1.71 
Min 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
Max 13.00 13.00 13.00 13.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 
Panel F: Frequency of board meetings      
Mean 5.17 5.08 4.95 5.15 5.21 5.03 5.23 5.53 
Median 0... 4.50 4.00 4.00 4.50 4.50 5.00 5.00 
STD 4.34 2.03 1.98 2.41 2.20 2.12 1.79 2.53 
Min 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 
Max 14.00 13.00 11.00 14.00 12.00 11.00 11.00 14.00 
Panel G: Board sub-committees (%)     
Mean 50.18 10.00 15.00 31.25 58.75 65.00 78.75 92.50 
Median 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
STD 50.04 30.19 35.93 46.64 49.54 48.00 41.17 26.51 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Panel H: Director ownership (%)     
Mean 13.06 11.23 11.43 11.53 12.84 13.61 14.46 14.56 
Median 13.00 11.00 11.00 12.00 13.00 14.00 14.00 15.00 
STD 34.34 17.05 17.06 17.06 16.77 16.79 16.88 16.73 
Min 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Max 71.60 71.60 71.60 71.60 68.63 68.77 67.03 66.60 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio), CEO duality (CEO), 
independent directors (INDD), board size (BSZ), frequency of board meetings (BFBM), presence of board sub-
committees (BCOM) and director ownership (DONR). The explanatory variable of the equilibrium-variable 
model, the SCGI, and control variables for both models have been analysed in Table 6.8. Chapter 5 presented 
definitions of all variables used. 
 
The average of the ROA over the sample period is in line with existing studies on 
developing countries. Klapper and Love (2004) use cross-country data and find an ROA of 
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9%, 10%, 5% and 5% in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand and Turkey. Furthermore, recent 
studies by Price et al. (2011), Mangena et al. (2012) and Ntim et al. (2012a) report 
averages of 3.2%, 4.8% and 11% in Mexico, Zimbabwe and South Africa, respectively. 
However, Gupta et al. (2009) and Renders et al. (2010) find an ROA of 3.3% and 6% in 
Canada and across European countries. 
Panel B of Table 6.9 shows statistical analysis of the results of the Q-ratio, defined 
by the ratio of a firm’s market value to its replacement cost. The highest average ratio 
among the sampled firms is 6.49, whilst the lowest is 0.94 and the average is 2.51. 
Comparing the mean over the sample years shows a high level of variation. The Q-ratio 
increased by 80% in 2005 and dropped by 48% in 2006 .Then, it continued on a downward 
trajectory in 2010 to 1.61. The obvious reason behind that is the crash of the Saudi stock 
market in 2006, where it lost about 53% of its value (Al-Abbas, 2009; Alshehri and 
Solomon, 2012). The aggregated mean of the Q-ratio is consistent with studies in emerging 
economies. For instance, Klapper and Love (2004) report Q-ratios for cross-country 
samples of 2.82, 2.23, 1.9 and 2.07 in India, Indonesia, South Africa and Thailand. Also, 
Price et al. (2011) and Mangena et al. (2012) find a Q-ratio equal to 1.00, while Gupta et 
al. (2009) and Renders et al. (2010) find Q-ratios of 1.72 and 1.82 in Canada and across 
European countries. 
 
6.3.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Individual Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
As discussed above, the explanatory variables used in the equilibrium-variable 
model are corporate governance mechanisms. Table 6.9 contains the descriptive statistics 
of the variables, as follows. Panels D, E and H present the independent directors (INDD), 
board size (BSZ) and director ownership (DONR), which have been discussed in Table 6.8 
and Subsection 6.2.2 as explanatory variables for the voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure model. Panel C statistically describes CEO duality, which is defined by 
combining the roles of chairperson and CEO.  
Table 6.9 shows that 31% of the firms combine these two positions. It can be noted 
from yearly comparisons that there has been an improvement in the percentage of firms 
that practice splitting the roles of CEO and chairperson. While the percentage of CEO 
duality is 49% in 2004, it decreased to 10% in 2010. This improvement supports the 
growing attention paid to this mechanism to limit agency problems and exploitation by 
executive management (Monks and Minow, 2011; Krause et al., 2014). Furthermore, this 
is consistent with the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC), which recommends 
splitting these two responsibilities. The aggregated mean is in line with Al-Abbas (2009). 
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He reports that 33% of Saudi listed firms had CEO duality. Similarly, Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006), Mangena and Chamisa (2008) and Samaha et al. (2012) report that CEO duality is 
26%, 36% and 61% among Malaysian, South African and Egyptian firms. However, Daily 
and Dalton (1994) and Bozec (2005) show this to be 45% and 23% in the US and Canada, 
respectively.  
Panel F shows that the frequency of board meetings ranges between one and 14 
meetings annually, with an average of 5.17 meetings per year. The mean value is 
moderately stable over the sample period and is consistent with studies in developing 
countries. El Mehdi (2007) and Jackling and Johl (2009) report 4 and 6.32 annual board 
meetings in Tunisia and India, respectively. However, previous studies find that US firms 
have meetings more often (e.g., Vafeas, 1999a; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Fich and 
Shivdasani, 2006). Finally, Panel G reports the statistical summary of board sub-
committees, which is used in this study as a categorical variable. The aggregated mean 
indicates that 50% of the listed firms have three board sub-committees: audit, remuneration 
and nomination. The attention paid to establishing board sub-committees increases over the 
sample period. The average is 10% in 2004, and rises to 92% in 2010. This coincides with 
the introduction of the SCGC, which sheds light on the importance of establishing audit, 
remuneration and nomination committees.  
 
 
6.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the summary descriptive statistics of the constructed Saudi 
Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) and the variables used in employed models. These 
variables are used to examine the relationship among corporate governance, voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure and firm financial performance. Specifically, the chapter 
aimed to achieve three objectives. First, it presents a detailed analysis of the SCGI. Second, 
it investigates whether the introduction of the SCGC has helped improve the level of 
compliance with corporate governance standards. Third, descriptive statistics are presented 
for the financial proxies, the explanatory variables and the control variables used in the 
employed models.  
The chapter was divided into three sections. The first section showed the statistical 
analysis of the SCGI and identified the factors influencing the level of compliance with 
corporate governance standards. The results indicate that the aggregated corporate 
governance score is 44%, while the level of compliance showed a gradual improvement 
during the study period from 2004 to 2010.  
193 
 
 
Additionally, the results show that compliance with 78% of the provisions (51 out 
of 65) improved significantly during the sample period. Furthermore, the analysis showed 
a high level of compliance with provisions relating to the rights of shareholders and 
general assembly, with an average of 69% of firms complied, followed by the disclosure 
and transparency sub-index, with a 55% average. Although the level of compliance with 
board of directors and committees’ provisions is 37%, the compliance score for internal 
control and risk management provisions is the lowest, at 26% of firms complied. 
To identify the factors influencing the level of compliance among the sampled 
firms, the complete sample is divided into large and small firms, firms audited by big-four 
and non-big-four audit firms, and according to industry type. The results are in line with 
existing studies, which indicate that large firms are more likely to comply with governance 
rules than small firms. In addition, firms audited by the big-four show high levels of 
disclosure. Regarding industry type, the results showed a substantial convergence in the 
level of compliance among firms.  
The second section initially addressed the extreme values for each of the financial 
proxies and control variables, and the treatment of winsorising the data to avoid violating 
the OLS assumptions. Subsequently, it presented the analysis of the variables used in the 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure model. As the findings of the SCGI were 
reported in the first part of the chapter, this subsection was limited to explanatory 
(corporate governance mechanisms) and control variables. The results showed great 
similarity with studies conducted in developed and developing economies. The third 
section provided the summary descriptive statistics for firm financial performance. 
Specifically, it investigated the financial proxies (ROA and Q-ratio) and corporate 
governance mechanism variables. 
In the next chapter, the results from the OLS assumptions of multicollinearity, 
autocorrelation, normality, homoscedasticity and linearity are presented. A multivariate 
regression analysis is subsequently used to investigate whether the introduction of the 
SCGC has helped improve corporate governance practices, voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure and firm financial performance. Finally, it also presents the findings from a 
number of robustness analyses, and discusses the potential endogeneity problem. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
QUANTITATIVE EMPRIRICAL FINDINGS 
AND DISCUSSION 
 
7.  INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Six presented the descriptive statistical summaries of the constructed Saudi 
Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) and the other variables used in the empirical models. 
This chapter presents the results obtained by estimating the multivariate regression. The 
chapter particularly seeks to achieve the following four objectives. First, it conducts 
diagnostic analyses relating to the variables used in examining the relationship among 
corporate governance practices, voluntary corporate governance disclosure and firm 
financial performance. Second, the chapter discusses the results obtained from the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation technique used to assess the determinants of 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure to answer the third research sub-question. 
Third, it discusses the results from the OLS regressions relating to both the equilibrium-
variable model and the compliance-index model to answer the fourth and fifth research 
sub-questions. Fourth, it examines the robustness of the results and tests for the existence 
of potential endogeneity problems.  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.1 presents the results of bivariate 
correlation and the OLS assumptions. Section 7.2 reports the findings from the multivariate 
regression analyses for the empirical models, while Section 7.3 discusses the robustness 
analysis and endogeneity problems in the models. 
 
 
7.1 BIVARIATE CORRELATION AND OLS ASSUMPTIONS  
As discussed in Chapters Five and Six, multivariate regression was used to 
investigate the relationship among corporate governance practices, voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure and firm financial performance. Consistent with corporate 
governance studies (e.g., Black, 2001; Gompers et al., 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; 
Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013), OLS assumptions 
including normality, multicollinearity, autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and linearity 
were tested. This helps to develop the “best” model in the sense that all the estimated 
coefficients have the “right” signs (Gujarati, 2003, p.516).  
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To begin, the normality of continuous variables was tested to check whether the 
variables are normally distributed (Cooke, 1998; Black, 2001). Following Ntim et al. 
(2012a), this study examined the normality of data using probability-probability (P-P), 
quintile-quintile (Q-Q) and histograms. The constructed Saudi Corporate Governance 
Index (SCGI) appeared to be normally distributed. However, the ownership variables 
showed mixed results. For example, government and institutional ownership suffered from 
slightly non-normal distribution, while director and block ownership were fairly normally 
distributed. Also, the findings suggest that most of the corporate governance variables 
employed in this study are relatively normally distributed. With regard to the financial 
proxies, while return on assets (ROA) is slightly normally distributed, Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio) 
follows a non-normal distribution. Furthermore, some of the control variables, such as 
leverage and capital expenditure, are not normally distributed.
53
  
In addition, the Skewness and Kurtosis tests corroborate the finding of fairly 
normal distribution of most of the variables. Specifically, the normal distribution of the 
Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) was investigated using Skewness and Kurtosis 
tests. For Skewness, the value of symmetrical distribution is zero (Gujarati, 2003; Brooks, 
2008). Table 7.2 shows that the Skewness of the SCGI is 0.09 (slightly skewed to the 
right), which is an approximate symmetric curve (a normal distribution). For Kurtosis, the 
hypothesis of non-normality can be rejected if its value is 3 (Gujarati, 2003; Brooks, 2008). 
Table 7.2 shows that the Kurtosis value of the SCGI is -1.22, which implies that the data is 
flatly distributed. Regarding ROA, the statistical analysis in Table 7.2 presents a Skewness 
of 0.52, indicating a slightly positive skew. The Kurtosis value of 2.43 indicates an 
approximately perfect distribution. However, Table 7.2 shows a Skewness value of the Q-
ratio of 2.16, indicating a highly positive Skewness. This implies that the hypothesis of 
non-normality cannot be rejected, whereas a Kurtosis value of 5.93 indicates that the Q-
ratio is not normally distributed.
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Regarding other variables, Table 7.2 shows that the Skewness values for most of 
the continuous variables fall between 0.05 and 1.31, except government and institutional 
ownership, whose values are over 2. For Kurtosis test statistics, the variables fall between 
0.18 and 3.44, indicating Skewness in some of the data. Gujarati (2003) argues that it is 
difficult for any research data to be perfectly normally distributed. Therefore, a level of 
non-normality in some of the data is expected.              -
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 Because of the large dataset and for brevity reasons, some of the test results are not reported here, but are 
available upon request. 
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 As explained further below, the non-normality problem was addressed by transforming and winsorising the 
affected variables. 
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Table 7.1: Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices of all variables for all (560) firm years 
Variable SCGI GONR IONR BONR DONR BDUAL INDD BSZ BFM CGC BCOM AFZ ROA 
Q 
ratio 
FSZ LVG SGR CEXC DV 
SCGI 
1 .130*** .061 .119*** .077* .451*** .054 .073* .122*** .326*** .673*** .117*** -.012 -.566*** .209*** .166*** -.159*** -.016 .093** 
GONR 
.144*** 1 .015 .628*** -.057 .185*** .082* .312*** .333*** .043 .031 .302*** .226*** -.154*** .635*** .177*** -.002 .315*** .435*** 
IONR 
.045 .004 1 .354*** .089* -.050 .000 .230*** -.111*** -.009 .022 .280*** -.112*** -.247*** .302*** .285*** .020 .069 .096** 
BONR 
.125*** .662*** .361*** 1 .493*** .142*** -.185*** .343*** .225*** .059 .079* .481*** .255*** -.140*** .684*** .365*** .087** .347*** .392*** 
DONR 
.063 -.159*** .059 .411*** 1 .120*** -.276*** .259*** -.056 -.009 .186*** .243*** .207*** .017 .227*** .236*** .109** .179*** .144*** 
BDUAL 
.456*** .176*** -.032 .155*** .086** 1 .052 -.023 .114*** .143*** .308*** .074* .110*** -.243*** .164*** .051 -.028 .066 .198*** 
INDD 
.053 .085* .004 -.146*** -.231*** .065 1 .017 .006 .082* -.051 -.102** -.083** -.021 -.158*** -.088** -.098** -.171*** -.121*** 
BSZ 
.066* .260*** .225*** .318*** .253*** -.032 -.014 1 .000 .099** .146*** .297*** .110*** -.162*** .526*** .226*** -.003 .248*** .251*** 
BFM 
.129*** .358*** -.110*** .251*** -.070* .107** .013 -.015 1 .103** .052 .013 .044 .023 .147*** .030 -.035 .131*** .164*** 
CGC 
.321*** .082* -.014 .070* .009 .143*** .093** .092** .113*** 1 .197*** .065 -.056 -.220*** .119*** .021 -.111*** .028 .003 
BCOM 
.648*** .006 .045 .063 .175*** .308*** -.026 .132*** .054 .197*** 1 .083* .021 -.403*** .189*** .205*** -.095** .054 .130*** 
AFZ 
.117*** .295*** .296*** .477*** .223*** .074* -.066 .301*** .030 .065 .083* 1 .124*** -.149*** .524*** .412*** .081* .308*** .217*** 
ROA 
-.008 .251*** -.110*** .274*** .246*** .117*** -.100** .146*** .039 -.053 .024 .136*** 1 .251*** .198*** -.098** .182*** .179*** .530*** 
Q ratio 
-.514*** -.128*** -.227*** -.129*** .068 -.246*** -.026 -.131*** .033 -.208*** -.398*** -.137*** .223*** 1 -.387*** -.276*** .113*** -.035 -.102** 
FSZ 
.214*** .624*** .304*** .698*** .189*** .175*** -.156*** .490*** .176*** .099** .194*** .523*** .231*** -.373*** 1 .580*** .113*** .430*** .420*** 
LVG 
.153*** .166*** .355*** .378*** .216*** .061 -.056 .212*** .033 .014 .208*** .408*** -.108** -.262*** .592*** 1 .101** .314*** .023 
SGR 
-.133*** -.004 .024 .083* .105** -.039 -.088** .024 -.036 -.098** -.096** .077* .196*** .109*** .100** .077* 1 .206*** .040 
CEXC 
-.015 .286*** .076* .326*** .167*** .058 -.167*** .245*** .138*** .018 .056 .306*** .189*** -.014 .413*** .285*** .198*** 1 .224*** 
DV 
.097** .419*** .102** .389*** .132*** .198*** -.117*** .260*** .175*** .003 .130*** .217*** .539*** -.095** .432*** .037 .043 .221*** 1 
Notes: The bottom left half of the table contains Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients, whereas the upper right half of the table shows Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients. ***, ** and 
* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: the Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI), government ownership (GONR), institutional ownership 
(IONR), block ownership (BONR), director ownership (DONR), CEO duality (BDUAL), proportion of independent directors (INDD), board size (BSZ), frequency of board meetings (BFM), the presence of a 
corporate governance committee (CGC), the presence of board sub-committees (BCOM), audit firm size (AFZ), return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio), firm size (FSZ), leverage (LVG), firm growth 
(SGR), capital expenditure (CEXC) and  dividends  (DV). Chapter Five presents the detailed definitions of variables employed. 
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However, Brooks (2008, p.164) suggests that “for sample sizes that are sufficiently 
large, violation of the normality assumption is virtually inconsequential”. Thus, the large 
sample in this study (560 firm-year observations) can mitigate the negative impact of the 
existing non-normality of some variables. The histograms for those variables are presented 
in Appendix 4. Furthermore, and in line with existing studies, non-normality in some of the 
variables was mitigated by transforming and winsorising the data (e.g., Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006; Ramly, 2012). As suggested by the literature, the variables were 
transformed to: (i) avoid violation of the OLS assumptions; (ii) moderate the problems of 
non-normality, and (iii) check homogeneity and outliers (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Ntim 
et al., 2012a; Ramly, 2012). 
A correlation matrix was used to test the direction and magnitude of the linear 
relationship between the variables. This test helps discover the potential presence of 
multicollinearity among the variables. There could be multicollinearity if a correlation 
coefficient between two variables is large.
55
 Following Ntim et al. (2012a) and Ntim and 
Soobaroyen (2013), the Pearson correlation coefficients (parametric) and Spearman 
correlation coefficients (non-parametric) are reported in Table 7.1. The table shows the 
correlation matrix for the dependent, explanatory and control variables employed for the 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure and firm financial performance models. 
However, the magnitude and direction of both the Pearson correlation coefficients 
(parametric) and Spearman correlation coefficients (non-parametric) appear to be relatively 
similar. This adds to the evidence that there is no major problem of non-normality among 
the variables in the models (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). In addition, both report that the 
correlations among the variables are fairly low, indicating that there is not a serious 
multicollinearity problem (see Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Dam and Scholtens, 2012; Ntim 
et al., 2012a; Ramly, 2012). 
On the other hand, Pryce (2005) argues that multicollinearity may still pose a threat 
even after running all the tests related to normality and transforming the data. Therefore, in 
line with Dam and Scholtens (2012) and Kajananthan (2012), two additional methods are 
used to investigate the presence of multicollinearity among the variables. These are 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and tolerance statistics tests. Multicollinearity may be a 
problem when VIF values are over 10 (Gujarati, 2003) and tolerance levels are near 0 
(Kajananthan, 2012). Table 7.2 shows that the VIF values of variables used in the models 
fall between a maximum of 7.37 and a minimum of 1.09, which suggests that there is no 
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 Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Ramly (2012) point out that multicollinearity may be a problem when the 
correlation exceeds 0.80 (as cited by Gujarati, 2003). 
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serious problem of multicollinearity. In terms of the tolerance statistics test, most of the 
variables show tolerance values between 0.13 and 0.91. Therefore, both the VIF and 
tolerance values show that there is no serious problem of multicollinearity in interpreting 
the results of the OLS regressions. 
After performing the normality and multicollinearity tests on the individual 
variables, other OLS assumptions are tested to ascertain whether the OLS technique can be 
estimated properly, including heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and linearity. First, 
heteroscedasticity means that the variance of the error term in the estimated model is not 
constant. Therefore, if the errors do not have constant terms, the model is heteroscedastic. 
Cooke (1998) suggests that heteroscedasticity can be assessed by the Breusch-Pagan test. 
Thus, in line with Ramly (2012), the Breusch-Pagan test was conducted to diagnose 
heteroscedasticity. The test result suggests that the model suffers from heteroscedasticity. 
Gujarati (2003) points out that performing an OLS regression in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity can lead to incorrect standard errors; hence, any inferences made could 
be misleading. Following Mitton (2002) and Bharath et al. (2013), to account for the 
presence of heteroscedasticity, the robust standard errors method was used to estimate the 
OLS regression. 
 
Table 7.2: The OLS assumptions tests  
Variable VIF Tolerance Skewness  Kurtosis   Cook’s distances 
      Min Max 
SCGI 1.092 0.916 0.09 -1.22    
GONR 6.141 0.163 2.02 3.44 
VCGD .00 .22 IONR 2.352 0.425 2.00 2.89 
BONR 7.374 0.136 0.26 -1.13 
DONR 3.271 0.306 1.18 0.76 
EVM-ROA .00 .04 
INDD 1.334 0.749 -0.45 -0.22 
BSZ 1.722 0.581 -0.05 -0.38 
EVM-Q  .00 .08 BFM 1.279 0.782 1.31 2.02 
ROA 1.877 0.533 0.52 2.43 
Q-ratio 2.525 0.396 2.16 5.93 
CIM-ROA .01 .09 FSZ 5.429 0.184 0.55 -0.46 
LVG 2.307 0.434 1.19 0.18 
SGR 1.162 0.861 0.81 0.81 
CIM-Q  .01 .09 
CEXC 1.506 0.664 1.07 0.18 
Notes: Variables and models are defined as follows: Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosure model (VCD), 
Equilibrium-Variable Model ROA (EVM-ROA), Equilibrium-Variable Model Q-ratio (EVM-Q-ratio), 
Compliance-Index Model ROA (CIM-ROA), Compliance-Index Model Q-ratio (CIM-Q-ratio), the Saudi 
Corporate Governance Index (SCGI), government ownership (GONR), institutional ownership (IONR), block 
ownership (BONR), director ownership (DONR), proportion of independent directors (INDD), board size (BSZ), 
frequency of board meetings (BFM), return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio), firm size (FSZ), leverage 
(LVG), firm growth (SGR) and capital expenditure (CEXC). Chapter Five presents the detailed definitions for all 
employed variables. 
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Second, the existence of autocorrelation or serial correlation could lead to incorrect 
standard errors. Consistent with Kajananthan (2012) and Ntim et al. (2012a), the Durbin-
Watson test was used to check for autocorrelation. This test is used to test for a relationship 
between an error and its lagged value. The null hypothesis of no autocorrelation could not 
be rejected if the Durbin-Watson value is equal or close to 2 (Gujarati, 2003). Specifically, 
the Durbin-Watson values are between 0.65 (minimum value) and 1.38 (maximum value) 
among the models used. Although, the Durbin-Watson values are relatively low for some 
of the estimated models, the results of the correlation test do not indicate the presence of 
serious violation of the autocorrelation or multitcollinearity problems.  
Third, following Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Ntim et al. (2012a), Cook’s 
distance tests were carried out to check the linearity of the variables used. Non-linearity 
exists if the Cook’s distance value exceeds 1 (Pryce, 2005; Maddala and Lahiri, 2009). 
Table 7.2 shows that the Cook’s distance values for the five models are between 0.00 
(minimum value) and 0.22 (maximum value).  Therefore, the Cook’s distance values do 
not exceed the critical value. This implies that there is substantial evidence of linear 
association amongst the variables used in the models. 
To sum up, a number of diagnostic tests were carried out, including: (i) the P-P and 
Q-Q; (ii) histograms; (iii) Skewness and Kurtosis; (iv) Variance Inflation Factor; (v) 
tolerance statistics; (vi) Durbin-Watson; (vii) Breusch-Pagan; and (viii) Cook’s distance. 
The results from these tests suggest that some of the variables do not follow a normal 
distribution, and they were transformed to correct this. In addition, the estimated models 
show evidence of heteroscedasticity, which is corrected using the robust standard errors 
method. Though evidence of violation of the normality assumption of the error terms in the 
models is found, this violation does not pose a major threat to the estimated coefficients, 
given the large sample size used in this study. 
 
 
7.2 MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSES  
Following the discussion on the OLS assumptions in Section 7.1, this section 
presents a discussion of the empirical results. A multivariate OLS regression examining 
determinants of voluntary corporate governance disclosure is estimated. Also, the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm financial performance is investigated 
using two different approaches: the equilibrium-variable model and the compliance-index 
model, as proxied by the accounting-based measure (ROA) and market-based measure (Q-
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ratio), respectively. This section ends by presenting comparisons between the findings 
obtained from the equilibrium-variable and compliance-index models. 
 
7.2.1 Empirical Results of the Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosure Model  
As explained in Chapter Five, the voluntary corporate governance disclosure model 
explores the determinants of voluntary corporate governance disclosure among Saudi listed 
firms. Specifically, this model aims to answer the third research sub-question: What are the 
factors that influence the level of compliance with the 2006 Saudi Corporate Governance 
Code (SCGC)? The constructed Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) is the 
dependent variable, which proxies corporate governance practices. The explanatory 
variables include eight board characteristics and ownership structure variables.  
Table 7.3 contains a summary of the hypotheses tested and the findings from the 
regression analysis of the relationships between corporate governance mechanisms and the 
SCGI. The finding of a positive coefficient on board size, audit firm size, presence of a 
corporate governance committee, government ownership and institutional ownership are 
consistent with the formulated hypotheses. Block ownership shows a negative impact on 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure, which is also in line with the hypothesis. 
However, the hypotheses for the proportion of independent directors and director 
ownership are rejected. The following part of this subsection discusses each variable in 
detail, with particular reference to how they compared to the results of previous studies.  
 
Table 7.3: A summary of all of the hypotheses and findings for the voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure model  
Dependent Variable The Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) 
Explanatory variable 
No. 
Hypot-
hesis 
Expect-
ed sign 
Finding 
sign 
Finding significance 
Hypothesis 
status 
Board of Directors’ Characteristics     
Independent Directors 1 + - Significant at the 1% level Rejected 
Board Size 2 + + Significant at the 1% level Accepted 
Audit Firm Size 3 + + Significant at the 5% level Accepted 
Presence of CG Committee 4 + + Significant at the 1% level Accepted 
Ownership Structure     
Government Ownership 5 + + Significant at the 1% level Accepted 
Institutional Ownership 6 + + Significant at the 10% level Accepted 
Block Ownership 7 - - Significant at the 10% level  Accepted 
Director ownership 8 - + Significant at the 10% level  Rejected 
Control Variables      
Firm size  + - Significant at the 1% level Rejected 
Leverage  +/- + Significant at the 10% level Accepted 
Firm growth  + + Insignificant Rejected 
Capital expenditure  +/- + Insignificant Rejected 
Dividends  +/- - Insignificant Rejected 
Notes: The hypotheses are presented in Chapter Three. 
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Beginning with board and corporate governance characteristics, the first hypothesis 
is that there is a positive relationship between the proportion of independent directors and 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure. Table 7.4 shows an inverse relationship 
between the proportion of independent directors and voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure. This finding led to the rejection of the first hypothesis. The finding is not 
consistent with agency theory that suggests the presence of independent directors improves 
corporate governance practices (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983) and 
information asymmetry (La Porta et al., 2002). In addition, stakeholder theory suggests 
that independent directors provide better representation of stakeholders’ interests (Clarke, 
1998). However, Jiraporn et al. (2009) suggest that independent directors may not have 
enough time to participate actively in the board, which negatively affects corporate 
governance. 
Empirically, the current finding is different from the findings in previous studies 
that show a positive relationship between independence of the board and governance 
practices. For example, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) report a positive relationship, suggesting 
that independence of the board of directors improves the board’s accountability in 
Malaysian listed firms. Other studies conducted in emerging countries by Chen (2011), 
Samaha et al. (2012) and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) show positive associations in 
Taiwan, Egypt and South Africa, respectively.  
As discussed in Chapter Nine, the interviewees explain that the appointment of 
independent directors in Saudi firms is not sufficiently transparent. Ezzine (2011) points 
out that the appointment of independent directors in Saudi listed firms is questionable. In 
this regard, Mahadeo et al. (2012) argue that the concept of independence of boards is very 
new in developing countries that recently adopted corporate governance reforms. 
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter One, political connections and informal social 
relations still influence the Saudi corporate environment on a large scale (Al-Twaijry et al., 
2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; Alshehri and Solomon, 
2012). This may affect the appointment of directors and may make the independence of 
boards in listed firms questionable. 
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Table 7.4: OLS regression findings of the voluntary corporate governance disclosure model (VCGD) 
 
 
  
Yearly estimations 
Model 
 
Expect-
ed Sign  
All firms 
years 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 Explanatory Variables   
Board of Directors’ Characteristics  
  Independent Directors 
 
+ -.187(.006)*** -.003(.849) .002(.941) -.054(.063)* -.239(.041)** -.450(.088)* -.485(.085) * -.112(.795) 
 Board Size 
 
+ .206(.009)*** -.037(.051)* -.060(.015)** -.104(.007)*** .099(.496) .277(.360) .634(.098)* .751(.060) * 
 Audit Firm Size 
 
+ .341(.012)** -.008(.770) .045(.215) .036(.520) .233(.239) .728(.092)* .554(.314) .217(.749) 
Presence of CG Committee 
 
+ .273(.006)*** .263(.010)*** .122(.344) .421(.001)*** -.009(.976) .166(.720) .252(.538) .603(.073) * 
Ownership Structure         
  Government Ownership  
 
+ .526(.002)*** .048(.269) .098(.066)* .115(.097)* .444(.064) * .832(.005)*** .301(.054) * -.158(.863) 
 Institutional Ownership 
 
+ .194(.063)* .013(.675) .042(.267) .053(.383) .337(.086)* .816(.056)* .115(.833) -.471(.479) 
 Block Ownership 
 
- -.267(.068)* -.067(.058) * -.102(.058)* -.181(.026)** -.483(.082)* -.940(.063) * -.388(.638) .563(.557) 
 Director ownership 
 
- .186(.048)* .068(.017)** .088(.015)** .106(.051)* .308(.085)* .722(.064)* .371(.444) -.307(.597) 
Control Variables:          
  Firm size 
 
+ -.353(.010)*** .041(.240) .070(.100)* .208(.005)*** .010(.970) -.044.(.060)* -1.375(.045)** -.310(.697) 
 Leverage 
 
+/- .160(.063)* .027(.229) .035(.266) -.042(.398) -.028(.893) .261(.532) .776(.067) * -.089(.883) 
 Firm growth 
 
+ .021(.385) .014(.485) .013(.585) .072(.063) * -.063(.599) .243(.333) .086(.790) -.040(.906) 
 Capital expenditure 
 
+/- .048(.273) -.021(.258) -.041(.073) * -.034(.380) .185(.091) * -.079(.799) -.200(.590) -.002(.995) 
 Dividends 
 
+/- -.076(.265) .052(.079)* .057(.055) * -.013(.824) -.079(.688) -.386(.365) -.131(.816) -.215(.744) 
    Industry dummies     Included Included Included     Included      Included Included    Included Included 
   Year dummies     Included Excluded Excluded     Excluded      Excluded Excluded    Excluded Excluded 
 Constant      1.812
*** 0.364*** 0.472
***
      0.762
*** 1.158*** 1.682***     2.629*** 3.811*** 
 Durbin-Watson statistics       0.975 1.934 2.403      2.309 2.127 2.148     2.119 2.282 
 F- value      18.206
*** 1.740* 1.795**      2.622*** 1.294 1.154     0.896 0.969 
 Adjusted R
2
       43.5% 15.1% 16.1%       28.1% 6.6% 3.6%     2.6% .07% 
 No. of observations        560 80 80         80 80 80      80 80 
Notes:    P-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Chapter Five provides a detailed definition of the measurement method of all 
the variables used for the estimation. To avoid the dummy variable trap, 2009 is excluded from regression analysis, while 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2010 are included. In addition, 
basic material, financial institutions, consumer goods, consumer services, telecommunications and utility industries are included. 
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  As shown in Table 7.4, the second hypothesis predicts that board size is positively 
related to good corporate governance practices. The table shows a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between board size and good corporate governance practices at the 
1% level of significance. This result indicates an acceptance of the second hypothesis. This 
finding is supported by resource dependence theory. In this regard, Fama and Jensen 
(1983) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) explaining that a large board is more capable of 
monitoring management behaviour than a small board because of the directors’ knowledge 
and the diversity of their experiences. Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) suggest that an 
increase in the number of directors improves firms’ control systems and enhances 
corporate governance practices. In addition, empirical studies by Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), 
Allegrini and Greco (2013) and Schiehll et al. (2013) find that large boards have a positive 
influence on good corporate governance practices in Malaysia, Brazil and Italy, 
respectively. Similarly, Ntim et al. (2012a) and Samaha et al. (2012) find that large boards 
in South African and Egyptians firms, respectively, are more likely to disclose corporate 
governance information. Board size is discussed in the Saudi Corporate Governance Code 
(SCGC). It recommends a board size of between three and eleven directors, according to 
the needs and size of the company. 
The third hypothesis indicates that there is a positive relationship between audit 
firm size and corporate governance disclosure. The coefficient shown in Table 7.4 is a 
significant and positive relationship between audit firm size and voluntary corporate 
disclosure. Therefore, the hypothesis cannot be rejected. Managerial signalling theory 
suggests that firms with a corporate governance committee expect to adopt good corporate 
governance practices. Establishing such a committee offers equal opportunities to both 
large and small shareholders to access information, which may help in reducing agency 
problems and the cost of capital (Morris, 1987; Hearn, 2011; Sharma, 2013). The result 
corroborates empirical findings from previous studies which suggest that large audit firms 
(big-four firms)
56
 seem to be more independent than small ones, and are more able to limit 
managers’ opportunistic behaviour due to their experience (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Eng 
and Mak, 2003). Furthermore, big-four firms may require the disclosure of further 
information in order to protect their reputation (DeAngelo, 1981; Depoers, 2000).  
The current finding is consistent with prior studies suggesting a positive 
relationship between audit firm size and voluntary corporate governance disclosure, such 
as studies by Raffournier (1995), Ntim et al. (2012a) and Schiehll et al. (2013) on Swiss, 
South African and Brazilian firms, respectively. Contrary to previous studies showing a 
                                                 
56
 The big-four audit firms are PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young and KPMG. 
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positive relationship between the two variables, some studies find no significant 
relationship. For example, Wallace et al. (1994) and Hossain et al. (1995) report that there 
is no significant relationship between audit firm size and voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure among Spanish and New Zealand firms, respectively. Similarly, Alsaeed (2006) 
finds no significant impact of audit quality on voluntary corporate disclosure in Saudi 
Arabia. The difference between Alsaeed’s (2006) finding and this study’s finding can be 
ascribed to the small sample size used by Alsaeed and the use of a one-year study period. 
Despite the importance of the audit firm in improving compliance with governance 
standards, the SCGC does not explicitly outline the role of audit firms regarding disclosure 
in firms’ annual reports.  
 The fourth hypothesis examines the relationship between the presence of a 
corporate governance committee and corporate governance practices. Table 7.4 shows that 
the hypothesis predicted that the presence of a corporate governance committee is 
positively related to corporate governance disclosure. As shown in Table 7.4, the results of 
multivariate OLS regression report that the presence of a corporate governance committee 
has a positive and significant impact on voluntary corporate governance disclosure at the 
1% level of significance. The finding is consistent with theoretical and empirical studies on 
corporate governance. In this regard, it is suggested that firms with a corporate governance 
committee are more likely to engage in good corporate governance practices (Core, 2001; 
Ntim et al., 2012a). In addition, stakeholder theory suggests that the presence of a 
corporate governance committee is essential to protecting stakeholders’ rights (Morris, 
1987; Clarke, 1998; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Solomon, 2010). Ntim et al. (2012a) suggest 
that there are few studies that investigate the influence of a corporate governance 
committee on corporate disclosure. They examine a sample of 169 South African listed 
firms from 2002 to 2006, and find a positive and significant relationship between the 
presence of a corporate governance committee and voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure. 
The second set of explanatory variables is related to ownership structures. These 
variables are used to analyse the relationship between ownership structures and voluntary 
corporate disclosure. As shown in Table 7.4, the fifth hypothesis indicates a positive 
impact of government ownership on voluntary corporate disclosure. The table contains the 
results from multivariate regression, leading us to accept the fifth hypothesis. This finding 
provides empirical support for the literature that suggests that government ownership is an 
important mechanism in improving board effectiveness and corporate disclosure (Conyon 
and He, 2011). The reported result is in line with existing empirical studies in emerging 
countries. For example, Eng and Mak (2003), Conyon and He (2011) and Ntim et al. 
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(2012a) find that government ownership is significantly related to increased corporate 
disclosure in Singapore, China and South Africa, respectively. As shown in Chapter Six, 
government ownership in Saudi listed firms is concentrated in large and profitable listed 
firms, such as petrochemical and telecommunication firms. As discussed in Chapter Nine, 
these firms have stable boards of directors and seek voluntary governance disclosure to 
signal their success. This explains the positive and significant relationship between 
government ownership and voluntary corporate governance disclosure in Saudi listed 
firms.  
The sixth hypothesis predicts that institutional ownership is positively associated 
with good corporate governance practices. As shown in Table 7.4, the hypothesis is 
accepted at the 10% level of significance. Agency theory explains this finding by 
suggesting that the presence of institutional investors ensures a degree of accountability 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Aggarwal et al., 2011). Empirically, this finding is consistent 
with existing studies (e.g., Barako et al., 2006; Bushee et al., 2010; Aggarwal et al., 2011; 
Ntim et al., 2012a) that report a positive and significant relationship.   
As reported in Table 7.4, the result for the seventh hypothesis indicates that there is 
a negative and significant relationship between block ownership and voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure. The negative relationship is supported by stakeholder theory, which 
suggests that large block shareholders can jeopardize stakeholders’ interests (Solomon, 
2010). This problem is more obvious in developing countries, such as Saudi Arabia, that 
suffer from a weak legal system (Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008). This explains the 
negative relationship between block ownership and voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure. In addition, the absence of external corporate governance mechanisms, like a 
market for corporate control, makes the firms’ management work towards large 
shareholders’ interests (Allegrini and Greco, 2013). The finding of this study offers further 
support to existing studies on emerging economies; for example, Barako et al. (2006) and 
Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) find a negative relationship between block ownership and 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure in Kenyan and South African firms, 
respectively. Similarly, Alsaeed (2006) uses a small sample of 40 listed firms in 2003 and 
finds that block holders have a negative influence on good corporate governance practices 
in Saudi Arabia. 
The last hypothesis tests the relationship between director ownership and good 
governance practices. As shown in Table 7.4, the result from the multivariate OLS 
regression reports that the coefficient is positive and significant at the 10% level of 
significance. There are two different explanations for the relationship between director 
ownership and voluntary corporate governance disclosure. From an agency theory 
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perspective, McConnell and Servaes (1990) suggest that the board of directors may seek to 
maximise their wealth by using insider information, which leads to poor corporate 
governance practices. However, Samaha et al. (2012) indicate that the board of directors 
seeks to improve corporate governance practices in order to increase the competitive 
position of their firms. This is consistent with stewardship theory’s expectation that boards 
of directors’ interests are aligned with other shareholders’ (Davis et al., 1997). In Saudi 
listed firms, there is ownership concentration by family firms (ROSC, 2009). Given that 
these families are strategic investors, they have an incentive to improve corporate 
governance practices to improve the competitive position of their firms (see Samaha et al., 
2012). 
 As discussed in Chapter Five, a number of control variables were employed in the 
model to reduce the impact of potential omitted variables and endogeneity (Ntim et al., 
2012a). Following corporate governance studies (e.g., Barako et al., 2006; Mangena et al., 
2012; Ntim et al., 2014; Upadhyay et al., 2014), firm size (FSZ), leverage (LVG), firm 
growth (SGR), capital expenditure (CEXC) and dividends (DV) are included as control 
variables. A hypothesis was formulated that firm size is positively related to voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure. As shown in Table 7.4, the coefficient on firm size is 
negative and significant at the 1% level of significance.  
This result is not supported by Eng and Mak (2003), Omar and Simon (2011), 
Elzahar and Hussainey (2012), Ntim et al. (2012a), Samaha et al. (2012) and Allegrini and 
Greco (2013), who find a positive relationship between firm size and good governance 
practices. However, Klapper and Love (2004) suggest that small firms tend to enhance 
corporate governance due to the greater opportunities for growth and the possibility of 
getting external financing. Therefore, a possible explanation for the negative finding could 
be attributed to the recent listing of many Saudi firms on the stock market. Such listing can 
lead to improvement in corporate governance disclosure and transparency, with the aim of 
improving their financial positions.  
  Table 7.4 shows that leverage is positively related to good governance 
performance. This positive relationship is in line with Haniffa and Cooke (2002). They 
suggest that firms with high operating leverage may need to improve their monitoring. In 
addition, creditors require high disclosure to protect their funds (Jensen, 1986). Also, firms 
with higher leverage seek to disclose corporate governance information to legitimise their 
actions to creditors and shareholders alike (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Some empirical 
studies, such as Ho and Wong (2001), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Akhtaruddin et al. 
(2009), Ntim et al. (2012a), Samaha et al. (2012) and Allegrini and Greco (2013) find no 
significant relationship between leverage and voluntary corporate governance disclosure. 
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However, Studies by Barako et al. (2006) and Omar and Simon (2011) find a positive 
relationship, which is consistent with the current study. Alsaeed (2006) also finds a 
positive relationship between leverage and voluntary corporate governance in Saudi listed 
firms.    
 The results suggest that firm growth is positively but insignificantly related to 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure, as reported in Table 7.4. This positive result is 
supported by theoretical explanation that growth in firms means an increase in investment 
opportunities, which requires more corporate disclosure (Beiner et al., 2006; Chung and 
Zhang, 2011). This result offers additional empirical support to previous studies suggesting 
a positive relationship between firm growth and voluntary corporate governance disclosure 
(e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Henry, 2008; Laidroo, 2009; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). 
Table 7.4 reveals that capital expenditure has no significant influence on corporate 
disclosure. This finding is in line with previous literature suggesting the existence of a 
weak relationship between capital expenditure and corporate disclosure (Ntim et al., 
2012a; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013).   
 Furthermore, the empirical results in Table 7.4 show that dividends are not 
associated with corporate governance disclosure. The finding of no significant relationship 
between dividends and good corporate governance practices is not in line with existing 
studies, such as Archambault and Archambault (2003) and Adjaoud and Ben-Amar (2010). 
The variation in findings can be attributed to the sample used. For example, the current 
study uses balanced panel data, while Archambault and Archambault (2003) and Adjaoud 
and Ben-Amar (2010) use unbalanced data. Furthermore, Archambault and Archambault 
(2003) use cross-country data from 41 countries. However, Adjaoud and Ben-Amar (2010) 
use a sample of listed firms from Standard and Poor’s index. The different institutional and 
legal systems in Saudi Arabia and other countries may lead to the differences in the 
findings ofthose studies (Bozec et al., 2010). 
  It is suggested that voluntary corporate governance disclosure varies over time and 
across industries (Conyon, 1994; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ntim et al., 2012a). The result 
of the OLS regression indicates that all of the year dummies are significant at the 1% level 
of significance. This is consistent with Conyon (1994), Chalevas (2011) and Ntim et al. 
(2012a), who find that firms’ level of compliance with corporate governance standards has 
improved over the years. In terms of the industry dummies, consumer goods and utility 
industries are significant at 1% and 10%, respectively.
57
 This is consistent with Hussainey 
                                                 
57
 Since there are many year and industry dummy variables employed, these are not reported in Table 7.4 for 
brevity. 
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and Al-Nodel’s (2008) finding of variation in corporate disclosure among Saudi listed 
firms based on industry. 
Finally, Table 7.4 shows that the adjusted R
2
 is 43.5%, while the F-value is 18.206, 
which is significant at 1% and indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis, suggesting that 
the coefficients of all eight corporate governance variables are jointly not equal to zero.
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The result of the goodness of fit test is in line with other studies on corporate disclosure 
conducted on developing countries. Barako et al. (2006) find an adjusted R
2
 of 53% for 
Kenyan firms. Similarly, Ntim et al. (2012a) report an adjusted R
2
 for South African firms 
of 45% using time-series and cross-sectional data over five years. Alsaeed (2006) and 
Samaha et al. (2012) examine cross-sectional data for one year and find an adjusted R
2
 of 
61% and 67% in Saudi Arabian and Egyptian firms, respectively. 
 
7.2.2 Empirical Results of the Firm Financial Performance Models 
This subsection presents the empirical results from the estimation of the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial performance. 
As explained in Chapter Five, existing studies have investigated this relationship using two 
different approaches: (i) the equilibrium-variable model (e.g., Vafeas and Theodorou, 
1998; Weir and Laing, 2000; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Chalevas, 2011; Mangena et al., 
2012); and (ii) the compliance-index model (e.g., Black, 2001; Gompers et al., 2003; 
Cremers and Nair, 2005; Morey et al., 2009; Bauer et al., 2010; Renders et al., 2010; 
Giroud and Mueller, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012b; Ammann et al., 2013; Munisi and Randoy, 
2013; Tariq and Abbas, 2013; van Essen et al., 2013).  
Despite the fact that previous studies on corporate governance mainly use only one 
of the two approaches, the current study uses both. One of the contributions that this study 
makes to the corporate governance literature is, thus, the use of both the equilibrium-
variable and compliance-index approaches, which allows us to examine the differences in 
the findings and their implications. The first part of this subsection reports the findings of 
the equilibrium-variable model, while the second part presents the findings of the 
compliance-index model.  
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 The study investigated the potential bias caused by omitted variables in the three main models. The 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure, equilibrium-variable and compliance-index models were re-
estimated without control variables. The results reveal a relative convergence between the models whether 
the control variables are excluded or included. 
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7.2.2.1  Empirical Results of the Equilibrium-Variable Model 
 In this section, the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
firm financial performance is examined by using return on assets (ROA) as an accounting-
based measure, and Tobin’s Q as a market-based (Q-ratio) measure. This model aims to 
answer the fourth research sub-question: What is the association between individual 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial performance? The variables 
investigated by the equilibrium-variable model include CEO duality (BDUAL), proportion 
of independent directors (INDD), board size (BSZ), frequency of board meetings (BFM), 
presence of board sub-committees (BCOM) and director ownership (DONR).
59
 
 
Table 7.5: A summary of all of the hypotheses and findings for the financial performance models  
Dependent Variable The accounting based measure (ROA) and market based measure (Q-ratio) 
Explanatory variable        No. 
Hypothesis 
Expected 
sign 
Finding 
sign 
Finding significance Hypothesis 
status 
Panel A: EVM –ROA     
  CEO duality 09 - + Significant at the 5% level Rejected 
  Independent Directors 10 + + Significant at the 10% level Accepted 
  Board Size 11 - - Significant at the 1% level Accepted 
  Frequency of board meetings 12 + - Insignificant  Rejected 
  Board sub-committees 13 + + Significant at the 1% level Accepted 
  Director ownership 14 - + Significant at the 1% level Rejected 
Panel B: EVM –Q-ratio    
  CEO duality 09 - - Insignificant Rejected 
  Independent Directors 10 + + Significant at the 5% level Accepted 
  Board Size 11 - + Significant at the 10% level Rejected 
  Frequency of board meetings 12 + + Significant at the 1% level Accepted 
  Board sub-committees 13 + - Insignificant  Rejected 
  Director ownership 14 - + Significant at the 1% level Rejected 
Panel C: Compliance- Index Model –ROA     
  The Saudi CG Index (SCGI) 15 + + Significant at the  5% level Accepted 
Panel D: Compliance- Index Model -Q-ratio     
  The Saudi CG Index (SCGI) 15 + - Insignificant Rejected 
Notes: The details of the hypotheses are presented in Chapter Three.  
 
i)  OLS regression findings based on accounting measure ROA 
Panel A of Table 7.5 shows a summary of the hypotheses developed to examine the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and ROA. CEO duality, board size 
and director ownership were hypothesised to be negatively related to ROA, whereas 
independent directors, frequency of board and presence of board sub-committees were 
hypothesised to be positively associated with ROA.  
 As shown in Table 7.6, the coefficient on CEO duality is positive and significant, 
leading us to reject the hypothesis. This positive association is supported by stewardship 
theory. Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) suggest that CEO duality reduces the board’s 
remuneration and compensation. Similarly, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) suggest that CEO 
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 Chapter Five provides the detailed definition and method of measuring corporate governance mechanisms 
used in this model. 
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duality is better than two separate roles in achieving firms’ objectives and strategies. 
Therefore, this finding supports stewardship theory, which suggests that CEOs are 
trustworthy and highly capable of running a firm and maximising shareholders’ value 
(Davis et al., 1997; Bozec, 2005; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007).  
 This finding is also empirically consistent with empirical studies that report a 
positive relationship between CEO duality and financial performance (e.g., Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991; Boyd, 1995; Brickley et al., 1997; Hearn, 2011). However, Al-Abbas (2009) 
finds no evidence in Saudi listed firms regarding CEO duality improving firm financial 
performance. The difference between the findings of this study and Al-Abbas’s study is 
related to methodology and sample size. While the current study employs ROA, Al-Abbas 
uses earnings management as an accounting measure. In addition, he uses an unbalanced 
sample consisting of 78 observations over three years, whereas this study uses a balanced 
sample of 560 observations over seven years. The Saudi Corporate Governance Code 
(SCGC) recommends splitting the CEO and chairperson positions. However, the positive 
and significant relationship observed in this study seems to indicate that this duality is 
financially better for Saudi companies.  
According to the tenth hypothesis, the proportion of independent directors is 
hypothesised to have a positive and significant relationship with ROA. Table 7.6 shows 
that the proportion of independent directors is positively related to ROA at the 10% level 
of significance. The positive impact of board independence is explained by agency, 
stakeholder and resource dependence theories. In this regard, the presence of independent 
directors on the board can reduce managerial opportunistic behaviour, and therefore 
possibly mitigate the agency problem (Berle and Means, 1932; Fama, 1980; Bebchuk and 
Weisbach, 2010). Furthermore, resource dependence theory suggests that independent 
directors are able to secure additional financial resources and contribute meaningfully to 
board strategic discussions (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007; Chen, 2011). This implies that the 
presence of independent directors may help facilitate rapid growth, thereby improving 
financial performance. 
Mangena and Chamisa (2008) find that firms with a small number of non-executive 
directors are more likely to be suspended in South Africa. Conyon and He (2011) use a 
large sample of 1,342 Chinese firms and report a positive relationship between board 
independence and ROA. However, the finding in this study supports the SCGC’s 
recommendations, including: (i) a majority of board members must be non-executive; (ii) 
two members or one third of the board members should be independent, whichever is 
greater; and (iii) the board sub-committees should be composed of a sufficient number of 
independent members. 
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Table 7.6: OLS regression findings of the equilibrium-variable model (EVM) based on accounting measure ROA  
Model 
Expected 
Sign 
 
All firms years 
Yearly estimations 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 Explanatory Variables   
Corporate Governance Mechanisms:         
  CEO duality -   .016(.022)
** -.012 (.526) .004 (.830) .026 (.072) * .035 (.060)* .022(.431) .037 (.284) .027 (.440) 
  Independent Directors + .008(.068)
 * .007(.615) .016 (.278) .015 (.275) -.007(.608) -.006(.726) .019 (.292) .024 (.078) * 
  Board Size - -.025(.000)
*** -.022(.079)* -.014 (.397) -.026(.086)* -.028(.082)* -.021(.280) -.044(.022)** -.025 (.084) * 
  Frequency of board meetings + -.003(.295) .017(.309) .010 (.527) -.002 (.880) -.015(.282) -.010(.515) .004 (.797) -.010 (.507) 
  Board sub-committees + .023(.007)
*** -.001(.977) .022 (.490) .035 (.059) * -.002(.920) .028(.228) .028 (.298) .040 (.320) 
  Director ownership + .027(.000)
*** .028(053)* .026(.097)* .013 (.352) .021(.065) * .024(.061) * .035(.021)** .043(.005)*** 
Control Variables         
  Firm size + .027(.002)
*** .010(.688) .042(.095)* .037(.055) * .011(.640) .026(.371) .023 (.461) .027 (.312) 
  Leverage +/- -.033(.000)
*** -.021(.237) -.034 (.054) * -.043(.024)** .004(.827) -.010(.707) -.014 (.600) -.069(.004)*** 
  Firm growth + .019(.000)
*** .023(.077)* .021 (.212) .044 (.020)** .034(.013)** .010(.529) .046(.007)*** .006 (.696) 
  Capital expenditure +/- -.005(.171) .013(.422) -.005 (.779) .008 (.616) -.013(.370) -.032(.056)
 * -.017 (.354) -.014(.418) 
  Dividends +/- .059(.000)
*** .079(.001)*** .068(.006)*** .058(.010)*** .076(.001)*** .036(.194) .042 (.083) * .069 (.015)** 
    Industry dummies  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
    Year dummies  Included Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded 
Constant  0.134
***
 0.114
***
 0.153
***
 0.156
***
 .0155
***
 0.139
***
 0.123
***
 0.083
***
 
Durbin-Watson statistics  0.676 2.020 2.215 2.060 2.015 2.223 1.918 1.790 
F- value  26.654
***
 4.859
***
 4.504
***
 5.990
***
 6.853
***
 4.903
***
 5.014
***
 4.330
***
 
Adjusted R
2
  51.4% 45.4% 43.0% 51.8% 55.7% 45.6% 46.3% 41.7% 
No. of observations  560 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Chapter Five provides a detailed definition of the measurement method of all the 
variables used for the estimation. To avoid the dummy variable trap, 2005 is excluded from regression analysis, while 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 are included. In addition, basic 
material, financial institutions, consumer goods, telecommunications and utility industries are included. 
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  The eleventh hypothesis predicts that board size is negatively related to ROA. As 
shown in Table 7.6, the relationship is negative at the 1% level of significance. The result 
is consistent with the explanation provided by Yawson (2006). He suggests that a large 
board may place a high financial burden on a firm, thereby reducing its profitability. This 
implies that an increase in the number of directors could result in an increase in board 
expenses, such as annual remuneration, bonuses, travel and other allowances (Vafeas, 
1999a). Similarly, Beasley (1996) and Yermack (1996) suggest that large boards are 
usually inefficient in terms of communication amongst members, and this lack of coherent 
interaction may result in weak financial performance.  
A number of empirical studies conducted on both developed and developing 
countries have found a negative association between board size and ROA. Eisenberg et al. 
(1998) and Hansson et al. (2011) report that Finnish firms with small boards have better 
ROA. Guest (2009) examines a large sample of 2,746 UK firms and finds a negative 
impact of board size on firms’ profitability. Similarly, in developing economies, 
Mashayekhi and Bazaz (2008) and Sanda et al. (2010) report a negative relationship 
between board size and firm performance in Iranian and Nigerian listed firms. The finding 
in this study is consistent with the recommendation of the SCGC that board size be limited 
to a maximum of eleven members.  
 Table 7.6 shows that the frequency of board meetings has no significant association 
with ROA. The theoretical explanation by Monks and Minow (2011) suggests that the 
board of directors should not participate in day-to-day activities. This is consistent with 
stewardship theory, which expects executive mangers to be trustworthy (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991; Letza et al., 2004). Empirically, the finding of this study is in line with El 
Mehdi (2007). He finds no significant influence of frequent board meetings on firms’ 
performance among Tunisian listed firms. Also, the lack of a relationship that has been 
found in this study is consistent with the SCGC, which does not address this issue because 
the relationship does not exist. 
 The obtained result suggests a positive and significant relationship between board 
sub-committees and firm financial performance, leading to the acceptance of the thirteenth 
hypothesis. As reported in Table 7.6, this finding supports the theoretical explanations in 
previous studies on corporate governance. Specifically, from agency theory perspective, it 
is argued that board sub-committees enhance the internal control system (Klein, 1998) and 
improve firms’ profitability (Main and Johnston, 1993). For example, audit and 
remuneration committees play vital roles in reducing excessive compensation for directors 
and executives (Harrison, 1987; Sun and Cahan, 2009). Therefore, the finding of this study 
provides further empirical evidence of the importance of board sub-committees. For 
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example, Wild (1994) finds that formation of an audit committee increases share returns. 
Similarly, Vafeas (1999b) reports that the selection of directors by the nomination 
committee positively affects firm performance. The SCGC recognises the importance of 
board sub-committees and also recommends listed firms have at least three committees, 
namely audit, remuneration and nomination committees. 
Similarly, as reported in Table 7.6, a positive and significant relationship is 
observed between director ownership and firm performance. The finding is supported by 
resource dependence theory, which suggests that the board of directors is an essential link 
between the firm and the financial and non-financial resources that are crucial for the 
firm’s growth (Pfeffer, 1972; Pearce and Zahra, 1992). However, this result is different 
from some existing literature which suggests that director ownership negatively affects 
firm performance. Hansen and Hill (1991) suggest that the duration of board of directors’ 
membership should be limited to a certain period of time. This can make directors seek to 
maximise their interests while sitting on the board. In the same vein, Vafeas and 
Theodorou (1998) and Konijn et al. (2011) find that the existence of director ownership 
increases the likelihood of collusion between directors and the firm’s management. 
Furthermore, managerial signalling theory suggests that directors have more information 
about the firm than outside shareholders (Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007; Bebchuk and 
Weisbach, 2010).  
However, some empirical studies support the positive relationship found in the 
current study. For example, Mangena and Tauringana (2007) and Mangena et al. (2012) 
suggest that director ownership is positively and significantly associated with firm 
financial performance in Zimbabwean and South African firms, respectively. This suggests 
that directors with large ownership seek to improve the firm’s performance to maximise 
their own interests, consequently working in the interest of other shareholders. As 
discussed in Chapter Nine, this positive relationship can be explained by the fact that board 
ownership is a form of strategic ownership mainly controlled by family members. 
Therefore, they aim to improve firm performance to maximise their wealth. 
 As discussed in Chapter Five, the control variables are included to reduce the 
potential effects of omitted variables (Ntim et al., 2012a). In line with other corporate 
governance studies, control variables associated with firm performance are selected (e.g., 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Chalevas, 2011; Mangena et al., 2012; Munisi and Randoy, 
2013; Jayachandran et al., 2013). These variables are firm size (FSZ), leverage (LVG), firm 
growth (SGR), capital expenditure (CEXC) and dividends (DV). Table 7.6 shows that firm 
size, firm growth and dividends are positively and significantly related to return on assets 
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(ROA). However, leverage impacts negatively on financial performance, and capital 
expenditure does not show any significant relationship with firm financial performance. 
 As shown in Table 7.6, the firm size coefficient is positive at the 1% level of 
significance. This finding is consistent with Chalevas (2011) and Mangena et al. (2012), 
who find that firm size is positively related to ROA. In this regard, Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006) explain that large firms have highly qualified managers that helps reduce 
investment risk. However, leverage shows a negative relationship with firm performance at 
the 1% level of significance. This result is supported by prior empirical studies. Haniffa 
and Hudaib (2006) report that leverage is negatively associated with financial performance 
measured by ROA among Malaysian firms. Similarly, Chalevas (2011) and Mangena et al. 
(2012) find a negative but insignificant relationship in Greek and South African firms. The 
presence of a negative relationship between leverage and ROA can be arguably attributed 
to the existing conflict between creditors and equity holders over risk and return (Haniffa 
and Hudaib, 2006). 
  Firm growth measured by sales growth is positively associated with financial 
performance. Table 7.6 shows that the hypothesis is accepted at the 1% level of 
significance. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Chalevas (2011) find that firm growth 
increases accounting return proxied by ROA. On the other hand, capital expenditure is 
expected to influence firm financial performance. Table 7.6 shows that the coefficient of 
correlation is negative but not significant. This finding is consistent with Jackling and Johl 
(2009), who report that there is no influence of capital expenditure on ROA. Dividends 
have a positive relationship with ROA at the 1% level of significance. This positive 
relationship supports the hypothesis that dividend payment is associated with firm 
profitability (La Porta et al., 2000). 
 In terms of the year dummy variables, the results show that year 2007 and year 
2008 are significant at the 10% level of significance; therefore, ROA is different (higher) 
in those years as compared to the base year. This is consistent with studies that find that 
financial performance is affected by year (e.g., Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). However, the 
industry dummy variables show significant coefficients supporting the notion that 
accounting return is different across various industries (Vafeas, 1999a). Since there are 
many year and industry dummy variables employed, for brevity, their coefficients are not 
reported in Table 7.6. 
Finally, to provide a general test for corporate governance mechanisms’ influence 
on firm financial performance, Table 7.6 shows that the F-value of 26.654 at the 1% level 
of significance indicates that the null hypothesis of coefficients being jointly significant is 
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rejected. This suggests that the influence of corporate governance on firm performance is 
not equal to zero. The adjusted R
2
 is 51.4%, which indicates that about 51% of the 
variations in ROA can be explained by the covariates used in this model. This result is 
similar to other studies on firm financial performance. For example, Chalevas (2011) finds 
an adjusted R
2
 of 51.7% in a sample consisting of 386 Greek firms over a four-year period. 
However, Al-Abbas (2009) reports an adjusted R
2
 of 37% among a sample of Saudi listed 
firms.  
 
ii)  OLS regression findings based on market measure Q-ratio  
Panel B of Table 7.5 shows a summary of the hypotheses developed to investigate 
the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and Q-ratio. The results from 
the regression indicate a positive and significant relationship between firm value and 
proportion of independent directors, board size, frequency of board meetings and director 
ownership. CEO duality and the presence of board sub-committees are reported as having 
no significant relationship with Q-ratio. A discussion of the results from the OLS 
regression regarding the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
value appears below.  
 To begin, CEO duality is hypothesised to be inversely related to firm value as 
proxied by Q-ratio. Table 7.7 shows that the coefficient on CEO duality is insignificant, 
indicating that there is no significant relationship between CEO duality and firm value. 
Thus, the hypothesis can be rejected. The weak relationship between CEO duality and firm 
value is supported by the literature. Monks and Minow (2011) argue that splitting these 
two positions does not necessarily lead to an increase in market returns. The finding is 
consistent with previous studies. For example, Baliga et al. (1996) find that the US stock 
market return is not affected by combining the roles of CEO and board chairperson. 
Similarly, Mangena and Chamisa (2008) report that there is no association between CEO 
duality and suspended listed firms in South African firms. 
The hypothesis suggests a positive relationship between the proportion of 
independent directors and Q-ratio. As shown in Table 7.7, the multivariate OLS regression 
reports that the relationship is positive at the 5% level of significance. This finding is in 
line with managerial signalling theory. Black et al. (2006b) suggest that the presence of an 
independent board signals to investors that information asymmetry is low. This positive 
relationship between the proportion of independent directors and Q-ratio is empirically 
consistent with prior studies. For example, Millstein and MacAvoy (1998) and Weir et al. 
(2002) find that the existence of independent directors in a board’s structure attracts 
potential investors and increases firm value in US and UK firms, respectively. 
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Table 7.7: OLS regression findings of the equilibrium-variable model (EVM) based on market measure Q-ratio  
Model 
Expect-
ed Sign 
 
All firms years 
Yearly estimations 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 Explanatory Variables   
Corporate Governance Mechanisms:   
  CEO duality - -.016(.421) -.224(.085)
* -.172 (.590) -.112 (.456) .145 (.381) .087 (.467) .079 (.682) .143(.512) 
  Independent Directors + .106(.020)
** -.044(.709) .154 (.495) .203(.078)* .212(.070)* .095 (.079)* .082(.403) .041(.691) 
  Board Size - .078(.094)
* .171(.211) .280 (.288) .053 (.672) -.005 (.975) -.005 (.949) .026(.809) .022(.847) 
  Frequency of board meetings + .200(.000)
*** .085(.560) -.084 (.747) .420(.000)*** .339(.008)*** .049 (.440) .213(.028)** .118(.218) 
  Board committees + -.110(.113) -.084(.813) -.801 (.111) .086 (.646) -.034 (.851) -.041 (.676) -.074 (.617) -.104(.676) 
  Director ownership - .243(.000)
*** .259(.041)** .369 (.138) .258(.029)** .232(.063)* .189(.005)*** .099 (.238) .162(.080)* 
Control Variables         
  Firm size + -.447(.000)
*** .005(.981) -.813(.048)** -.513(.009)*** -.678(.002)*** -.300(.017)** -.681(.000)*** -.392(.019)** 
  Leverage +/- -.300(.000)
*** -.601(.000)*** -.089(.001)*** -.052(.739) .005(.980) .029 (.792) .015 (.916) -.073 (.607) 
  Firm growth + .034(.244) .197(.080)
* .104 (.694) -.273 (.082)* .045(.715) .075 (.262) .060 (.520) -.081 (.357) 
  Capital expenditure +/- .030(.297) .119(.385) -.043 (.888) -.139 (.280) -.089(.514) -.030 (.713) .031 (.767) -.006 (.955) 
  Dividends +/- -.075(.190) -.131(.523) -.279 (.459) -.081(.663) -.013(.948) .189(.052)
* .152(.366) .130(.448) 
    Industry dummies  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
    Year dummies  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant  1.342
***
 1.400
***
 3.290
***
 1.535
***
 1.638
***
 0.575
***
 0.843
***
 0.689
***
 
Durbin-Watson statistics  1.388 2.249 2.188 1.740 1.810 1.968 2.033 2.241 
F- value  34.442
***
 2.465
***
 3.503
***
 3.469
***
 3.436
***
 1.678
*
 2.725
***
 1.530 
Adjusted R
2
  58.3% 24.0% 35.0% 34.7% 34.4% 12.7% 27.1% 10.2% 
No. of observations  560 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Chapter Five presents the provides a detailed definition of the measurement method of 
all the variables used for the estimation. To avoid the dummy variable trap, 2009 is excluded from regression analysis, while 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2010 are included. In addition, basic 
material, financial institutions, consumer goods, telecommunications and utility industries are included. 
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  Similarly, Gupta et al. (2009) report that the resignation of independent directors 
adversely impacts on firm value in US stock markets. In addition, El Mehdi (2007) and 
Mangena et al. (2012) find that investors’ confidence increased for Tunisian and South 
African firms with independent directors on their boards. Similarly, Mangena and 
Tauringana (2007) indicate that foreign ownership increases in Zimbabwean firms where 
board independence is very high.  
Also, the relationship between board size and Q-ratio is hypothesised to be 
negative. Table 7.7 shows a positive and significant coefficient on board size, leading to 
the rejection of the hypothesis. The positive finding is consistent with resource dependence 
theory. Yawson (2006) and Dalton et al. (1998) suggest that decisions are better in large 
boards due to the diversity of experiences and knowledge of the directors. Kiel and 
Nicholson (2003) examine large Australian public firms and find that a large board shows 
a positive relationship with firm value. Recently, Jackling and Johl (2009) and Mangena et 
al. (2012) find that Q-ratio is positively associated with board size in a sample of Indian 
and South African listed firms.   
 Frequent board meetings are predicted to increase shareholders’ value. As shown in 
Table 7.7, the coefficient is positive at the 1% level of significance. This is in line with 
agency, stakeholder and resource dependence theories. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest 
that board activities are positively associated with firm financial performance. 
Furthermore, frequent board meetings help directors to monitor the firm’s operation and 
protect shareholders’ and stakeholders’ interests (Solomon, 2010). This implies that 
participants within stock markets react positively to firms having active boards. 
Empirically, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) examine 275 large firms in the US and find 
that firms that have a large number of board meetings are more likely to make or update 
accurate earnings forecasts. Similarly, Jackling and Johl (2009) find a positive relationship 
between frequency of board meetings and Q-ratio in a sample of Indian firms.    
 The hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between the presence of board sub-
committees and Q-ratio. As shown in Table 7.7, the results from the empirical analysis 
indicate no significant relationship between board sub-committees and Q-ratio. This result 
seems to suggest that a board sub-committee does not explain variations in firm value 
measured using Q-ratio. As discussed in Chapter Nine, the absence of a relationship can be 
attributed to the weakness of the market for corporate control as an external corporate 
governance mechanism in the Saudi stock market. In addition, the awareness and 
appreciation of good corporate governance practices among individual investors may lead 
to a weak relationship between the presence of board sub-committees and market value. 
This finding is consistent with the studies of Vafeas and Theodorou (1998), who report no 
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significant relationship between the presence of board sub-committees and financial 
performance using data from 250 listed firms in the UK. Similarly, Klein (1998) finds a 
marginal role of board sub-committees in improving board of directors’ performance using 
a sample of 486 firms in the US. Additionally, Dulewicz and Herbert (2004) suggest that 
audit and remuneration committees in 86 UK firms appeared to have no impact on 
company performance.  
However, the hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between director 
ownership and firm value. Table 7.7 shows that the coefficient is positive at the 1% level 
of significance. The current finding is consistent with empirical studies conducted on data 
from emerging countries (e.g., Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Mangena et al., 2012).  
 Following existing literature on corporate governance, a number of control 
variables (firm characteristics) are included in this model (e.g., Hossain et al., 2001; Weir 
et al., 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Ntim et al., 2014; 
Upadhyay et al., 2014). Similar to the previous model, this model includes firm size (FSZ), 
leverage (LVG), firm growth (SGR), capital expenditure (CEXC) and dividends (DV) as 
control variables. As shown in Table 7.7, firm size and leverage are negatively and 
significantly associated with Q-ratio at the 1% level of significance. However, firm 
growth, capital expenditure and dividends show no significant relationship with firm 
value.  
 The negative and significant coefficient on firm size, which is measured by the 
natural log of total assets, is consistent with findings from prior studies; for example, 
Jackling and Johl (2009) report a negative and significant relationship between firm size 
and Q-ratio. Recently, Mangena et al. (2012) find a negative relationship among South 
African firms. Leverage is also negatively related to firm value at the 5% level of 
significance. This negative coefficient is in line with a number of studies on corporate 
governance. Weir et al. (2002) conduct a study on 311 firms in the UK. They also find a 
significant and negative relationship between leverage and Q-ratio. Similarly, Jackling and 
Johl (2009) report a negative relationship in India. However, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) 
and Mangena et al. (2012) find a negative association in Malaysian and South African 
firms. This implies that potential investors are concerned with existing high leverage in 
firms, which can have a negative implication for the firm’s financial performance, 
(Mangena et al., 2012). 
 On the other hand, the result reveals that firm growth has no significant relationship 
with Q-ratio. This result is contrary to some existing corporate governance studies that find 
firm growth has some explanatory power in determining changes in firm value. For 
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example, Weir et al. (2002), Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Gupta and Fields (2009) find 
a negative and statistically significant relationship between firm growth and Q-ratio using 
data samples from the UK, Malaysia and Canada, respectively. Also, as shown in Table 
7.7, capital expenditure has no statistically significant relationship with firm value. This 
result is also different from some previous studies which show a positive and significant 
relationship (e.g., Weir et al., 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006).  
The multivariate OLS regression results show that dividends have a negative but 
insignificant relationship with Q-ratio. This result is in line with Officer (2011). He find 
that firms with a low Tobin’s Q have significantly more positive dividend initiation 
announcement returns than other firms.  Finally, the OLS regression results indicate that 
the year and industry dummy variables are statistically significant for most of the study 
period. This is again in line with studies that find that firm value is different across 
different financial years and industries (e.g., Millstein and MacAvoy, 1998). Since there 
are many year and industry dummy variables employed, for brevity, their coefficients are 
not reported in Table 7.7. 
Finally, Table 7.7 shows the goodness of fit of the model, with an adjusted R
2
 of 
58.3% and an F-value of 34.442, significant at the 1% level of significance. This finding is 
consistent with the literature examining the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and Q-ratio. For example, Millstein and MacAvoy (1998) report an adjusted 
R
2
 of 51% in a sample of 154 listed firms in the US over five years. In the same vein, 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Jackling and Johl (2009) find an adjusted R
2
 of 27% and 
32% in Malaysian and Indian firms. However, Andres and Vallelado (2008) find an 
adjusted R
2
 of 39% in a cross-country study.  
 
iii)  Comparison of Results using ROA and Q-ratio Measures  
The relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and financial 
performance shows variations based on the measures used. The differences in the results 
between accounting and market measures are consistent with previous studies. For 
example, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) investigate the association between corporate 
governance mechanisms using both ROA and Q-ratio. They find that CEO duality is 
negatively related to ROA and positively related to Q-ratio. Similarly, Munisi and Randoy 
(2013) find that corporate governance practices are positively related to ROA, but 
negatively associated with Q-ratio.  
From Table 7.5, the differences can be summarised as follows. First, CEO duality 
shows a significant positive relationship with ROA and a weak relationship with Q-ratio. 
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This difference explains the lack of consensus in the literature about the optimal measure 
with which to assess firm financial performance (Mangena et al., 2012). Also, it explains 
the need to adopt a multiple-theoretical perspective to provide a richer basis for 
interpreting findings (Turnbull, 1997; van Ees et al., 2009; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). 
For example, agency theory suggests that CEO duality may increase agency costs and 
reduce firm performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). On the other hand, stewardship 
theory suggests that CEOs can be trusted to run a firm and maximise shareholders’ value 
(Davis et al., 1997; Bozec, 2005; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007).  
Second, the proportion of independent directors shows a positive relationship with 
both ROA and Q-ratio. This is consistent with corporate governance theories. In relation to 
agency and resource dependence theories, the presence of independent directors may 
improve the effectiveness of board monitoring and increase firm performance (Berle and 
Means, 1932; Fama, 1980). In addition, managerial signalling theory predicts that the 
presence of independent directors could reduce asymmetric information and thus attract 
potential investors (Black et al., 2006b). Third, board size and frequency of board meetings 
are reported to have a negative relationship with ROA and a significantly positive 
relationship with Q-ratio. This suggests that large boards and frequent board meetings are 
not essential in improving accounting returns. This is consistent with Weir and Laing 
(2000) and Jiraporn et al. (2009), who suggest that the board of directors is not required to 
participate in a firm’s routine activities but should draw up the firm’s strategies and 
policies. On the other hand, large board size and a high number of board meetings send a 
signal to investors regarding the effectiveness of the board of directors. This explains the 
positive relationship obtained between both board size and frequent board meetings and Q-
ratio.  
Fourth, the results show a difference in the influence of board sub-committees on 
ROA and Q-ratio. For instance, the results reveal that board sub-committees have a 
positive and statistically significant relationship with firm profitability, but a negative and 
insignificant relationship with firm value. This significant positive relationship with ROA 
is in line with corporate governance codes, such as the Cadbury Report and the SCGC, 
which recommend listed firms establish at least three committees: audit, remuneration and 
nomination committees. Finally, contrary to the theoretical expectation of agency theory, 
the OLS regression results show that director ownership is positively and significantly 
related to both ROA and Q-ratio.  
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7.2.2.2   Empirical Results of the Compliance-Index Model 
As explained in Chapters Three and Five, the compliance-index model uses a 
constructed corporate governance index. This model helps in examining the influence of 
corporate governance as a set of provisions on firm performance. This model aims to 
answer the fifth research sub-question: What is the relationship between compliance with 
the 2006 SCGC and firm financial performance? In this study, the Saudi Corporate 
Governance Index (SCGI) was constructed, consisting of 65 governance provisions 
derived from the Saudi governance code. Results from the multivariate OLS regression 
examining the relationship between the SCGI and firm financial performance are discussed 
in the following subsections.  
 
i)  OLS regression findings based on accounting measure ROA  
The fifteenth hypothesis predicts that the relationship between the SCGI and ROA 
is positive and statistically significant. Panel A of Table 7.8 reports that the coefficient is 
positive at the 5% level of significance. Agency theory suggests that compliance with 
corporate governance standards improves internal control systems and board performance 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Harrison, 1987; Klein, 1998; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). 
This reduces agency costs and consequently improves firm financial performance (Haniffa 
and Hudaib, 2006; Solomon, 2010). Also, managerial signalling theory suggests that 
improvement of corporate governance standards can lead to reduced asymmetric 
information and market uncertainty (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). From a resource 
dependence theory perspective, it can be argued that good corporate governance practices 
lead to a better board’s composition. This helps firms to acquiring financial and non-
financial resources (Pfeffer, 1972; Pearce and Zahra, 1992). This positive relationship is 
consistent with prior studies on corporate governance; for example, Bauer et al. (2010) and 
Giroud and Mueller (2011) examine the relationship between a constructed corporate 
governance index and ROA among US firms. They find that good corporate governance 
practices are positively associated with firm performance.  
Similarly, Clacher et al. (2008) develop an index derived from the 2003 Combined 
Code and report a positive relationship. Klapper and Love (2004), Renders et al. (2010) 
and Munisi and Randoy (2013) use a cross-country sample to investigate this relationship 
in developing countries. All report a positive coefficient between the level of compliance 
with corporate governance standards and ROA. In addition, Tariq and Abbas (2013) find a 
positive relationship between corporate governance practices and ROA among 119 
Pakistani firms. 
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As discussed in relation to the equilibrium-variable model, year and industry 
dummy variables are included to examine the relationship between corporate governance 
index and firm financial performance. The findings are consistent with those obtained from 
the equilibrium-variable model, which reveal that type of industry exerts a more significant 
influence on ROA than year dummies. Since there are many year and industry dummy 
variables employed, for brevity, their coefficients are not reported in Table 7.8. 
Finally, as shown in Panel A of Table 7.8, the F-value is 15.434, which is 
significant at the 1% level of significance, leading us to reject the null hypothesis. This 
suggests that most of the variables used in this model have jointly significant explanatory 
power in explaining variations in firm financial performance when measured by ROA. On 
the other hand, the table shows that the adjusted R
2
 for the full sample is 31.7%. This 
finding is consistent with studies which use a corporate governance index to examine the 
impact of corporate governance mechanisms on financial performance. 
For example, Giroud and Mueller (2011) find an adjusted R
2
 of 32% in a sample of 
3,241 firms in the US. Also, Tariq and Abbas (2013) report an adjusted R
2 
of 41% in a 
sample of 119 Pakistani firms. However, Klapper and Love (2004), Bruno and Claessens 
(2010) and Renders et al. (2010) use cross-country samples and find adjusted R
2
 results of 
20%, 20% and 18%, respectively.
60
  
 
ii)  OLS regression findings based on market measure Q-ratio 
The relationship between the SCGI and Q-ratio is hypothesised to be positive. 
Panel B in Table 7.8 shows that there is no significant relationship between the SCGI and 
Q-ratio. More precisely, the correlation coefficient is very low and insignificant. This 
means that the hypothesis that there is a significant positive relationship between good 
corporate governance practices and firm value is rejected. The theoretical expectation in 
corporate governance literature suggests a positive relationship between good corporate 
governance practices and firm value (Solomon, 2010). However, this may not apply to the 
Saudi stock market. As discussed in Chapter Nine, there are three main reasons that can 
explain the lack of a relationship between the SCGI and Q-ratio in the Saudi stock market: 
(i) the presence of a high volume of speculative trading; (ii) the dominance of individual 
investors over institutional investment; and (iii) the low number of listed firms, which 
limits the options for trading for investors. Chapter Nine discussed in detail the key 
stakeholders’ perceptions of the relationship between corporate governance and firm value 
in the Saudi stock market. 
                                                 
60
 These studies include Asian countries and other developing countries, but do not include Saudi Arabia. 
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Table 7.8: OLS regression findings of the compliance-index model (CIM) based on both accounting measure (ROA) and market measure (Q-ratio)  
Model 
Expect-
ed Sign 
All firms years 
Yearly estimations 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Panel A: CIM -ROA   
   Saudi CG Index (SCGI) +
 .239 (.016)** .513(.095)*   .032(.929)   .166(.597)   .254(.339)   .244(.456)   .003(.994)   .412(.167) 
 Control Variables           
  Firm size + .056 (.300)   -.105(.673)   .349(.250)   .120(.653)   -.178(.495)   -.105(.765)   -.084(.834)   .205(.492) 
  Leverage +/- - .179(.023)
**   -.189(.341)   -.311(.215)   -.257(.246)   .356(.069)*   .287(.361)   .012(.973)   -.578(.033)** 
  Firm growth + .255(.000)
***   .176(.338)   .343(.085)*   .449(.047)**   .448(.006)***   .248(.221)   .576(.012)**   -.061(.692) 
  Capital expenditure +/- -.105(.068)
 *   .256(..064)*   -.170(.467)   .125(.495)   -.258(.155)   -.560(.022)**   -.192(.446)   -.171(.375) 
  Dividends +/- .588(.000)
***   .508(.068)*   .551(.066)*   .546(.041)**   .859(.002)***   .556(.051)*   .500(.215)   .657(.044)** 
   Industry dummies      Included Included Included Included    Included Included Included Included 
  Year dummies      Included Included Included Included    Included Included Included Included 
Constant        1.606
*** 1.948*** 1.549*** 1.592*** 1.651*** 1.897*** 2.077*** 0.856** 
Durbin-Watson statistics         0.654 2.120 2.055 1.884 1.790 2.091 1.705 1.747 
F- value  15.434
*** 4.489*** 3.404*** 3.756*** 5.052*** 4.083*** 2.731*** 3.104*** 
R
2
/Adjusted R
2
  31.7% 34.6% 26.7% 29.5% 38.1% 31.9% 20.8% 24.2% 
No. of observations  560 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Panel B: CIM –Q-ratio         
   Saudi CG Index (SCGI) + -.092 (.152) -.358 (.128) -.116 (.804) -.100 (.677) -.110 (.598) .019 (.864) .038 (.796) .143 (345) 
 Control Variables           
  Firm size + -.352(.000)
*** .133 (.490) -.755(.061)* - .452(.029)** -.673(.002)*** -.258(.035)** -.628(.000)*** - .337(.029)** 
  Leverage +/- -.284(.000)
*** -.541(.001)*** - .976(.004)*** -.074 (.659) .004 (.982) .040 (.709) .007 (.963) -.044 (.746) 
  Firm growth + -.026(.301) .248 (.081)
* .127 (.626) -.168 (.324) -.023(.857) .082 (.239) .035 (.697) -.080 (.308) 
  Capital expenditure +/- .077(.088)
* .228 (.079)* .006 (.984) -.061 (.662) .040(.778) -.033 (.688) .063 (.535) .017 (.864) 
  Dividends +/- -.052(.275) -.097 (.647) -.273 (.484) -.066 (.741) .064(.759) .217(.065)
* .221 (.088)* .184 (.262) 
   Industry dummies  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
   Year dummies  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant  2.067
*** 1.145*** 3.635*** 1.426*** 1.594*** 0.596*** 0.877*** 0.530** 
Durbin-Watson statistics  1.304 2.395 2.174 1.549 1.513 1.900 2.017 2.205 
F- value  39.821
*** 2.873*** 4.106*** 2.528*** 3.226*** 1.274 3.176*** 1.900** 
R
2
/Adjusted R
2
  55.6% 22.2% 32.1% 18.8% 25.3% 4.0% 24.8% 12.0% 
No. of observations  560 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Chapter Five provides a detailed definition of the measurement method of all the 
variables used for the estimation. To avoid the dummy variable trap, 2005 and 2009 are excluded from regression analysis as year dummy variables in ROA and Q-ratio model respectively. The 
customer service industry is excluded from the ROA and Q-ratio models, respectively.  
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Regardless of the theoretical explanation suggesting a positive relationship, the 
finding in this study is consistent with a number of studies conducted on both developed 
and developing countries. For instance, Klein et al. (2005), Gupta et al. (2009) and Bozec 
et al. (2010) report no significant relationship between their constructed corporate 
governance index and Q-ratio in Canadian firms. Similarly, Price et al. (2011) develop a 
corporate governance index based on Mexico’s corporate governance code and find that 
the index shows no significant relationship with Q-ratio among 107 Mexican listed firms. 
Consistent with the equilibrium-variable model, year and industry dummy variables were 
employed. The result indicates that there are significant differences in Q-ratio values 
across years and industries. Since there are many year and industry dummy variables 
employed, for brevity, their coefficients are not reported in Table 7.8. 
Finally, the regression model reports that the F-value is 39.821 and significant at 
the 1% level of significance. In addition, the adjusted R
2
 is 55.6%, indicating that 
approximately 56% of the variations in Q-ratio can be explained by the model. This 
finding is consistent with previous studies on corporate governance. For example, Daines 
et al. (2010) use four governance indices to examine their relationship with Q-ratio. They 
find an adjusted R
2
 between 57% and 66% in US firms. Similarly, Beiner et al. (2006) 
report an adjusted R
2
 of 42% among firms in Switzerland. In developing countries, Black 
et al. (2006a and b) and Garay and Gonzalez (2008) find an adjusted R
2
 of 33%, 68% and 
35% for Korean, Russian and Venezuelan samples, respectively.  
 
iii) Comparison of ROA and Q-ratio results 
As shown in Panels C and D in Table 7.5, the OLS regression shows that good 
corporate governance practices, proxied by the SCGI, are significantly and positively 
related to ROA, but have no significant relationship with Q-ratio. As discussed in the 
literature on corporate governance, compliance with corporate governance standards 
improves both firm profitability and firm value. This is not the case among Saudi listed 
firms in terms of firm value. However, these findings are consistent with a number of prior 
studies on both developed and developing countries where a constructed governance index 
was used. For example, Black et al. (2006a) report that corporate governance standards are 
positively related to firm value and not related to firm performance. Bauer et al. (2004) 
find that firm financial performance has an inverse relationship with good governance 
practices, and a positive relationship with firm value. In contrast, Ikaheimo et al. (2011) 
report that the constructed governance index is positively related to financial performance, 
though negatively related to firm value. Munisi and Randoy (2013) use a multi-
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dimensional performance framework to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance practices and firm performance. They find that corporate governance practices 
are positively related with ROA and negatively related with Q-ratio. 
 
7.2.3 The Results of a Comparison of Equilibrium-Variable and Compliance-Index 
Models 
 As discussed in Chapter Five and Subsection 7.2.2, this study used two different 
models to examine the relationship between corporate governance and financial 
performance: (i) the equilibrium-variable model; and (ii) the compliance-index model. 
While the equilibrium-variable model employed eight corporate governance mechanisms, 
the compliance-index model used a constructed corporate governance index consisting of 
65 provisions as measures of corporate governance practices. The following subsection 
compares the findings obtained from these two models.  
First, Panel A of Table 7.9 shows that the equilibrium-variable model is better at 
explaining the ROA than the compliance index model. The adjusted R
2
 is 51.4%, whereas 
for the compliance-index model it is 31.7%. Additionally, the F-value is 26.654 in the 
equilibrium-variable model, and 15.434 in the compliance-index model, with similar 
Durbin-Watson values. Panels B, C, D, E, F, G and H in Table 7.9 show the comparisons 
based on the fully specified model based on yearly estimations. The equilibrium-variable 
model shows a higher adjusted R
2
 value and F-value than the values in the compliance-
index model.   
Second, regarding the relationship between corporate governance and firm value 
measured by Q-ratio, Panel A shows that there is a relative convergence in adjusted R
2 
among the equilibrium-variable model and the compliance-index model. Precisely, the 
adjusted R
2
 is 55.6% in the compliance-index model and 58.3% in the equilibrium-variable 
model. The convergence in R
2 
implies that the six variables used (CEO duality, proportion 
of independent directors, board size, frequency of board meetings, board sub-committees 
and director ownership) significantly explain the changes in corporate governance 
behaviour and their impact on firm value. Therefore, both the equilibrium-variable model 
and the compliance-index model have similar explanatory power in evaluating the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm value. Based on the 
yearly estimations in Panels B, C, D, E, F, G and H, the adjusted R
2
 in
 
the equilibrium-
variable model is better than that of the compliance-index model in analysing the 
relationship between corporate governance and Q-ratio. 
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Table 7.9: Comparison of the financial performance models used 
Models 
Equilibrium -variable model Compliance-index model 
ROA Q-ratio ROA Q-ratio 
Panel A: All firms including 
control variables 
    
  Adjusted R
2 
 51.4% 58.3% 31.7% 55.6% 
  F-value 26.654
***
 34.442
***
 15.434
***
 39.821
***
 
  Durbin-Watson statistics 0.676 1.388 0.654 1.304 
Panel B: 2004 all firms     
  Adjusted R
2 
 45.4% 24.0% 34.6% 22.2% 
  F-value 4.859
***
 2.465
***
 4.489
***
 2.873
***
 
  Durbin-Watson statistics 2.020 2.249 2.120 2.395 
Panel C: 2005 all firms     
  Adjusted R
2 
 43.0% 35.0% 26.7% 32.1% 
  F-value 4.504
***
 3.503
***
 3.404
***
 4.106
***
 
  Durbin-Watson statistics 2.215 2.188 2.055 2.174 
Panel D: 2006 all firms     
  Adjusted R
2 
 51.8% 34.7% 29.5% 18.8% 
  F-value 5.990
***
 3.469
***
 3.756
***
 2.528
***
 
  Durbin-Watson statistics 2.060 1.740 1.884 1.549 
Panel E: 2007 all firms     
  Adjusted R
2 
 55.7% 34.4% 38.1% 25.3% 
  F-value 6.853
***
 3.436
***
 5.052
***
 3.226
***
 
  Durbin-Watson statistics 2.015 1.810 1.790 1.513 
Panel F: 2008 all firms     
  Adjusted R
2 
 45.6% 12.7% 31.9% 4.0% 
  F-value 4.903
***
 1.678
*
 4.083
***
 1.274 
  Durbin-Watson statistics 2.223 1.968 2.091 1.900 
Panel G: 2009 all firms     
  Adjusted R
2 
 46.3% 27.1% 20.8% 24.8% 
  F-value 5.014
***
 2.725
***
 2.731
***
 3.176
***
 
  Durbin-Watson statistics 1.918 2.033 1.705 2.017 
Panel H: 2010 all firms     
  Adjusted R
2 
 41.7% 10.2% 24.2% 12.0% 
  F-value 4.330
***
 1.530 3.104
***
 1.900
**
 
  Durbin-Watson statistics 1.790 2.241 1.747 2.205 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
  
To summarise the above discussion, the equilibrium-variable model clearly shows 
greater explanatory power than the compliance-index model for the relationship between 
corporate governance practices and accounting returns. However, the equilibrium-variable 
and compliance-index models have the same explanatory power in explaining the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm value. Hence, there is no ideal 
methodology to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
financial performance. Therefore, this study employed these two models to provide deeper 
insight into the varying effects of using different methods.  
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7.3  ROBUSTNESS IN FINDINGS AND ENDOGENEITY  
This section presents the sensitivity analysis, particularly with regards to potential 
endogeneity problems. Subsection 7.3.1 reports the robustness of the main results and 
Subsection 7.3.2 provides a discussion relating to potential endogeneity problems.  
 
7.3.1 Robustness of the Main Results 
 The results from the voluntary corporate governance disclosure and the 
compliance-index models are tested to check whether they are robust. In line with the 
recent literature (e.g., Henry, 2008; Ammann et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2012a and b), this 
study uses four different tests: (i) estimating the voluntary corporate governance disclosure 
pre- and post-2006, when the Saudi Corporate Governance (SCGC) was introduced; (ii) 
using weighted index of the SCGI; (iii) using sub-indices of the SCGI; and (iv) running 
firm level fixed-effects. First, as discussed in Chapter Five, the sample period covers the 
years 2004 to 2010, inclusive. The SCGC was introduced in 2006. This study attempts to 
explore whether there are differences in the results with respect to the period under 
investigation. Therefore, the regressions model is re-estimated by splitting the sample into 
two sub-samples: pre-2006 (from 2004 to 2005) and post-2006 (from 2006 to 2010).  
 Table 7.10 shows the robustness test results for the voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure model. Models II and III reveal that the results are different in terms of the 
impact of corporate governance mechanisms on corporate disclosure pre- and post-2006. 
Specifically, the post-2006 ownership structure variables are marginally significant, and 
the pre-2006 ones are more significant. The coefficients of block ownership and director 
ownership are statistically significant at 1% in the pre-2006 period, while they are 
significant at 10% in the post-2006 period. Furthermore, institutional ownership has a 
positive and significant effect on voluntary corporate governance disclosure after the 
release of the corporate governance code.  
The sign of the coefficient on board size, however, changes. In this regard, the 
result seems to suggest a negative and significant relationship between voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure and board size pre-2006, and a positive and significant effect post-
2006. In addition, audit firm size has a positive and significant influence on good corporate 
governance practices. A practical implication of this finding is the increase in the 
awareness of the importance of audit firms in improving the quality of disclosed 
information.   
 Additionally, the coefficients of firm characteristics (control variables) show 
different levels of significance. For example, capital expenditure and dividends are 
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statistically significant in the pre-2006 period but insignificant in the post-2006 period with 
a changing sign. In addition, there are variations in the signs of coefficients of firm size, 
with stability in the level of significance. This indicates that the relationship between these 
variables and corporate governance mechanisms varies, depending on whether they are 
measured before or after the introduction of the 2006 SCGC. 
Table 7.11 presents the results from examining the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm financial performance before and after the introduction of SCGC in 
2006 for the compliance-index model. Panel A reports the results obtained from using 
ROA as an accounting measure. Specifically, Models II and III show a variation in the 
results based on the sample period. The SCGI is positively and significantly related to 
ROA post-2006 at the 5% level of compliance (P-value is .024), whereas it was significant 
before the introduction of the SCGC in 2006 at the 10% level of compliance (P-value is 
.094). This implies that the improvement in corporate governance practices led to 
improved financial performance.  
 
Table 7.10: Robustness analysis of the  impact of board characteristics and ownership structure at the extent of 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure 
 Model Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
Independent Variable 
Main-index- 
SCGI Pre-2006  Post-2006  Weighted-SCGI  Fixed-effects   
Board of Directors’ Characteristics 
  Independent Directors -.187 (.006)*** -.001 (.460) -.273 (.006)
*** -.158 (.014)** .088 (.300) 
  Board Size .206 (.009)*** -.047 (.000)
*** .319 (.006)*** .213 (.005)*** .007 (.489) 
  Audit Firm Size .341 (.012)** .018 (.200) .308 (.037)
 ** .199 (.043)** -.019 (.456) 
  CG Committee .273 (.006)*** .194 (.007)*** .352 (.014)** 1.061 (.000)*** .399 (.008)*** 
Ownership Structure           
  Government Ownership  .526 (.002)*** .074 (.012)
** .716 (.002)*** .455 (.005)*** .001 (.500) 
  Institutional Ownership .194 (.063) * .028 (.107) .233 (.093)
* .136 (.132) 1.246 (.006) *** 
  Block Ownership -.267 (.068) * -.086 (.005)
*** -.321 (.099)* -.148 (.196) -.602 (.135) 
  Director ownership .186 (.048) ** .077 (.000)
*** .234 (.070)* .057 (.305) .375 (.207) 
Control Variables:           
  Firm size -.353 (.010)*** .052 (.023)
** -.517 (.009)*** -.280 (.028)** -.299 (.214) 
  Leverage .160 (.063)* .031 (.039)
** .217 (.084)* .167 (.049)** .026 (.430) 
  Firm growth .021 (.385) .014 (.155) .018 (.425) .043 (.264) .015 (.411) 
  Capital expenditure .048 (.273) -.027 (.038)
** .054 (.317) .059 (.223) .160 (.047)* * 
  Divid. payment status -.076 (.265) .055 (.006)
*** -.138 (.214) .063 (.294) -.193 (.099) * 
   Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
   Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
   Firm dummies Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Included 
Constant 1.812*** 0.374*** 2.272*** 1.786*** 4.400** 
Durbin-Watson statistics 0.975 1.677 1.023 1.099 1.199 
F- value 18.206*** 4.548
***
 9.965
***
 23.057
***
 8.931
***
 
Adjusted R
2
 43.5% 30.9% 34.1% 49.7% 58.2% 
No. of observations 560 160 400 560 560 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Chapter Five 
provides a detailed definition of the measurement method of all of the variables.  
 
However, Panel B shows that the relationship between corporate governance 
practices proxied by the SCGI and Q-ratio remains insignificant, but the magnitude of the 
229 
 
coefficient increases. Quantitatively, the coefficient is -0.210 in Model II (pre-2006 
period), and increases to -0.018 in Model III (post-2006 period). In addition, it can be seen 
from the table that there are also variations in the magnitude and significance of the 
estimated coefficients of the control variables. From this, one can conclude that there 
seems to be an improvement in the level of compliance with the corporate governance 
code, which led to improved firm financial performance. 
Second, as discussed in Chapters Five and Six, the Saudi Corporate Governance 
Index (SCGI) consists of four sub-indices. Each sub-index has a different number of 
provisions, and also varies in the weights assigned to each sub-index: board of directors 
(54%); disclosure and transparency (25%); internal control and risk management (9%); and 
the rights of shareholders and the general assembly (12%). The weighted SCGI was 
constructed to ascertain whether the main results are robust to the weighting in these four 
sub-indices. Following Beiner et al. (2006), each index is awarded an equal weight of 25%. 
Model IV of Table 7.10 presents the weighted SCGI used in the voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure model. In terms of board characteristics, the results show 
that there is no significant difference between the estimated coefficients of the un-weighted 
index (Model I) and the weighted index (Model IV). Specifically, independent directors, 
board size, audit firm size and presence of corporate governance committee are found to be 
unchanged in terms of the level of statistical significance and the signs of the estimated 
coefficients. The results from the weighted and un-weighted index models reveal slight 
variations, particularly with respect to the ownership variables, including institutional 
ownership, block ownership and director ownership. Government ownership remains 
relatively similar in terms of the significance and magnitude of the estimated coefficients 
in these two models. Of the control variables, all variables except dividends are similar in 
the weighted and un-weighted indices. 
Similarly, a weighted index was used with the compliance-index model for 
estimating the relationship between corporate governance practices and each of ROA and 
Q-ratio. Models I and IV of Panel A of Table 7.11 show that there is a fair similarity in 
relation to the significance and magnitude of the coefficients in both the weighted and un-
weighted indices. Specifically, the coefficient on the SCGI relating to ROA is positive at 
the 5% level of significance in these two models. Also, the control variables remain 
unchanged in terms of the level of statistical significance and the signs of the estimated 
coefficients. On the other hand, the adjusted R
2
 and F-value show some degree of 
similarity (31.7% and 15.434 at the 1% level of significance for the un-weighted index, 
and 31.3% and 15.151 at the 1% level of significance for the weighted index). 
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Table 7.11: The effect of corporate governance practices on firm financial performance: Fixed-Effect 
regressions  
Compliance-Index 
Model Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
 Panel A: Accounting 
return ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
  SCGI .239  (.016)**         
  SCGI Pre-2006   .298 (.094)*       
  SCGI Post-2006     .259 (.024)**     
  Weighted-SCGI       .124 (.036)**   
  Firm Fixed-effects           .107 (.132) 
Control Variables: 
  Firm size .056  (.300) .090 (.315) -.006 (.483) .064 (.275) .284 (.135) 
  Leverage - .179 (.023)** -.253 (.049)** -.110 (.167) -.164 (.034)** -.482 (.000)*** 
  Firm growth  .255 (.000)*** .222 (.040)** .281 (.000)*** .259 (.000)*** .225 (.000)*** 
  Capital expenditure  -.105 (.068)* -.093 (.242) -.170 (.024)** -.103 (.072)* -.043 (.256) 
  Divid. payment status  .588 (.000)*** .499 (.005)*** .646 (.000)*** .591 (.000)*** .287 (.003)*** 
   Industry dummies   Included Included Included Included Included 
   Year dummies   Included Included Included Included Included 
   Firm dummies   Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Included 
Constant 1.606*** 1.731*** 1.489*** 1.580*** 0.714** 
Durbin-Watson 
statistics 
0.654 1.309 0.634 0.644 1.482 
F- value 15.434*** 7.240*** 12.559*** 15.151*** 15.413*** 
Adjusted R2 31.7% 33.8% 31.7% 31.3% 70.1% 
No. of observations 560 160 400 560 560 
Panel B: Firm value Q-ratio Q-ratio Q-ratio Q-ratio Q-ratio 
  SCGI -.092  (.152)         
  SCGI Pre-2006   -.210 (.220)       
  SCGI Post-2006     -.018 (.402)     
  Weighted-SCGI       -.139 (.062)*   
  Firm Fixed-effects           -.038 (.352) 
Control Variables:           
  Firm size  -.352 (.000)*** -.281 (.106) -.457 (.000)*** -.346 (.000)*** -.862 (.000)*** 
  Leverage  -.284 (.000)*** -.759 (.000)*** -.001 (.496) -.287 (.000)*** -.250 (.009) ***  
  Firm growth  -.026 (.301) .128 (.199) -.044 (.152) -.026 (.303) -.039 (.205) 
  Capital expenditure  .077 (.088)* .072 (.326) .002 (.483) .077 (.086)* .014 (.416) 
  Divid. payment status  -.052 (.275) -.224 (.168) .125 (.049) ** -.042 (.312) -.123 (.124) 
   Industry dummies   Included Included Included Included Included 
   Year dummies   Included Included Included Included Included 
   Firm dummies   Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Included 
Constant 2.067*** 1.263*** 0.949*** 2.057*** 1.451*** 
Durbin-Watson 
statistics 
1.304 1.995 0.892 1.305 1.945 
F- value 39.821*** 12.321*** 15.533*** 39.990*** 13.902*** 
Adjusted R2 55.6% 48.1% 36.8% 55.7% 67.7% 
No. of observations 560 160 400 560 560 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Chapter Five 
provides a detailed definition of the measurement method of all the used variables. 
 
The weighted index used to examine firm value is different from the main model. 
From Models I and IV of Panel B in Table 7.11, the results show slight changes in the level 
of significance, though the direction remains the same (negative with Q-ratio). In addition, 
the control variables used in both models display great similarity in terms of the estimated 
coefficients and the fit, as well as the joint explanatory powers of the models. The great 
similarity in results obtained from the compliance-index model support the validity and 
reliability of the constructed index (see Sekaran, 2003; Hassan and Marston, 2010).   
231 
 
Third, as discussed above, the constructed corporate governance index consists of 
four sub-indices constituting 65 provisions.
61
 These are: board of directors (BOD), with 35 
provisions, disclosure and transparency (DAT), with 16 provisions, internal control and risk 
management (IRM), with 6 provisions, and rights of shareholders and general assembly 
(ROS), with 8 provisions. The main results suggest that cross-sectional variations in the 
constructed index can be explained by the explanatory variables. Since the SCGI contains 
different categories, it is possible to develop a link between each category and the 
explanatory variables. This helps to ensure whether the relationships between the sub-
indices and the explanatory variables show convergence. Therefore, Equation 1 in Chapter 
Five, examining the factors influencing voluntary corporate governance disclosure, is re-
formulated to replace the SCGI with BOD, DAT, IRM and ROS.  
 
Noticeably, the findings from the four indices examining the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and corporate disclosure in Models I to IV in Table 7.12 
are relatively similar, thereby suggesting that the previous results relating to the SCGI are 
robust. As shown in Table 7.12, the significance and magnitude of the coefficients of board 
characteristics and ownership structure in the four indices are moderately similar, except in 
                                                 
61
 Table 5.3 in Chapter Five provides a full list of the Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) provisions 
derived mainly from the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC). 
Table 7.12: The impact of board characteristics and ownership structure on the extent of voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance practices 
 Model Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 Independent Variable BOD sub-index DAT sub-index IRM sub-index ROS sub-index. 
Board of Directors’ 
Characteristics 
 
  Independent Directors -.201 (.005)** -.108 (.067)* -.068 (.135) -.147 (.007)*** 
  Board Size .198 (.013)** .054 (.257) -.035 (.312) .033 (.316) 
  Audit Firm Size .229 (.032)** .141 (.110) .168 (.045)** .038 (.344) 
  Presence of CG Committee -.006 (.483) .101 (.217) 1.649 (.000)*** .069 (.258) 
Ownership Structure         
  Government Ownership  .405 (.015)** .463 (.004)*** -.003 (.493) .317 (.015)** 
  Institutional Ownership .195 (.067)* .350 (.002)*** .016 (.441) -.085 (.201) 
  Block Ownership -.280 (.064)* -.575 (.000)*** .070 (.318) .044 (.379) 
  Director ownership .228 (.027)** .314 (.003)*** -.137 (.075)* -.195 (.017)** 
Control Variables:         
  Firm size -.360 (.011)** .055 (.352) .013 (.459) .268 (.014)** 
  Leverage .182 (.045)** -.099 (.162) .083 (.168) -.088 (.147) 
  Firm growth .049 (.248) .131 (.026) ** .008 (.447) .029 (.301) 
  Capital expenditure -.036 (.332) .184 (.009)** .080 (.112) -.162 (.006)*** 
   Dividends -.083 (.252) -.067 (.283) .232 (.010)* ** .098 (.156) 
   Industry dummies Included Included Included Included 
   Year dummies Included Included Included Included 
Constant 1.832*** 1.856*** 1.684*** 1.566*** 
Durbin-Watson statistics 1.025 1.099 1.314 1.204 
F- value 15.034*** 16.304*** 28.653*** 7.813*** 
Adjusted R2 38.6% 40.6% 55.3% 23.4% 
No. of observations 560 560 560 560 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variables 
are defined as follows: Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI), board of directors sub-index (BOD), disclosure and 
transparency sub-index (DAT), internal control and risk management sub-index (IRM) and rights of shareholders and the 
general assembly sub-index (ROS). Chapter Five provides a detailed definition of the measurement method of all the 
variables used. 
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Model III. Also, the control variables show slight differences based on the index used. 
Furthermore, the adjusted R
2
 falls between about 39% and 55%, excepting Model IV, at 
23%. Table 7.13 shows the relationship between firm financial performance and the sub-
indices. Regarding the accounting returns, Panel A, which reports the sub-indices, shows 
that the ROA remains positive and significant, with the exception of the estimated 
coefficient on DAT. Also, the control variables show similar magnitudes and signs over 
the four indices. 
Panel B also shows negative relationship between the firm value measured by Q-
ratio and the four sub-indices. Apart from the coefficients on DAT and IRM, the other 
indices remain insignificant in relation to Q-ratio. Additionally, the control variables show 
a convergence in direction and magnitude for all four indices. Also, the adjusted R
2
 for the 
four models are largely similar, equal to about 55%. The results show the stability and 
robustness in the relationship between the sub-indices and financial performance.  
Finally, voluntary corporate governance disclosure and firm performance may be 
determined by unobserved firm-specific characteristics (Henry, 2008; Ntim et al., 2012a). 
The panel data is used to run the fixed-effects model for possible unobserved firm-specific 
heterogeneity. This is done by constructing 79 dummies to represent 80 sampled firms. 
Model V of Table 7.10 shows the re-estimation of the voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure model using a fixed-effects model. This model shows that the magnitudes of the 
estimated coefficients are different in comparison with Model I (main-index SCGI). Whilst 
the proportion of independent directors, board size and audit firm size were significant in 
the main model, they become insignificant in the firm fixed-effects model. The control 
variables show a slight similarity between the main model and the fixed-effects model. 
This suggests that the findings are statistically sensitive to the potential unobserved firm-
specific heterogeneity in voluntary corporate governance disclosure.  
However, coefficients in the compliance-index model (Model I in Table 7.11) are 
relatively similar to the firm fixed-effects results (Model V). Particularly, Panel A of Table 
7.11 reports that the firm fixed-effects model is positively but not significantly related to 
ROA. The control variables, on the other hand, are largely the same in the two models. 
Similarly, the firm fixed-effects model in Panel B shows a slight stability in coefficients 
using Q-ratio. Also, the control variables are similar in their significance and magnitude of 
the estimated coefficients in the two models. 
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To conclude, the sensitivity tests show that the results are robust. For testing, the 
sample was split into two sub-samples: the pre- and post-2006 periods. The findings 
suggest that the introduction of the 2006 code helped improve corporate governance 
practices. The use of the weighted index shows that the results remain the same. 
Additionally, replacing the SCGI with the four sub-indices generally shows similar results 
to those of the main model. Nonetheless, the results obtained through the firm fixed-effects 
model suggest the presence of unobserved firm-specific characteristics. 
 
7.3.2 Endogeneity Problems  
When using a multiple regression model, endogeneity is said to occur if the 
dependent and explanatory variables have a high correlation with the error term (van Lent, 
Table 7.13: The impact of corporate governance practices on firm financial performance: Fixed- Effect 
regressions  
Compliance-Index Model Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 Panel A: Accounting return ROA ROA ROA ROA 
  BOD sub-index .245 (.008)***       
  DAT sub-index   -.057 (.294)     
  IRM sub-index     .240 (.011)**   
  ROS sub-index       .204 (.003)*** 
Control Variables:        
  Firm size .058 (.293) .082 (.219) .083 (.216) .025 (.407) 
  Leverage -.182 (.021)** -.161 (.037)** -.161 (.035)** -.147 (.050)** 
  Firm growth .258 (.000)*** .265 (.000)*** .260 (.000)*** .259 (.000)*** 
  Capital expenditure -.108 (.063)* -.101 (.076)* -.095 (.088)* -.084 (.117) 
   Dividends .598 (.000)*** .606 (.000)*** .625 (.000)*** .566 (.000)*** 
   Industry dummies Included Included Included Included 
   Year dummies Included Included Included Included 
Constant 1.539*** 1.541*** 1.519*** 1.582*** 
Durbin-Watson statistics 0.651 0.638 0.660 0.652 
F- value 15.533*** 15.075*** 15.488*** 15.678*** 
Adjusted R2 31.9% 31.2% 31.8% 32.1% 
No. of observations 560 560 560 560 
Panel B: Firm value Q-ratio Q-ratio Q-ratio Q-ratio 
  BOD sub-index -.011 (.449)       
  DAT sub-index   -.250 (.002)***     
  IRM sub-index     -.179 (.017)**   
  ROS sub-index       -.035 (.280) 
Control Variables:         
  Firm size -.360 (.000)*** -.334 (.000)*** -.356 (.000)*** -.369 (.000)*** 
  Leverage -.290 (.000)*** -.292 (.000)*** -.292 (.000)*** -.288 (.000)*** 
  Firm growth -.029 (.286) -.012 (.405) -.030 (.276) -.029 (.281) 
  Capital expenditure .076 (.090)* .080 (.077)* .081 (.076)* .079 (.083)* 
   Dividends -.058 (.251) -.052 (.270) -.043 (.309) -.065 (.228) 
   Industry dummies  Included  Included  Included Included 
   Year dummies  Included  Included  Included Included 
Constant 1.353*** 2.033*** 2.061*** 1.351*** 
Durbin-Watson statistics 1.306 1.325 1.303 1.309 
F- value 39.686*** 40.830*** 40.268*** 39.728*** 
Adjusted R2 55.5% 56.2% 55.8% 55.5% 
No. of observations 560 560 560 560 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variables 
are defined as follows: Return on assets (ROA), Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI), board of directors sub-index 
(BOD), disclosure and transparency sub-index (DAT), internal control and risk management sub-index (IRM) and rights 
of shareholders and the general assembly sub-index (ROS). Chapter Five  provides a detailed definition of the 
measurement method  of all the used variables. 
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2007; Ntim et al., 2012b). Ammann et al. (2011) indicate that endogeneity may pose a 
crucial problem in examining the effect of corporate governance on voluntary corporate 
governance, disclosure and firm financial performance. According to studies, there are 
three main factors that can cause endogeneity in the regression model: (i) measurement 
errors; (ii) omitted variables; and (iii) simultaneity (Chenhall and Moers, 2007; Ammann et 
al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2012b). Thus, endogeneity could be a threat if caused by a weak 
econometric model (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010). 
The causes of endogeneity are discussed below. First, the main cause of 
endogeneity is measurement errors (Borsch-Supan and Koke, 2002; Omar and Simon, 
2011). Regarding the corporate governance disclosure index, the explanatory variable may 
be endogenous if it cannot be adequately constructed. For example, measuring corporate 
governance disclosure by a developed index heavily focuses on financial disclosure rather 
than non-financial disclosure. Second, another cause is the omission of control variables; 
for example, unavailability of data (van Lent, 2007; Ntim et al., 2012b). Black et al. 
(2006a) point out that corporate governance is likely to correlate with economic variables; 
this makes the selection of control variables important in reducing omitted variables which 
may cause endogeneity. Third, simultaneity emerges when the explanatory variable is 
simultaneously determined by the dependent variable (Ghosh and Sirmans, 2005; Jo and 
Harjoto, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012b). An example is whether high CEO compensation leads 
to a firm showing good financial performance or vice versa; this suggests that high 
corporate profitability leads to high CEO compensation (Ghosh and Sirmans, 2005). 
Endogeneity can increase the bias in the results of the regression model (Chenhall 
and Moers, 2007; Larcker and Rusticus, 2010; Ammann et al., 2011; Jo and Harjoto, 
2011). It can be noted that existing studies do not discuss the problems of endogeneity 
adequately (Black et al., 2006a). This study, however, attempts to address the potential 
endogeneity problems. This helps to ensure the robustness and stability of the estimated 
coefficients. In this regard, and in line with Larcker and Rusticus (2010) and Ntim et al. 
(2012b), this study used alternative approaches of statistical and econometric methods to 
check the endogeneity problems. First, one of the statistical methods is to use cross-
sectional and time-series data. Borsch-Supan and Koke (2002) suggest that panel data 
helps solve the simultaneity problem. They state that “panel data can provide instruments 
that are not available in cross-sectional data” (Borsch-Supan and Koke, 2002, p.301). 
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Also, in line with Black et al. (2006a), the study uses a set of control variables to reduce 
the problem caused by omitted variables.
62
  
To mitigate the potential problem of measurement errors, the study follows two 
approaches: (i) constructing a broad composite governance index, which consists of 65 
corporate governance provisions; and (ii) using a governance index constructed by the 
researcher rather than analysts’ ratings. This enables the governance index to accurately 
measure corporate governance practices of Saudi firms.  
Second, this study follows recent studies in addressing endogeneity problems by 
using two econometric methods (e.g., Renders et al., 2010; Ammann et al., 2011; Ntim et 
al., 2012b). The first method is to use a lagged structure, which is considered appropriate 
to deal with omitted variables and simultaneity problems (Ammann et al., 2011; Ntim et 
al., 2012b). The second method is to use Instrumental Variable (IV), which deals with the 
potential problems caused by measurement errors and omitted variables (e.g., Black et al., 
2006a; Renders et al., 2010).  
 
7.3.2.1  Estimation of a Lagged Structure    
To address the potential omitted variables and simultaneity problems, the main 
models are re-estimated with a one-year lag between the dependent variables and the 
explanatory variables (e.g., Ntim et al., 2012b). This is because the dependent variables 
may also be influenced by the previous years’ corporate governance practices (the 
explanatory variables). For example, when the CEO and chairperson roles are split, this 
may not influence the governance practices and financial performance in the same year. 
Therefore, this sample excluded 2004 as the first year, thereby reducing the entire sample 
from 560 to 480 observations. This subsection reports and discusses the results obtained by 
estimating the lagged structure for the voluntary corporate governance disclosure model 
and firm financial performance models. The subsection is organised into three parts: (i) 
estimation of the lagged structure for the voluntary corporate governance disclosure model; 
(ii) estimation of the lagged structure for the equilibrium-variable model; and (iii) 
estimation of the lagged structure for the compliance-index model. 
 
i)  Lagged structure and voluntary corporate governance disclosure model  
Table 7.14 shows the comparison between results obtained from the lagged 
structure regression and main regression models (un-lagged) to examine the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and voluntary corporate governance 
                                                 
62
 This study used extensive data available from the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) database to select a 
number of control variables. 
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disclosure. More precisely, Panel A shows the statistical results obtained from an un-lagged 
structure model, while Panel B shows the results of the estimated lagged structure. The 
main equation presented in Chapter Five (Equation 1) of the voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure model is re-estimated and shown below: 
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 SCGI refers to the constructed corporate governance index derived from the Saudi 
Corporate Governance Code (SCGC). As discussed in Chapter Five and Section 7.2, the 
explanatory variables consist of two sets of variables: board characteristics and ownership 
structure. These variables are proportion of independent directors (INDD), board size 
(BSZ), audit firm size (AFZ), presence of corporate governance committee (GCC), 
government ownership (GONR), institutional ownership (IONR), block ownership (BONR) 
and director ownership (DONR). CONTROLS are control variables including firm size, 
leverage, firm growth, capital expenditure, dividends, and industry and year dummy 
variables. As the estimated lagged structure model depends on re-estimation by a one-year 
lag, the sample period has been reduced to six years (excluding 2004), representing 480 
observations. 
 As shown in Table 7.14, coefficients of explanatory variables in the un-lagged 
model have a similar significance and magnitude with the lagged structure estimation 
model. Specifically, board size, audit firm size, presence of corporate governance 
committee, government ownership, institutional ownership and director ownership are 
found to be positive and to have same level of significance. However, proportion of 
independent directors and block ownership have an inverse and statistically significant 
relationship with the SCGI. Concerning the control variables, the coefficients in both un-
lagged and lagged structures are relatively similar. Particularly, leverage has a positive and 
significant relationship with the SCGI in both models. In contrast, firm size shows a 
negative and significant relationship with the corporate governance index. The results 
show that firm growth and capital expenditure are positively but not significantly related, 
while dividends show a negative but insignificant relationship with the SCGI in both 
models.  
 The adjusted R
2
 shows slight variation between un-lagged and lagged structure 
models reported in Panels A and B in Table 7.14, respectively. Specifically, it is about 44% 
and 40% in the un-lagged and lagged structures, respectively. The F-value in the un-lagged 
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structure is 18.206 at the 1% level of significance. Similarly, the F-value is 14.076 at the 
1% level of significance in the estimated lagged structure. Therefore, the results show that 
there is relative similarity among the main regression model (un-lagged) and the estimated 
lagged structure model. This implies the robustness of the findings and also supports the 
results reported in Section 7.2, related to the voluntary corporate governance disclosure 
model.  
Table 7.14: Regression results of the estimated lagged stricture for the voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure model 
 Independent Variables 
Panel A: Main regression 
un-lagged structure 
Panel B: Estimation lagged 
structure regression 
Board of Directors’ Characteristics   
  Independent Directors -.187 (.006)*** -.221 (.006)
*** 
  Board Size .206 (.009)*** .247 (.006)
*** 
  Audit Firm Size .341 (.012)** .293 (.019)
** 
  Presence of CG Committee .273 (.006)*** . 344 (.009)
*** 
Ownership Structure     
  Government Ownership  .526 (.002)*** .604 (.001)
*** 
  Institutional Ownership .194 (.063) * .213 (.074)
* 
  Block Ownership -.267 (.068) * -.297 (.077)
* 
  Director ownership .186 (.048)* .210 (.058)
* 
Control Variables:    
  Firm size -.353 (.010) *** -.406 (.012)
** 
  Leverage .160 (.063)* .173 (.085)
* 
  Firm growth .021 (.385) .020 (.403) 
  Capital expenditure .048 (.273) .056 (.275) 
  Dividends -.076 (.265) -.111 (.216) 
   Industry dummies Included Included 
   Year dummies Included Included 
Constant 1.812*** 1.284*** 
Durbin-Watson statistics 0.975 0.992 
F- value 18.206*** 14.076*** 
Adjusted R
2
 43.5% 39.6% 
No. of observations 560 480 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
of significance, respectively. Chapter Five provides a detailed definition of the measurement method 
of all the used variables. Panel B introduced 2004 as a one year lag. To avoid the dummy variable, 
2009 is excluded as a dummy variable from Panel A, and 2005 is excluded from Panel B. In addition, 
the industry sector dummy variable is excluded from Panel A and Panel B. 
 
ii)  Lagged structure and equilibrium-variable model 
This subsection presents the findings from both the lagged and the un-lagged 
models to examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
financial performance using the equilibrium-variable model. Panel A of Table 7.15 shows 
the results based on the un-lagged structure, while Panel B shows the estimated lagged 
structure model. As shown below, the main equation presented in Chapter Five (Equation 
2) of the equilibrium-variable model for both accounting measure ROA and market 
measure Q-ratio is re-estimated as follows: 
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FP constitutes the firm financial performance measured by ROA, as an accounting-
based measure, and Q-ratio, as a market-based measure. The explanatory variables are 
corporate governance mechanisms. In particular, these variables include CEO duality 
(BDUAL), proportion of independent directors (INDD), corporate board size (BSZ), 
frequency of board meetings (BFM), presence of board sub-committees (BCOM) and 
director ownership (DONR). CONTROLS are control variables including firm size, 
leverage, firm growth, capital expenditure, dividends, and industry and year dummy 
variables.  
 First, Panels A and B report the findings obtained from the un-lagged and lagged 
structure models, respectively, to examine the influence of corporate governance 
mechanisms and ROA. Specifically, the results show an enormous similarity in statistical 
significance and magnitude. CEO duality, proportion of independent directors, presence of 
board sub-committees and director ownership show a positive and significant relationship 
with ROA in both models. However, board size is negatively and significantly related to 
ROA, while frequency of board meetings has no significant relationship with firm 
performance in both models. This means that the selected explanatory variables in both 
models show the same power and direction in their relationship with firm financial 
performance.  
 Excluding capital expenditure, the coefficients and magnitudes of control variables 
for un-lagged and lagged structure models seem to be similar. Specifically, leverage shows 
a significant and negative association with ROA in both models. However, firm size, firm 
growth and dividends show a significantly positive relationship with ROA. Capital 
expenditure is negative but not significantly related to ROA in the un-lagged structure 
model, while it is significantly and positively related to ROA in the lagged structure model.  
 The adjusted R
2
 is similar in both models. Panels A and B show that the R
2
 is 51% 
and 52% in the un-lagged and lagged structures, respectively. This implies that 51% of the 
variation can be explained by the examined variables. The F-value is 26.654 and 24.397 at 
the 1% level of significance in the un-lagged and lagged structures, respectively. This great 
similarity in the results shows that the obtained results in the main model are robust, and 
suggests that firms with high levels of compliance with corporate governance standards 
have higher financial performance measured by ROA. 
 Second, for Q-ratio, Panels A and B in Table 7.15 show that the results from the un-
lagged and lagged structure models are relatively similar. Regarding the explanatory 
variables, all variables except for CEO duality show similar coefficients and magnitudes. 
On the other hand, the control variables show a change in the magnitudes of the results for 
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firm size, leverage, firm growth and capital expenditure. There is slight similarity for the 
adjusted R
2
 between the un-lagged and lagged structure models. Specifically, the R
2
 in the 
un-lagged structure is about 58%, while it is 62% in the estimated lagged structure. The F-
value is 34.442 in the un-lagged structure model and 35.968 in the lagged structure model, 
both at the 1% level of significance. This offers further support for the robustness of the 
equilibrium-variable model.  
 
Table 7.15: Regression results of estimated lagged stricture for the equilibrium-variable model 
Independent Variables 
Panel A: Main regression results un-
lagged structure 
Panel B: Estimation lagged structure 
regression 
ROA Q-ratio ROA Q-ratio 
  CEO duality .016 (.022)** -.016 (.421) .023 (.005)
*** .011 (.452) 
  Independent Directors .008 (.068)* .106 (.020)
** .009 (.059)* .136 .(008)*** 
  Board Size -.025 (.000)*** .078 (.094)
* -.025 (.000)*** .057 (.188) 
  Frequency of board meetings -.003 (.295) . 200 (.000)
*** -.005 (.171) .209 (.000)*** 
  Board sub-committees .023 (.007)
*** -.110 (.113) .024 (.006)*** -.112 (.117) 
  Director ownership .027 (.000)*** .243 (.000)
*** .027 (.000)*** .236 (.000)*** 
Control Variables:        
  Firm size .027 (.002)*** .447 (.000)
*** .029 (.002)*** -.510 (.000)*** 
  Leverage -.033 (.000)*** .300 (.000)
*** -.034 (.000)*** -.227 (.003)*** 
  Firm growth .019 (.000)*** .034 (.244) .020 (.000)
*** -.073 (.083)* 
  Capital expenditure -.005 (.171) .030 (.297) -.008 (.088)
* -.009 (.446) 
  Dividends .059 (.000)*** -.075 (.190) .057 (.000)
*** -.044 (.318) 
   Industry dummies Included Excluded Included Included 
   Year dummies Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.134*** 1.342*** 0.143*** 2.363
*** 
Durbin-Watson statistics 0.676 1.388 0.756 1.534 
F- value 26.654*** 34.442
***
 24.397
***
 35.968
***
 
Adjusted R
2
 51.4% 58.3% 51.8% 61.6% 
No. of observations 560 560 480 480 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Chapter Five 
presents the detailed definition measurement method of all the variables used. 2004 is introduced as a one year lag. To avoid 
the dummy variable, 2009 is excluded as a dummy variable from the main regression (un-lagged structure), while 2005 is 
excluded from the estimation lagged structure. In addition, the consumer services industry is excluded as an industry dummy 
variable from all of the regression models. 
 
iii)  Lagged structure and compliance-index model 
Table 7.16 shows the findings obtained from the main regression model (un-
lagged) and the lagged structure regression for the compliance-index model. Panel A 
reports the findings based on the un-lagged structure model, while Panel B reports the 
findings from the estimated lagged structure model. As shown below, the main equation 
presented in Chapter Five (Equation 3) of the compliance-index model for both accounting 
measure ROA and market measure Q-ratio is re-estimated as follows: 
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 FP refers to firm financial performance measured by both ROA and Q-ratio. The 
SCGI is the constructed Saudi Corporate Governance Index, consisting of 65 provisions. 
As in the previous models, CONTROLS are the control variables used in the model, 
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including firm size, leverage, firm growth, capital expenditure, dividends, and industry 
and year dummy variables.  
 First, Panels A and B in Table 7.16 report the findings obtained from the un-lagged 
and lagged structure models using ROA, respectively. Panel A shows the SCGI is 
significantly and positively related to ROA at the 5% level of significance. Similarly, in 
Panel B, which includes the estimated lagged structure, this particular relationship is 
positive at the 5% level of significance. This means that the SCGI in both models has the 
same explanatory power (regarding significance and magnitude). Moreover, the 
coefficients of the control variables for both the un-lagged and lagged structure models are 
similar in terms of significance and magnitude. Particularly, leverage and capital 
expenditure show a significant and positive relationship with ROA in these two models. 
Firm growth and dividends show a significant and positive association with ROA, while 
firm size shows no significant relationship in both models. 
 The adjusted R
2
 is approximately similar in the un-lagged and lagged structure 
models, as shown in Panels A and B, respectively. More precisely, the R
2
 is about 32% and 
31%, respectively. The F-value in the un-lagged structure model is 15.434 at the 1% level 
of significance. The F-value in the estimated lagged structure is 13.912, also at the 1% 
level of significance. The consistency in findings from the two models supports the results 
reported in Section 7.2 indicating that firms with good corporate governance show higher 
financial performance measured by ROA.        
 Second, Panels A and B in Table 7.16 report the findings obtained from the un-
lagged and lagged structure models using Q-ratio, respectively. The main regression (un-
lagged) in Panel A shows that there is no significant relationship between the SCGI and Q-
ratio. Similarly, in Panel B, the result for the estimated lagged structure indicates no 
association between the two variables. This means that the SCGI has no explanatory power 
in explaining changes in corporate governance and firm value. Furthermore, the control 
variables in both the un-lagged and lagged structure models are similar in their significance 
and magnitude of the estimated coefficients, except for capital expenditure. Specifically, 
firm size and leverage are reported to be significantly and negatively related to Q-ratio. 
Firm growth and dividends show a negative but non-significant relationship with Q-ratio. 
 The adjusted R
2
 is relatively similar in the un-lagged and lagged structure models, 
as shown in Panels A and B, respectively. In the main regression, the R
2
 is about 56%, 
while it is 59% in the estimated lagged structure. The F-value is 39.821 at the 1% level of 
significance and 41.598 at the 1% level of significance in the un-lagged and lagged 
structure models, respectively. This implies that the similarity between the results obtained 
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from both models supports the robustness of the main findings. Also, the empirical 
findings support the robustness of the main findings, including that there is no significant 
relationship between corporate governance practices and firm value in the Saudi stock 
market. 
 
Table 7.16: Regression results of estimated lagged stricture for the compliance-index model 
  
Independent Variables 
Panel A: Main regression - un-lagged 
structure 
Panel B: Estimation lagged structure 
regression 
ROA Q-ratio ROA Q-ratio 
  SCGI .239 (.016)** -.092 (.152) .288 (.030)
** -.063 (.257) 
Control Variables:        
  Firm size .056 (.300) -.352 (.000)
*** .065 (.289) -.436 (.000)*** 
  Leverage -.179 (.023)
** -.284 (.000)*** -.159 (.058)* -.210 (.005)*** 
  Firm growth .255 (.000)
*** -.026 (.301) .270 (.000)*** -.067 (.109) 
  Capital expenditure -.105 (.068)
* .077 (.088) * -.157 (.023)** .030 (.317) 
  Dividends .588 (.000)
*** -.052 (.275) .604 (.000)*** -.011 (.454) 
  Industry dummies Included Included Included Included 
  Year dummies Included Included Included Included 
Constant 1.606*** 2.067*** 1.528*** 1.296
*** 
Durbin-Watson statistics 0.654 1.304 0.650 1.455 
F- value 15.434*** 39.821
***
 13.912
***
 41.598
***
 
Adjusted R
2
 31.7% 55.6% 31.4% 59.0% 
No. of observations 560 560 480 480 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Chapter 
Five provides a detailed definition of the measurement method of all the variables used. 2004 is introduced as a one year 
lag. To avoid the dummy variable, 2005 and 2009 are excluded as dummy variables in the main regression (un-lagged 
structure) for ROA and Q-ratio models, respectively, while 2005 is excluded from the estimation lagged structure for 
both ROA and Q-ratio models. In addition, the consumer services industry is excluded as an industry dummy variable 
from all of the regression models. 
 
 
7.3.2.2  Results of the Compliance-Index Model based on Instrumental Variable (IV) 
As discussed in Subsection 7.3.2, to address the potential endogeneity problems in 
the model by using the econometric method, the Instrumental Variable method (IV) is 
estimated. This helps to deal with potential omitted variables and measurement errors 
causing endogeneity. Larcker and Rusticus (2010) argue that the IV estimation is helpful in 
corporate governance and corporate disclosure research when the independent variables are 
endogenous. Therefore, this section presents the results estimating the IV model and 
compares them with the findings from the multivariate OLS regression of the compliance-
index model. Here, the focus is on the compliance-index model because the Saudi 
Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) is the main interest in this study. Furthermore, the 
SCGI consists of a set of corporate governance mechanisms, including the variables used 
in the equilibrium-variable model.   
In line with Larcker and Rusticus (2010), the key explanatory variables are 
examined using the exogeneity test to check whether the variables are endogenous or not. 
Therefore, following Black et al. (2006a) and Ntim et al. (2012b), the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman exogeneity test was used to examine the existence of an endogenous relationship 
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between the SCGI and financial performance. The study conducted the test in two steps. 
First, because the SCGI is expected to be endogenous in the main model (Equation 3), the 
residuals from the main model regression (R_SCGI) are saved as follows: 
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Second, after obtaining the R_SCGI from the above formula (Equation 7), the 
R_SCGI was added to the main model (compliance-index model) to find the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman statistic (t-statistic), as follows: 
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 The Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test indicates that the SCGI is endogenously 
associated with firm financial performance; this may suggest that some important variables 
are probably omitted from the main compliance-index model.
63
 Therefore, the study 
constructs an instrumental variable method by using an instrument that is highly correlated 
with the SCGI and weakly correlated with the predicted value (P_SCGI). To identify an 
appropriate instrument, the study follows Beiner et al. (2006) and Ntim et al. (2012b) to 
generate the instrument variable (P_SCGI) in two steps. In the first step, it is assumed that 
the constructed SCGI will be determined by alternative corporate governance mechanisms, 
which is used in predicting the P_SCGI as follows: 
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The following alternative variables were used to analyse the effect of corporate 
governance mechanisms on voluntary corporate governance disclosure, including 
corporate board size (BSZ), institutional ownership (IONR), block ownership (BONR), 
audit firm size (AFZ), presence of a corporate governance committee (CGC) and frequency 
of board meetings (BFM). According to agency theory, board size is essential in 
monitoring management behaviour and mitigating agency problems (Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). It can be argued that a large board of directors may 
reduce the likelihood of collusion between directors on the board (Haniffa and Cooke, 
                                                 
63
 The coefficient on the R_SCGI shows that it is insignificant for the ROA model, which means that the 
SCGI is exogenously related to the ROA. This implies that the constructed Saudi Corporate Governance 
Index is exogenous with ROA. However, the coefficient on the R_SCGI is significant at the 1% level of 
significance for the Q-ratio. This suggests that the SCGI is endogenous with the Q-ratio. 
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2002). Therefore, it is expected that a large board size could improve corporate governance 
disclosure.  
The presence of institutional investors ensures that a degree of accountability exists 
for executive management (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Aggarwal et al., 2011). This is 
because they have a greater incentive to monitor firm performance to protect their 
investment (Chung and Zhang, 2011). Therefore, institutional investors prefer to invest in 
firms with a high level of transparency and disclosure, to reduce the cost of investment 
(Chen et al., 2009). Thus, it is hypothesised that institutional ownership has a positive 
impact on corporate governance. The presence of block shareholders may exacerbate the 
agency problem due to their considerable power in the appointment of directors, which 
puts small shareholders at risk (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Therefore, it is hypothesised that 
block ownership is negatively associated with corporate governance.  
It is expected that audit firms limit agents’ opportunistic behaviour (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002). Large audit firms have high standards that can improve the quality of 
auditing (Depoers, 2000; Alsaeed, 2006). Therefore, firms audited by big-four audit firm 
may have better voluntary corporate governance disclosure (Barako et al., 2006). 
Corporate governance committee can help in implementing good corporate governance 
practices (Ntim et al., 2012a). Thus, the relationship between corporate governance 
committee and corporate governance can be expected to be positive. From an agency 
theory perspective, board activities are positively linked with frequent board meetings 
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Board meetings provide adequate time for directors to monitor 
firms’ performance (Vafeas, 1999a).  
After estimating the regression model in Equation 9, the P_SCGI is replaced with 
the SCGI in the main formula (Equation 3) to re-estimate the compliance index model (see 
Equation 10). Before that, the P_SCGI has to be examined to check whether it is an 
appropriate instrument to be replaced with the SCGI. During this check, the P_SCGI is 
supposed to be positively correlated with the SCGI, while it is supposed to be weakly or 
not correlated with the residual R_SCGI or structural error term ( t ) (Larcker and 
Rusticus, 2010). This assumption is tested through finding the correlations matrix. As 
shown in Table 7.18, Pearson and Spearman correlations indicate that the P_SCGI is 
highly correlated with the SCGI, at .791 and .839, respectively. However, the P_SCGI is 
weakly correlated with R_SCGI, at .050 and -.317 for the Pearson and Spearman 
correlations, respectively. This means that the P_SCGI is an appropriate instrument to be 
replaced with the SCGI.    
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Therefore, in the second step, the main formula for the compliance index model 
(Equation 3) is re-estimated as follows: 
it
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Panels A and B in Table 7.17 present the results obtained from the main OLS 
regression model using ROA and Q-ratio. The result of the SCGI is relatively similar with 
the P_SCGI in the instrumental variable estimation for ROA, where both are significant 
and positive. However, the coefficient of the SCGI is slightly changed in the Q-ratio 
model. Specifically, it is negative but insignificant, while the P_SCGI remained negative 
but significant in the instrumental variable estimation.  
 
Table 7.17: Regression results of estimated instrumental variable for the compliance-index model 
  
Independent Variables 
Panel A: Instrumental variables estimation  Panel B: Main OLS regression model 
ROA Q-ratio ROA Q-ratio 
  SCGI     .239 (.016)** -.092 (.152) 
  R_SCGI         
  P_SCGI .659 (.006) *** -.690 (.000)***     
Control Variables:         
  Firm size .087 (.406) -.372 (.000)
*** .056 (.300) -.352 (.000)*** 
  Leverage -.128 (.155) -.325 (.000)
 ***  -.179 (.023)** -.284 (.000)*** 
  Firm growth .254 (.000)
*** -.021 (.677) .255 (.000)*** -.026 (.301) 
  Capital expenditure -.034 (.650) .004 (.950) -.105 (.068)
* .077 (.088)* 
  Dividends .600 (.000)
*** -.052 (.539) .588 (.000)*** -.052 (.275) 
  Industry dummies Included Included Included Included 
  Year dummies Included Included Included Included 
Constant 1.400*** 2.248
*** 1.606*** 2.067*** 
Durbin-Watson statistics 0.663 1.317 0.654 1.304 
F- value 15.676
***
 41.360
***
 15.434*** 39.821
***
 
Adjusted R
2
 32.1% 56.5% 31.7% 55.6% 
No. of observations 560 480 560 560 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are 
defined as follows: the Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI); R_SCGI is the saved residuals of regression of the 
SCGI; and the P_SCGI is the saved predicted values of regression of the SCGI. Chapter Five provides a detailed definition 
of the measurement method for the control variables.  
 
In terms of the control variables, the coefficients and directions of the OLS 
regression model and instrumental variable estimation are relatively similar. More 
precisely, for the ROA model, firm size, firm growth and dividends remained positive at 
the same level of significance, whereas leverage and capital expenditure remained 
negative, but with a change in the level of significance. For the Q-ratio model, firm size, 
leverage, firm growth and dividends remained negative and kept the same level of 
significance. Although capital expenditure was significant and positive in the OLS 
regression model, it became insignificant in the instrumental variable estimation. 
245 
 
Table 7.18: Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices of alternative corporate governance mechanisms for all (560) firm year 
Variable SCGI R_SCGI P-SCGI GONR IONR BONR DONR BSZ BFM CGC BCOM AFZ ROA Q ratio FSZ LVG SGR CEXC DV 
SCGI 1 .077* .839*** .130*** .061 .119*** .077* .073* .122*** .326*** .673*** .117*** -.012 -.566*** .209*** .166*** -.159*** -.016 .093** 
R_SCGI .368*** 1 -.317*** -.035 .074* -.007 .095** .093** -.047 .022 .086** .061 .074* .137*** .009 -.002 .096** -.085** .063 
P-SCGI .791*** .050 1 .126*** .047 .148*** .063 .163*** .227*** .381*** .540*** .150*** -.065 -.519*** .157*** .138*** -.200*** .021 .028 
GONR .144*** .050 .119*** 1 .015 .628*** -.057 .312*** .333*** .043 .031 .302*** .226*** -.154*** .635*** .177*** -.002 .315*** .435*** 
IONR .045 .028 .036 .004 1 .354*** .089* .230*** -.111*** -.009 .022 .280*** -.112*** -.247*** .302*** .285*** .020 .069 .096** 
BONR .125*** .040 .130*** .662*** .361*** 1 .493*** .343*** .225*** .059 .079* .481*** .255*** -.140*** .684*** .365*** .087** .347*** .392*** 
DONR .063 .042 .047 -.159*** .059 .411*** 1 .259*** -.056 -.009 .186*** .243*** .207*** .017 .227*** .236*** .109** .179*** .144*** 
BSZ .066* .101** .134*** .260*** .225*** .318*** .253*** 1 .000 .099** .146*** .297*** .110*** -.162*** .526*** .226*** -.003 .248*** .251*** 
BFM .129*** .072* .211*** .358*** -.110*** .251*** -.070* -.015 1 .103** .052 .013 .044 .023 .147*** .030 -.035 .131*** .164*** 
GC .321*** .096** .438*** .082* -.014 .070* .009 .092** .113*** 1 .197*** .065 -.056 -.220*** .119*** .021 -.111*** .028 .003 
BCOM .648*** .178*** .525*** .006 .045 .063 .175*** .132*** .054 .197*** 1 .083* .021 -.403*** .189*** .205*** -.095** .054 .130*** 
AFZ .117*** .081* .129*** .295*** .296*** .477*** .223*** .301*** .030 .065 .083* 1 .124*** -.149*** .524*** .412*** .081* .308*** .217*** 
ROA -.008 -.056 -.087** .251*** -.110*** .274*** .246*** .146*** .039 -.053 .024 .136*** 1 .251*** .198*** -.098** .182*** .179*** .530*** 
Q ratio -.514*** .041 -.476*** -.128*** -.227*** -.129*** .068 -.131*** .033 -.208*** -.398*** -.137*** .223*** 1 -.387*** -.276*** .113*** -.035 -.102** 
FSZ .214*** 009 .136*** .624*** .304*** .698*** .189*** .490*** .176*** .099** .194*** .523*** .231*** -.373*** 1 .580*** .113*** .430*** .420*** 
LVG .153*** -.002 .103** .166*** .355*** .378*** .216*** .212*** .033 .014 .208*** .408*** -.108** -.262*** .592*** 1 .101** .314*** .023 
SGR -.133*** .096** -.192*** -.004 .024 .083* .105** .024 -.036 -.098** -.096** .077* .196*** .109*** .100** .077* 1 .206*** .040 
CEXC -.015 -.085** -.010 .286*** .076* .326*** .167*** .245*** .138*** .018 .056 .306*** .189*** -.014 .413*** .285*** .198*** 1 .224*** 
DV .097** .063 .024 .419*** .102** .389*** .132*** .260*** .175*** .003 .130*** .217*** .539*** -.095** .432*** .037 .043 .221*** 1 
Notes: The bottom left half of the table contains Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients, whereas the upper right half of the table shows Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients. ***, ** and * indicate that correlation 
is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: the Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI), Residual-SCGI (R_SCGI), Predicted-SCGI (P_SCGI), government ownership (GONR), 
institutional ownership (IONR), block ownership (BONR), board of director ownership (DONR), board size (BSZ), frequency of board meetings (BFM), the presence of a corporate governance committee (CGC), the presence of board 
committees (BCOM), audit firm size (AFZ), return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio), firm size (FSZ), leverage (LVG), firm growth (SGR), capital expenditure (CEXC) and  dividends  (DV). Chapter Five presents the detailed 
definitions of variables employed. 
246 
 
 
 
Finally, as shown in Panels B and C, the F-value and adjusted R
2
 are mainly similar 
among the OLS regression and instrumental variable estimation. Particularly, for both 
ROA and Q-ratio, the F-values are significant at the 1% level of significance, and the 
adjusted R
2
 remains mostly similar. In addition, the adjusted R
2
 for ROA and Q-ratio in the 
OLS regression is 31.7% and 55.6%, respectively, whereas the adjusted R
2
 for ROA and 
Q-ratio are 32.1% and 56.5%, respectively. This implies that the P-SCGI and control 
variables have similar explanatory power to explain the variation in financial performance. 
Therefore, despite the slight change in the coefficient among a few variables when 
comparing the OLS regression and the instrumental variable estimation, the great similarity 
in most of the explanatory variables, the F-values and the adjusted R
2
 indicate that the 
findings obtained from the compliance-index model are robust. 
 
 
7.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
This chapter reported and discussed the empirical results. Specifically, it sought to 
achieve three main objectives. First, this chapter examined the important assumptions of 
the OLS methodology, including: normality, multicollinearity, autocorrelation, 
heteroscedasticity and linearity. The normality test suggests some variables show slightly 
non-normal distribution. Data were winsorised and transformed to address the non-
normality issue. After winsorising and transforming the variables, a number of diagnostic 
tests were carried out, including: (i) P-P and Q-Q scatter plots; (ii) histograms to test 
normality; (iii) Skewness and Kurtosis; Variance Inflation Factor; (iv) tolerance statistics; 
(v)Breusch-Pagan ; (vi) Durbin-Watson; and (vii) Cook’s distance. The results of these 
tests suggest that there is no major threat regarding non-normality, multicollinearity and 
linearity, whereas some models suffered from heteroscedasticity. To account for the 
presence of heteroscedasticity, the robust standard errors method was used to estimate OLS 
regression. Therefore, it can be noted that there is no major violation of the results obtained 
from the multivariate OLS regression.  
Second, this chapter presents the empirical results of three main models. The first 
model is the voluntary corporate governance disclosure model. This model examines the 
relationship between eight corporate governance mechanisms and voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure. The findings suggest that most of the governance mechanisms 
examined result in a statistically significant relationship with voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure. The second model is the equilibrium-variable model, investigating 
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the association between individual corporate governance mechanisms and financial 
performance using two different financial measures. The findings show a difference in 
results regarding the relationship between the corporate governance variables and firm 
performance, as measured by two different proxies.  
While some of the examined corporate governance mechanisms show a significant 
positive relationship with ROA, others showed a negative relationship with Q-ratio. The 
third model investigated is the compliance-index model, which examines the relationship 
between compliance with the SCGC and firm financial performance using a constructed 
corporate governance index. The results showed that the constructed governance index 
related positively to ROA, but had no relationship with Q-ratio. In addition, this study 
compares the results from the equilibrium-variable and the compliance-index models. This 
also helps in examining the methodology used to investigate the relationship between 
corporate governance and financial performance. 
Third, this chapter discusses the tests used to check robustness and examines the 
existence of potential endogeneity problems. Four tests were employed to check whether 
the results are robust, including: (i) estimating pre- and post-2006 regression models; (ii) 
using sub-indices; (iii) using weighted indices; and (iv) estimating the firm level fixed-
effects. The first three tests support the robustness of the findings. However, the fixed-
effects model is found to be sensitive to the results for potential unobserved firm-specific 
characteristics. Lagged structure and Instrumental Variable were used to examine potential 
endogeneity problems. The results based on re-estimation of the main models to the lagged 
structure model show great similarity with the findings of the main regression model (un-
lagged regression). Also, examining the potential endogeneity problems using the 
Instrumental Variable method shows that the findings obtained from the compliance-index 
model are relatively robust. Therefore, the potential endogeneity problems in this 
regression model do not seem to be harmful to the results based on the lagged structure and 
instrumental variable tests. 
The next chapter presents the qualitative research design. In particular, the process 
of data collection using semi-structured interviews is explained. Furthermore, the chapter 
explains the technique used to analyse the interview data. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
8. INTRODUCTION  
As discussed in Chapter Four, this study adopts mixed-methods in investigating 
corporate governance reforms in Saudi Arabia. Chapter Five discussed the quantitative 
research design used in this study to investigate the relationship among corporate 
governance mechanisms, voluntary corporate governance disclosure and firm financial 
performance. This chapter discusses the qualitative method used to answer the sixth 
research sub-question, which investigates the awareness and appreciation of good 
corporate governance practices among key stakeholders following corporate governance 
reforms in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, investigating this qualitative research sub-question 
helps to understand and explain the quantitative findings. The chapter intends to achieve 
three aims. First, it explains the theoretical framework employed in the qualitative analysis. 
Second, it discusses the qualitative design and interview data used in examining the level 
of awareness and appreciation of good corporate governance practices among key 
stakeholders. Third, the chapter presents the interview analysis process.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.1 discusses the theoretical 
framework of the qualitative research. Section 8.2 explains the design and data collection 
process of the semi-structured interviews. Section 8.3 presents the interview analysis 
procedure, while Section 8.4 presents a chapter summary. 
 
 
8.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH  
Qualitative research investigating human behaviour has received much attention in 
social science, as well as in the corporate governance literature (Morgan and Smircich, 
1980; Cassell et al., 2005; Saunders et al., 2007; Boyd et al., 2012; Soobaroyen and 
Mahadeo, 2012). Zattoni et al. (2013) state that the varied findings in studies using agency 
theory serve as motivation for governance scholars to employ qualitative designs. Thus, in 
this case a qualitative research design can help in exploring the interaction among key 
corporate governance practitioners in Saudi Arabia. McNulty et al. (2013) suggest that a 
qualitative research design explores how governance actors and institutions actually 
engage with governance practices. Furthermore, qualitative research can increase the 
robustness of quantitative results through comparison of the findings (Mengoli et al., 
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2009). Thus, the following subsections address the theoretical framework of qualitative 
research and the methods used in this study.  
 
8.1.1 Overview of Qualitative Research  
In the early 1970s, qualitative research approaches became popular among 
researchers in social sciences (Morgan and Smircich, 1980; Scott and Garner, 2013). The 
attention given to qualitative research methods has increased, and suggests that the need to 
discover social reality is greater than it used to be (Gilbert, 2008; Collis and Hussey, 2009). 
Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2011) suggest the increasing use of qualitative research in recent 
years reflects the importance of closely studying human behaviour in the business 
environment. Thus, qualitative research in business studies aims to provide detailed 
interpretations of quantitative results by exploring how, why and what (Creswell and 
Clark, 2011). 
Lichtman (2013, p.7) defines qualitative research as: “a way of knowing in which a 
researcher gathers, organizes, and interprets information obtained from humans using his 
or her eyes and ears as filters. It can be contrasted with quantitative research, which relies 
heavily on hypothesis testing, cause and effect, and statistical analyses”. Hence, it can be 
noted that qualitative research is a holistic approach as well as an interdisciplinary 
landscape that generates knowledge from different angles (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2011). 
Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2011) indicate three purposes for conducting qualitative 
research: (i) exploring and understanding social reality; (ii) offering a rich description of 
social life; and (iii) explaining social phenomena. Bryman (2012) suggests three main steps 
to conducting qualitative research. The first step is determining the research problem and 
identifying the research questions. The second step is the selection of an appropriate data 
collection method. The third step is analysing and interpreting the data using selected data 
analysis techniques. 
Some considerations can be taken into account when conducting qualitative 
research (Lichtman, 2013). First, there is no single method in qualitative studies that fits 
every research project. Second, qualitative research simply employs the inductive 
approach; therefore, it does not aim to examine hypotheses (see Bryman, 2012). Third, 
qualitative research is used to explore social phenomena in detail. Thus, qualitative 
research methods explore a limited number of themes and cases in depth rather than a large 
number of samples. 
Qualitative research is characterised as a flexible approach in studying human 
behaviour and experiences (Silverman, 2011). Therefore, the current study aims to explore 
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qualitatively the corporate governance reforms in Saudi Arabia and their influence on 
corporate disclosure and firm financial performance. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 
4.2 in Chapter Four, a qualitative research design can help in overcoming the limitations of 
using a quantitative research design alone (Cohen et al., 2002; Creswell and Clark, 2011).  
 
8.1.2 Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research    
Reliability and validity are important in qualitative research (Bryman, 2004). Due 
to the different natures of qualitative and quantitative data, reliability and validity in 
qualitative studies rely heavily on the data collection and analysis processes (Golafshani, 
2003; Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2011). This indicates that there are no specific tests that can 
be applied to all qualitative methods to examine reliability and validity (Bryman, 2004). 
Reliability refers to the possibility of reproducing the same results if the research 
were repeated (Collis and Hussey, 2009). Though reliability is often related to quantitative 
research methods, the idea is applicable to qualitative methods as well (Golafshani, 2003). 
It is argued that this interest is shared by both approaches (Golafshani, 2003; Silverman, 
2011). Silverman (2011) suggests three main criteria to enhance the reliability of 
interviews. First, an interview guide should be developed which is clear and 
understandable for interviewees. Also, an interview guide can ensure precision in the 
coding and analysis of the data. Second, to make the findings more reliable, accurate 
taping and transcribing is required. Third, inter-coding reliability needs to be maintained. 
Hence, it is important to avoid any ambiguity when data is coded; for example, an overlap 
among the coding categories or simple coding errors.   
Validity in qualitative research is as important as reliability (Golafshani, 2003). 
Here, validity indicates the extent to which the interpretation of the results accurately 
reflects the phenomena under consideration (Collis and Hussey, 2009). Barriball and While 
(1994) argue that validity of interviews is determined by the extent to which interviewees 
are willing to provide knowledgeable data. Therefore, careful selection of interviewees is 
important. Triangulation is applied by adopting two or more methods in exploring the 
answers to the research questions, to verify the findings. Furthermore, Hesse-Biber and 
Leavy (2011) and Silverman (2011) suggest that triangulation of various methods 
improves research validity. As this study benefits from using a mixed-methods approach, 
triangulation helps in verifying whether the qualitative findings match the results of the 
quantitative methods.  
As discussed above, there are no specific tests to gauge reliability and validity in 
qualitative research. Both rely on the interview process and the quality of data collection, 
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transcription and analysis. The reliability and validity of the interview data will be 
discussed when the process of conducting the interviews is described in the following 
subsections.  
 
8.1.3 Interviews  
 Interviews are important within a qualitative research design (Bryman, 2004; Scott 
and Garner, 2013). Scott and Garner (2013) define an interview as a research method to 
obtain data (life narratives) through the experiences and perceptions of individuals or 
groups. Bryman (2004) suggests that the interview is one of the most widely used methods 
in qualitative research. This is because interviews allow for flexibility in data collection 
and analysis. For example, McNulty et al. (2013) reviewed 78 qualitative studies on 
corporate governance and found that the majority used interviews.  
 There are three different forms of interviews: structured, semi-structured and 
unstructured (Collis and Hussey, 2009; Silverman, 2011). Structured interviews are 
designed to be used with a specified set of research questions (Bryman, 2012). In semi-
structured interviews, the interviewer has a list of questions, with the flexibility to pursue 
other topics that arise during the interview (Collis and Hussey, 2009). Such interviews are 
not limited to the prepared questions. This allows the researcher to develop follow-up 
questions during the interview (Collis and Hussey, 2009).  
Structured interviews are frequently used in quantifying results because they rely 
on specific answers (Scott and Garner, 2013). In contrast, semi-structured interviews allow 
the interviewer the freedom to ask, and diversify, questions based on given answers 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Liew, 2007; Johl et al., 2012). Therefore, the semi-structured 
interview is the most appropriate type of interview with which to explore corporate 
governance in detail (Liew, 2007; Piesse et al., 2012; Bailey and Peck, 2013). 
Bryman (2004) suggests that use of semi-structured interviews is increasing 
because they help explore answers to research questions in detail. For this reason, it can be 
noted that semi-structured interviews are preferred by researchers (Bryman, 2004; 
Soobaroyen and Mahadeo, 2012; McNulty et al., 2013). Using semi-structured interviews, 
the researcher develops a list of questions, called the interview guide, which helps guide 
discussion about the issue from all aspects. However, interviewees have the right to share 
their thoughts; it is important for interviewees to have the opportunity to share their views 
(Bryman, 2004; Humphrey and Lee, 2004).  
  The current study employed semi-structured interviews to explore the recent 
corporate governance reforms in Saudi Arabia and examine the level of awareness and 
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appreciation of good corporate governance practices among key stakeholders within the 
Saudi corporate context. The interviews help to improve the explanation of quantitative 
findings. Semi-structured interviews were selected for three reasons. First, they are used to 
provide deep understanding of corporate governance phenomena (e.g., Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2007; Liew, 2007; Johl et al., 2012; Piesse et al., 2012; Soobaroyen and Mahadeo 
(2012); Bailey and Peck, 2013).  
Second, previous studies demonstrate a connection between the corporate 
governance regime and other systems, such as political, economic and legal systems (La 
Porta et al., 1997; Klapper and Love, 2004; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). Semi-
structured interviews are a better means of discussing the connections between these 
systems and corporate governance behaviour. Also, they ensure a full understanding of the 
incentives and barriers to corporate governance reforms. Third, semi-structured interviews 
allow the researcher to assess the reliability of interviews and explore underlying motives 
directly (Humphrey and Lee, 2004). There were three phases of the interview process: (i) 
designing the interview guide; (ii) conducting the interviews; and (iii) analysing the 
interviews. These procedures are discussed in detail in the following sections. 
 
 
8.2 SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION  
This section presents the design and data collection process of the semi-structured 
interviews used in the current study. Particularly, Subsection 8.2.1 addresses the selection 
of interviewees, Subsection 8.2.2 explains the design of the interview guide, Subsection 
8.2.3 discusses the procedure of conducting the interviews and Subsection 8.2.4 addresses 
the ethical issues related to the interview process. 
 
8.2.1 Selection of Interviewees  
Corbin and Strauss (2008) suggest that data collection using theoretical sampling 
can help the researcher identify concepts and themes pertinent to the research problem. In 
this study, theoretical sampling was used to select the interviewees using two sequential 
phases. In the first phase, targeted groups of interviewees were identified (practitioners). 
The interviews targeted five key groups of internal and external stakeholders: (i) boards of 
directors; (ii) executive management; (iii) audit firm partners; (iv) regulators; and (v) 
shareholders. These groups were selected for the following reasons. First, the need to 
understand corporate governance reforms requires interviewing both internal and external 
key stakeholders. Second, a review of the corporate governance literature suggest these 
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five groups are essential to good corporate governance practices, and important partners in 
the corporate governance reforms in Saudi Arabia (see Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Liew, 
2007; Alshehri and Solomon, 2012; Piesse et al., 2012; Bailey and Peck, 2013).  
 The literature suggests the board of directors represents the most important 
mechanism in enhancing the accountability of firms and protecting shareholders’ rights 
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Soobaroyen and Mahadeo, 2012); as such, the interview sample 
included boards of directors. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO) were identified as key executives of listed firms because of their roles in 
good governance practices (Ntim et al., 2014). Audit firms were selected because of their 
very influential effect on the quality of corporate disclosure (Barako et al., 2006). Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002) point out that audit firms act as a mechanism for limiting agents’ 
opportunistic behaviour.  
Officers at the Capital Market Authority (CMA) and the Saudi Stock Exchange 
(Tadawul) were selected as representatives of regulatory and supervisory bodies of the 
capital market (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). Finally, shareholders were selected as the 
cornerstone of corporate governance reforms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As a result, the 
five groups were identified as having a direct impact on good corporate governance 
practices. This provided reliable information about corporate governance reforms in Saudi 
Arabia and their influence on corporate disclosure and firm financial performance. 
Since the quality of findings depends on the quality of data (Sekaran, 2003; 
Saunders et al., 2007), criteria for the selection of practitioners were carefully constructed. 
First, the practitioners’ knowledge about corporate governance in Saudi Arabia was 
considered; this helped in obtaining expert and informed opinions and experiences (Bailey 
and Peck, 2013). Second, the selected boards of directors’ members and executive 
managers were from listed firms (see Bailey and Peck, 2013). Third, the selected audit 
firms also had listed firms as clients. This study focuses on quality of data through the 
careful selection of interviewees, rather than focusing on the number of interviewees (see 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). These decisions enhanced the reliability of the data in this 
study. 
In the second phase, after the targeted groups were identified, the researcher 
communicated with the targeted candidates to check their availability. The researcher used 
telephone and e-mail to communicate with them, and provided an offer letter explaining: 
(i) the objective of the study; (ii) the purpose of the interview; (iii) information about the 
researcher and the university; (iv) the time required for the interview; and (v) how 
confidentiality would be ensured. Furthermore, a copy of the interview questions was 
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provided. These procedures aimed to increase credibility and encourage willingness from 
the practitioners to participate in the study (e.g., Bailey and Peck, 2013).  
 
Table 8.1: Summary of the final sample of semi-structured interviews 
 No Group Acr. Practitioner’s Position Category Type 
In
te
rn
al
 k
ey
 
st
ak
eh
o
ld
er
s 1 Board of Directors B-1 Board of Directors Listed firm Face-to-face 
2  B-2 Board of Directors Listed firm Face-to-face* 
3  B-3 Board of Directors Listed firm Face-to-face 
4 Key Executives E-1 CEO Listed firm Face-to-face 
5  E-2 CEO Listed firm By Telephone 
6  E-3 CFO Listed firm Face-to-face 
E
x
te
rn
al
 k
ey
 
st
ak
eh
o
ld
er
s 
7 Audit Firms I-1 Audit Firm Partner Big-four Face-to-face 
8  I-2 Audit Firm Partner Big-four Face-to-face * 
9  I-3 Audit Firm Partner Non big-four Face-to-face 
10 Regulators R-1  Regulatory body representative Capital Market Authority Face-to-face  
11  R-2  Regulatory body representative Capital Market Authority Face-to-face* 
12  R-3 Regulatory body representative Saudi Stock Exchange Face-to-face 
13 Shareholders S-1 Shareholder In listed firms Face-to-face 
14  S-2 Shareholder In listed firms Face-to-face 
15  S-3 Shareholder In listed firms By Telephone 
* The practitioner did not allow taping of the interview. 
 
There were some restrictions that limited the number of interviewees. The study 
made a conscious effort to seek out the views of all members of all five identified key 
stakeholder groups in order to obtain a balanced view of the perceptions and experiences of 
the practitioners regarding the governance reforms (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). However, 
the main limiting factor regarding the actual number of participants and interviews within 
each targeted stakeholder group was accessibility to, and the willingness of, the 
practitioners to voluntarily participate in the research. In this regard, various techniques 
were adopted, which aimed at enhancing access to practitioners and maximising the 
number of participants. In particular, the researcher’s personal contacts64 and snowballing 
techniques in recruiting participants and securing interview appointments were crucial in 
the ability to successfully implement the qualitative research design. After using these 
techniques, a total of fifteen practitioners agreed to be interviewed, which were evenly 
distributed across the five key stakeholder groups. Table 8.1 presents details about the 
interviewees.  
 
 
 
                                                 
64
 Until embarking upon his PhD studies, the researcher was the CFO of a medium sized Saudi listed firm, a 
role which not only involved regular interaction with boards of directors, audit partners and shareholders 
internally, but also with the CMA and Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) authorities. The researcher is also a 
qualified member of the Saudi Organisation for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA), which is the only 
professional accounting body in Saudi Arabia. Personal contacts and interactions with members of these 
bodies were, therefore, helpful in recruiting participants and securing interview appointments for the study.  
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8.2.2 Designing the Interview Guide  
 An interview guide is used to organise the research questions in semi-structured 
interviews (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Bryman (2012) suggests that an interview guide for 
semi-structured interviews should be a brief list of questions that address the research 
problem. This study follows Gilbert (2008) in designing the interview guide following 
three steps. The first step is to determine the framework of the interview guide, which is 
derived from the research problem. The guide is designed to clearly identify the themes to 
be used in analysing the interview data. As shown in Tables 8.2 and 8.3, it consists of five 
main sections, including: (i) board structure and sub-committees; (ii) Saudi corporate 
governance code and corporate disclosure; (iii) rights of shareholders and general 
assembly; (iv) regulatory bodies and legal system; and (v) the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm financial performance. These five sections were used as a 
basis to formulate the resulting interview questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1: Semi-structured interview guide and the five key stakeholder groups (Source: researcher’s design). 
 
As discussed previously and as shown in Figure 8.1, the researcher conducted 
interviews with five different groups (internal and external key stakeholders). Therefore, 
two guides were constructed, according to the differences between the interviewees’ 
backgrounds, to help deepen understanding of the topic. The first form is a semi-structured 
guide used with internal stakeholders, including board of directors’ members and key firm 
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executives (CEO and CFO). The second form was used with external stakeholders, 
including audit firm partners, regulatory bodies and shareholders. Tables 8.2 and 8.3 
present these two interview guides.   
Three main sources were used to generate the interview questions and discuss the 
topic from different aspects: (i) questions derived from the research problem (Gilbert, 
2008); (ii) questions derived from the literature on corporate governance, especially 
corporate governance reforms in emerging countries (Lichtman, 2013); and (iii) questions 
that emerged from quantitative findings in this study (Creswell and Clark, 2011). 
The second step is formulating the interview questions. Lichtman (2013) indicates 
that the questions should be designed to: (i) demonstrate an understanding of the actual 
knowledge of the individuals; (ii) reveal the interviewees’ views; (iii) explore their 
emotional responses; and (iv) reveal participants’ personal experiences. According to 
Charmaz (2002), questions asked during the interview can be of three types: (1) opening 
questions that start the discussion; (2) intermediate questions that investigate the issues in 
detail; and (3) concluding questions that assist in obtaining advice and recommendations 
(as cited by Bryman, 2004). 
A number of considerations were taken into account when formulating the 
questions. First, the researcher formulated interview questions in a way that helped elicit 
more accurate answers (Bryman, 2004). Second, the questions were designed not to be too 
narrow, because that may limit follow-up questions or clarifications of the main issue 
during interviews (Bryman, 2004). Third, the questions were ordered, to ensure a 
reasonable flow so that the research issue could be discussed properly (Bryman, 2004). 
Fourth, as this study employs a mixed-methods approach, the questions were designed to 
help achieve integration between quantitative and qualitative approaches (Creswell and 
Clark, 2011). 
The third step is reviewing the proposed interview guide (Gilbert, 2008; Lichtman, 
2013). It can be said that there is no standardised interview guide (Gilbert, 2008); thus, the 
constructed guide in this study was reviewed by the researcher’s supervisor and discussed 
with colleagues in doctoral colloquium conferences. Their reviews helped identify issues 
that had not previously been considered. Also, their reviews were useful in ensuring the 
validity and reliability of the interview data (Lichtman, 2013). After the review process, 
the proposed amendments were taken into account, and the final design was eventually 
developed. 
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Table 8.2: Semi-structured interview guide: internal stakeholders form 
Panel A: Board Structure and Sub-committees 
1 What do you think about the effect of board composition on corporate governance (CG)?  
2 What is your view about board sub-committees and their role in good governance practices?  
3 Would you please share your thoughts on the level of concentration in your firm’s ownership structure?  
4 How do you evaluate your firm’s shareholders’ awareness of the board’s performance and governance 
practices? 
Panel B: Disclosure, Transparency and Internal Control System 
1 In your opinion, how adequate are the SCGC disclosure and transparency requirements? 
2 Would you like to talk about the level of transparency and disclosure in your firm?  
3 In your opinion, to what extent are the internal control systems in  your firm effective? 
Panel C: Rights of Shareholders and General Assembly 
1 How does your firm protect shareholders’ rights generally and minority rights particularly?  
2 What protection is offered to shareholders by the existing legislation? 
3 What mechanisms do you use to encourage your shareholders to exercise their rights? 
Panel D: Regulatory Bodies and Legal System 
1 Would you please describe how you assess corporate governance reforms that have been pursued in 
Saudi Arabia? 
2 Would you please talk about stakeholders’ awareness and appreciation of good CG practices? 
3 How successful is the co-ordination and interaction between regulatory bodies? 
4 To what extent do you believe the current legal system supports such reforms? 
Panel E: Level of Compliance and Financial Performance 
1 How do you evaluate the level of compliance with the SCGC in your firm?   
2 In your view, what are the most influential factors in good governance practices? 
3 How would you assess the relationship between CG and financial performance? 
Source: Developed by the researcher 
 
Table 8.3: Semi-structured interview guide: external stakeholders form 
Panel A: Board Structure and Sub-committees 
1 What is your view about board independence in Saudi listed firms?   
2 What is your view about board sub-committees and their role in good governance practices? 
3 How do you generally evaluate the concentration of ownership in Saudi listed firms? 
Panel B: Disclosure, Transparency and Internal Control System 
1 In your opinion, how adequate are the SCGC disclosure and transparency requirements?   
2 Have the corporate governance reforms increased attention to disclosure and transparency?  
3 To what extent do you think the internal control systems in Saudi listed firms are effective? 
Panel C: Rights of Shareholders and General Assembly 
1 How well do you think Saudi listed firms protect their shareholders? 
2 What protection do you think the existing legislation offers to shareholders? 
3 To what extent do Saudi listed firms help shareholders exercise their rights? 
Panel D: Regulatory Bodies and Legal System 
1 How do you assess corporate governance reforms? 
2 Would you please describe how you evaluate stakeholders’ awareness and appreciation of good CG 
practices? 
3 What do you think about the interaction and co-ordination between regulatory bodies? 
4 To what extent do you believe the current legal system supports good CG reforms and practices? 
Panel E: Level of Compliance and Financial Performance 
1 How do you evaluate the level of compliance with the SCGC among listed firms?  
2 In your opinion, what are the most influential factors in good governance practices? 
3 How would you assess the relationship between CG and firm financial performance? 
Source: Developed by the researcher. 
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The interviews were conducted in Arabic because the practitioners, from Saudi 
Arabia, were only fluent in Arabic. Therefore, the question guide was translated from 
English into Arabic. To ensure the validity of the translation, this was done in three stages. 
First, the interview questions were translated into Arabic by the researcher, who is a native 
Arabic speaker. In the second stage, an Arabic colleague studying corporate governance at 
the same university was asked to translate the questions. Finally, the two translations were 
compared to ensure the accuracy of the translation. These procedures improved the content 
and construct validity (see Saunders et al., 2007). The interview questions in Arabic appear 
in Appendices 5 and 6. 
 
8.2.3 Semi-structured Interviews: Process and Reflection  
Building on the above discussion, this section addresses the procedure of 
conducting the interviews. Specifically, it discusses the type of interviews and the stages in 
which they were conducted. In this study, one-to-one interviews, instead of a focus group, 
were employed for three reasons. First, the interview questions sought information about 
the practitioners’ workplaces. Focus groups interviews conflict with the confidentiality that 
may be required by interviewees (Saunders et al., 2007). Second, one-to-one interviews 
allow interviewees to be able to freely express themselves without restrictions that may be 
imposed by the presence of third parties that may be associated with focus groups 
(Bryman, 2004). In other words, interviewees can expand on issues they see as important. 
Third, there are practical difficulties with gathering practitioners in one place at one time, 
due to the tight schedules associated with their high job profiles (mainly senior corporate 
executives, such as CEOs, board of directors, audit firm partners and regulators). 
Moreover, the researcher was keen to conduct face-to-face interviews rather than 
online or telephone interviews because: (i) body language is important in dialogue, such as 
facial expressions that cannot be captured in telephone interviews (Bryman, 2004; 
Yazdifara et al., 2008); and (ii) face-to-face interviews develop an atmosphere of ease and 
trust between interviewer and interviewees (Bryman, 2004).   
Conducting the interviews took approximately one month: from December 15, 
2011, to January 13, 2012. Although this period covers the year-end Christmas and New 
Year holidays of banks and firms in most countries, this is not the case in Saudi Arabia. 
These were working days in these companies, because the Saudi government follows the 
Hijri calendar. By considering these circumstances, the researcher took advantage of this 
time to conduct the interviews. As shown in Table 8.1, 13 face-to-face interviews were 
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conducted, while two interviews were conducted over the telephone because the 
practitioners were unavailable for face-to-face interviews.  
Interviews lasted between 30 and 75 minutes. All of the interviews were conducted 
in a mutually agreed place chosen by the practitioners. Also, the interviews were taped 
after obtaining consent from the interviewees. Three of the interviewees refused to allow 
taping because of the sensitivity of their positions (these included one board director, a 
member of the CMA and a big-four audit firm partner
65
). Taping the interviews helped 
ensure accurate data and reduced mistakes in transcribing the interviews (Barriball and 
While, 1994). 
The interviews were conducted in three stages. The first stage was the preparation 
before starting the interview. In this stage, the researcher obtained further information 
about the organisations the practitioners belonged to; for example, the organisational 
structure and level of disclosure were discovered from the firms’ profile and annual 
reports. Each practitioner’s background and experience were also reviewed. More 
information about the regulatory bodies and policy makers was collected. Having this 
information improved the interaction with the interviewees (see Liedtka, 1992). 
In the second stage, before asking questions, the practitioners were asked to allow 
taping of the interview. They were assured of the confidentiality of the information used by 
the researcher. After that, the practitioner was asked briefly about his professional 
background (e.g., Bailey and Peck, 2013). Then, practitioners were given an overview of 
the research objectives and themes. This helped give them a general idea about the 
information the researcher was seeking, which assisted in maintaining the conversation 
during the interview process (Coleman et al., 2010). 
After the introduction, the researcher opened up the inquiry through the three types 
of questions presented in the interview guide in Subsection 8.2.2. During the interview, the 
practitioner was given the freedom to express his opinions and ideas even if they were not 
directly linked to the questions asked. Therefore, the semi-structured interviews obtained 
rich data (Creswell and Clark, 2011). The interview guide was followed to ensure that all 
of the questions were asked, and notes were taken in order to record the essential points in 
the interview (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). 
In the third stage, at the end of the interview, the researcher expressed his gratitude 
to the interviewees for their time, and reassured them about the confidentiality of the 
information.  They were offered a copy of the thesis, if desired. After the interview was 
                                                 
65
 As discussed in Section 8.3, detailed notes were taken immediately after conducting the interviews. This 
helped in recording the interviewees’ answers accurately. 
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complete and the venue was vacated, the researcher made detailed notes to summarise 
what had been discussed. These notes allowed the researcher to record the information 
safely; they also helped improve the quality of the transcripts (Yazdifara et al., 2008).  
 
8.2.4  Ethical Issues Related to the Interviews  
Ethical issues are important to consider in a qualitative approach where interviewer 
and interviewees interact (Bryman, 2012). Research ethics can be considered in three 
stages, as follows: (i) before conducting the interviews; (ii) during the data collection; and 
(iii) after conducting the interviews (Saunders et al., 2007). The first stage involves 
accessibility to organisations, data sources and participants. This starts with exploring the 
organisational contexts and providing interviewees with an understanding of the issues 
surrounding the research problem (Liedtka, 1992; Saunders et al., 2007). In the second 
stage, research ethics are considered during data collection, informed by the principle of 
informed consent. Bryman (2012) suggests that interviewees should be informed about: (i) 
what the research is about; (ii) its objectives; (iii) who is sponsoring it; (iv) the nature of 
their participation in the research; and (v) their right to withdraw from the interview at any 
time.  
The third stage, after conducting the interviews, considers research ethics during 
the data analysis and results reporting; for example, maintaining the confidentiality of data 
during analysis and interpretation of the results. The interviewees should have a reasonable 
expectation that the information provided will be treated confidentially (Lichtman, 2013). 
The researcher must ensure that the interviewees’ privacy will not be violated, such as by 
revealing their identity in this thesis or any other later publication (Bryman, 2012). 
Commitment to ethics makes for better research. Also, ethics are considered in accurately 
reflecting the interviewees’ viewpoints when results are reported and coded (Liedtka, 
1992). Lichtman (2013) suggests some other ethical considerations during the interviews, 
such as behaving appropriately and avoiding questions about interviewees’ personal lives. 
 
 
8.3 ANALYSIS OF SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS  
The current study uses a thematic analysis approach in analysing qualitative data 
(Boyatzis, 1998; Bailey and Peck, 2013). As discussed in Chapter Four, a mixed-methods 
approach is used in this study, based on the explanatory sequential design. This means that 
conducting the interviews is the second stage after obtaining quantitative findings. This 
explains why the hypotheses were not developed (Creswell and Clark, 2011). Using 
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thematic analysis in this study helps explore, in depth, corporate governance reforms and 
their influence on firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia (Boyatzis, 1998; Bailey and 
Peck, 2013). 
In terms of analysis procedures, Corbin and Strauss (2008) argue that each 
researcher ‘analyst’ develops their own style during data analysis, such as using memos, 
coding cards and diagrams to make notes. This study used two phases of data analysis, in 
line with the corporate governance literature (e.g., Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Bailey and 
Peck, 2013). These two phases are, first, the pre-coding phase, and second, the coding or 
categories phase.  
In the first phase, the interviews were transcribed. All of the interviews took place 
in Arabic, so they were first transcribed in Arabic. The researcher himself transcribed the 
interviews to ensure the quality of the transcripts. During the transcription, some points 
were not clear. Specifically, some of the words were not clear in the tape, or the 
practitioner was hard to understand. To overcome this problem, clarification was elicited 
from the practitioners by phone or e-mail after the interview (e.g., Yazdifara et al., 2008; 
Bailey and Peck, 2013). 
The study has not adopted a verbatim approach in transcribing the interviews, but 
recorded the main ideas discussed. Arguably, not everything mentioned in the interviews is 
worth coding (Cohen et al., 2002; Saldana, 2013). Bryman (2012) points out that some 
explanations are extensive and can complicate the process of coding; therefore, it is not 
valuable to include these in the data. Each interview took about three to five hours to 
transcribe. In total, each interview was an average of four pages, transcribed. To ensure 
accuracy, the transcription was read while listening to the tape.  
After all of the interviews had been transcribed, the researcher started reading 
memos and the interviews to build up an initial conceptual framework to identify concepts 
and categories (e.g., Bailey and Peck, 2013). In doing so, the researcher read all the 
transcripts twice, to develop a general idea, and wrote in the margins and underlined the 
fundamental and pertinent issues in the data (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). From the first 
reading, preliminary concepts emerged through the use of memos (the researcher’s notes 
during and after the interview process), which helped establish reliable and clear coding 
cards (Saldana, 2013). Saldana (2013) argues that it is not possible to implement a coding 
system from an initial reading of the data; at least two cycles of reading are required to get 
a good coding framework. Thus, the researcher re-read the transcripts to filter the concepts; 
this also enhanced the validity of coding. 
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Figure 8.2: Coding system and data structure   
Concepts/Codes Axial Codes/Sub-themes Themes 
   
Source: Constructed by the researcher based on the approach of Bailey and Peck (2013, p.138). 
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In the second phase, the data was coded. Before starting this phase, the preliminary 
conceptual framework and concepts had been determined (Corbin and Strauss, 2008; 
Saldana, 2013). The coding process can be defined as “extracting concepts from raw data 
and developing themes of their properties and dimensions” (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, 
p.159). Through breaking up the data by open coding, 34 concepts were identified, as 
shown in Figure 8.2. Concepts are the basic units of coding. There were three main sources 
of identifying concepts in this study: (i) the research problem; (ii) the literature on 
corporate governance reforms; and (iii) the results obtained from the quantitative part of 
this study. These sources are also presented in Section 8.2.2, in discussion of the interview 
guide. 
Corbin and Strauss (2008) define codes as words that stand for groups of events 
and actions which have common characteristics or threads. Coding cards were used to 
determine similarities, differences, frequency, sequence and causation in transcripts and 
memos (Saldana, 2013). Specifically, the analysis adopted the constant comparisons 
approach by examining the similarities and differences between the groups. This also 
helped to support or reject inferences obtained from cases in the data. Corbin and Strauss 
(2008) argue that the constant comparisons approach is important because: (i) it helps in 
understanding the meaning of events and eliminating ambiguity about the issues; (ii) it 
stimulates the researcher to explore the concepts used in data analysis; (iii) it helps the 
researcher test basic assumptions, biases and perspectives; (iv) it helps the researcher 
examine the obtained results; and (v) it develops the link between themes and subthemes 
using ‘axial coding’. 
After analysing the interview data and identifying similarities and differences using 
the constant comparisons approach (Corbin and Strauss, 2008), the researcher started 
assembling ‘concepts’ using memos to determine axial codes. These axial codes relate 
concepts to the patterns and themes in the data. Figure 8.2 shows the coding structure used 
in this study. The axial codes (sub-themes) are identified to achieve integration (linking the 
concepts to the central themes). Themes can be defined as central issues derived from the 
coded data (Lichtman, 2013). Corbin and Strauss (2008) point out that the integration 
process relies on the following conditions: (i) the theme should be relevant and link to 
other themes; (ii) the theme should appear frequently in the data cases, and be a common 
denominator in most of the cases; and (iii) the theme must be logical and consistent with 
the data. Hence, to improve the reliability of the coding system, a constructed diagram of 
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themes emerging from the interview data was discussed with the researcher’s supervisor 
and academic colleagues.
66
 
Additionally, the interview transcripts were analysed with the help of software 
programs, such as Microsoft Word for data management. The researcher did not use any 
other software programs in coding the interview data, because such programs are time-
consuming, ineffective in interpreting the results and do not help explain the research 
issues in depth. For example, Gallagher (2007) and her research team used a software 
program in their study and found that the “software was effective for data management, but 
inadequate for nuanced and complex work of data analysis. The software package gave us 
style, but not substance… In effect, we returned to a manual coding system that respected 
the sheer quantity and complexity of qualitative data and the surrounding contexts” (as 
cited by Saldana, 2013, p.26). 
 
 
8.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
This chapter presented a discussion of qualitative methods used in this study to 
examine the awareness and appreciation of good corporate governance practices among 
key stakeholders to answer the sixth research sub-question. In addition, interviews were 
used to improve explanations of the findings obtained from qualitative data. The chapter 
addressed a number of issues. First, the theoretical framework of qualitative research and 
its importance in investigating the business environment generally and corporate 
governance particularly was discussed. The study employed qualitative methods to explore 
real-life governance issues. Also, reliability and validity in qualitative research were 
discussed briefly in the first section.  
Second, this chapter presented the data collection process using semi-structured 
interviews. More precisely, it discussed the selection of the interviewees. A total of fifteen 
interviews were conducted with members of five groups representing internal and external 
key stakeholders. These are the: (i) board of directors; (ii) executive management; (iii) 
audit firm partners; (iv) regulators; and (v) shareholders. The researcher developed two 
different interview guides for the interview questions. One was for internal key 
stakeholders and the other for external key stakeholders. Due to the interviewees’ positions 
                                                 
66
As previously noted the researcher presented and discussed the questions, the coding and the approach to 
analysis with colleagues and experienced researchers at several doctoral conferences and workshops, in 
addition to careful guidance and direction received from supervisors.  
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and the nature of the interviewer’s questions, one-to-one interviews were conducted. The 
chapter also discussed ethical issues considered before and after conducting the interviews.   
Third, the chapter discussed the data analysis procedure. The thematic analysis 
approach was used to analyse the interview data. The data was analysed in two phases: pre-
coding reading of interview transcripts and emerging themes, and, subsequently, analysing 
the emerging themes based on codes from the interviews.  
The next chapter presents the findings obtained from the interview data. 
Specifically, it explores stakeholders’ perceptions and appreciation of good corporate 
governance practices. In addition, it explores (qualitatively) the corporate governance 
reforms and their influence on firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
QUALITATIVE EMPIRICAL ANALYSES, 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
9. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter presents an analysis of the data gathered from interviews targeting five 
different key stakeholder groups, including boards of directors and executive management, 
as internal stakeholders, and audit firm partners, regulators and shareholders, as external 
stakeholders. Specifically, the chapter attempts to achieve four objectives. First, it explores 
the views of key stakeholders about corporate governance disclosure and transparency in 
Saudi listed firms. Particularly, the analysis explores the level of compliance with 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure and practitioners’ views on factors that 
influence the level of compliance. This analysis follows the corporate governance reforms 
through the establishment of the Capital Market Authority (CMA) and the release of the 
Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC).
67
  
Second, this chapter explores the interviewees’ perceptions about the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance. It looks at the 
influence of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms on firm financial 
performance and firm value in Saudi Arabia. Third, it explores the key stakeholders’ 
awareness and appreciation of good corporate governance practices in the context of Saudi 
business. Thus, it specifically investigates the impact of recent reforms in the governance 
regime on increasing awareness of good governance practices. Fourth, this chapter seeks to 
discuss the integration between the results from the interviews and the quantitative findings 
to provide richer insights into corporate governance developments in Saudi Arabia.  
 This chapter is structured to analyse the three main themes extracted from the 
coding system discussed in Chapter Eight, including: (i) disclosure and transparency; (ii) 
financial performance; and (iii) stakeholders’ awareness and appreciation of good 
corporate governance practices. Therefore, the chapter is organised as follows. Section 9.1 
discusses how practitioners evaluate corporate disclosure and transparency in Saudi listed 
firms. Section 9.2 investigates the assessment of the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm financial performance. Section 9.3 reviews the impact of 
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 As discussed in Chapter Two, the Saudi government started broad economic reforms at the beginning of 
the 2000s, which included reorganising the capital market and establishing the CMA in 2003, and issuing a 
number of corporate governance legislations, such as the Listing Rules in 2004 and the SCGC in 2006. 
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corporate governance reforms on the key stakeholders’ awareness and appreciation of good 
corporate governance practices. Section 9.4 discusses the integration between the 
quantitative results and the qualitative findings, while Section 9.5 presents a summary of 
the chapter. 
 
 
9.1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY 
Since the CMA was founded, corporate governance reforms have been pursued to 
penetrate the market and improve voluntary corporate governance disclosure. The most 
prominent reforms are those of the internal corporate governance framework, through 
issuing legislation, such as the SCGC, as guidelines to improve good governance practices. 
In this section, the level of compliance with the SCGC and voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure in Saudi listed firms is investigated from the key stakeholders’ perspectives. In 
addition, this section examines the factors that influence the level of compliance with 
corporate governance. In doing so, three main issues are addressed: (i) the board of 
directors; (ii) ownership concentration; and (iii) firm characteristics. The analysis of the 
interview data shows that the board of directors is the main driver in enhancing corporate 
governance, and performs a fundamental role in improving firms’ disclosure and 
transparency. Also, the key stakeholders’ views show that ownership concentration and 
firm characteristics are important factors in promoting accountability and establishing good 
corporate governance standards. 
The key stakeholders’ views on the above issues are presented as follows. 
Subsection 9.1.1 addresses the role of the board of directors in voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure. Subsection 9.1.2 examines the impact of ownership concentration 
on the level of compliance. Subsection 9.1.3 presents a view of the influence of firm 
characteristics on corporate governance. 
 
9.1.1 Board of Directors 
These subsections present the key internal and external stakeholders’ views about 
the relationship between: (i) independence of the board of directors; (ii) board size; (iii) the 
presence of a corporate governance committee; and (iv) the content of firms’ annual 
reports, and levels of compliance. A growing call in corporate governance literature to 
further understand boards of directors’ behaviour has led to a focus on boards of directors’ 
characteristics (Soobaroyen and Mahadeo, 2012). 
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(i) Independence of the Board of Directors 
As discussed in the corporate governance literature, the structure of the board of 
directors plays a central role in its effectiveness (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Allegrini and 
Greco, 2013). In this regard, most of the internal stakeholders’ views show that the 
independence of the board is important in reducing the personal interests of executives or 
management and protecting shareholders’ rights. In addition, independent directors are 
more capable of monitoring the firm’s management. Similarly, their presence helps ensure 
stakeholders’ interests are represented on the board.  
A member of a board of directors, B3, reports that firms with independent board 
members have better voluntary corporate governance disclosure. From his point of view, 
this indicates that the independence of board members helps establish good governance 
practices. However, B3 argues that large shareholders have the power to select the 
independent directors in some listed firms. Thus, he explains that large shareholders may 
appoint members who may be close relations as independents to achieve their interests, 
which is incompatible with real independence. This is in line with Piesse et al. (2012) 
explaining that large shareholders in Saudi listed firms have the apparent power to select 
directors. Therefore, from Piesse et al.’s point of view, independence and composition of 
the board of directors depends on large shareholders’ orientation. Article 2 of Part One of 
the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) defines independent directors as members 
of the board of directors with no direct interests in the company that may affect their 
independence. However, the code does not address a mechanism for verifying candidates’ 
independence. Similarly, B1 was of the view that the appointment of independents must be 
more transparent and should be controlled by the CMA to make it more objective. 
However, B1 reports,  
Specifying the criterion of being independent in the SCGC is a good step toward 
activating the role of the board. It is more likely that if the awareness of 
stakeholders is increased, the independence of boards of directors in Saudi listed 
firms will improve, especially when the shareholders exercise their rights 
regarding accountability and appoint directors through the general assembly.           
                                                                                                          (Interviewee B1) 
In the same vein, B2 shows that his firm had sought to enhance the independence of the 
board when the family firm transformed into a listed firm. Particularly, they appointed 
independent directors instead of some family members, and this enhanced investor 
confidence in their firm. However, B2 emphasises that the concept of independence is 
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relatively new in the context of Saudi business. This is supported by Ezzine (2011), who 
indicates that the concept of board of directors’ independency is still questionable. B2 
suggests that awareness of the importance of board independence may improve with time. 
In addition, key executive managers E2 and E3 agree that the absence of independence in 
the board may weaken a firm’s control system and adversely affect good governance 
practice. Hence, it can be noted from the key stakeholders’ views that there is a need to 
increase awareness among directors and shareholders about the importance of the role of 
independents and the mechanisms of their appointment. This is consistent with descriptive 
studies that attempt to understand corporate governance behaviour (e.g., Soobaroyen and 
Mahadeo, 2012; Alshehri and Solomon, 2012). 
Contrary to the interviewees’ views reported above, E1 argues that appointing 
independent directors instead of executive directors may not benefit the firm. E1 is of the 
view that independent directors may not have direct interests in the firm, and therefore may 
have a weak attachment to the firm, especially when they realise that their presence on the 
board is temporary.  
The key external stakeholders agree on the importance of independent directors. 
However, I2 explains that voluntary corporate governance disclosure does not necessarily 
depend only on the presence of independent members. I1 reported, fairly similarly, that 
independence is a good indicator of the effectiveness of the board, but is not enough to 
assess its success. This is in line with Solomon (2010), who suggests that some companies 
have a culture of disclosure and transparency; thus, the presence of independent directors 
may not increase the level of voluntary disclosure. 
Shareholder S3 points out that independence of the board is influenced by firm size. 
He emphasises that boards of directors of bigger firms, such as telecommunications and 
electricity companies, are more independent and have better levels of voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure than those of smaller firms. This is because of the efficiency of the 
company’s operation, the nature of their products and the presence of strategic plans. 
However, S3 suggests that directors in small firms focus more on their personal interests 
and the pursuit of individual gains during their time on the board. R1 is of the view that 
independence of the board makes investors more confident in the board’s performance. 
Thus, the stakeholders praise the SCGC’s recommendation to appoint independent 
directors
68
 as well as identify the independent directors in the firms’ annual reports. A 
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 The SCGC, in Article 12e, stipulates that the number of independent members of the board of directors 
shall not be less than two, or one third of all of the members, whichever is greater. 
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number of practitioners, B1, B3, E3, S1 and S2, are of the view that regulatory bodies 
should be more effective in ensuring the independence of directors.  
In this regard, Piesse et al. (2012) find that Saudi corporate governance legislation 
aims to enhance boards’ independence, but the reality is that large shareholders still control 
boards, which influences the boards’ effectiveness. However, the CMA notes the difficulty 
of finding a mechanism to examine the independence of directors. Similarly, R1 and R2, 
from the CMA, indicate that the SCGC identifies independence standards and seeks to 
increase awareness among stakeholders about the importance of independence of the 
board. Consequently, a nominations committee has to verify a candidate’s independence. 
Similar to this, R2 reflected that one Saudi listed firm appointed a CEO who was a brother 
of the chairperson. R2 feels that the shareholders should have objected to the appointment 
in the general assembly by exercising their right to accountability. This is supported by 
Vafeas (1999b) indicating that a nomination committee can contribute to effectively 
verifying the independence of directors.  
 
(ii) Board Size 
The key internal and external stakeholders agree on the importance of board size. 
Specifically, most of the interviewees’ views indicate that board size is associated with the 
expertise of board members, the number of board sub-committees, firm size and business 
activities. B3 is of the view that board size determines the quality of the board. 
Board composition is very critical; for example, there should be one or more 
specialists in finance, experts in business activities and other specialists in 
strategic planning in the board structure. Thus, diversifying directors’ experiences 
compensates for large board size.                                                    (Interviewee B3) 
This suggests that with larger boards, quality can be maintained if the directors’ 
composition is diverse, according to their area of expertise. Similarly, B1 is of the view 
that three factors determine board size: (i) the number of sub-committees formed by the 
board, and how well they are represented by the directors; (ii) firm size, related to the 
complexity of the capital structure; and (iii) the proportion of independent directors on the 
board, as recommended by the SCGC. Regarding this, I1 indicates that  
The board size should be judged on the grounds of quality, not quantity. It is 
important to achieve a balance within the board structure. For instance, some 
firms have very large boards, and this negatively impacts on decision-making 
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processes. Particularly, strategic decision-making is difficult in terms of achieving 
consensus inside the boardroom. However, a small board comes at the cost of the 
firm failing to take advantage of experience. Therefore, achieving a balance 
according to the size and needs of firms is important.                      (Interviewee I1) 
S1 and S3 agree about the importance of diversification of knowledge among board 
members. They explain that board size is important because of the board of directors’ 
ability to lead the firm to success. Contrary to the interviewees’ views reported above, I2 is 
of the view that a large board may be an obstacle to establishing good governance because 
of the difficulty of interaction among directors. Moreover, I2 suggests that a small board is 
better than a large board in terms of interaction and harmony among board members. 
Therefore, according to his view, small boards are better at exercising their monitoring 
role. Thus, I2 is of the opinion that executive directors are more likely to control and 
dominate the board orientations and agenda in large boards. 
However, S2 expresses concern that increasing the number of directors on the 
board may reduce the chance of directors prioritising their interests at the expense of 
outside shareholders. S2 relates a personal experience about large shareholders seeking to 
control small boards inside small firms. Interestingly, they remained members for a certain 
period, and then moved to the boards of other companies after achieving their personal 
interests. Thus, large boards might decrease the possibility of board members becoming 
allied with a firm’s management. In this regard, Soobaroyen and Mahadeo (2012) indicate 
the importance of corporate governance reforms by introducing codes to limit the 
dominance of executive directors on the board. 
R2, from the CMA, states that a regulatory body cannot force companies to have a 
certain number of directors, due to the variation among firms in terms of the nature and 
complexity of their business. However, the SCGC determines appropriate board size as 
between three and eleven members. The participants report fairly similar views on the 
difficulty of imposing a certain number of directors in companies. They note the 
importance of diverse qualifications in improving board quality. 
 
(iii) Presence of Corporate Governance Committee  
The corporate governance committee aims to ensure the effective implementation 
of corporate governance mechanisms (Ntim et al., 2012a). Some Saudi listed firms have 
recently formed corporate governance committees. It is important to note that the internal 
and external stakeholders held similar views on this matter, claiming that the presence of a 
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corporate governance committee can improve corporate governance practices and 
corporate disclosure in particular. However, B2 responds that the presence of an active 
internal control system eliminates the need for such a committee. Also, B2 mentions that 
compliance should be a part of firm culture, to ensure permanent compliance with 
corporate governance standards. Similar to the above views, I2 states,  
Encouraging and achieving good governance practices must stem from the 
conviction of the board of directors; the committee may not be successful without 
this motivation. Therefore, corporate governance is made up of practices, not the 
instructions and decisions of committees.                                          (Interviewee I2) 
Similarly, E3 is of the view that a large number of committees is not in the interest of 
firms; on the contrary, the presence of a corporate governance committee may be useful if 
it is temporary and created for the establishment of good governance practices.  
B3 maintains that the implementation of corporate governance is supposed to be 
part of the internal control system in a firm. Also, he reports that implementing a good 
governance system in the firm can be achieved by introducing a governance code. 
Furthermore, B3 explains that he is a director in two firms which have their own 
governance codes. These governance codes helped the firms to establish good governance 
and corporate disclosure practices. This is also consistent with the findings of Al-Matari et 
al. (2012), who note that releasing governance codes helps top management and the board 
of directors become aware of their responsibilities and obligations in terms of the 
principles of corporate governance.  
R3, from the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), reports that a corporate governance 
committee may impact positively on the level of compliance, but the increased cost should 
be considered. However, R3 indicates that an audit committee can supervise the 
implementation of corporate governance, if it has the ability and strength to supervise. This 
is not consistent with Al-Twaijry et al. (2002), who find that audit committees in Saudi 
companies have not performed as expected. This implies that tasking the audit committee 
with monitoring corporate governance standards can overburden them. They might not be 
able to perform their own duties properly. Thus, it may not be appropriate to assign an 
audit committee to follow up the implementation of corporate governance standards. 
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(iv) Contents of Firms’ Annual Reports  
With respect to voluntary corporate governance disclosure in firms’ annual reports, 
the interviewees are of the view that there has been clear improvement in the content of 
these reports since 2006. This is due to the governance reforms and some legislation, such 
as the Listing Rules in 2004, serving as a guide to improve the content of the reports.
69
 In 
addition, the 2006 SCGC constitutes guidelines for adopting corporate governance 
standards. 
S2 points out that there has been an apparent improvement in firms’ annual reports 
have become include financial and non-financial information. It is noted that the reports 
issued before the governance reforms were brief and did not contain meaningful 
disclosure. Similar to the view mentioned above, E3 states that the following up by the 
CMA has contributed to improving the firms’ annual reports, specifically their compliance 
with voluntary disclosure. This is in line with Alshehri and Solomon (2012), who claim 
that the recent corporate governance regulations guided Saudi firms to improve their 
annual reports significantly. 
B3 states that firms’ current annual reports contain more disclosure; for example, 
disclosure about the ownership structure and details of compensation and remuneration 
paid to directors and top management, which was not previously disclosed. Furthermore, 
parts of the reports describe and assess the firms’ internal control systems. However, E2 
expresses that there is variation between sectors in terms of disclosure volume. For 
example, financial firms and most industrial firms have more voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure in their annual reports. Contrary to the interviewees’ views reported 
above, E2 argues that those reports still do not contribute to enhancing investment 
decisions, despite the improvement in the volume of information. Similar to E2’s view, I3 
reports,  
 Looking at the firms’ annual reports for a long time, I have noticed that some 
firms comply with the mandatory provisions, while the indicative provisions still 
have limited compliance. This means that compliance is at the minimum level to 
satisfy and fulfil the CMA’s requirements.                                       (Interviewee I3) 
 
I2 is of the view that external auditors’ opinions about the content of firms’ annual reports 
should be added to the reports. This is consistent with Haniffa and Hudaib (2007), who 
indicate that auditors are trusted by shareholders in the Saudi stock market. Therefore, 
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 Article 27 of the Listing Rules determines the minimum disclosure requirements in the annual reports of all 
listed companies, both financial and non-financial. 
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information included in the annual reports can be reviewed by auditors to increase 
confidence in the reports and improve the quality of information. R2, from the CMA, 
explains that the CMA has established the Continuous Disclosure Department to review 
firms’ reports annually, so that it can provide observations about the weaknesses of reports 
and ways to improve them. In addition, R2 responds that improvement can be seen in the 
reports after 2006, as a result of the corporate governance reforms in Saudi Arabia. 
Overall, it can be noted from the key internal and external stakeholders’ views that 
independence of the board of directors is an important factor in improving governance 
practices. However, the majority of interviewees emphasise the need to develop a 
mechanism for appointing independent directors to make the process transparent in Saudi 
listed firms. In addition, the interviewees are of the view that board size is related to 
diversity of experiences, number of board sub-committees and firm size. Thus, it is 
important to achieve a balance between board size and the monitoring role of the board.  
The interviewees agree that the presence of a corporate governance committee can 
improve corporate disclosure and transparency. However, the stakeholders argue that 
governance practices should be part of the firm culture. Thus, it is not necessary to 
establish a corporate governance committee, as the presence of an effective internal control 
system and internal governance code can be enough. It can be noted from the practitioners’ 
views that a gradual improvement in firms’ annual reports has recently been noted. 
However, some of the interviewees reported that there is variation in the volume of 
information in these reports, according to industry type. 
 
9.1.2 Ownership Concentration 
This subsection presents the interviewees’ views about the relationship between 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure and ownership concentration, including 
government, institutional, block and director ownership. There is a high proportion of 
government ownership among firms on the Saudi stock market.
70
 The interviewees are of 
the view that government ownership of listed firms provides stability in the firms’ boards 
and performance. S1 claims that government investment in certain companies increases 
investor confidence in these companies; investors expect that these firms are low-risk 
firms. Similar to the views mentioned above, S3 points out that firms with high 
government ownership have more independent boards of directors, since personal interests 
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 As discussed in Chapter Six, government ownership is concentrated in a number of listed firms, 
representing about 42% of the total stock market value in 2010. Government ownership is concentrated in 
strategic firms, such as telecommunications, electricity and petrochemical firms. 
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are no longer in conflict with public interest. Furthermore, I3 is of the view that 
government ownership in the board helps to secure necessary funding sources for the firm. 
It is also noted from S3’s and I3’s views that government representatives in boards of 
directors usually act in the public’s interest and mitigate interventions of other large 
shareholders. This is not consistent with Mahadeo and Soobaroyen (2012), who find that 
firms with high government ownership in emerging countries must make greater efforts in 
improving voluntary governance disclosure. 
Some interviewees reported that the board’s functioning in these firms is 
characterised by bureaucracy, despite the fact that government-owned firms are often 
successful. B2 is of the view that government ownership hinders firm growth due to slow 
decision-making. However, B2 also believes that the success of these firms is attributed to 
the fact that they almost dominate the industry. For example, government ownership in the 
Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), one of the largest petrochemical companies 
in the world, is 70%. Executive director E1 describes the relationship between his firm and 
government ownership, 
It was an agreement with the government to establish a subsidiary company to 
accomplish a vital project. The representation in the board of directors is a mix of 
the government and our company representation. As a result, the representatives of 
the government hinder the board’s performance due to their government 
background.-                                                                                    (Interviewee E1)                                                                                                                                       
Similar to E1’s view, I2 agrees that the government’s slow decision-making and 
bureaucratic working style reduces the productivity of the board of directors. This is in line 
with Piesse et al. (2012). They point out that political connections and social norms 
influence the appointment of qualified directors in firms with high government ownership. 
Interestingly, though government ownership is not a condition to improve firm 
performance, it possibly helps stabilise the board and improve disclosure. 
Institutional investors were given much attention in the literature on governance as 
key players in the stock market (Aggarwal et al., 2011). The practitioners also point out the 
importance of institutional investment, despite the fact that there is no significant 
institutional investment in the Saudi stock market. B1 reports,  
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The institutional investors in Saudi listed firms are still performing as short-term 
investors. Therefore, they are not contributing to improving corporate voluntary 
disclosure and the level of compliance.                                            (Interviewee B1) 
Also, I2 emphasises the importance of institutional ownership to small investors, claiming,  
When I decide to make an investment in a company, I prefer and have more 
confidence in a company in which institutional investors have invested. 
                                                                                                            (Interviewee I1) 
                                                                                                -                                                                                                      
 I2 is also of the view that if the CMA requires the disclosure of institutional ownership, it 
should impose such a regulation even if the institutional ownership is less than 5%.
71
 This 
could help small investors make decisions about investing in such companies. 
Block ownership is a key factor influencing the level of compliance with corporate 
governance (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). B1’s views indicate that block ownership 
usually impacts negatively on good governance practices. Specifically, block holders have 
the power to appoint directors who work in their interest. In this regard, B3’s views 
suggest that block ownership may affect the independence of the board. He reports a story 
of a listed firm where he was a board member, 
The block shareholders appointed a CEO (and managing directors as well); 
however, such appointment usually causes a decrease of the board’s independence 
and also weakens the board’s role in monitoring firm’s management.  
                                                                                                          (Interviewee B3) 
I3 is of the view that block shareholders influence board decisions and the agenda of the 
general assembly. Thus, the influence of block shareholders on the board of directors 
adversely reflects on the interests of small shareholders. 
On the other hand, the key internal and external stakeholders argue that director 
ownership improves board performance. S3’s views indicate that board ownership is an 
incentive to improve firm value. Furthermore, the board of directors seeks to increase 
voluntary corporate disclosure to attract potential investors. This is supported by Piesse et 
al. (2012), who indicate that board ownership in Saudi firms is concentrated among 
families as strategic investors. This helps in enhancing the board of directors’ performance. 
S3 reports an example of a company which performed well financially when directors 
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 The CMA requires that listed firms disclose any ownership that is equivalent to 5% or more of the firm’s 
shares. 
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made up a high proportion of the firm’s capital structure. This firm became a loss-making 
firm after the directors reduced their ownership and left the board. This is because it was 
managed by new directors, who did not have a direct interest in the company. 
S2 reports that directors’ interests are not supposed to conflict with outside 
shareholders’ interests, as they all have the same goal (high firm value). In the same vein, 
I3 is of the view that directors with high ownership should appoint qualified directors and a 
management team. This is in line with Soobaroyen and Mahadeo (2012), who indicate that 
the corporate governance reforms in Mauritius led to the increased directors’ awareness of 
corporate governance.  
However, I2 describes that the presence of board members with more ownership 
may reduce the overall independence of the board. I2 is also of the view that this is not a 
severe problem when looking at a number of successful Saudi companies which have high 
board ownership. These firms generally perform better, as observed from their growing 
market value.  
 The board of directors’ interviewees point out that director ownership enhances 
firm performance and improves corporate disclosure and transparency. For example, B2 
reports,  
An increase in voluntary corporate governance disclosure is protection for 
directors’ investments. In addition, compliance with corporate governance 
standards is strong, from both the internal and external shareholders alike. This is 
because it protects the board and firm from any accountability which may damage 
the board and firm’s reputation.                                                       (Interviewee B2                                                                  
B3 explains that the spread of ownership leads to a lack of control over the firm’s 
management, given that the board may not perform its monitoring role efficiently. In 
contrast, S1 argues that high board ownership is important, but may not alone ensure the 
firm’s success. Therefore, the board of directors is required to maintain a certain degree of 
professionalism and good governance. Furthermore, the board should have plans and 
objectives to be achieved in the future. This is supported by Baydoun et al., (2013), who 
point out that international banks hesitated to lend money to a particular Saudi company 
because of the absence of good corporate governance practices among its board of 
directors.  
To summarise, the interviewees agree that the level of compliance and corporate 
disclosure are better in firms with high government ownership, despite government 
ownership hindering firm growth due to its bureaucratic work style. Interviewees’ 
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responses indicate that government ownership is usually concentrated in large listed firms, 
decreasing uncertainty and increasing investor confidence. The key stakeholders point out 
that institutional investment in Saudi listed firms is still below the desired level, indicating 
that institutional investors, though by definition long-term investors, act like short-term 
investors. Therefore, institutional investment does not affect the improvement of corporate 
disclosure and transparency. Additionally, the interviewees emphasise that block 
ownership is usually negatively associated with good governance practices because block 
owners are devoted to their own interests, at the expense of small investors’ interests. 
However, all practitioners agree that board ownership leads to an active and efficient board 
of directors, improved firm performance and growth in market value. 
 
9.1.3 Firm Characteristics 
This subsection addresses the interviewees’ perceptions about firm characteristics, 
including: (i) level of compliance; (ii) audit firm size; (iii) firm internal control system; and 
(iv) firm size and culture, and their influence on good corporate governance practices. 
First, as discussed in Chapters One and Two, in early 2006, the Saudi stock market 
witnessed a dramatic crash
72
 which pushed the supervisory body to introduce the SCGC in 
November 2006. Liew (2007) finds that the 1997/1998 Asian crisis created an urgent need 
to issue corporate governance codes in Asian countries. The interviewees agree that the 
level of compliance with corporate governance standards in listed firms has improved. B1 
responds that there has been progress in strengthening compliance with the code’s 
provisions. This, in his view, is due to a rise in boards of directors’ appreciation of good 
corporate governance practices. 
Furthermore, B2’s views indicate that the CMA sought to increase confidence in 
the stock market after the crash by issuing governance legislation. B2 reports that the 
CMA’s performance is fairly convincing in this regard, specifically by raising awareness 
among shareholders and directors alike about the importance of corporate governance. 
Also, E1 and E2 argue that the improvement in voluntary corporate governance disclosure 
can be noted by looking at firms’ annual reports. These reports, in recent years, have 
become more comprehensive by including financial and non-financial information. This is 
consistent with Al-Matari et al. (2012) indicating that releasing corporate governance 
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 As discussed in Chapter Two, the Saudi stock market witnessed a dramatic drop in 2006. Specifically, it 
lost about 53% of its market value. The index was about 16,700 at the beginning of 2006, and dropped to 
about 7,900 by the end of 2006 (SFG, 2009; Tadawul, 2012).   
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regulations in Saudi Arabia has improved the quality of firms’ annual report. From the 
above argument, it can be deduced that such improvement in corporate disclosure has 
helped reduce information asymmetry. Audit firm partners also find that the levels of 
disclosure and transparency have gradually improved in recent years. I1 reports,  
I can refer the improvement to either: (i) the company's culture, and therefore the 
recent governance reforms will strengthen that commitment; or (ii) compliance only 
to meet the requirements of the CMA and the fear of fines, and this may affect the 
quality of compliance.                                                                           (Interviewee I1) 
However, E2 emphasises that the regulatory authority and firms still need to work 
together to improve the quality of voluntary governance disclosure. On the other hand, E3 
explains that it is unclear whether the improvement in compliance is due to awareness of 
board of directors. In this regard, E2 was of the view that a lack of social responsibility 
may be evidence that Saudi firms comply with the minimum requirements of the 
legislation. Liew (2007) indicates that Asian countries that adopt a shareholders-based 
system do not widely focus on social responsibility. Thus, it is important to establish good 
corporate governance as a culture, rather than complying because of a fear of 
consequences.  
I3 expresses that there is variation among firms in terms of compliance, where 
some are committed to most of the provisions and some adhere only to the mandatory 
provisions. In interviews, the shareholders point out that the level of compliance is 
relatively good considering the short time since the governance reforms. Nevertheless, they 
are still looking forward to more compliance with corporate governance and an increase in 
voluntary disclosure. For example, S2 states, 
It is true that we have been noticing improvement in corporate disclosure, but we 
wish to increase penalties for non-compliant firms by the CMA, especially those 
firms that do not comply with the provisions that are directly related to 
shareholders’ rights. This makes them comply more with important provisions in 
the SCGC.                                                                                        (Interviewee S2) 
 
Similarly, S1 suggests that a mechanism should be developed to reduce the variation in the 
level of compliance between firms, where some firms need more transparent disclosure. 
On the other hand, R2, from the CMA, argues that investors play a central role in forcing 
firms to improve their level of disclosure; he states,  
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The investors have a responsibility to assess the firm’s governance practices. 
However, when they find disclosure or transparency lacking, it is supposed that the 
demand for that company can decrease. Thus, whenever investors look for 
companies that have good voluntary disclosure, this may force poorly governed 
firms to improve their disclosure to attract investors.                      (Interviewee R2)                                               
R1 indicates that the CMA had conducted a study about the obligation of listed firms to 
publish their quarterly financial statements within 15 working days after the end of the 
financial period. The CMA found that the compliance rate was 40% in 2005, and increased 
to 95% in 2009, after its establishment in 2003. It can be noted that the level of compliance 
with the SCGC improved among listed firms since the initiation of the governance reforms. 
This is supported by Soobaroyen and Mahadeo (2012), who find that implementing 
corporate governance codes can increase compliance in devolving countries.    
Second, the literature on corporate governance suggests that audit firm size affects 
the quality of auditing and the level of corporate disclosure (Barako et al., 2006; Schiehll 
et al., 2013). In the interviews, some stakeholders identify the significant role of audit 
firms in increasing the reliability of information. S2 emphasises that investors and 
shareholders have become aware of the importance of appointing reputable audit firms. S2 
explains that it has recently been noticed that shareholders require firms to appoint big 
audit firms. This implies that audit firm size is essential in enhancing confidence in 
corporate disclosure. I3 emphasises the necessary differentiation between big and small 
audit firms. For example, small audit firms confine their work to the minimum 
requirements of the profession; however, big audit firms examine the client’s internal 
control system to evaluate its efficiency before approving the procedures.  
Similarly, I1 explains how one firm refused to engage with a big-four audit firm 
because the auditor objected to how the firm treated the Drop-in Securities Value 
provision. I1 points out that big-four audit firms ask to view a company’s profile and 
documents, including their annual report, before signing the engagement letter. One of the 
issues raised by I1 is that the governance legislation does not explain exactly what is 
required from audit firms regarding disclosure in firms’ annual reports. It can be suggested 
from I2’s views that audit firms should offer their observations on the quality of disclosure 
in the firms’ annual reports. This is supported by Haniffa and Hudaib (2007), who find that 
in Saudi Arabia, shareholders’ confidence in firm performance relies on auditors’ reports. 
Therefore, the auditor’s role should not be limited to examining financial statements, but 
should also ensure the quality of governance disclosure.  
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Third, most respondents assumed that a firm’s corporate governance system is 
related to its internal control system. B1 suggests that a good internal control system 
emerges from the board of directors’ belief that a control system can protect their firm’s 
assets. B1 states,  
The board of directors should work to strengthen internal control because this will 
reflect positively on the board of directors’ performance. Furthermore, the 
interaction between the board and internal control should be regular and 
transparent.                                                                                       (Interviewee B1) 
B2 and I2 point out that strengthening the internal control system helps protect 
shareholders’ rights; in addition, they emphasise the importance of the audit committee in 
activating the internal control system. I1 claims that the internal control system is one of 
the components of good governance practices. Thus, companies that have an active internal 
control system imply that they have good corporate governance. E1’s views indicate that 
his firm has an internal control system that has been linked directly to the board of 
directors. He explains,  
The existence of an active internal control system benefits firm top management in 
two ways: (i) the existence of an internal auditor as an independent party to assess 
management performance; and (ii) to evaluate the firm’s general performance 
continuously.                                                                                     (Interviewee E1) 
On the other hand, I3 talks about his experience of nearly 20 years in internal auditing 
before moving to external auditing. He says,  
Saudi firms do not have documentation of an internal control system. This weakens 
their role due to the absence of a mechanism that could possibly adjust its work. --- 
            (Interviewee I3) 
This is supported by Haniffa and Hudaib (2007), who find that most Saudi listed firms do 
not pay attention to the internal control system.   
The interviewees’ views indicate that shareholders should make a point of looking 
at a firm’s internal control system to protect their rights. S2 asserts that a good control 
system enhances confidence in the management’s performance. Moreover, S2 explains that 
shareholders cannot ask directors about their daily business activities. Thus, the internal 
control system performs on behalf of shareholders in protecting the firm’s resources. In the 
same vein, S1 reports a story of a listed firm where an internal auditor had objected to 
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paying undeserved incentives to the board chairperson. This objection was appreciated by 
the firm’s shareholders and potential investors. 
However, R3 states that despite the regulators’ efforts to raise awareness of the 
concept of internal control, some companies still do not acknowledge or work with this 
concept. For example, it has been noted that internal auditors are structurally connected to 
the board of directors, but in practice work under the CEO’s control, which limits 
achievement of the objectives of the internal control system. 
Fourth, firm size and culture are considered to influence the level of compliance 
with governance standards (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). B3 is of the view that firm size is 
usually associated with the number of qualified directors in the firm; he notes that large 
firms are more able to attract eligible board members. Also, eligible directors do not risk 
their reputations by participating in small firms. Furthermore, large firms are less affected 
by the personal interests of directors. B2 argues that large firms provide better protection 
of stakeholders’ interests by increasing their representation on the board. Similarly, S3 is 
of the view that boards of directors in large firms are more stable than those in small ones. 
These views indicate that the boards of directors in large firms improve firm performance. 
On the other hand, B3 is of the view that a firm’s culture, presence of vision and mission 
improve its performance. B3 reports,  
The presence of a company's identity and strategic plan, and increasing incentives, 
would enhance the board function and increase the efficiency of management. ----           
           (Interviewee B3)  
I1’s views indicate that the culture of a firm with regards to its appreciation of corporate 
governance helps shareholders exercise their rights. For example, some firms allow 
shareholders to vote remotely, thus giving them the opportunity to participate in the 
general assembly from outside the meeting room. This is consistent with Liew’s (2007) 
suggestion that corporate governance is a culture rather than only a practice, which ensures 
better compliance with governance standards. 
Overall, the interviewees agree that the level of compliance with the SCGC has 
shown gradual improvement since its introduction in 2006. However, the interviewees’ 
views suggest that investors should invest in companies that have good disclosure. 
Moreover, interviewees are of the view that internal control is part of a firm’s corporate 
governance system. Thus, implementation of an internal control system can improve 
corporate governance practices. However, some practitioners point out the importance of 
firm size and culture in voluntary corporate governance disclosure. Also, they identify that 
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large firms are attractive to qualified directors and explain that a firm’s culture helps 
shareholders exercise their rights.  
 
 
9.2 FIRM FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
This section explores the key stakeholders’ perceptions of the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms on the financial performance of Saudi listed firms. Particularly, 
Subsection 9.2.1 presents an analysis of the key stakeholders’ perceptions of the 
relationship between internal corporate mechanisms and firm performance. Subsection 
9.2.2 addresses the key stakeholders’ perceptions about the relationship between external 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. 
 
9.2.1 Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
There are a number of key internal governance mechanisms that can improve firm 
performance and maximise shareholders’ profit. Specifically, this subsection investigates: 
(i) the influence of the presence of executives on the board; (ii) CEO duality; (iii) the 
frequency of board meetings; (iv) board independence; (v) board size; (vi) presence of 
board sub-committees; and (vii) managerial ownership and board compensation. 
It is found that stakeholders held different views regarding the presence of 
executives on the board. Some report that executive directors are usually less accountable. 
However, B2, a non-executive director, argues that executive directors have more 
information about firms. He suggests that non-executives could be utilised by making them 
attending board meetings as non-members. B2 and E3 are of the view that the board acts as 
a supervisory authority over executives’ performance. These views suggest that the 
presence of executives weakens the board’s role as a monitor. Shareholder S1 is of the 
view that executives’ membership in the board reduces shareholders’ and investors’ 
confidence in the board. He reports, 
Executive directors have the ability to influence board meeting agendas and 
determine the subjects under discussion. They also possess the power to pass 
whatever they want or to reject what they do not want.                    (Interviewee S1)  
This is in line with Soobaroyen and Mahadeo (2012), who find that it is difficult for non-
executive members to criticise executives’ performance or assess their performance 
impartially. 
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However, B1 states that the creation of active committees can limit the influence of 
the executives on the board of directors. Similar to the view above, E1 points out that it is 
necessary to include executives on the board of directors to develop the link between the 
board and top management. However, E1 stresses the need for the active accountability of 
executive directors, even if they are board members. In addition, there is an obvious need 
to draw a line between the board and executive directors. E1 highlights the importance of 
the role of the chairperson in addressing any attempt by executives to abuse their power. 
Similarly, E2’s and I2’s views support the presence of CEOs as board members; for 
example, E2 reports,  
It is in the interest of the company and accelerates the decision-making. Also, this 
helps the company achieve its goals.                                                (Interviewee E2) 
In contrast, key internal stakeholders do not support CEO duality. Practitioners B1, B2, B3, 
E2 and E1 are of the view that CEO duality reduces board power and may marginalise 
some board members, especially independent directors. The practitioners’ views are 
generally positive on the relationship between the frequency of board meetings and firm 
financial performance. For example, I1 reports,  
During the past years, there has been growing awareness about the importance of 
board meetings among directors, and firms have been meeting continually. For 
example, boards of directors discuss the quarterly financial statements in detail. ---          
                                                                                    (Interviewee I1) 
Furthermore, he states that frequent board meetings are essential during expansions or 
difficulties faced by the company. However, there is no need for many meetings during 
normal performance, with no operating problems. 
Conversely, I2 is of the view that a firm may have many meetings but their 
productivity may be weak, and vice versa. Therefore, I2 suggests that it is important for the 
remuneration committee to evaluate board performance. I2 reports an incident within a 
firm where the company had consecutive meetings and high productivity. But when a new 
board of directors was elected, the number of meetings was reduced, yet the firm’s 
performance continued progressively. This is in line with Vafeas (1999a) indicating that 
the number of meetings should depend on the strategy set up by the board and its 
implementation.  
Shareholders S2 and S3 are of the view that companies are greatly affected by their 
local and global surroundings, which reflect on their financial performance. They believe 
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boards of directors are required to meet frequently. Also, B3 reports that the number of 
meetings in his firm is determined by two aspects, the strategic plan and the volume of 
projects. He reports,  
The effectiveness of meetings is more important than the number of meetings. 
Therefore, it is important to inform members about the meeting agenda and 
provide them with sufficient time for the paperwork. Furthermore, the results of 
board sub-committee meetings must be robustly presented in board meetings.  
                                                                                                         (Interviewee B3) 
B2, E1, E3 and I3 are of the view that the minimum number of meetings should normally 
be four in a year, on a quarterly basis, to discuss the quarterly financial statements. They 
also point out the importance of deciding a schedule of meetings at the start of the year. 
This ensures that meeting times do not conflict with other events. The interviewees’ views 
indicate that this strategy ensures attendance at meetings by most of the members, if not all 
of them. R2, from the CMA, explains that the exact number of meetings in a year is not 
specified by the governance code. It encourages a number of meetings, in accordance with 
the firm’s needs and its circumstances. Generally, the practitioners believe that the 
frequency of board meetings does not necessarily impact on firm financial performance.  
Some stakeholders address the influence of independent directors on firm financial 
performance. B2 is of the view that appointing independent directors improves firm 
performance by protecting outside shareholders’ interests. Also, B1 highlights that the 
CMA did well in mandating that a third of every board must be made up of independent 
directors to limit exploitation by inside directors. 
It is important to note that some of the interviewees distinguish between large and 
small firms when examining the relationship between independence of the board of 
directors and financial performance. S3 argues that independent directors are more 
preferred in small firms than in large firms, where executive directors are more capable of 
influencing firm policies. Furthermore, shareholders do not exercise their right of making 
directors of large firms accountable in general assemblies. 
With respect to the relationship between board size and firm performance, some 
practitioners prefer to balance between the number of members and the availability of 
expertise and knowledge. B2 and I1 are of the view that large boards face difficulties 
working inside the boardroom and making decisions. Furthermore, B1 reports that the 
number of board sub-committees is an important element in determining appropriate board 
size. However, S2 argues that a larger board may be most efficient in protecting 
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shareholders’ rights. Thus, the stakeholders’ views indicate that directors of small boards 
are more likely to have collusion than those of large boards. 
On the other hand, the interviewees agree on the importance of board sub-
committees in improving board performance. This is consistent with Al-Twaijry et al. 
(2002), who find that stakeholders in Saudi Arabia were of the view that board sub-
committees, such as audit committees, provide protection for shareholders. In this regard, 
B2 emphasises that board sub-committees are part of the board of directors, and contribute 
to its effectiveness. B2 also reports that his firm has four board sub-committees: audit, 
remuneration and nominations, executive, and investment. All of these committees include 
one or more members from the board of directors. Similarly, I1 mentions that the role of 
committees helps the board in making decisions: 
For example, the audit committee provides reliable information to the board of 
directors, which helps the board improve its financial performance. 
                                                                                                            (Interviewee I1) 
B1 and B3 point out the importance of the presence of directors in committees. According 
to them, this assists in building communication channels with the board and increases the 
interaction between the board and the committees. Similar to this, E1’s views indicate that 
committees should include experts from outside the board to ensure their success. E2 
suggests that the efficient performance of committees reduces the need for frequent board 
meetings, so board costs affect firm financial performance less.  
On the other hand, I3 is of the view that some committees may not be significantly 
important or necessarily required: 
The executive committee or ‘mini board’ conflicts with board tasks because their 
responsibilities are similar. Perhaps this committee is useful for temporary 
purposes or when its objective is to pursue tasks that are not permanent. 
                                                                                                           (Interviewee I3)  
In this regard, S1 and S2 emphasise that the membership of executives makes committees 
work in accordance with the directions from the board of directors. For example, if the 
remuneration committee includes executive directors, they may be influenced by their 
direct interests in higher compensation. In the same vein, R1and R3, from the CMA, 
emphasise the need to examine the independence of committee members before appointing 
them. S3 agrees with all other participants on the importance of committees, and he 
suggests considering the size of a firm when determining the number of committees. For 
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example, small firms probably do not need many committees, while large firms may 
require many committees; for example, an investment committee to assist the board of 
directors.  
However, I1 and E3 respond that there are three main committees, audit, 
nominations and remuneration. Thus, an increase in the number of committees may not 
necessarily benefit the firm. In this regard, R2 reports,  
The Saudi governance code requires the establishment of three key committees. 
Furthermore, the governance legislation seeks to increase awareness of the 
importance of the committees.                                                          (Interviewee R2)  
Thus, the interviewees report fairly similar views that the effectiveness of the committees 
may reduce the burden on the board and speed up board decisions. Therefore, firms should 
be concerned about the number, size and quality of committees. Since 2008, the Saudi 
Corporate Governance Code has forced listed firms to establish an audit committee, while 
nominations and remuneration committees were made mandatory staring in 2011. 
Regarding this, Piesse et al. (2012) find that board sub-committees in Saudi listed firms are 
still in the early stages, and stakeholders must develop greater awareness of their 
importance. 
The majority of interviewees agree that managerial ownership has a positive 
influence on firm financial performance. Additionally, they reveal that a number of 
profitable firms have directors with high ownership in the firm. B3 argues that the absence 
of managerial ownership may weaken board performance and exploit firms’ resources. 
Also, E2, I1 and I2 maintain that managerial ownership can help a company achieve its 
objective of maximising profit.  
Shareholders noted that investors care about director ownership, especially strategic 
ownership. S3 is of the view that directors who have shares in the firm are more motivated 
to improve its performance. Similar to the views in Subsection 9.1.2, S2 suggests that there 
is no conflict of interest between managers and shareholders because they have similar 
aspirations of maximising firm value. 
Some participants consider board compensation a sensitive issue in firm 
performance. B1’s views link board compensation with firm profitability: 
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Paying the directors as a proportion of the firm’s profit instead of a fixed amount73 
would motivate the board to perform better. Moreover, regulatory bodies hold the 
board of directors responsible for the firm’s assets and equity. Therefore, the 
current compensation system is not relative to the volume of responsibilities. 
                                                                                               (Interviewee B1) 
Similarly, S1 argues that some firms pay higher board compensation, even when it does 
not match the board’s achievements. 
In sum, it is interesting to observe a variation between the views of internal and 
external stakeholders about the relationship between the presence of executives on the 
board of directors and firm financial performance. Some practitioners believe that CEO 
duality may eliminate the role of independent directors on the board. In contrast, there is 
agreement among the interviewees about increasing awareness of the importance of board 
meetings. Also, the majority of stakeholders prefer a balance between board size and the 
presence of experts and committees. The stakeholders indicate that board sub-committees 
help the board in making decisions. They also agree that the independence of committees 
and annual assessment of their performance helps increase their effectiveness. Also, 
stakeholders point out that managerial ownership is positively associated with firm 
performance and leads the firm to achieve its goals. However, some stakeholders point out 
the importance of connecting board compensation with firm performance, which stimulates 
the board to work efficiently. 
 
9.2.2 External Corporate Governance Mechanisms   
This subsection presents an analysis of the interviewees’ perspectives on the 
influence of external corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance among Saudi 
listed firms. Specifically, it addresses three important external governance mechanisms, 
including: (i) the market for corporate control; (ii) strengthening the financial market; and 
(iii) allowing foreign investment. 
The majority of key internal and external stakeholders agreed that the Saudi stock 
market is still inefficient, where the market value is not associated with firm financial 
performance and voluntary corporate governance disclosure. The majority of stakeholders’ 
views indicate that the corporate control mechanism may not be appropriately effective in 
the Saudi stock market. I1 reports,  
                                                 
73
 As discussed in Chapter Two, the 1965 Companies Act stipulates that the annual board compensation 
should be a maximum of $53,000 for each member, with a maximum of 10% of the total profits for all of the 
firms’ members. 
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There is supposed to be a positive relationship between firm value and firm 
performance. Therefore, firm performance is expected to reflect the preferences of 
investors. Despite this fact, this is not the case with all of the firms in the Saudi 
stock market.                                                                                      (Interviewee I1) 
In the same spirit, it can be noted from E2’s view that the lack of awareness among 
investors impacts negatively on their preferences. E2’s views indicate that although the 
CMA is striving to change investors’ perceptions about corporate governance and 
corporate disclosure, there is insufficient awareness of investment decisions. S1 and S2 
maintain that the stock market still does not act as a mechanism to improve corporate 
governance. Though there are some companies with high market value, their corporate 
governance practices are poor. This is supported by Alshehri and Solomon (2012), who 
point out that the Saudi stock market needs to expand its market base (i.e. increase the 
number of listed firms) to strengthen the market for corporate control as an external 
governance mechanism. 
Consistent with the shareholders’ view, members of boards of directors believe that 
the Saudi stock market still does not effectively penalise non-compliant companies. B1 and 
B2 are of the view that the presence of speculators in the market hinders the maturity of the 
market as an external mechanism – ‘market for corporate control’. B3 stresses that the 
CMA made an effort to reduce the impact of speculation by restricting the change in prices 
of shares by 10% to the upper and lower bounds daily. B3 reveals that gradual 
improvement in investors’ awareness about their investment in successful companies has 
been observed. From the above argument, it can be noted that investment in companies 
with good corporate disclosure will make poorly governed companies improve their 
performance or suffer a decrease in firm value. This is in line with Liew (2007), who 
indicates that potential investors are attracted to firms with good corporate governance 
practices.  
The CMA emphasises symmetric information, so that investors can make decisions 
based on the same available and reliable information. R1 mentions that shareholders were 
greatly influenced by informal information in the past. However, a good proportion of 
investors are currently looking for official sources of information on the stock market 
website. Furthermore, R2 explains that the regulatory body is working to penalise 
companies that do not comply with some corporate governance standards. R2, from the 
CMA, admits that they have not reached the required level of symmetric information, but 
are proceeding in the right direction through the recent governance reforms.  
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Additionally, R2 is of the view that some non-compliant companies suffer from a 
weak demand for their shares because of the absence of disclosure and transparency. R2 
claims the market has begun to perform its role (albeit partially) as an external governance 
mechanism. E1 argues that the CMA is anticipated to activate some external governance 
mechanisms to strengthen the role of market corporate control: 
 
The stock market still needs to be more organised. For example, it is necessary to 
increase institutional investment. Individual investment is dominating the current 
investment environment, which leads the market to be inefficient. Furthermore, it is 
important to activate the policy of treasury shares, strengthen the stock market and 
allow foreign direct investment.                                                        (Interviewee E1) 
 
To strengthen the stock market, S1 is of the view that there is a need to increase the number 
of companies in the stock market. He explained that the CMA has been able to increase the 
number of listed firms in the last few years, with a 100% increase from 2006 to 2010, but it 
still needs to increase stock market liquidity. B2 believes that market depth can ensure the 
presence of long-term investors and limit the speculation in some companies.  
However, the Saudi stock market currently prevents foreign direct investment 
(except for citizens of the Arab Gulf states
74
). In this regard, B2 suggests that the presence 
of foreign direct investment increases liquidity in the market, and this is important to 
improve firms’ market value. E3’s views indicate that the importance of foreign 
investment cannot be ignored in providing financial and non-financial resources, such as 
experience and transfer of knowledge. Liew (2007) and Piesse et al. (2012) support the 
view that foreign investment is necessary for emerging economies in general and Saudi 
Arabia in particular. E1 emphasises the feasibility of opening the Saudi stock market to 
foreign investors, though this requires efforts from the CMA to develop confidence in the 
Saudi stock market. E1 and I2 are of the view that the number of companies and the level 
of liquidity in the stock market, compared to the Saudi economy, are still not encouraging.  
In sum, the internal and external stakeholders agree that the Saudi stock market is 
still inefficient, as there is no significant relationship between firm financial performance 
and firm market value. Also, they point out that the market still does not fully punish 
companies that do not comply with corporate governance. However, the interviewees’ 
                                                 
74
 In August 2009, the CMA allowed non-Saudi foreigners to invest in shares trading through swap 
agreements with locally approved and licensed intermediaries (SFG, 2009). Recently, the CMA has 
embarked on a process of allowing foreign investors to invest directly in companies listed on the Saudi 
market (Okaz, 2013). 
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responses indicate that the CMA is putting effort into increasing awareness among 
investors. They are also of the view that the CMA should activate external governance 
mechanisms, such as increasing the market depth and allowing foreign direct investment. 
According to their views, this can help to secure non-financial resources, such as transfer 
of knowledge. 
 
 
9.3 AWARENESS AND APPRECIATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
As discussed in Chapters One and Two, despite the fact that the Saudi stock market 
is the largest of Middle East and North African (MENA) countries (Hearn et al., 2011), the 
concept of corporate governance was not well known among stakeholders there until the 
early 2000s (Al-Motairy, 2003). In 2003, the CMA was established in order to reorganise 
the stock market and issue legislation ensuring good corporate governance practices (Al-
Nodel and Hussainey, 2010). This section addresses the interviewees’ views about 
stakeholders’ awareness and appreciation of good corporate governance practices, and the 
impact of the recent governance reforms. Specifically, Subsection 9.3.1 discusses the 
stakeholders’ perceptions of the importance of corporate governance. Subsection 9.3.2 
explores practitioners’ perceptions of shareholders’ rights. Subsection 9.3.3 looks at the 
views of stakeholders regarding the governance reforms in the Saudi context. 
 
9.3.1 Importance of Corporate Governance 
As suggested in previous studies on corporate governance, stakeholders’ awareness 
of the importance of governance is essential in establishing good practices (Sternberg, 
1997; Clarke, 1998). Particularly, directors’ appreciation of good corporate governance 
practices is important in improving voluntary corporate governance disclosure, and the 
awareness of shareholders helps them exercise their role effectively. E3 explains that 
directors’ appreciation of corporate governance enhances firm control systems. B1 agrees 
with E3 about the gradual development of managers’ awareness of the importance of their 
role, stating,  
I am a member of the board of directors in three companies, and I find that 
members are starting to recognise their responsibilities. Moreover, they have 
developed an understanding that their membership is not a formality, but requires 
continuous attention to manage performance, discuss firm management and 
request periodic reports.                                                                   (Interviewee B1) 
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I3 and E3 illustrate in their views that the improvement in the content of firms’ annual 
reports is an indicator of the attention given by the board of directors to developing 
voluntary governance corporate disclosure. They also emphasise that the recent corporate 
governance regulations, such as the Listing Rules and the SCGC, help directors understand 
the tasks they should undertake. I1 describes that an increase in the number of board 
meetings in recent years for most companies provides evidence of the attention given to 
board duties. Soobaroyen and Mahadeo (2012) find that the corporate governance reforms 
improved directors’ awareness of their responsibility in developing countries. However, a 
member of a board of directors, B2, and an audit firm partner, I2, argue that there are still 
some directors who consider their membership to represent their share ownership, without 
being aware of their duties and responsibilities. Given that, B3 is of the view that some 
directors run for board membership without being sentient of the company’s business or 
having a plan of action to achieve in the event of their candidacy.  
It can be summarised that participants report fairly similar views about the 
improvement in directors’ awareness of corporate governance. However, there is still a 
need to raise awareness about corporate governance among some members. The 
participants illustrate that promoting voluntary corporate governance disclosure requires 
directors to realise corporate governance standards, such as accountability, shareholders 
rights and social responsibility. 
Regarding shareholders’ perceptions of corporate governance, a number of 
interviewees indicated that they have changed in recent years.  B2 reports, 
When our firm issued an annual report recently, many inquiries came to us from 
shareholders about what is stated in the report. In addition, some of them discussed 
the financial performance in detail. Also, increased interaction of shareholders in 
the general assembly has been noted. This also implies an increase in 
shareholders’ perceptions of their rights.                                         (Interviewee B2) 
S3 supports this view that the recent governance reforms have helped increase 
shareholders’ awareness, such as by asking for the results of board meetings, which did not 
happen before the governance reforms. B1 reports,  
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We are one of the developing countries suffering from weakness in the 
understanding of the culture and application of rights. Therefore, the CMA and 
governance regulations should be able to achieve the desired outcome if culture 
develops in society to make people aware of their rights.                (Interviewee B1)                                
E1 adds that shareholders’ awareness of corporate governance depends on their 
background and level of education. E1 explains that some shareholders invest in 
companies without being informed or knowledgeable about those companies. S3 discusses 
this particular issue on the basis of shareholders’ ownership, and states that large 
shareholders have greater awareness about the importance of corporate governance. In 
contrast, small shareholders are less aware of corporate governance because they are 
mostly short-term investors. I2 criticises the regulatory bodies for failing to educate small 
shareholders about the importance of corporate governance and their role in the success of 
governance practices. 
Contrary to the interviewees’ views reported above, R2, of the CMA, argues that 
the authorities are working to increase the awareness and appreciation of shareholders and 
companies alike. He further adds that the CMA established the Corporate Governance 
Practices Development Department in 2009, which is tasked with raising awareness and 
appreciation of corporate governance among stakeholders. In line with this, R1 expresses 
that shareholders’ awareness of corporate governance has improved, and some 
shareholders have started practising accountability. The views above indicate that there has 
been progress in promoting good corporate governance practices.  
It is important to note that the majority of interviewees realise that shareholders’ 
awareness of their rights can force firms to comply with corporate governance. Therefore, 
it is important to stimulate shareholders to exercise their rights; this also makes the board 
of directors consider their responsibilities more effectively. This is consistent with Alshehri 
and Solomon (2012), who note that corporate governance reforms in Saudi Arabia should 
focus on increasing awareness of corporate governance among stakeholders. 
To sum up, the interviewees report that there has been improvement in 
stakeholders’ awareness and appreciation of good corporate governance practices, which 
supports recent implementation and advancement in corporate governance reforms. This 
improvement reflects positively on voluntary corporate governance disclosure and 
encourages shareholders to exercise their rights. Although the CMA is struggling to 
increase governance awareness, the practitioners believe that there is a need for greater 
awareness, and suggest holding workshops for various stakeholders. 
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9.3.2 Shareholders’ Rights 
The internal governance framework in Saudi Arabia focuses on the Anglo-
American model
75
 of shareholders’ interests (Alshehri and Solomon, 2012; Piesse et al., 
2012). Thus, the interviewees’ perceptions were mainly focused on the influence of 
corporate governance reforms on shareholders’ interests. This subsection explores the key 
stakeholders’ perceptions of shareholders’ rights in Saudi listed firms. Specifically, it 
addresses how shareholders can exercise their rights meaningfully in terms of general 
assemblies, information asymmetry and protection of the minority shareholders. S2 states,  
Shareholders increasingly search for information to get news about the company. 
Also, this makes it easier for them to practice their rights. However, a concern is 
noted that small shareholders still do not attend the general assembly meetings due 
to their belief their presence is useless. And this attendance does not influence the 
meeting decisions.                                                                             (Interviewee S2) 
Closely related to this view, I1 and E3 note that some shareholders do not discuss the 
company’s performance during the general assembly meetings, but attend to vote on the 
dividends. This is in line with Piesse et al. (2012), who state that shareholder activism is 
particularly low in the Saudi stock market. Therefore, they believe that the dominance of 
large shareholders may lead to the majority of shareholders failing to exercise their rights. 
I3 describes that some firms do not help shareholders in exercising their rights. He states,  
I have been attending general assembly meetings and found that firm management 
is trying to finish the meeting as soon as possible. In addition, they are unwilling to 
open the discussion for shareholders by answering their inquiries briefly.                       
                                                            (Interviewee I1) 
Contrary to the above view, I1 describes that some companies seek to encourage 
shareholders to play their role through remote voting. Similarly, B3 emphasises the 
importance of activating the one-share-one-vote policy. I1 reports,  
Vote per share encourages shareholders to attend the general assemblies and is 
influential. Also, firms should provide them with the firm corporate governance 
code to let them know about their rights and duties.                         (Interviewee I1) 
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 As discussed in Chapter Two, the internal governance framework is based on an Anglo-American model. 
This is apparent when looking at how the Companies Act and the SCGC address shareholders’ rights. 
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The majority of the interviewees agree with the importance of differentiating between large 
and small shareholders and between long- and short-term shareholders in exercising 
shareholders’ rights. In this regard, CEO E1 is of the view that the majority of large 
shareholders in his company attends the general assembly and discusses issues in detail. E3 
supports that strategic large shareholders in listed firms are more inclined to seek out 
information to protect their investments. B2 and S3 argue that small shareholders try to 
find a balance between their desire to exercise their rights and the costs that they must 
assume, such as moving from one area to another to attend the general assembly meeting. 
I1 explains that ownership concentration may limit shareholders’ ability to exercise their 
rights. He gives the example that 70% of shares in the Saudi Electricity Company are 
owned by the government, and the rest of the shares are distributed among small 
shareholders. Thus, from his view their vote is almost meaningless, as they have so little 
control. 
From the above argument, it can be noted that there is a need to activate 
mechanisms to ensure a large proportion of shareholders practice their role in corporate 
governance. This may result in improved control over management and enhanced firm 
performance. Similarly, Al-Twaijry et al. (2002) find that the assemblies themselves 
cannot exercise any role in making the board accountable. 
Another subject discussed by the practitioners is the use of financial and non-
financial information by shareholders and investors. E3 and B2 indicate that investors 
formerly made decisions based on informal information. However, they have now begun 
requesting information from official sources. Furthermore, there is a clear shift in 
shareholders’ and investors’ views about their desire to seek firm news. S3 adds that 
shareholders became aware of the quality of information, while the CMA could to some 
extent limit the impact of informal (unofficial) information on investors’ decisions. Thus, 
interviewees’ views indicate that the market’s official website, the Tadawul, has become 
the most significant source of information because companies accelerate publishing their 
news on the website. This is due to the sanctions imposed if news is leaked before being 
published on the Tadawul. 
R1, of the CMA, states that the authority obliges companies to disclose the results 
of board and general assembly meetings immediately on the Tadawul website, making it 
available to everyone at the same time. R1 emphasises that representatives of the CMA 
attend general assembly meetings to make sure that no information is leaked to the 
audience at the expense of the shareholders who do not attend; for example, information 
related to management’s expectations for the next financial results. This shows how the 
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CMA has been relatively able to limit information asymmetry and encourage shareholders 
to rely on formal information. The audit firm partners, on the other hand, discuss how 
corporate governance principles can protect minority shareholders. I2 suggests the need to 
provide greater protection for the minority shareholders. He reports,  
The CMA is supposed to exercise its disciplinary role more effectively. Yes, some 
exploitative behaviour of directors is punished, but it looks like symbolic 
punishment that does not protect minorities.                                     (Interviewee I2) 
He cites a story of a suspended firm in 2007. He said that when the firm was facing 
financial difficulties, the large insider shareholders sold all of their shares; therefore, the 
ownership structure became divided among small shareholders. I2 expresses his wonder at 
why insider shareholders were allowed to leave the company immediately, before it was 
suspended.  
Similarly, I3 criticises the role of the CMA in protecting small shareholders in 
Saudi companies. He reports that the SCGC
76
 emphasises non-discrimination among 
shareholders in providing information, but there is in fact a distinction. I3’s views indicate 
that large shareholders have easy access to firm information through good relationships 
with the management. In contrast, small shareholders often have difficulty getting 
information and answers to their questions. I3 explains that many companies have a 
Shareholders Affairs Department, but they do not interact with all shareholders equally. I3 
suggests that the CMA should be stricter about this particular issue. In this regard, Liew 
(2007) finds that good corporate governance practices require an enforcement mechanism 
by regulatory bodies to protect the rights of shareholders in emerging countries.  
On the whole, the interviewees’ views indicate that small shareholders exercise 
their rights to a lesser extent with respect to attending general assembly meetings and 
voting on resolutions. In contrast, large shareholders exercise their rights more, in order to 
maintain their investments. However, information asymmetry is relatively reduced because 
of the CMA’s efforts to improve corporate disclosure and transparency. However, the 
stakeholders believe that minority shareholders need greater protection. 
 
9.3.3 Corporate Governance Regime Reforms 
This subsection explores stakeholders’ assessment of the efforts of regulatory 
bodies in corporate governance reforms. Particularly, it addresses legislators’ performance 
                                                 
76
 Part Two of the SCGC focuses on shareholders’ provisions, including a statement on the public rights of 
shareholders, facilitating the exercise of their rights and access to information. 
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and evaluates existing governance legislation and the legal system in the Saudi business 
context. In this regard, B1, E3, I2 and S3 report that the CMA has managed to reorganise 
and strengthen the stock market to some extent since its establishment in 2003. Since then, 
the number of listed firms has increased by nearly 100%. As discussed in Chapter Two, it 
also issued a number of governance legislations to organise stock market performance, 
such as the Listing Rules in 2004, the Market Law in 2004 and the Saudi Corporate 
Governance Code (SCGC) in 2006. I2 reports,  
The CMA’s performance is persuasive considering the short life of the body and 
specifically the enhancement of voluntary corporate governance disclosure. 
Despite that, we are still waiting for more work in improving the quality of 
disclosure.                                                                                          (Interviewee I2)   
                                                      
Similar to the above, R1, from the CMA, illustrates that the authority is making efforts to 
improve companies’ disclosure. He reveals that there are penalties for companies that do 
not comply with some mandatory corporate governance provisions. Moreover, the CMA 
forces companies to disclose such offenses in their annual report and in the income 
statement, separately. It can be noted from the companies’ apprehensions that they fear the 
effect on their reputations of disclosing such offenses; therefore, they avoid them. 
E3 explains that firms’ annual reports have improved as a result of the follow-up by 
the CMA; for example, ownership structure and compensation of directors are disclosed. 
The reports also provide an analysis of the risk management faced by the firm. From his 
perspective, the establishment of the CMA reassured both companies and shareholders. E3 
reports,  
Companies began to realise that there is an authority that seeks to protect 
shareholders’ rights. It is true that there are still some gaps, but I think that the 
work of the CMA in this issue is not bad!                                         (Interviewee E3) 
Contrary to the views reported above, B2 criticises the CMA for not emphasising 
institutional investment. Similar to the view above, E1 makes the following suggestion,  
It is best to make the market efficient by focusing on institutional investment. In 
developed countries, institutional investors are the largest proportion, unlike in 
Saudi Arabia and other emerging countries, in which the market is dominated by 
individuals. Therefore, the authority should stimulate shareholders to invest 
through institutional investment.                                                       (Interviewee E1)                                              
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I2 reports that good corporate governance practices among listed firms require raising 
stakeholders’ awareness and understanding of their rights. Importantly, B2 and E3 suggest 
that the CMA has to make companies comply with governance through conviction, not just 
because of the fear of penalties. A possible explanation for the above argument voiced by 
interviewees is that good governance practices are a culture, and must be part of the firm’s 
identity to ensure effective compliance. This is consistent with Soobaroyen and Mahadeo 
(2012), who find that good corporate governance practice stems from the desire of the 
company and board of directors specifically.  
However, S2 and E1 argue that the CMA should benefit from other financial 
markets’ experiences in accelerating corporate governance reforms. For example, E1 
explains that the lack of coordination between the CMA and other bodies, such as the 
Central Bank, caused a great market crash in 2006. E1 wonders why banks were allowed to 
give customers large loans to invest in market shares without any guarantee. This resulted 
in a large percentage of citizens investing in the shares market, which caused the stocks 
index to inflate before losing 53% of its value. Overall, E1 emphasises coordination 
between the CMA and the Central Bank to protect both investors and the stock market. 
Another important issue related to the CMA’s performance discussed by 
interviewees is Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). S3 and B2 describe IPOs as being unfair for 
some companies. A member of a board of directors, B2, states,  
The CMA did not perform as anticipated regarding this particular issue. I think the 
authority is greatly affected by the pressures of being non-independent. Our 
company was influenced by such an evaluation, although it is working in a vital 
sector and has domestic and foreign investment.                             (Interviewee B2 
The monitoring side of the CMA is criticised by some practitioners. S2 explains that when 
companies disclose signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), this possibly 
reflects positively on the share price. However, the firm may not be serious about this 
agreement. He believes it may be a manipulation by the company’s management to 
influence the share price.  
In a similar vein, S1 is of the view that legislators sometimes do not intervene in a 
timely manner. For example, there was a company facing the threat of bankruptcy due to 
the presence of financial corruption. Nevertheless, the intervention of the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry (MCI) and the CMA unfortunately happened too late, after the 
company’s bankruptcy and the loss of shareholders’ funds. R1, of the CMA, explains that 
the CMA is working to protect shareholders and achieve the aspirations of stakeholders. 
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However, he explains that the CMA was established recently and is still in the 
development phase.  
With respect to the existing corporate governance regulations, most of the 
interviewees’ views indicate that the current regulations, in general, could lead to good 
corporate governance practices. However, they suggest the importance of modernising the 
1967 Companies Act to make it compatible with the governance regulations issued 
recently. In this regard, B2 and I3 explain that the Listing Rules and the SCGC, as 
guidelines, have recently helped companies improve voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure.  
However, S3 and B3 argue that the current legislation does not stipulate the 
criminalisation of certain violations by directors which harm outside shareholders’ 
interests. Liew (2007) points out that criminalising some directors’ behaviour has helped 
eliminate corruption in some firms in Malaysia that suffer from weak internal control 
systems. B3 reports:  
One of the companies bought a large portion of private company equity owned by 
the chairperson without approval from the general assembly. The shareholders 
filed a court case against the directors of the MCI. Consequently, the case was 
resolved through the invalidity of the bargain, with a nominal fine to some 
directors, without consideration of their crime.                               (Interviewee B3) 
 B3 explains that the new Companies Act, which is expected to be issued soon, may reduce 
such abuses because it is mandatory. I3 reports that the Companies Act that was issued 
decades ago is not consistent with the developments of the modern business environment.
77
 
Despite issues over nearly five decades and ongoing revisions to this Act, it does not 
include many provisions related to corporate governance. The central issue in the above 
argument described by participants is the importance of achieving integration between 
legislators. In this regard, B1 reports, 
The presence of two legislators responsible for listed firms represented by the MCI 
and CMA causes duplication between regulatory bodies and weakens their 
monitoring role.                                                                                (Interviewee B1) 
                                                 
77
 As discussed in Chapter Two, the new Companies Act was prepared by the MCI as a replacement for the 
current 1965 Act. The act is currently pending approval by the Council of Ministers. The most prominent 
features of the new act include expansion of the powers of the general assembly (Alriyadh, 2011a). 
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I1, I3, S1 and S2 agree about the lack of coordination between regulatory bodies. This, 
from their point of view, may weaken the corporate governance reforms. This is consistent 
with Haniffa and Hudaib (2007), who find that there is a need to unify the efforts of 
legislators in Saudi Arabia. They point out that the dual legal system causes problems, 
undermines the effectiveness of the regulatory bodies and hinders the governance reforms. 
CMA representative R1 recognises the existence of that conflict. He states that some 
companies have been taken to court over issues related to shareholders’ rights. Those 
issues have not been decided yet because of conflict between the authorities. In addition, 
audit firm partner I1 raises an important issue, which is adding auditors’ opinions about the 
level and quality of disclosure in the firms’ annual reports. He reports,  
Despite the importance of the auditor in adding more confidence to financial 
statements, the existing legislation omits the auditor’s role in a firm’s corporate 
governance practices.                                                                        (Interviewee I1) 
While the majority of interviewees indicate that the CMA has succeeded in introducing 
legislation to some extent, it has failed to activate the market as a corporate control 
mechanism and strengthen it more broadly. In this regard, B2 and E1 argue that the 
authority did not effectively stimulate some external governance mechanisms, such as 
allowing foreign direct investment and increasing institutional investment. From their point 
of view, adopting these mechanisms can help make the stock market more efficient and 
activate it for corporate control. Furthermore, E3 suggests that the presence of foreign 
investment helps in securing financial and non-financial resources for companies. 
However, I2, S3 and B2 reveal that there is a need to deepen the market to restrain 
speculation on stocks and expand options for investors. Moreover, they report that the 
number of Saudi listed firms does not currently match the volume of the Saudi stock 
market, and is not representative of the Saudi economy. In this regard, Liew (2007) finds 
that a lack of corporate governance reforms in emerging countries would make foreign 
investment uninterested in these firms, or likely to withdraw their assets from the firms. 
Corporate governance reforms also help to stabilise the economy and strengthen 
competitive advantage. Thus, such reforms are not an option in emerging countries, but a 
necessity.  
To sum up, the interviewees’ views indicate that the CMA has been able to 
reorganise the stock market, issue corporate governance legislation and increase the 
number of companies. They also show that the authority performs well, given its short 
lifespan. However, they believe that the CMA still has not activated the role of the market 
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as a mechanism for corporate control. Some of the interviewees claim that there is a need 
to open the stock market to foreign investors, as well as making legislation stricter in order 
to protect both the stock market and the interests of shareholders.  
 
 
9.4 INTEGRATION BETWEEN QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE 
FINDINGS 
The previous sections presented an analysis of interview data regarding corporate 
governance disclosure, firm financial performance and stakeholders’ awareness and 
appreciation of good corporate governance practices. As discussed in Chapters One and 
Four, the study adopts mixed-methods, using quantitative and qualitative data (see Figure 
4.1 in Chapter Four). This section seeks to achieve integration between the interviewees’ 
perceptions and the quantitative results. Specifically, by using the Explanatory Sequential 
Design proposed by Creswell and Clark (2011), the integration: (i) helps in exploring and 
understanding corporate governance behaviour in Saudi Arabia (Boyd et al., 2012; 
McNulty et al., 2013; Zattoni et al., 2013); and (ii) improves the explanation of the 
quantitative findings (Saunders et al., 2007; Creswell and Clark, 2011).  
First, as reported in Chapter Six, the level of compliance with the Saudi Corporate 
Governance Code (SCGC) improved from 17% in 2004 to 73% in 2010. This gradual 
improvement is due to the corporate governance reforms, which started in 2003 with the 
establishment of the CMA and the introduction of governance regulations. This finding is 
consistent with the literature that highlights the importance of corporate governance 
reforms in improving corporate governance disclosure (Cuervo, 2002; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2012). Empirical findings in previous studies show a positive influence of the 
release of a governance code on the level of compliance with governance regulations (e,g., 
Chalevas, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012a; Tariq and Abbas, 2013).  
Similarly, the interviewees agree that the level of voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure has improved in Saudi firms in recent years. They attribute that to the clear 
development in compliance with the SCGC’s provisions since it was issued in 2006 (e.g., 
B1). Also, some of the interviewees report that firms’ annual reports have also recently 
shown improvement, which helps reduce information asymmetry (e.g., E1 and E2).  
 Second, the descriptive analysis shows that the level of compliance with the SCGC 
by firms audited by the big-four is significantly higher than that of other firms. This 
positive relationship can be found in previous studies (e.g., Raffournier, 1995; Ntim et al., 
2012a; Schiehll et al., 2013). In this study, this particular relationship can be explained by 
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interviewees’ views that big-four audit firms are more qualified to limit management’s 
opportunistic behaviour (I1, I3, R2 and S2). Furthermore, shareholders and investors in 
Saudi listed firms became relatively aware of the importance of high-quality auditing (S2). 
The stakeholders are of the view that high-quality auditing increases the reliability of 
firms’ information (I1). Moreover, they believe that being audited by the big-four indicates 
that a firm’s internal control system is reliable and effective. 
Quantitative results show a positive role of a corporate governance committee in 
increasing the level of compliance with the SCGC, consistent with Ntim et al. (2012a). 
This positive relationship can be explained by the stakeholders’ perceptions that the 
presence of a corporate governance committee can help the firm to improve the level of 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure and provide protection for stakeholders’ 
interests (I2). This is because the governance committee derives its power from being part 
of the board structure (B2). This explains the recent attention given to this committee in 
corporate governance legislation (Ntim et al., 2012a). 
Third, it can be noted that the quantitative and qualitative results are integrated 
regarding the influence of ownership concentration. In this study, four different proxies for 
ownership, including government, institutional, block and board ownership, were 
examined. As is evident from Chapter Seven, the regression analysis shows a significant 
positive relationship between the presence of government ownership and voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure, consistent with Eng and Mak (2003) and Conyon and He 
(2011). The analysis of interview data supports the quantitative data results. For example, 
the interviewees explain that government ownership may not help improve financial 
performance, but its presence is linked with the highest levels of corporate disclosure (B1, 
B2, E1, E2, E3 and R1). They explain that government ownership provides better 
protection for shareholders (S1). 
Regarding institutional ownership, the empirical findings show a significantly 
positive relationship between institutional ownership and corporate governance, consistent 
with empirical studies (e.g., Barako et al., 2006; Chung and Zhang, 2011; Ntim et al., 
2012a). Moreover, some of the stakeholders explain that institutional investors are more 
willing to invest in firms with good corporate disclosure to protect their investment. 
Therefore, the key stakeholders believe that institutional investment enhances 
accountability and improves transparency (B1 and I2). The statistical data analysis in 
Chapter Six shows that the proportion of institutional investment in the Saudi stock market 
is around 7% of the total market value. This implies that the Saudi stock market depends 
on individual investors. Therefore, given the importance of institutional investment, the 
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stakeholders call for more institutional investment to enhance the market as a corporate 
control mechanism (B1 and I2). 
The quantitative data shows a negative relationship between block ownership and 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure in Saudi listed firms, consistent with Alsaeed 
(2006) and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013). The interviewees explain that large shareholders 
in Saudi listed firms have the ability to influence board composition and board policy, 
possibly to maximise their interests (B1, B2 and I1). 
With respect to board ownership and its influence on voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure, it can be noted that there is integration between the quantitative 
results and the interviewees’ perceptions of a significant positive relationship between 
board ownership and corporate governance. However, it is interesting to note that some 
studies have found this relationship to be negative (e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Bauwhede 
and Willekens, 2008), while some studies find no significant relationship (Samaha et al., 
2012). The stakeholders show that director ownership in Saudi firms is a strategic 
ownership concentrated among family members (B2, S1, S2, S3, I2 and I3). They explain 
that boards of directors increase corporate disclosure and transparency to maintain their 
interests (e.g., B2, S2 and S3). It is suggested that poor corporate governance practices 
may harm a firm’s reputation and value. Therefore, the directors see their ownership as a 
long-term investment. 
Fourth, as discussed in Chapter One, the study aims to examine the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial performance among Saudi 
listed firms. To achieve this objective, and in line with recent studies (e.g., Bozec et al., 
2010; Giroud and Mueller, 2011; Price et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2012b), the study 
constructed a corporate governance index, containing a set of governance provisions. 
Specifically, two different financial measures were used to investigate these relationships. 
These measures are accounting-based measure Return on Assets (ROA) and market-based 
measure Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio). 
The quantitative analysis shows a significant positive relationship between the 
Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) and firm financial performance measured by 
ROA, which is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; Clacher et 
al., 2008; Bauer et al., 2010; Renders et al., 2010; Giroud and Mueller, 2011; Munisi and 
Randoy, 2013). The interviewees agree that good corporate governance practices lead to 
firms’ higher financial performance. Thus, the interview data supports the quantitative 
findings, indicating a significant positive relationship between the governance index and 
firm profitability in Saudi listed firms. 
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 However, the regression analysis shows that there is no significant relationship 
between voluntary corporate governance disclosure and firm value measured by Tobin’s Q. 
This is in line with some studies which also indicate the lack of such a relationship (e.g., 
Klein et al., 2005; Gupta et al., 2009; Bozec et al., 2010; Ezzine, 2011; Price et al., 2011). 
In this regard, stakeholders report that firm share price is not affected by voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure in Saudi listed firms. They explain that the absence of this 
relationship is due to the fact that the Saudi stock market is still inefficient (I2 and S1). 
Some interviewees also emphasise the importance of increasing institutional investment to 
reduce the impact of speculation on the stock market (E1 and B2). They also emphasise 
allowing foreign direct investment in the stock market (E3 and I2). Adopting the above 
mechanisms would help the market become more efficient and exercise its role as an 
external corporate governance structure. 
Fifth, the empirical results show a negative relationship between the independence 
of the board of directors and voluntary corporate governance disclosure. However, this 
finding is not consistent with previous studies which find a positive relationship (e.g., 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Chen, 2011; Samaha et al., 2012; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). 
The interviewees suggest that Saudi firms are different in terms of board composition. This 
is because most of the firms have recently been listed on the Saudi stock market
78
 (e.g., E1 
and I3).   
More precisely, the variation can be due to the following: (i) many of the firms 
were family firms before being listed on the stock exchange, so family members have 
retained ownership and membership of the board of directors (B1 and S3); (ii) the 
appointment of independent directors in Saudi firms is not transparent, and there is no 
mechanism for the CMA to verify the independence of firms’ boards (e.g., B3); and (iii) 
some independent directors do not have experience and knowledge of the firm’s business, 
though their presence on the board is prestigious for the firm. The above explanation is in 
line with Ezzine (2011). He indicates that the selection of independent directors in Saudi 
listed firms is questionable. This is consistent with the results of Mahadeo et al. (2012). 
They find that developing countries have recently adopted corporate governance reforms; 
therefore, the concept of independence of boards is still very new in listed firms in these 
countries. 
This explains the differences between the quantitative results of this study and prior 
studies on the negative relationship between independent directors and corporate disclosure 
                                                 
78
 As discussed in Chapter Two and Subsection 9.2.2, the number of listed firms has increased sharply over 
the past couple of years. More specifically, the number of listed firms grew by 100% from 2006 to 2010 due 
to the capital market and governance reforms that have been pursued in Saudi Arabia.   
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in Saudi firms. The interviewees suggest that the supervisory bodies should play an active 
role in examining the independence of members, and not rely on what is disclosed in firms’ 
annual reports about the independence of members. 
 Unlike the findings from the quantitative data, the interviewees are of the view that 
the positive relationship between board size and good corporate governance practices 
cannot be generalised to all of the companies. The interviewees suggest that there are a 
number of factors determining board size, such as firm size and board sub-committees 
(B3). For example, for small firms whose business is not complex, a small board may be 
better for ensuring uniformity among members. However, large firms may need a larger 
board to assist in monitoring firm performance (B3, S1 and S3). I1 suggests achieving a 
balance in board size by appointing a sufficient number of independent and executive 
directors. The SCGC recommends that boards should comprise between three and eleven 
members, due to the differences among firms’ characteristics. 
 
 
 9.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented interview data that explain the key stakeholders’ perceptions 
of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government began reforming its 
corporate governance regime by establishing the CMA in 2003 and introducing a number 
of governance regulations. Therefore, the analysis follows the corporate governance 
reforms by addressing four main issues. First, it examined the interviewees’ views about 
the level of voluntary corporate governance disclosure in Saudi listed firms and the impact 
of governance reforms in improving the level of compliance. Also, the factors affecting 
corporate disclosure have been discussed, including board of directors, ownership 
concentration and firm characteristics. 
Second, this chapter presented an analysis of stakeholders’ perceptions of the 
relationship between governance mechanisms and firm financial performance. Specifically, 
the impact of internal and external governance mechanisms on firms’ profitability and 
value was addressed. Third, this chapter explored the key stakeholders’ awareness and 
appreciation of good corporate governance practices. More specifically, an attempt has 
been made to explore the key stakeholders’ views to assess the influence of corporate 
governance reforms in increasing attention to corporate governance within the Saudi 
corporate governance context. Thus, this chapter analysed the interviewees’ perceptions 
about the performance of regulatory bodies and their role in the protection of shareholders’ 
rights.  
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Fourth, this chapter sought integration between the quantitative results and the 
interview findings. This assisted in interpreting the statistical results and enabled deep 
understanding of corporate governance behaviour. 
The next chapter presents the conclusion of this study. More specifically, it presents 
a summary of the quantitative and qualitative findings and policy implications in the Saudi 
business context. It also addresses the limitations and recommendations of the study. 
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CHAPTER TEN  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
10. INTRODUCTION   
This study investigates the corporate governance reforms in the Saudi business 
context and their influence on voluntary corporate governance disclosure and firm 
financial performance. As discussed in Chapters One and Four, to achieve its objectives, 
the study employed a mixed-methods research design as a new way of studying corporate 
governance behaviour, with a view of gaining a complete understanding of the effects of 
corporate governance reforms on corporate performance and voluntary governance 
disclosure (Boyd et al., 2012; Johl et al., 2012; McNulty et al., 2013; Zattoni et al., 2013). 
 More precisely, the study used quantitative data to: (i) examine the level of 
compliance with, and disclosure of, corporate governance provisions contained in the 2006 
Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) among Saudi listed firms; (ii) ascertain 
whether the publication of the 2006 SCGC has helped in improving corporate governance 
standards in Saudi listed firms; (iii) investigate the factors influencing good governance 
practices; (iv) assess the association between a number of individual corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm financial performance, using the equilibrium variable model (EVM); 
and (v) explore the relationship between the level of compliance with the 2006 SCGC and 
firm financial performance, using the compliance index model (CIM). Additionally, the 
study used qualitative data (semi-structured interviews) to explore stakeholders’ 
perceptions of the corporate governance reforms that have been pursued in Saudi Arabia, 
as well as their awareness and appreciation of good corporate governance practices. 
This chapter seeks to achieve four main objectives. First, it presents a summary of 
the empirical findings regarding the level of compliance with the 2006 SCGC and sheds 
light on the determinants of good corporate governance practices. The chapter also 
presents a summary of the findings obtained relating to the association between corporate 
governance and financial performance. Second, this chapter summarises stakeholders’ 
views about the Saudi corporate governance reforms. Third, it discusses attempts at 
integrating the findings from the quantitative and qualitative data. Fourth, this chapter 
highlights the implications of the findings for corporate governance policy-makers and 
practitioners. Finally, this chapter addresses the contributions and limitations of the study, 
and offers suggestions for future research. 
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This chapter is organised as follows. Section 10.1 provides an overview of all the 
chapters in the thesis. Section 10.2 presents a summary of the quantitative data findings. 
Section 10.3 presents a summary of the findings from the interview data. Section 10.4 
presents how integration between quantitative and qualitative data is achieved. Section 
10.5 discusses the implications of this study for policy-makers and practitioners. Section 
10.6 addresses the contributions of this study to the literature on corporate governance. 
Section 10.7 explicitly discusses the limitations of the study, while Section 10.8 presents 
suggestions for future research.  
 
 
10.1 OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS  
As discussed in Chapters One and Two, the Saudi government began corporate 
governance reforms in 2003, when the Capital Market Authority (CMA) was established 
(Al-Abbas, 2009; Alshehri and Solomon, 2012; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012). Saudi 
Arabia is an Islamic state, where the rules of Shariah originated (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 
2008; Safieddine, 2009; Al-Matari et al., 2012). As a result, Islamic rules seem to have a 
direct impact on corporate governance practices.
79
 Corporate governance practices are also 
greatly affected by the informal social norms that are still popular and highly socially 
valued in Saudi society (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; Boytsun et al., 2011; Baydoun et 
al., 2013). Thus, the uniqueness of the Saudi corporate environment, as well as the 
importance of its economy, served as an important motivation in investigating the 
corporate governance reforms. Political connections also influence corporate governance 
practices, such as board appointments (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008). These differences 
between Saudi religious, social and political systems and those of developed countries 
distinguish the Saudi corporate context, and could have significant implications on 
corporate governance, disclosure, accountability and performance.  
In addition, the level of ownership concentration in Saudi listed firms is another 
obstacle to good corporate governance practices. Ownership concentration is a strong 
feature of Saudi firms (ROSC, 2009; Soliman, 2013a and b). This can impair the 
effectiveness of the market for corporate control as an external governance mechanism 
                                                 
79
 As noted previously, whereas some contextual factors (e.g., ownership concentration and board 
characteristics) were operationalised and tested, due to difficulties in obtaining data, other unique contextual 
factors and challenges (e.g., political connections, Islamic values, Islamic business transactions and social 
norms, amongst others) were not operationalised and empirically tested in the various regression models. 
However, because of their relevance, they have been articulated normatively as part of the key motivations of 
the study. As discussed in Section 10.7, this is explicitly acknowledged as part the study’s limitations, and 
thus suggested as a potential avenue for future research. 
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(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Ntim et al., 2012b).
80
 However, 
the Saudi corporate governance regime is voluntary; it is based on the UK’s ‘comply or 
explain’ style, which is expected to operate effectively in a diffuse shareholding 
environment (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Al-Abbas, 2009; Seidl et al., 2013). 
This raises questions as to the applicability of a voluntary corporate governance regime for 
the Saudi corporate context. Given the differences between Western and Eastern 
environments in terms of effective governance mechanisms, legal systems and cultural 
aspects (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Bozec et al., 2010; Kamla and Roberts, 2010), this 
study examines whether the UK style voluntary compliance regime could be effective in 
raising corporate governance standards in the Middle Eastern firms in general and Saudi 
Arabian corporations in particular. 
As discussed in Chapter One, Saudi Arabia is one of the largest emerging 
economies (Al-Filali and Gallarotti, 2012). It has achieved an important economic position 
as a member of the world’s largest 20 economies (G20) (Al-Matari et al., 2012). This 
implies that any weakness in corporate governance practices in such an economy could 
have serious implications for countries far beyond Saudi Arabia, the Middle East and 
developing countries. 
This thesis was organised into ten chapters. Chapter One introduced corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia, highlighting its background briefly. Chapter One also 
discussed the research problem, presented the research questions and discussed the 
motivation for conducting this research. The internal and external corporate governance 
frameworks in Saudi Arabia were presented in Chapter Two, shedding light on the 
regulatory bodies and the existing regulations relating to corporate governance in the Saudi 
business context. Chapter Three discussed the relevant literature by reviewing the relevant 
corporate governance theories. The literature review included empirical studies on the level 
of compliance with codes of corporate governance for both developed and developing 
countries, and the determinants of voluntary corporate governance disclosure. Moreover, 
studies addressing the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
financial performance were also reviewed using two different models, namely the 
equilibrium-variable model and the compliance-index model. 
Chapter Four discussed the mixed-methods approach used in this study, which 
includes the positivist and the interpretivist paradigms. Also, the chapter discussed the 
research design and the challenges of using a mixed-methods research design. In Chapter 
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 As shown in Chapter Six, the government owned more than 70% of some firms’ equity, with an average of 
42% of the stock market value. 
310 
 
 
Five, the quantitative research design was presented by explaining the data collection 
process and the methods used in the statistical analysis. Chapter Six presented the results 
from the summary descriptive statistics from the quantitative data. Chapter Seven 
presented the empirical findings and the results from the robustness tests, and also 
discussed the results of testing the existence of potential endogeneity problems.  
After discussing the findings from the quantitative data, Chapter Eight addressed 
the theoretical framework for the qualitative research method, the design of the semi-
structured interviews and the interview data collection process. In Chapter Nine, 
stakeholders’ perceptions of governance reforms in Saudi Arabia were reported and 
discussed. Integration between the interview findings and the quantitative findings was 
presented. Chapter Ten presents a summary of the results from the quantitative and 
qualitative data, and the implications for policy and practice based on these findings. Also, 
it discusses the contributions and limitations of the study and offers suggestions for future 
research. 
 
 
 
10.2 SUMMARY OF QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS 
This section summaries the findings obtained from the quantitative data (see 
Chapters Six and Seven). Previous empirical studies suggest that good corporate 
governance leads to improved voluntary corporate governance disclosure and financial 
performance (Ntim et al., 2012a and b; Samaha et al., 2012). Also, most previous studies 
on Saudi Arabia shed light on corporate disclosure, and few investigate issues relating to 
financial performance (e.g., Alsaeed, 2006; Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; Al-Moataz and 
Hussainey, 2012; Al-Moataz and Lakhal, 2012). Therefore, this study aims to achieve 
integration by analysing voluntary corporate governance disclosure and firm financial 
performance in Saudi listed firms. It empirically examines whether listed firms complying 
with governance standards perform better financially or not. Thus, the hypotheses were 
formulated in light of prior relevant studies. Suitable statistical tests were used to answer 
the first five research sub-questions, which are: (i) What is the level of compliance with the 
2006 Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC)?; (ii) Has the introduction of the 2006 
Saudi Corporate Governance Code improving Saudi corporate governance practices?; (iii) 
What are the factors influencing the level of compliance with the 2006 SCGC?; (iv) What 
is the relationship between individual corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial 
performance?; and (v) What is the relationship between compliance with the 2006 SCGC 
and firm financial performance? 
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In order to answer these sub-questions, balanced panel data analysis was used, 
including financial and non-financial information collected manually from firms’ annual 
reports, among other sources. The sample included 80 listed firms on the Saudi Stock 
Exchange (Tadawul) over seven years, from 2004 to 2010, resulting in a total of 560 firm-
year observations. This study empirically constructed the Saudi Corporate Governance 
Index (SCGI) to explore the level of compliance with, and disclosure of, corporate 
governance provisions, and to examine the relationship between governance mechanisms 
and firm financial performance.  
To investigate the relationship between corporate governance and firm financial 
performance, two different models were used. Existing studies use either the equilibrium-
variable model (e.g., Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Weir and Laing, 2000; Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006; Chalevas, 2011; Mangena et al., 2012) or the compliance-index model (e.g., 
Black, 2001; Gompers et al., 2003; Cremers and Nair, 2005; Morey et al., 2009; Bauer et 
al., 2010; Renders et al., 2010; Giroud and Mueller, 2011; Black and Kim 2012; Ammann 
et al., 2013; Munisi and Randoy, 2013; Tariq and Abbas 2013; van Essen et al., 2013). As 
discussed further in the following sections, this study contributes to the literature by using 
these two different models. This helps in exploring the influence of the employed methods 
on the findings and their implications for future research.  
For clarity, this section is further divided into three subsections. Subsection 10.2.1 
presents a summary of the findings on voluntary corporate governance disclosure among 
Saudi listed firms. Subsection 10.2.2 shows the findings obtained by the equilibrium-
variable model, while Subsection 10.2.3 shows the results obtained from the compliance-
index model. 
 
10.2.1 Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosure 
This subsection presents a summary of the findings from the quantitative data that 
is used to answer the first three research sub-questions, which examine: (i) the level of 
compliance with corporate governance standards; (ii) whether governance standards have 
improved following the introduction of the SCGC in 2006; and (iii) the factors influencing 
such compliance. As discussed in Chapter Six, the statistical analysis shows that the level 
of compliance with the SCGC among Saudi listed firms has improved over the sample 
period from 2004 to 2010. More precisely, the aggregate corporate governance scores for 
the SCGI are 17% in 2004, and significantly increased up to 73% in 2010, with 56% 
improvement. This improvement in the level of compliance can be attributed to the 
corporate governance reforms (Al-Abbas, 2009; Al-Moataz and Lakhal, 2012; Alshehri 
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and Solomon, 2012). This finding supports the studies conducted on emerging countries 
which find improvement in the level of compliance with governance standards. 
Specifically, they find an increase in the level of compliance after the publication of local 
governance codes (e.g., Alves and Mendes, 2004; Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Price et al., 2011; 
Ntim et al., 2012a; Allegrini and Greco; 2013). Also, this improvement offers further 
support for the feasibility of adopting a ‘comply or explain’ style voluntary corporate 
governance code to enhance corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. 
Despite the improvement in the level of compliance, as evidenced in the aggregated 
sample, differences among firms are observed. In this regard, the literature on corporate 
governance explains the differences in the level of compliance among firms based on their 
characteristics, such as firm size, audit firm size and industry type (Ntim et al., 2012a; 
Samaha et al., 2012; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). As shown in Chapter Six, the study finds 
a significant positive relationship between firm size and level of compliance with good 
corporate governance practices, which is consistent with studies by Alsaeed (2006) and 
Elzahar and Hussainey (2012). The results also show that firms audited by the big-four 
have a higher level of compliance than others, which is consistent with the studies of 
Barako et al. (2006) and Ntim et al. (2012a). However, consistent with Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002) and Hussainey and Al-Nodel (2008), the level of compliance varies among 
industries.  
For the factors influencing the level of voluntary corporate governance disclosure 
reported in Chapter Seven, regression results are in line with prior studies. Specifically, the 
study examined eight explanatory variables. Board size, audit firm size, presence of 
corporate governance committee, government ownership, institutional ownership and 
director ownership show a positive relationship with corporate disclosure. These findings 
are mostly in line with the following studies: Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Eng and Mak 
(2003), Barako et al. (2006), Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), Ntim et al. (2012a) and Samaha et 
al. (2012). On the other hand, the results show a negative impact of block ownership on 
corporate governance practices, which is consistent with Alsaeed (2006) and Ntim and 
Soobaroyen (2013).  
Also, findings from the analysis of quantitative data reveal a negative relationship 
between proportion of independent directors and voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure, which is inconsistent with existing literature that suggests a positive 
relationship between the two (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). 
The interview data explain that the appointment of independent directors in Saudi firms is 
not a transparent process. Ezzine (2011) argues that the independence of boards of 
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directors in Saudi listed firms may be questionable. In this regard, Mahadeo et al. (2012) 
point out that the concept of board independence is very new in developing countries that 
recently adopted corporate governance reforms. Importantly, as discussed in Chapter One, 
political connections and informal social relations still largely influence the Saudi 
corporate environment (Al-Twaijry et al., 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Hussainey and 
Al-Nodel, 2008; Alshehri and Solomon, 2012). Theoretically, this may influence, to some 
extent, the appointment and therefore independence of boards of directors.  
 
10.2.2 Firm Financial Performance and the Equilibrium-Variable Model 
 This subsection summarises the findings obtained from the quantitative data to 
investigate the fourth research sub-question. It examines the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm financial performance. As discussed in Chapter Five, the 
equilibrium-variable model helps in exploring the influence of individual corporate 
governance mechanisms on firm financial performance. The literature shows few studies 
conducted on Saudi Arabia, such as Al-Abbas (2009), Alzharani et al. (2011) and Ezzine 
(2011) that examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm financial 
performance. However, these studies are different from the current study. Alzharani et al. 
(2011) heavily focus on firm characteristics as explanatory variables. Al-Abbas (2009) 
uses a different accounting measure, which is earning management, while Ezzine (2011) 
uses only a market-based measure.  
In the current study, in line with the literature, six corporate governance variables 
were examined to investigate their impact on firm performance (e.g., Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006; Mangena et al., 2012; Ntim et al., 2012b). These variables include CEO duality, 
proportion of independent directors, corporate board size, frequency of board meetings, 
presence of board sub-committees and director ownership. To examine the relationship, 
two measures were used, return on assets (ROA), as an accounting-based measure, and 
Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio), as a market-based measure. These variables are widely used in 
corporate governance studies (e.g., Bruno and Claessens, 2010; Mangena et al., 2012; 
Munisi and Randoy, 2013). The use of two different measures helps to extend the 
comparison with the existing literature and ensure the robustness of the findings (see 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Ntim et al., 2012b). 
 First, as shown in Chapter Seven, it is empirically found that CEO duality is 
positively associated with ROA. Despite some studies showing a negative relationship 
between CEO duality and firm financial performance, the positive relationship obtained in 
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this study is consistent with other studies, such as Donaldson and Davis (1991), Boyd 
(1995), Brickley et al. (1997) and Hearn (2011). However, this study finds no relationship 
between CEO duality and firm value that is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Baliga et 
al., 1996; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008). 
Second, independent directors have a significant relationship with firm profitability 
using ROA, in line with the findings of Mangena and Chamisa (2008) and Conyon and He 
(2011). The positive influence of board independence is explained theoretically by the 
literature. It can be argued that independent directors are more able to mitigate the agency 
problem by reducing managerial opportunism (Fama, 1980; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 
2010). Similarly, the results from the multivariate OLS regression show a positive 
relationship between independent directors and Q-ratio. The positive relationship can be 
explained by the argument that the presence of independent directors can signal, to both 
the market and potential investors, information asymmetries at lower levels (Black et al., 
2006b). This finding offers further support to studies, such as Millstein and MacAvoy 
(1998), Weir et al. (2002), El Mehdi (2007), Mangena and Tauringana (2007) and Gupta et 
al. (2009). 
Third, the findings show that board size has a negative relationship with ROA. 
Theoretically, this means that a large board may increase board expenses, such as 
remuneration (Vafeas, 1999a), and may indicate a lack of interaction among directors 
(Beasley, 1996; Yermack, 1996). This finding supports the literature (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 
1998; Guest, 2009; Hansson et al., 2011). Also, the regression analysis shows a positive 
relationship between board size and Q-ratio, consistent with Jackling and Johl (2009) and 
Mangena et al. (2012). 
Fourth, as shown in Chapter Seven, the frequency of board meetings does not 
significantly affect ROA. This suggests that the participation of directors in a firm’s daily 
activities is not necessary (Monks and Minow, 2011). However, directors should focus on 
implementing long-term strategies (Vafeas, 1999a), since the board represents the highest 
level in the firm’s structure (Jiraporn et al., 2009). However, the findings indicate a 
positive relationship between frequency of board meetings and firm value. This supports 
the argument by Lipton and Lorsch (1992) that the financial market reacts positively to 
firms having active boards. This is in line with Jackling and Johl (2009), who also find a 
positive influence of frequency of board meetings on firm value using Q-ratio.   
Fifth, the data analysis shows that board sub-committees improve firms’ 
profitability. This is consistent with the notion that existing board sub-committees enhance 
internal control systems. Thus, the presence of board sub-committees positively reflects on 
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firm financial performance (Harrison, 1987). Empirically, this finding is supported by 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein’s (2009) indication that remuneration committees reduce 
CEOs’ and executives’ compensation, and it is also consistent with the findings of Wild 
(1994) and Vafeas (1999b). On the other hand, the findings show that there is no 
significant impact of board sub-committees on firm value. This finding is in line with 
Hearn (2011) explaining that board sub-committees are officially under the board of 
directors’ control. Therefore, complete independence of board sub-committees cannot be 
expected.  
Finally, the results from statistical tests performed in the current study show that 
there is a positive relationship between director ownership and firm profitability. The 
positive finding is consistent with empirical studies in emerging countries (e.g., Mangena 
and Tauringana, 2007; Mangena et al., 2012). Similarly, director ownership is positively 
associated with firm value, consistent with prior studies (e.g., Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; 
Mangena et al., 2012). This suggests that directors with a large share of ownership 
improve the firm’s performance to maximise their own interests as well as the interests of 
other shareholders.
81
 
 
10.2.3 Firm Financial Performance and the Compliance-Index Model 
As discussed in Section 10.2, the study employed two different approaches to 
examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial 
performance. While Subsection 10.2.2 summarises the findings from the equilibrium-
variable model, this subsection presents a summary of the results obtained from the 
compliance-index model to answer the fifth research sub-question. The Saudi Corporate 
Governance Index (SCGI) was constructed to examine the influence of corporate 
governance as a set of provisions on firm performance. The proxies for financial 
performance that were used in this model are similar to those employed in the equilibrium-
variable model: ROA and Q-ratio as the accounting-based measure and market-based 
measure, respectively.  
As discussed in Chapters Three and Five, the compliance-index model is a 
relatively new approach, and has not been used yet in studies focusing on Saudi Arabia. 
However, developed countries introduced codes of best governance practice much earlier 
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 In the interviews analysis in Chapter Nine, the key stakeholders explained that director ownership leads to 
improved control over firm management.   
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than emerging countries
82
 (e.g., the Cadbury Report in the UK, 1992; the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act in the US, 2002). Therefore, most studies using the compliance-index model are 
performed on developed economies (Renders et al., 2010; Bozec and Bozec, 2012). This 
study sought to fill the gap in the existing literature, particularly with regards to Saudi 
Arabia. It was hypothesised that the relationship between the SCGI and firm financial 
performance is significantly positive.  
As analysed in Chapter Seven, it is found that there is a significantly positive 
association between corporate governance practices proxied by the SCGI and firm 
profitability measured by ROA. This is consistent with the theoretical expectation that 
good corporate governance practices lead to enhanced accountability and improve internal 
control systems in firms, which reduces agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Harrison, 1987; Klein, 1998; Solomon, 2010). Empirical findings are in line with studies 
using a governance index to examine the relationship between corporate governance and 
ROA (e.g., Bauer et al., 2010; Giroud and Mueller, 2011; Clacher et al., 2008; Klapper and 
Love, 2004; Renders et al., 2010; Munisi and Randoy, 2013; Tariq and Abbas, 2013). 
Contrary to the above findings, the results show that there is no significant 
relationship between the SCGI and firm value measured by Q-ratio. This finding is not 
consistent with some literature that suggests a positive impact of corporate governance 
practices on firm value. For example, potential investors prefer firms with higher 
governance standards (Chung and Zhang, 2011; Buskirk, 2012). Although this finding is 
not theoretically supported by the literature, it is in line with many studies conducted on 
both developed and developing countries. For example, Klein et al. (2005), Gupta et al. 
(2009) and Bozec et al. (2010) find no significant relationship between corporate 
governance index and Q-ratio in the Canadian market. Similarly, Price et al. (2011) 
construct a corporate governance index based on Mexico’s governance code and find no 
significant relationship with Q-ratio in 107 Mexican listed firms. 
As discussed in Chapter Nine, the key stakeholders are of the view that there exists 
no significant relationship between voluntary corporate governance disclosure and firm 
value in the Saudi stock market. They explain that the Saudi stock market is still inefficient 
and does not effectively penalise companies not complying with voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure. Therefore, the CMA should activate external governance 
mechanisms, such as increasing market depth, enhancing institutional investment and 
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 As discussed in Chapters One and Three, the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) reported 
that 91 countries around the world had released their own codes of governance by the middle of 2013 (ECGI, 
2013). 
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allowing foreign investors. This could help improve the market for corporate control as a 
corporate governance mechanism. 
 
 
10.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM INTERVIEW DATA 
This section presents a summary of the key stakeholders’ perceptions about their 
awareness and appreciation of good corporate governance practices. It summaries the 
stakeholders’ understanding and evaluation of corporate governance reforms in Saudi 
Arabia. Following Haniffa and Hudaib (2007), Liew (2007), Johl et al. (2012), Piesse et al. 
(2012), Soobaroyen and Mahadeo (2012) and Bailey and Peck (2013), semi-structured 
interviews were used to answer the sixth research sub-question: ‘What is the level of 
awareness and appreciation of the importance of good corporate governance practices in 
Saudi Arabia among key stakeholders following corporate governance reforms?’ In 
addition, investigating this qualitative research sub-question improved understanding of the 
quantitative findings. Interviews were conducted with fifteen key stakeholders representing 
five different groups, including internal and external key stakeholders. Three themes 
emerged from the interview data: disclosure and transparency, financial performance, and 
stakeholders’ awareness and appreciation of good corporate governance practices. 
To summarise the results, this section is further divided into two subsections. 
Subsection 10.3.1 presents the interviewees’ perceptions of voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure and firm performance. Subsection 10.3.2 presents a summary of the 
stakeholders’ views regarding their level of awareness and appreciation of good corporate 
governance practices. 
 
10.3.1 Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosure and Firm Financial Performance  
This subsection first presents a summary of the key stakeholders’ perceptions about 
governance mechanisms influencing voluntary corporate governance disclosure. The 
interviewees’ perceptions were summarised in three sub-themes: board of directors’ 
characteristics, ownership concentration and firm characteristics.  
First, regarding the board of directors’ characteristics, the internal and external 
stakeholders believe that the presence of independent directors limits exploitation by 
executives and helps protect shareholders’ rights. However, large shareholders in Saudi 
listed firms have the power to nominate independent directors, which is incompatible with 
the concept of independence. Thus, the interview data analysis indicates that the 
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appointment of independent directors must be highly transparent and objective and should 
be controlled by the legislator. 
In terms of board size, the stakeholders report that board size should be compatible 
with the number of board sub-committees and firm size, making it more effective. 
Recently, attention to corporate governance committees has increased (Ntim et al., 2012a). 
Despite the importance of corporate governance committee, the interviewees state that the 
effectiveness of a firm’s internal control systems and the presence of an internal 
governance code can compensate for the establishment of a corporate governance 
committee. In terms of the firms’ annual reports, the key stakeholders note that there has 
been an apparent improvement in their content since 2006, especially after the CMA 
released the Listing Rules and introduced the SCGC as guidelines in adopting corporate 
governance standards.  
Second, the key stakeholders are of the view that the ownership concentration (of 
various kinds) influences corporate governance practices. Although government ownership 
may hinder firm growth due to bureaucracy (Cornett et al., 2010; Al-Filali and Gallarotti, 
2012), corporate governance practices are still better in these firms. In addition, the 
stakeholders explain that the government invests in large and profitable listed firms, such 
as petrochemical and telecommunication firms. Therefore, these firms have stable boards 
of directors and seek voluntary disclosure to signal their success.   
The interviewees also indicate that institutional investment in Saudi listed firms 
focuses on short-term investment. Furthermore, the Saudi stock market is dominated by 
individual investors. Therefore, the stakeholders are of the view that institutional 
investment should be prioritised over individual investment in the Saudi stock market. In 
terms of block ownership, large shareholders have the power to appoint directors who can 
maximise their interests. This adversely affects the interests of small shareholders in 
particular and corporate governance in general. Contrary to the above, most of the internal 
and external key stakeholders suggest that director ownership improves corporate 
disclosure and firm performance. This can be explained by the directors seeking to attract 
potential investors to increase the firm’s value. It is noted that there is no conflict between 
the directors’ interests and external shareholders’ interests, because all of them seek to 
maximise the firm’s value.  
 Third, the interviewees’ views suggest that firm characteristics, such as level of 
compliance, audit firm size, internal control system, firm size and firm culture, influence 
corporate governance practices. The internal and external stakeholders agree that the level 
of compliance with corporate governance standards has improved gradually since the 
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release of the SCGC in 2006. They point out that although the level of compliance among 
firms is fairly convincing, considering the short time since the introduction of the 
governance reforms, there is still a need to improve the quality of voluntary governance 
disclosure. Regarding audit firm size, the auditors’ role is important in increasing the 
reliability of disclosed information. However, the corporate governance regulations in 
Saudi Arabia do not explicitly outline the role of audit firms regarding firms’ disclosure in 
annual reports.
83
  
 Internal and external key stakeholders are of the view that the firm’s internal 
control system is part of good corporate governance practices. Indeed, a good internal 
control system helps protect shareholders’ rights and increases confidence in the firm’s 
management. However, they argue that internal control systems do not perform 
appropriately in Saudi listed firms. For example, some listed firms formally link the 
internal auditor to the board of directors, even though he/she actually works under the 
CEO’s control. Stakeholders also believe firm size influences good corporate governance 
practices. Large firms specifically are more capable in terms of appointing qualified 
directors than small firms. Thus, large firms are less influenced by directors’ personal 
interests. However, firms with a clear mission and identity (firm culture) can enhance the 
board’s function and improve corporate governance within the firm.  
Regarding the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
financial performance, internal governance mechanisms have been analysed, including the 
impact of executives on the board, the frequency of board meetings, CEO duality, board 
independence, board size, board sub-committees, managerial ownership and board 
compensation. As shown in Chapter Nine, interviewees have different opinions on the 
presence of executives on the board of directors. Some report that executive directors have 
more inside information than independent directors, which makes them more capable of 
improving board performance. 
However, other stakeholders argue that executive directors are usually less 
accountable. Thus, the presence of executive directors on the board may weaken the 
board’s monitoring of management’s performance. In particular, their views show that 
independent ‘non-executive’ directors face difficulty in criticising executives’ performance 
or being impartial when evaluating them. Similarly, they argue that CEO duality may 
marginalise the board of directors, especially independent directors. Members of boards of 
directors note that the appointment of independent directors increases board experience 
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 Some corporate governance regulations, such as Article 281 of the Omani Capital Market Law, require 
listed firms to add auditors’ assessments about the firm’s corporate governance to their opinions on the 
financial statements. 
320 
 
 
and improves firm performance. Moreover, they appreciate the CMA’s recommendation 
that (at least) one third of the board of directors be comprised of independent directors. 
This helps to limit collusion between inside directors and firm management. 
In terms of the frequency of board meetings, interviewees agree on the importance 
of frequent board meetings. They suggest that meetings should be held a minimum of four 
times per year (quarterly) to discuss quarterly performance. In relation to board size, it has 
been noted that board size should be determined by the knowledge and experience of the 
directors as well as firm size and the number of board sub-committees.   
The key internal and external stakeholders’ views show that they generally agree on 
the importance of board sub-committees in enhancing firm performance. In particular, the 
committees’ composition is an essential factor in their effectiveness. The stakeholders 
emphasise the importance of mixing executive and independent members in the 
committees. For example, if executives make up the majority of the remuneration 
committee, this may lead to higher remuneration. Most stakeholders held fairly similar 
views that firm size should be considered in forming board sub-committees. For instance, 
the executive committee acts as a mini-board in small firms, which conflicts with the 
board’s tasks. Beyond the three main committees (audit, remuneration and nomination), 
other committees may be a burden on firm performance. Also, the interviewees suggest 
that director ownership positively influences firm financial performance. Thus, most 
profitable Saudi firms have high director ownership. However, low director ownership 
may weaken the monitoring role of the board of directors, and may lead to a firm’s 
resources being exploited.   
   The relationship between external corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
financial performance was investigated with the key stakeholders. The findings indicate 
that the majority of key internal and external stakeholders agree that the Saudi stock 
market is still inefficient, where the market value is not related to voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure and financial performance. Despite a theoretically expected positive 
relationship between good corporate governance practices and firm value (Solomon, 2010), 
this is not the case in the Saudi stock market. There are three main reasons for this: (i) the 
presence of speculative trading hinders the efficiency of the stock market; (ii) the 
dominance of individual investors over institutional investors; and (iii) the small number of 
listed firms, which limits the investing options for investors. In this regard, the 
interviewees are of the view that the CMA is making efforts to enhance the market as a 
corporate control mechanism. For example, the CMA tries to reduce the impact of 
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speculation.
84
 Also, it works to increase the breadth of the stock market by increasing the 
number of listed firms. Furthermore, the CMA has sought to improve investors’ awareness 
about investment in profitable and well-governed firms.  
Nevertheless, the key stakeholders indicate that additional reforms are needed in 
the stock market as part of the general corporate governance reforms. They suggest 
increasing institutional investment to ensure the existence of long-term investors. 
Similarly, as discussed in Chapters Two and Nine, the market authority prevents direct 
foreign investment. Therefore, it is important to open the stock market to foreign investors. 
This helps bring financial and non-financial benefits, such as experience and transfer of 
knowledge. However, these changes require efforts from regulatory bodies to develop 
confidence in the Saudi financial market. Specifically, the number of listed firms and the 
volume of trading (liquidity) in the stock market are still not encouraging, considering the 
size of the Saudi economy. 
    
10.3.2 Awareness and Appreciation of Corporate Governance 
 As discussed in Chapters One and Two, the concept of corporate governance was 
not well known among stakeholders in Saudi Arabia until the early 2000s (Al-Motairy, 
2003; Alshehri and Solomon, 2012). Due to the importance of good corporate governance 
practices, the Saudi government started to reform the governance system in 2003 (Al-
Nodel and Hussainey, 2010). This subsection summarises the internal and external 
stakeholders’ perceptions about three main issues: (i) the appreciation of good corporate 
governance practices; (ii) awareness of shareholders’ rights; and (iii) evaluation of the 
corporate governance reforms.   
First, awareness of corporate governance on the part of the board of directors and 
shareholders is essential. The majority of interviewees report fairly similar views about the 
improvement in directors’ awareness of the importance of corporate governance. Most of 
the interviewees refer to corporate governance reforms, such as the introduction of the 
Listing Rules and the SCGC, which assisted directors in understanding their tasks. 
However, they point out that awareness about accountability and social responsibility 
should increase among directors.  
Regarding shareholders’ awareness and appreciation of good corporate governance 
practices, large shareholders are found to be relatively aware of corporate governance. This 
is due to their keenness in protecting their investments. Small shareholders are mostly 
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 After the stock market crash in 2006, the CMA restricted the change in prices of shares by 10% to the 
upper and lower bounds daily.  
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short-term investors. In this particular issue, the CMA has been criticised for failing to 
educate small shareholders about the importance of exercising their role in successful 
corporate governance. From the key stakeholders’ views, it is important to note that 
shareholders’ awareness of their rights forces firms to comply with corporate governance 
standards. Thus, the CMA should encourage small shareholders to exercise their rights so 
that boards of directors can execute their responsibilities seriously.    
Second, as discussed in Chapters Two and Nine, the corporate governance regime 
in Saudi Arabia is geared more towards the Anglo-American model, where governance 
legislation mainly focuses on protecting shareholders’ interests (Alshehri and Solomon, 
2012; Seidl et al., 2013). Therefore, this subsection addresses how shareholders can 
exercise their rights meaningfully in the general assembly, towards reducing information 
asymmetry and protecting the interests of minority shareholders. 
The key internal and external stakeholders are of the view that the exercising of 
shareholders’ rights, such as attending general assemblies and accessing information, has 
improved as a result of the corporate governance reforms. Members of boards of directors 
indicate that there has been an apparent increase in the number of shareholders who attend 
general assembly meetings. Furthermore, they have started searching for financial and non-
financial information. Nevertheless, a number of stakeholders suggest further protection 
for small shareholders. They report that small shareholders’ attendance at general assembly 
meetings is not useful enough because they do not have decision-making power. For 
example, some companies are 70% owned by the government; therefore, in these 
companies, small shareholders have minimal power. 
However, implementing legislation ensures that the majority of shareholders 
exercise their rights, such as through remote voting. Also, the implementation of a one-
share-one- vote
85
 policy would stimulate small shareholders to participate in general 
assembly meetings. Also, the stakeholders suggest governance legislation criminalising 
certain violations by directors to protect small shareholders. 
Third, the interview data shows the interviewees’ assessment of the regulatory 
bodies’ performance and evaluation of the existing governance legislation and legal 
system. The interviewees show that the CMA’s efforts in reforming corporate governance 
have been persuasive and meaningful, especially considering the short time that has 
elapsed since they have been active. They report that the CMA has succeeded fairly well in 
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 Theoretically, this corporate governance mechanism may increase the opportunity to appoint small 
shareholders’ representatives to the board (Adams and Ferreira, 2008). A number of developed countries 
have adopted a one-share-one-vote policy (e.g., the UK and the US). In Saudi Arabia, in January 2012, the 
MCI issued a resolution to mandate listed firms to apply accumulative voting (one-share-one-vote) during 
board elections in general assembly meetings (Al-jazirah, 2012). 
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re-organising and strengthening the stock market after its dramatic drop in February 2006. 
From the interviewees’ point of view, the CMA accelerated the release of the governance 
code in November 2006 and has worked to increase the number of listed firms by 100% 
between 2007 and 2010.
86
 As discussed in Section 10.1, these attempts restored confidence 
in the stock market after its dramatic drop. 
With respect to corporate governance legislation, the key stakeholders believe that 
the current governance regulations could lead to good governance practices generally. 
However, some of the interviewees express their concerns about the importance of 
updating other regulations, such as the Companies Act
87
 issued in 3740, specifically to 
make it compatible with the new governance regulations and consistent with the modern 
business environment. As discussed in Subsection 10.3.1, although the CMA has been 
successful in introducing governance legislation, it has still several shortcomings. It is 
interesting to note that there is a need to increase institutional investment and stock market 
depth, and to allow foreign investment, which is still restricted by swap agreements. It is 
noted that the implementation of these mechanisms may help the stock market to become 
efficient and compatible with the size of the Saudi economy, which is the largest in the 
region. 
Furthermore, the stakeholders suggest that there is a need to achieve integration 
between regulatory bodies, such as the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI), the 
Capital Market Authority (CMA) and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA). The 
lack of co-operation among these authorities hinders quick implementation of governance 
reforms. For example, the stakeholders’ views suggest that the main reason behind the 
falling stock market in 2006 was a lack of co-ordination between the CMA and the SAMA. 
More precisely, several banks’ customers were allowed to take out large loans from banks 
to invest in the stock market without sufficient guarantees. This caused the stock index to 
inflate before losing 53% of its value. Also, an overlap is noted between the 
responsibilities of the regulatory bodies, which delayed appropriate intervention by the 
authorities. This can lead the companies towards bankruptcy, which is also harmful for 
shareholders. 
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 As discussed in Chapter One and Two, there were about 14 listed firms by 1975. As a result of the growth 
of oil-producing countries and the expansion of their economies, the number of Saudi listed firms increased 
to 75 firms in the early 2000s. Between 2003 and 2006, the Saudi government introduced corporate 
governance and stock market reforms, resulting in an increase in the number of listed firms, from 75 to 140 
firms in 2010 (Tadawul, 2012). 
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 As discussed in Chapter Two, the new Companies Act was prepared by the MCI as a substitute for the 
current 1965 Act. The Act is pending approval by the Council of Ministers. The most prominent feature of 
the new Act involves expanding the power of the general assembly (Alriyadh, 2011a). 
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10.4 INTEGRATION BETWEEN QUANTATIVE AND QUALITATIVE 
FINDINGS 
The previous sections presented separate summaries of the findings from the 
quantitative and qualitative data. As discussed in Chapters One and Four, this study 
employs a mixed-methods approach. This approach is very useful for explaining results 
when both quantitative and qualitative data are used (Creswell and Clark, 2011; Boyd et 
al., 2012). Recently, the mixed-methods approach has been widely welcomed in the 
corporate governance literature and is considered very effective for developing a deep 
understanding of corporate governance behaviour (McNulty et al., 2013; Zattoni et al., 
2013). The study employed the Explanatory Sequential Design (two sequential stages) 
proposed by Creswell and Clark (2011). As discussed in Chapter Four, the Explanatory 
Sequential Design depends on two distinct interaction phases. Specifically, after obtaining 
the statistical findings, the study explored deep insights from interviews. This provided a 
unique opportunity to improve our ability to understand and explain the statistical results. 
This section outlines the integration of the results from the quantitative and qualitative 
data.  
Most of the findings from the interviews support and explain the results obtained 
from the statistical analysis. As discussed in Chapter Six, the level of compliance with the 
SCGC increased from 17% in 2004 to 73% in 2010. This gradual improvement is 
attributed to the corporate governance reforms. The interviewees agree that the level of 
voluntary corporate disclosure has improved in Saudi listed firms in recent years. 
Furthermore, the interviewees show that the content of the firms’ annual reports has also 
recently improved. This improvement applies both to financial and non-financial 
information in the annual reports. The interviewees also show that directors’ awareness of 
the importance of corporate governance has increased. This can explain the gradual 
improvement shown by statistical analysis in the level of compliance with the SCGC since 
it was introduced in 2006. 
Regarding the factors affecting voluntary corporate governance disclosure, the 
descriptive analysis shows that the corporate governance practices of firms audited by one 
of the big-four are significantly better than those of their counterparts not audited by one of 
the big-four auditing firms. This could be explained by the interviewees’ perception that 
big-four audit firms are more qualified to limit management’s opportunistic behaviour. 
Also, the interviewees show that investors in the Saudi stock market became relatively 
more aware of the importance of appointing a big-four audit firm. This explains the 
positive relationship between audit firm size and voluntary corporate governance in Saudi 
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listed firms. In addition, findings from the quantitative and qualitative data are integrated 
to explain the role of the corporate governance committee in improving voluntary 
corporate disclosure. The quantitative findings show that the presence of a corporate 
governance committee improves the level of compliance with governance standards. The 
interviews explain this result, as the stakeholders mention that corporate governance 
committees derive their power from being part of the board structure. This makes them 
highly effective. 
In terms of the relationship between voluntary corporate governance disclosure and 
ownership structure, the quantitative findings show that government, institutional and 
director ownership positively influence corporate governance practices. The stakeholders 
are of the view that government ownership can improve the independence of the board of 
directors and ensure better protection for shareholders. Similarly, they are of the view that 
large institutional investment and director ownership could enhance accountability and 
improve transparency. Despite most of the literature on corporate governance showing a 
negative impact of director ownership on corporate disclosure, the key stakeholders 
suggest that this is not the case for Saudi listed firms. They explain that director ownership 
in Saudi firms is a strategic ownership based on long-term investment. Thus, the boards of 
directors attempt to improve corporate disclosure and transparency to maintain their 
interests and protect the firms’ reputation. However, the interviewees support the results of 
the quantitative data, which show that block ownership negatively affects voluntary 
corporate disclosure. The interviewees explain that large shareholders in Saudi listed firms 
have the power to appoint directors, which influences board policy and performance.  
 The quantitative data analysis shows a positive relationship between corporate 
governance index and ROA. This result is consistent with the key stakeholders’ 
perceptions of the relationship between corporate governance practices and firm 
performance. Specifically, the stakeholders suggest that effective internal corporate 
governance mechanisms could improve accountability, which would positively affect 
shareholders’ rights. However, the results of regression analysis show that there is no 
significant relationship between voluntary corporate disclosure and firm value measured by 
Tobin’s Q. The stakeholders explain that the Saudi stock market is inefficient, which 
consequently leads to a weak relationship between good corporate governance practices 
and firm value. Therefore, they point out that there is a need to encourage institutional 
investment, breadth of the market and foreign investment to enhance the external corporate 
governance mechanisms.  
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However, the interviewees are of the view that the relationship between 
independent directors and good corporate governance practices is theoretically positive. 
They also suggest that the independence of the board of directors improves the board’s 
monitoring role and improves corporate performance. As discussed in Chapter Nine, the 
interviewees explain that this is not the case in Saudi listed firms, for two main reasons: (i) 
many firms recently listed on the stock market were successful family firms before they 
were listed. Thus, family members (who are non-independent) maintain high ownership 
and membership on the board of directors; and (ii) the appointment of independent 
directors in Saudi firms is not transparent, and there is no mechanism for the CMA to 
verify the independence of a firm’s board. This explains the quantitative findings showing 
a negative relationship between independent directors and corporate governance in Saudi 
listed firms. 
 
 
10.5 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS STUDY 
As discussed in Chapter One, the current study contributes to the literature on 
corporate governance in several ways. First, business studies in general and corporate 
governance studies in particular are dominated by quantitative studies (Molina-Azorin, 
2012). Boyd et al. (2012) suggest that the literature on corporate governance could greatly 
benefit from the use of additional qualitative methods or mixed-methods research 
approaches in order to enhance understanding of corporate governance practices. It can be 
argued that quantitative data alone does not present an explanation of the findings from 
statistical tests. More precisely, quantitative findings do not provide sufficient 
interpretation of the findings, and are less likely to shed light on the insights of ‘why’ a 
social phenomenon happens (Morgan and Smircich, 1980; Cohen et al., 2002; Creswell 
and Clark, 2011).  
In this regard, Zattoni et al. (2013) indicate that the lack of agreement in corporate 
governance findings refers to the inability of quantitative data to provide explanations of 
the results. This serves as motivation for researchers to use interviews along with 
quantitative data (mixed-methods research) to explore interactions among key stakeholders 
(Boyd et al., 2012; Molina-Azorin, 2012; Zattoni et al., 2013).  
Boyd et al. (2012) and Molina-Azorin (2012) argue that mixed-methods research 
generates more reliable and credible findings than any single method used. In response to 
the recent call for more mixed-methods research, this study uses mixed-methods as a new 
approach to studying corporate governance (Boyd et al., 2012; McNulty et al., 2013; 
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Zattoni et al., 2013). As discussed in Chapter One, the study provides evidence that it is 
empirically possible to conduct research on corporate governance reforms using mixed-
methods. Therefore, this study contributes to the corporate governance literature by 
showing how the findings from quantitative and qualitative data can be integrated to 
examine corporate governance behaviour. This paves the way for future research in the 
context of corporate governance. 
Second, the study contributes to the literature by adopting a multiple-theoretical 
framework to interpret the empirical findings and to understand corporate governance 
behaviour in depth. More precisely, it is argued that most existing studies on corporate 
governance concentrate on agency theory, though they mention other corporate governance 
theories (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009; Chalevas, 2011; Zattoni et al., 2013). Zattoni et al. 
(2013) suggest that the mixed findings obtained from corporate governance studies can be 
attributed to adopting an agency-based perspective. Furthermore, this study responds to the 
recent calls to use complementary theories in empirical governance studies to enhance 
understanding of corporate governance behaviour. In addition, the corporate governance 
phenomenon is related to a variety of disciplines, such as sociology, economics, law and 
business (Rwegasira, 2000; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010), which are inherently multi-
theoretically oriented. Therefore, adopting a multiple-theoretical perspective in this study 
helps in explaining how to use multiple theories to interpret the empirical findings. 
Third, the SCGC is used as a main source in constructing the governance index. To 
the researcher’s best knowledge, this study is the first to show evidence of the level of 
compliance with the SCGC, as well as comparing compliance before and after the 
introduction of the 2006 SCGC. However, compliance with the SCGC is voluntary in 
nature, carefully mimicking the UK’s ‘comply or explain’ style voluntary compliance 
regime (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Al-Abbas, 2009; Piesse et al., 2012). Given 
the differences between the UK and Saudi Arabia in terms of the effectiveness of 
governance mechanisms (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009), legal systems (Bozec et al., 
2010) and cultural values (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Kamla and Roberts, 2010), it is not 
certain whether a voluntary code will be effective in raising governance standards, or 
applicable to the Saudi corporate environment. In light of the above reasons, this study 
contributes to the literature by investigating the feasibility of adopting Western legislation 
aimed at enhancing corporate governance mechanisms in developing Arabic countries, 
especially Saudi Arabia. 
Fourth, the study provides empirical evidence of the determinants of compliance 
with corporate governance standards in Saudi listed firms, including internal corporate 
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governance mechanisms and ownership structure. This contributes to the existing literature 
by shedding light on the main factors that influence the level of voluntary compliance with, 
and disclosure of, corporate governance provisions in Saudi Arabia.  
Fifth, this study contributes to the extant literature by offering evidence on the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm financial performance in Saudi listed 
firms. The literature examining this relationship suggests the use of either the equilibrium-
variable model or the compliance-index model. This study also contributes to the literature 
by adopting these two approaches, and helps explore the influence of the chosen methods 
on the findings and their implications for future research. Moreover, this study uses two 
different measures, accounting and market-based measures, and thereby serving as a 
robustness check for the findings (see Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Ntim et al., 2012b). 
Sixth, by conducting in-depth interviews, the study contributes to the literature by 
assessing the awareness and appreciation of good corporate governance practices among 
key stakeholders in Saudi Arabia. The interview data provides insights about the views of 
board members, regulators, auditors, professionals and general stakeholders regarding the 
recent corporate governance reforms that have been pursued in Saudi Arabia.   
Seventh, as shown in Chapter Three, most empirical studies that adopt a corporate 
governance index use ‘analysts’ ratings’. The differences in governance structures and 
legal systems among countries are not taken into account when such ratings are used 
(Renders et al., 2010). In addition, those ratings usually broadly focus on the board of 
directors’ provisions and ownership structure (Ammann et al., 2013). Thus, to the 
researcher’s best knowledge, this study is innovative in Saudi Arabia because it employs a 
broad self-constructed index consisting of 65 provisions, derived from local governance 
legislation. The constructed index includes four sub-indices investigating corporate 
governance mechanisms from different governance aspects. Thus, this study contributes to 
the literature by using a self-constructed index that is arguably more applicable to the 
Saudi context, and thus opens up new avenues for future studies. 
Eighth, it can be noted that the corporate governance literature focuses heavily on 
developed countries (Bozec and Bozec, 2012; Baydoun et al., 2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 
2013). To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no study has investigated corporate 
governance reforms either in developed or developing countries using an integrated 
framework. Specifically, this study considers three main perspectives: (i) voluntary 
corporate governance compliance and disclosure; (ii) firm financial performance; and (iii) 
awareness and appreciation of good corporate governance practices. Therefore, the 
integrated framework contributes new insights to the study of corporate governance 
329 
 
 
reforms. Thus, the findings of this study pioneer the use of the integrated approach by 
establishing evidence of the effects of corporate governance reforms on corporate 
performance and disclosure in Saudi Arabia. 
Finally, the findings suggest recommendations to policy-makers in assessing 
corporate governance reforms, such as: (i) to improve coordination among regulatory 
bodies in order to avoid a conflict of responsibilities which seems to hinder the 
implementation of reforms; (ii) to ensure better protection for small shareholders through 
the criminalisation of certain violations by members of boards of directors; (iii) to enforce 
the mechanisms that encourage small shareholders to exercise their rights; (iv) to create 
and promote awareness among stakeholders of the importance of good corporate 
governance practices through holding workshops; (v) the CMA should increase awareness 
about institutional investment in order to help the stock market develop further; (vi) to 
provide foreign investors with access to the stock market, which may help in increasing 
market capitalisation, turnover, liquidity and visibility; and (vii) the CMA should work to 
strengthen and widen the breadth of the stock market by increasing the number of listed 
firms, which could improve the external market as a corporate control mechanism. 
 
 
10.6 RESEARCH FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY-MAKERS 
This section presents the implications for policy-makers based on the findings. 
Specifically, Subsection 10.6.1 presents implications for voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure. Subsection 10.6.2 sheds light on the implications for firm financial 
performance. 
 
10.6.1 Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosure and Implications for Policy-
Makers 
As discussed in the findings, the level of compliance with corporate governance 
standards shows gradual improvement during the sample period from 2004 to 2010. This 
finding has the following implications. First, corporate governance reforms in Saudi 
Arabia, specifically the release of the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) in 2006, 
have helped to improve voluntary corporate governance disclosure. This suggests that 
despite the weak legal system in emerging countries (Bozec et al., 2010), the issuance of 
governance regulations is able to improve corporate governance practices in these 
countries in general and in Saudi Arabia in particular.  
Second, as shown in Table 6.1 in Chapter Six, the findings indicate a low level of 
compliance with some provisions. For example, firms rarely disclose information on 
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CEOs’ compensation. This implies that there the need for regulatory authorities to enforce 
compliance among Saudi firms, especially relating to important corporate governance 
provisions that could affect shareholders’ rights. The level of compliance with internal 
control and risk management’s provisions is the lowest. Thus, given the importance of 
these provisions in protecting firms’ assets and resources (Wang, 2012), the CMA needs to 
be more precise in monitoring firms’ compliance with those provisions. Furthermore, 
external auditors can be assigned to assess firms’ internal control systems and report on 
these to shareholders.  
Third, despite the improvement in the level of compliance for the entire sample, 
variations in compliance are observed based on firm size and industry type. The findings 
show that larger firms provide more voluntary corporate governance disclosure. This is 
because large firms are more able to afford the costs of governance implementation than 
smaller firms (Ammann et al., 2011). Also, large firms have more agency problems due to 
the complexity of capital structure; thus, they are required to provide additional disclosure 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). Therefore, it is worth 
distinguishing between large and small firms when introducing legislation to achieve a 
balance between costs and benefits of compliance (see Ammann et al., 2011). For 
example, establishing board sub-committees should depend on a firm’s size (i.e., small 
firms might not need a remuneration committee). 
On the other hand, the findings also show differences in the level of disclosure 
based on industry type. It can be argued that the nature of firms’ activities may require 
different levels of disclosure, according to industry type. Therefore, it may be appropriate 
for annual reports to feature two levels of disclosure: (i) general disclosures for all firms; 
and (ii) industry-specific disclosures which provide essential information about the firm’s 
status and future in relation to its industry.  
The results show a number of remarkable implications regarding the factors and 
mechanisms affecting voluntary corporate governance disclosure. These implications can 
be taken into account to improve internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. 
First, the findings show that independence of the board of directors is negatively related to 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure. As discussed in Chapter Nine and Section 10.2, 
this is contrary to the suggestion in the literature that the presence of independent directors 
limits opportunistic executives (Fama and Jensen, 1983), protects stakeholders’ welfare 
(Clarke, 1998) and ensures benefits from more knowledge and experience (Barako et al., 
2006). The negative relation could imply the following: (i) the mechanism for selecting 
independent directors is not transparent in Saudi firms because the power to appoint 
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directors rests with large shareholders; and (ii) some independent directors in Saudi listed 
firms do not have the required experience and knowledge. These two factors adversely 
affect the independence of the board of directors. Therefore, it is important that the CMA 
establishes criteria for the selection of independents and verifies the independence of 
candidates to ensure that their contribution is effective and substantial. 
Second, the results show that institutional ownership is positively associated with 
corporate disclosure in Saudi listed firms. This is consistent with the literature that suggests 
that institutional investors usually have higher incentives to monitor firms’ performance 
and protect their investments, especially when their exit is costly (Chung and Zhang, 
2011). Institutional investment is very low in Saudi listed firms, only about 6% of the 
market value. This may explain the need to enhance institutional ownership to improve 
good corporate governance practices. Specifically, the CMA needs to encourage 
individuals to invest through institutional investment rather than direct investment. This 
can improve the external corporate governance mechanism.  
Third, audit firm size has a positive impact on firm corporate governance 
disclosure. Although the role of audit firms is important, the existing Saudi governance 
regulations do not explicitly outline their role in improving disclosure. Therefore, it is 
appropriate to add the auditor’s assessment of a firm’s governance practices to its annual 
report. This may ensure compliance with corporate governance standards by the firm’s 
management. Finally, the presence of a corporate governance committee helps establish 
good governance practices (Ntim et al., 2012a), especially in countries that recently 
adopted the governance concept, such as Saudi Arabia. The findings indicate that a small 
number of firms have formed such committees. Therefore, the CMA should encourage 
listed firms, especially big firms, to establish corporate governance committees so that they 
can implement and monitor good governance practices. 
 
10.6.2 Firm Financial Performance and Implications for Policy-Makers 
The results obtained from examining the relationship between internal corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm financial performance have a number of implications. 
First, it is theoretically expected that the presence of director ownership may increase the 
free-rider problem due to the possibility of collusion between directors and firm 
management (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998). However, this is not the case in Saudi listed 
firms, because a positive relationship is found between director ownership and firm 
financial performance measured by ROA and Q-ratio. This could be because director 
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ownership in Saudi firms is a strategic ownership mainly controlled by family members, 
whose aim is to improve firm performance so that their interests can be maximised.   
The major implication of these findings is that the existing legislation, specifically 
the 1965 Companies Act, requires directors to maintain a minimum of 1,000 shares, and 
they must hold these while they are sitting on the board. This minimum limit of 
shareholding for sitting directors seems quite small; it is not certain that directors would 
have the incentive to perform their professional best. Therefore, it is important for the 
legislation to require higher ownership by directors, especially executive directors, making 
them active board members. This may also make directors keen to enhance the firm’s 
financial performance. 
Second, the findings show a positive relationship between board sub-committees 
and firm profitability, while there is no association with firm value. Board sub-committees 
are essential in making the board’s decisions effective (Harrison, 1987). Despite the 
growing attention given to such committees globally over the past two decades (Jiraporn et 
al., 2009), they are still in their infancy and are not much appreciated in Saudi listed firms. 
Therefore, the finding indicates the lack of a significant relationship between board sub-
committees and Q-ratio. The main implication is that there is a need to raise awareness and 
appreciation of the importance of board sub-committees generally among stakeholders and 
particularly among investors.  
 Finally, for the relationship between corporate governance index (the SCGI) and 
firm financial performance, the findings suggest a positive relationship between corporate 
governance index and firm profitability measured by ROA. This supports the notion that 
good corporate governance practices can mitigate monitoring and bonding costs and 
improve firm financial performance (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Monks and Minow, 2011). 
Moreover, the findings show no significant relationship between the SCGI and firms’ 
value measured by Q-ratio. These findings suggest that the lack of a relationship is due to 
the absence of an external corporate governance mechanism. As discussed in Subsection 
10.5.2, the CMA should activate external governance mechanisms, such as increasing 
market depth and institutional investment and allowing foreign direct investment to make 
the stock market efficient. This may lead to a positive relationship between corporate 
governance practices and firm value. 
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10.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The previous sections addressed the contributions of the study and implications for 
policy in Saudi Arabia. However, this study has a number of limitations. The limitations 
are discussed from three main aspects: (i) the general framework of the research; (ii) the 
quantitative research design; and (iii) the qualitative research design.  
Regarding the general framework of the research, the study has the following 
limitations. First, although listed firms are important, there are other firms that 
significantly contribute to the Saudi economy and are worthy of being studied, such as 
family firms. The current study focuses on listed firms due to the importance of good 
governance practices in these firms, as they have a large number of shareholders who need 
to be protected. Furthermore, it is more difficult to obtain data for non-listed firms. Second, 
given the diverse nature of corporate governance, the theoretical framework of the study 
relied on multiple theoretical perspectives to explain corporate governance mechanisms 
(Rwegasira, 2000; Solomon, 2010). Analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data is 
limited to main theories, such as agency, shareholders, stewardship, managerial signalling 
and resource dependence theories. This is because the governance system (Anglo-
American model) in Saudi Arabia mainly focuses on shareholders’ interests (ROSC, 2009; 
Alshehri and Solomon, 2012; Seidl et al., 2012). Thus, adopting additional theories could 
extend the multiple theoretical perspective and provide a richer basis for understanding and 
exploring corporate governance reforms. 
Using mixed-methods research involves a number of challenges in terms of the 
time and cost needed to design and conduct the research (Creswell and Clark, 2011). 
Regarding the quantitative research design, there are some limitations that need to be 
addressed. First, the quantitative sample size of 80 listed firms is relatively small when 
compared to the 145 firms listed as of 31 December, 2010. The selection of the firms was 
subject to two criteria: (i) the firms had to meet the criteria for balanced panel data 
analysis, which is important in assessing whether cross-sectional associations between 
corporate governance practices and each of voluntary corporate governance disclosure and 
firm financial performance hold over the study period (Ntim et al., 2012b); and (ii) annual 
reports for the firms had to be available for the seven years of the study period. 
The data were extracted manually from the firms’ annual reports using content 
analysis, which requires substantial time and effort. In spite of this, the sample size (560 
observations) is larger than the samples used in previous studies on Saudi firms. Previous 
studies also did not use balanced panel data. For example, as reviewed in Chapters Three 
and Five, Alsaeed (2006) examines 40 firms in 2003, while Hussainey and Al-Nodel 
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(2008) and Al-Nodel and Hussainey (2010) use 64 and 37 firms in 2005, respectively. 
Furthermore, Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2012) examine 52 firms over two years, and Al-
Moataz and Lakhal (2012) use a sample consisting of 48 firms covering two years. Also, 
Al-Abbas (2009) uses a sample of 106 observations over three years between 2005 and 
2007. Alzharani et al. (2011) examine 392 observations over four years, while Soliman 
(2013a and b) uses a sample of 64 observations over three years. Although the sample used 
in this study is large compared to previous studies, the generalisability of the findings 
could be improved if the sample size was even larger. 
Second, the study relies on the firms’ annual reports as the main source of financial 
and non-financial data. However, there are other sources of disclosure, such as firms’ 
websites (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008). Although the study is limited to mainly one 
source, this source is more reliable than others (Omar and Simon, 2011). According to 
Knutson (1992, p.22), “the annual report is the major reporting document and every other 
report is in some respect subsidiary or supplementary to it”. All listed firms are obliged to 
publish their reports formally on the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) website. This allows 
for complete access to the required data and helps in creating a balanced panel and 
minimising missing data. Furthermore, the use of the firms’ annual reports is in line with 
prior studies conducted either in Saudi Arabia (e.g., Al-Abbas, 2009; Al-Moataz and 
Lakhal, 2012; Al-Janadi et al., 2013) or in other emerging countries (e.g., Elzahar and 
Hussainey, 2012; Samaha et al., 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a; Tariq and Abbas, 2013). On the 
other hand, the study used interviews to explore key stakeholders’ perceptions of voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure. This could help to minimise the limitations of using only 
one source (i.e. annual reports).  
Third, as discussed in Chapter Five, the study uses a corporate governance index 
developed by the researcher to examine the relationship between governance mechanisms 
and each of corporate governance disclosure and firm financial performance. However, 
analysts’ ratings are professionally developed based on the experience and knowledge of 
analysts (Hassan and Marston, 2010). Therefore, unlike analysts’ ratings, the self-
constructed index used in this study could perhaps have been influenced by the 
researcher’s subjectivity. Despite this, the researcher worked to improve the validity of the 
index through: (i) relying on corporate governance legislation in Saudi Arabia, especially 
the corporate governance code as a source of provisions (see Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2009; Renders et al., 2010; Allegrini and Greco, 2013); (ii) selecting provisions 
which constitute the main aspects of corporate governance mechanisms; and (iii) passing 
the checklist of proposed provisions through two phases before making them final. As 
335 
 
 
noted previously in Chapter Five, the first draft was discussed with junior and senior 
colleagues in several annual doctoral conferences, and was then revised based on the 
researcher supervisors’ comments. These processes helped minimise any problems or 
shortcomings of the constructed corporate governance index. 
Fourth, binary coding was used for scoring the governance index. Although binary 
coding is highly common in most corporate disclosure studies (Gompers et al., 2003; 
Ammann et al., 2013), there are some limitations to this technique (Beattie et al., 2004). 
For example, unlike weighted scoring, the binary method does not distinguish between 
provisions in terms of their importance (Hassan and Marston, 2010). However, the use of 
binary coding is justified by the following reasons: (i) there is no theoretical basis or 
concurrence among analysts and experts about how to weight governance provisions 
(Barako et al., 2006); (ii) the weighted approach requires experienced judgment, which 
may not be available to all researchers; (iii) the development of a weighted index requires 
conducting surveys among relevant user groups, which also requires extra time and 
additional costs (Beattie et al., 2004); (iv) although there are few provisions in the 
developed index requiring the researcher’s judgment, most of the coded provisions are 
substantiated by confirming their presence or absence; and (v) adopting an un-weighted 
index is in line with existing studies on corporate governance disclosure (e.g., Alsaeed, 
2006; Barako et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012), which allows for 
comparisons between the findings. 
To mitigate the problem of weighting the index, the researcher took a number of 
steps, namely: (i) having a relatively large number of provisions (65) in the SCGI reduced 
the variation between the provisions (Beattie et al., 2004); (ii) the study classified the 
provisions into four sub-indices; the more important the sub-index was, the more items that 
sub-index had in the overall SCGI; and (iii) consistent with Ntim et al. (2012a), the coding 
scores were designed to measure the qualitative differences in governance information 
across the firms’ annual reports. This is unlike some studies that examined only the 
existence of a few provisions (e.g., Barako et al., 2006; Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Samaha et 
al., 2012). For example, these studies assign a point if a firm has an audit committee; 
however, the constructed SCGI seeks to measure other corporate governance mechanisms 
associated with the audit committee, such as the committee composition and chairperson 
classification.   
Fifth, although the study minimises the impact of omitted variables by focusing on 
the most influential explanatory variables, some variables could not be examined due to 
unavailability of data. In particular, and due to unavailable data, interesting contextual 
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variables and challenges, such as political connections, social norms, Islamic values and 
Islamic business transactions, were not operationalised and empirically tested. These were, 
however, normatively articulated as part of the key motivations of the study. As discussed 
below, future research can incorporate such issues in their research design. 
There are some limitations of the qualitative research design. First, the interviews 
focus only on key stakeholders, especially those who can influence good corporate 
governance practices, such as members of boards of directors, executive managers, audit 
firm partners and a representative of regulatory bodies, in addition to shareholders (see 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Solomon, 2010). However, other important stakeholders 
involved with the firms’ ownership structure and having a similar potential impact on 
governance mechanisms and performance were not interviewed, such as government 
representatives, institutional investors and family owners. This was largely due to 
accessibility constraints.  
Second, some interviewees, specifically members of boards of directors, CEOs and 
CFOs, avoided responding more directly to some of the questions concerning their firms’ 
performance and management. Thus, it is noted that their answers may be insufficient on 
some issues. Third, unlike quantitative research, the researcher in a qualitative study faces 
the problem of subjectivity while analysing the research problem (Collis and Hussey, 
2009). Therefore, the collection and analysis of the interview data may be influenced by 
the researcher’s subjectivity (Creswell and Clark, 2011). However, and arguably, the use of 
mixed-methods research design has helped in minimising such subjectivity problems. 
Finally, due to accessibility problems, only fifteen interviews were conducted; further 
insights could have potentially been gleaned if more participants were interviewed.  
 
 
10.8 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The previous section addressed the limitations of the study. The limitations 
themselves open up new avenues for further corporate governance research. Some 
suggestions and ideas for future research are offered, as follows. First, much attention has 
been recently paid to the use of mixed-methods in exploring corporate governance 
behaviour, and researchers are encouraged to employ this approach in their analyses 
(McNulty et al., 2013; Zattoni et al., 2013). Creswell and Clark (2011, p.15) suggest that 
“One way to help convince others of the utility of mixed-methods is to locate exemplary 
mixed-methods studies in the literature on a topic or in a content area and share studies to 
educate others”. This may help to overcome the limitations in using mixed-methods, such 
337 
 
 
as the need to develop a clear theoretical framework (Smith and Heshusius, 1986; Morgan, 
1998). Moreover, mixed-methods research helps achieve integration between the findings 
from quantitative and qualitative data. Greene et al. (1989) examine integration by 
reviewing 57 mixed-methods studies. Their findings indicate that 44% of the studies did 
not show any integration between the quantitative and qualitative methods used. Therefore, 
wider use of this promising field in management research can improve findings and 
conclusions.  
Second, future studies can examine non-listed firms’ level of compliance with 
corporate governance standards. While most existing empirical studies are conducted on 
listed firms, a study examining non-listed firms may be an innovative opportunity to 
compare the level of compliance among listed and non-listed firms. Additionally, one can 
investigate whether corporate governance mechanisms have similar impacts on all 
companies (listed and non-listed). Third, future studies can examine both balanced and 
unbalanced panel data. This can help determine whether the findings are different based on 
the methodology used; this can also help in generalising the results. 
Fourth, corporate governance is related to different disciplines and is explained by 
many theories (Rwegasira, 2000). Existing studies have focused on a number of 
governance theories, such as agency, stakeholders, shareholders, resource dependence, 
managerial signalling and stewardship theories, in investigating the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance (see Ntim et al., 2013). Therefore, future 
studies could shed light on some other governance theories, for example legitimacy, 
political and transaction cost theories, among others, to develop multiple theoretical 
frameworks in examining the relationship between corporate disclosure and firm 
performance. This can assist in achieving integration between theoretical and practical 
frameworks, thereby providing a deeper understanding of corporate governance practices.  
 Fifth, new research may possibly improve the construction of a corporate 
governance index by developing a weighted index. New research may conduct surveys of 
groups and other professional organisations that could help in examining the weighting of 
provisions and their relative importance. Such research may improve the validity and 
reliability of the constructed index, and these new findings could be compared with 
empirical studies that have already used un-weighted indices. In addition, future research 
may seek to capture and operationalise Saudi specific contextual factors, such as political 
connections, social norms, Islamic values and Islamic business transactions, in 
constructing the corporate governance index. 
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Sixth, future research could explore other aspects of corporate governance, such as 
social responsibility. Much attention has recently been paid to social responsibility and its 
impact on firm performance over the long term. Although social responsibility has been 
addressed in existing studies in developed countries, this topic has not been researched 
widely in emerging countries (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Also, it would be interesting 
to conduct a study in Saudi Arabia investigating the influence of social norms and Islamic 
principles on firms’ social responsibility. 
Finally, as Saudi firms suffer from ownership concentration problems, future 
research using qualitative methods can focus on studying awareness and appreciation of 
good corporate governance practices among large shareholders, such as representatives of 
the government, families and institutional investors. This may help in providing a deeper 
understanding of the effect of corporate governance reforms on corporate performance and 
disclosure practices. 
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Appendix 1: A List of the Names and Industries of the 80 Sampled Firms 
Full Company Name No. in 
Tadawul 
Chosen 
Code 
Industry 
1 Al Ahsa Development Co. 2140 SAH Consumer Services 
2 Al Baha for Development & Investment Co. 4130 SBH Consumer Services 
3 Al Rajhi Bank 1120 FRJ Financials  
4 Al Babtain Power & Telecommunication Co. 2320 TBT Telecommunications 
5 Aldrees Petroleum & Transport Services Co. 4200 SAD Consumer Services 
6 Al Jouf Agriculture Development Co. 6070 GJF Consumer Goods 
7 Almarai Company 2280 GMR Consumer Goods 
8 Alujain Corporation 2170 BLU Basic Materials 
9 Anaam International Holding Group CO. 4061 GAN Consumer Goods 
10 Arab National Bank 1080 FAN Financials  
11 Arabian Cement Co. 3010 IAR Industrials 
12 Arabian Pipes Company 2200 IPI Industrials 
13 Arriyadh Development Co. 4150 SAR Consumer Services 
14 Aseer Trading and Contracting Co. 4080 SAS Consumer Services 
15 Ash-Sharqiyah Development Company 6060 GSH Consumer Goods 
16 Bank Al Bilad 1140 FBL Financials  
17 Bank Al Jazira 1020 FJA Financials  
18 Banque Saudi Fransi 1050 FSF Financials  
19 Dar Alarkan Real Estate Development Company 4300 SDA Consumer Services 
20 Eastern Province Cement Co. 3080 IES Industrials 
21 Etihad Etisalat Co 7020 TET Telecommunications 
22 Filing & Packing Materials Manufacturing Co. 2180 IFP Industrials 
23 Fitaihi Holding Group 4180 SFT Consumer Services 
24 Jarir Marketing Co 4190 SJR Consumer Services 
25 Jazan Development Co. 6090 GJA Consumer Goods 
26 Makkah Construction & Development Co. 4100 SMK Consumer Services 
27 Middle East Specialized Cables Co 2110 ICB Industrials 
28 Nama Chemicals Co. 2210 BNM Basic Materials 
29 National Agriculture Development Co. 6010 GNA Consumer Goods 
30 National Agriculture Marketing Co. 4160 GTH Consumer Goods 
31 National Gas & Industrialization Co. 2080 UGA Utilities 
32 National Gypsum Company 2090 IGP Industrials 
33 National Industrialization Co 2060 BIN Basic Materials 
34 National Metal Manufacturing and Casting Co. 2220 IMD Industrials 
35 Qassim Agriculture Co. 6020 GQA Consumer Goods 
36 Riyad Bank 1010 FRI Financials  
37 SABB 1060 FSB Financials  
38 Sahara Petrochemical Co. 2260 BSH Basic Materials 
39 Samba Financial Group 1090 FSM Financials  
40 Saudi Advanced Industries Co. 2120 SSA Consumer Services 
41 Saudi Arabia Fertilizers Co. 2020 BSF Basic Materials 
42 Saudi Arabian Amiantit Co. 2160 IAM Industrials 
43 Saudi Arabian Refineries Co. 2030 SSR Consumer Services 
44 Saudi Automotive Services Co. 4050 SSS Consumer Services 
45 Saudi Basic Industries Corp 2010 BSB Basic Materials 
46 Saudi Cement Co. 3030 ISA Industrials 
47 Saudi Ceramic Co. 2040 ICE Industrials 
48 Saudi Chemical Company 2230 ISC Industrials 
49 Saudi Electricity Company 5110 UEL Utilities 
50 Saudi Fisheries Co. 6050 GFI Consumer Goods 
51 Saudi Hollandi Bank 1040 FSH Financials  
52 Saudi Hotels & Resort Areas Co. 4010 SHO Consumer Services 
53 Saudi Industrial Development Co. 2130 ISD Industrials 
54 Saudi Industrial Export Co 4140 ISE Industrials 
55 Saudi Industrial Investment Group 2250 BSG Basic Materials 
56 Saudi Industrial Services Co. 2190 SSI Consumer Services 
57 Saudi International Petrochemical Co 2310 BSP Basic Materials 
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Appendix 1 (Continued): A List of the Names and Industries of the 80 Sampled Firms 
Full Company Name No. in 
Tadawul 
Chosen 
Code 
Industry 
58 Saudi Pharmaceutical Indust. Corp. 2070 IPH Industrials 
59 Saudi Public Transport Co. 4040 SAP Consumer Services 
60 Saudi Real Estate Co. 4020 SRE Consumer Services 
61 Saudi Research and Marketing Group 4210 SRG Consumer Services 
62 Saudi Telecom 7010 TST Telecommunications 
63 Saudi Transport and Investment Company 4110 SMB Consumer Services 
64 Saudia Dairy & Foodstuff Co. 2270 GFO Consumer Goods 
65 Food Products Co. 2100 ISF Industrials 
66 Savola Group 2050 ISG Industrials 
67 Southern Province Cement Co. 3050 ISU Industrials 
68 Tabouk Cement Co. 3090 ITB Industrials 
69 Tabuk Agriculture Development Co. 6040 GTB Consumer Goods 
70 Taiba Holding Co. 4090 STI Consumer Services 
71 The Company for Cooperative Insurance 8010 FTA Financials  
72 The National Co. for Glass Industries 2150 IGL Industrials 
73 The National Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia 4030 SSH Consumer Services 
74 The Qassim Cement Co. 3040 IQA Industrials 
75 The Saudi Investment Bank 1030 FSI Financials  
76 Tihama Advertising & Public Relations Co. 4070 STM Consumer Services 
77 Tourism Enterprise Co. 4170 SSM Consumer Services 
78 Yamamah Saudi Cement Co. 3020 IYM Industrials 
79 Yanbu Cement Co. 3060 IYN Industrials 
80 Zamil Industrial Investment Co. 2240 IZA Industrials 
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Appendix 2: Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) Provisions and Measurement  
Corporate Governance Provision 
Acronym/ 
Code 
Saudi Code (SC)/ 
Companies Act 
(AC)/Listing 
Rules (LR) Ref of 
Article and Pages 
Measurement 
1- Board of Directors 
A- Board Structure 
   
Role Duality 
 
BDUAL SC 12/D (P.13)    A binary number of 1 if the CEO 
position is separate from the 
chairperson position, 0 otherwise. 
 
Board Chairperson Classification 
 
BCP SC 12/D (P.14)    A binary number of 1 if the 
chairperson of a firm is an 
independent director, 0 otherwise. 
 
Majority of Board of Directors BMBD SC 12/E (P.13) 
 
   A binary number of 1 if the 
majority of the members are non-
executive, 0 otherwise. 
 
Directors’ Classification  
 
BDCL SC 9/C (P.8)    A binary number of 1 if there is a 
clear narrative that classifies 
directors into executive, non-
executive and independent directors 
in the firm’s annual report, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Directors’ Biography  BDB OECD 1/5 (P.22)    A binary number of 1 if a firm 
discloses the directors’ biography in 
the firm’s annual report, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Policies of Directors’ Appointment BDPA SC 9&10 (P.9-11)    A binary number of 1 if a firm 
drafts policies of board and 
committee appointments, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Membership of Directors in other 
Firms’ Boards of directors 
 
BMOB SC 9/B (P.8)    A binary number of 1 if a firm 
discloses in its annual report 
information about directors who are 
members in other listed firms at the 
same time, 0 otherwise. 
 
Directors’ membership in other 
Boards of Listed Firm 
 
BMBN SC 12/H (P.14) A binary number of 1 if a firm’s 
directors are not board members of 
more than five listed firms at the 
same time, 0 otherwise. 
 
Frequency of Board Meetings 
   
BFBM SC 16/B (P.17)    A binary number of 1 if a firm 
discloses the number of board 
meetings in the firm’s annual 
report, 0 otherwise. 
 
Individual Directors’ Meetings 
Attendance 
BDMA LR 27/16 (P.26)    A binary number of 1 if meeting 
attendance of individual directors is 
disclosed in the firm’s annual 
report, 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix 2 (Continued): Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) Provisions and Measurement 
Corporate Governance Provision 
Acronym/ 
Code 
Saudi Code (SC)/ 
Companies Act 
(AC)/Listing 
Rules (LR) Ref of 
Article and Pages 
Measurement 
     B-   Board Sub-Committees    
Audit Committee    
Existence 
 
AEX SC 13/A&B 
(P.14) 
   A binary number of 1 if a firm 
has an audit committee, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Description of the Jurisdictions & 
Duties (Charter)   
 
ADJD SC 12/A (P.13)   A binary number of 1 if a firm 
briefly describes the jurisdiction 
and duties of the audit committee in 
the firm’s annual report, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Committee Composition ACOM SC 13/C (P.14)    A binary number of 1 if an audit 
committee has a sufficient number 
of non-executive members, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Committee Chairperson 
Classification 
 
ACP SC 9/D (P.8)     A binary number of 1 if the 
chairperson of the audit committee 
is independent, 0 otherwise. 
 
Identify Committee Chairperson ACN SC 9/D (P.9)      A binary number of 1 if the audit 
committee chairperson’s name is 
disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
 
Number of Committee Members ACNM SC 14/A (P.15)     A binary number of 1 if a firm’s 
audit committee is not less than 
three members, 0 otherwise. 
 
Disclosure of Membership  ADM SC 9/D (P.8)    A binary number of 1 if the 
membership of the audit committee 
is disclosed in the firm’s annual 
report, 0 otherwise. 
 
Frequency of Committee Meetings 
 
AFM SC 9/D (P.8)    A binary number of 1 if a firm 
discloses the number of audit 
committee meetings in the firm’s 
annual report, 0 otherwise. 
 
Individual Members’ Meeting 
Attendance 
AMMA SC 9/D (P.8)  A binary number of 1 if meeting 
attendance of individual members is 
disclosed in the firm’s annual 
report, 0 otherwise. 
 
Nomination Committee    
Existence 
 
NEX SC 13/B (P.14) 
9/D/8 (P.14) 
   A binary number of 1 if a firm 
has a nomination committee, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Description of the Jurisdictions & 
Duties (Charter)   
 
NDJD SC 12/A (P.13)   A binary number of 1 if a firm 
briefly describes the jurisdiction 
and duties of the nomination 
committee in the firm’s annual 
report, 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix 2 (Continued): Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) Provisions and Measurement 
Corporate Governance Provision 
Acronym/ 
Code 
Saudi Code (SC)/ 
Companies Act 
(AC)/Listing 
Rules (LR) Ref of 
Article and Pages 
Measurement 
Committee Composition NCOM SC 13/C (P.14)    A binary number of 1 if the 
nomination committee has a 
sufficient number of non-executive 
members, 0 otherwise. 
 
Committee Chairperson 
Classification 
 
NCP SC 9/D (P.8)       A binary number of 1 if the 
chairperson of the nomination 
committee is independent, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Identify Committee Chairperson NCN SC 9/D (P.8) A binary number of 1 if the 
nomination committee 
chairperson’s name is disclosed, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Disclosure of Membership NDM SC 9/D (P.8)    A binary number of 1 if the 
membership of the nomination 
committee is disclosed in the firm’s 
annual report, 0 otherwise. 
 
Frequency of Committee Meetings 
 
NFM SC 9/D (P.8)    A binary number of 1 a firm 
discloses the number of nomination 
committee meetings in the firm’s 
annual report, 0 otherwise. 
 
Individual Members’ Meeting 
Attendance 
NMMA SC 9/D (P.8)    A binary number of 1 if the 
meeting attendance of individual 
members is disclosed in the firm’s 
annual report, 0 otherwise. 
 
Remuneration Committee    
Existence 
 
REX SC 9/D/8 (P.14) 
13/B (P.14) 
   A binary number of 1 if a firm 
has a remuneration committee, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Description of the Jurisdictions & 
Duties (Charter)   
 
RDJD SC 12/A (P.13)   A binary number of 1 if a firm 
briefly describes the jurisdiction 
and duties of the remuneration 
committee in the firm’s annual 
report, 0 otherwise. 
 
Committee Composition RCOM SC 13/C (P.14)    A binary number of 1 if the 
remuneration committee has a 
sufficient number of non-executive 
members, 0 otherwise. 
 
Committee Chairperson 
Classification 
 
RCP SC 9/D (P.8)       A binary number of 1 if the 
chairperson of the remuneration 
committee is independent, 0 
otherwise. 
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Appendix 2 (Continued): Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) Provisions and Measurement 
Corporate Governance Provision 
Acronym/ 
Code 
Saudi Code (SC)/ 
Companies Act 
(AC)/Listing 
Rules (LR) Ref of 
Article and Pages 
Measurement 
Identify Committee Chairperson RCN SC 9/D (P.9) A binary number of 1 if the 
remuneration committee 
chairperson’s name is disclosed, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Disclosure of Membership RDM SC 9/D (P.8)    A binary number of 1 if the 
membership of the remuneration 
committee is disclosed in the firm’s 
annual report, 0 otherwise. 
 
Frequency of Committee Meetings 
 
RFM SC 9/D (P.8)    A binary number of 1 a firm 
discloses the number of 
remuneration committee meetings 
in the firm’s annual report, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Individual Members’ Meeting 
Attendance 
RMMA SC 9/D (P.8)    A binary number of 1 if the 
meeting attendance of individual 
members is disclosed in the firm’s 
annual report, 0 otherwise. 
 
2- Disclosure and Transparency    
Disclosure of Ownership Structure DOS LR 30 (P.26-28)   A binary number of 1 if a firm 
discloses its ownership structure in 
the firm’s annual report, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Director Ownership 
 
DBO CA 68 (P.11) 
 
A binary number of 1 if each of the 
firm’s board of directors owns at 
least 1,000 of the firm’s shares at 
the end of the financial year, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Board’s Compensation DBC SC 9/E (P.8)    A binary number of 1 if a firm 
discloses details of compensation 
and remuneration paid to board 
members in the firm’s annual 
report, 0 otherwise. 
 
Value of the Board’s 
Compensation 
 
DVBC AC 1071/74 
(P.12) 
   A binary number of 1 if the value 
of annual compensation of each 
director is  equal to or less than 
$53,000 or 10% of the firm’s profit 
for all members, whichever is 
lower, 0 otherwise.   
  
CEO/MD/GM Compensation 
 
DCEOC SC 9/E (P.8)    A binary number of 1 if a firm 
discloses details of compensation 
and remuneration paid to 
CEO/MD/GM in the firm’s annual 
report, 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix 2 (Continued): Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) Provisions and Measurement  
Corporate Governance Provision 
Acronym/ 
Code 
Saudi Code (SC)/ 
Companies Act 
(AC)/Listing 
Rules (LR) Ref of 
Article and Pages 
Measurement 
Top Management Compensation 
 
DTMC SC 9/E (P.8)    A binary number of 1 if a firm 
discloses details of compensation 
and remuneration paid to top 
management in the firm’s annual 
report, 0 otherwise. 
 
Disclosure Operation Performance 
(Charter) 
DOP 
(was DPI) 
LR 27/B/5 (P.23) 
LR 27/B/1 (P.25) 
A binary number of 1 if a firm’s 
annual report includes details about 
the firm’s operation and 
explanation for any material 
differences with the previous year, 
0 otherwise. 
 
Disclosure of the Firm’s Loans DFL LR 27/B/12 
(P.26) 
A binary number of 1 if a firm 
discloses all loans in a statement of 
the aggregate indebtedness of the 
firm and its group together with any 
amounts paid by the firm as 
repayment of loans during the year 
(if there are no loans outstanding, 
the firm must provide an 
appropriate statement), 0 otherwise. 
 
Disclosure of Firm’s Performance 
During last Five Years (Charter) 
DPFY LR B/3 (P.23)    A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a comparative summary of 
its assets and liabilities for the last 
five financial years or from 
incorporation, whichever is shorter, 
0 otherwise. 
 
Disclosure Strategies and 
Objectives (Charter) 
 
DSO SC 10/A (P.10) 
LR 27/B/2 (P.25) 
   A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides strategic plans and main 
objectives of the company in the 
firm’s annual report, 0 otherwise. 
 
Description of the Principal 
Activities (Charter) 
DPA LR 27/B/1 (P.25)  A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a description of the 
principal activities of the firm and 
its group. If two or more activities 
are described, a statement must be 
included giving the turnover and 
contribution to trading results 
attributable to it for each activity, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Disclosure Policy of Dividends 
 
DPD SC 7/A (P.7) 
LR 27/B/9 (P.24) 
A binary number of 1 if a firm 
discloses a clear policy of dividends 
in the firm’s annual report, 0 
otherwise. 
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Appendix 2 (Continued): Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) Provisions and Measurement 
Corporate Governance Provision 
Acronym/ 
Code 
Saudi Code (SC)/ 
Companies Act 
(AC)/Listing 
Rules (LR) Ref of 
Article and Pages 
Measurement 
Disclosure of Related Party 
Transactions 
 
DRP LR 27/B/17 
(P.25) 
A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides information relating to any 
contract to which the firm is party 
and in which the directors, the 
CEO, the CFO or any associate is 
or was materially interested, or if 
there are no such contracts, the firm 
must submit an appropriate 
statement, 0 otherwise. 
 
 Retraction/Punishment by 
Supervisory Body 
DSP SC 9/F (P.10)  A binary number of 1 if a firm 
discloses in its annual report any 
punishment, plenary or preventive 
retraction imposed on the firm by 
any supervisory body, or if there 
are no such activities, the firm must 
submit an appropriate statement, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Narrative on the Firm as a Going 
Concern 
DGC LR 27/22 (P.27) A binary number of 1 if a firm’s 
directors provide a clear narrative 
about no significant doubts 
concerning the firm’s ability to 
continue as a going concern, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Narrative on Compliance/Non-
Compliance with SCGC 
 
DCNC SC 1/C (P.3)    A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a positive statement on the 
compliance or non-compliance with 
the provisions of the SCGC in the 
annual report, 0 otherwise. 
 
3- Internal Control and Risk Management   
Effectiveness of Internal Control 
System 
 
ICEF SC 9/G (P.9) 
 
   A binary number of 1 if a firm 
discloses the results of the annual 
audit of the effectiveness of the 
internal control system in the firm’s 
annual report, 0 otherwise. 
 
Control Procedures for Company 
Risk Management 
 
ICRM SC 10/B/3 (P.11)    A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides clear control procedures 
for risk management in the firm’s 
annual report, 0 otherwise. 
 
Disclosure of Firm’s Risks IFR SC 3/B (P.11) 
LR P 27B/2 
(P.25) 
   A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a description about the 
firm’s risks, both actual and 
potential, whether at firm or 
economy level, 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix 2 (Continued): Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) Provisions and Measurement 
Corporate Governance Provision 
Acronym/ 
Code 
Saudi Code (SC)/ 
Companies Act 
(AC)/Listing 
Rules (LR) Ref of 
Article and Pages 
Measurement 
Firm’s Financial Report Approved IFRA RL 26/A (P.24)    A binary number of 1 if a firm’s 
financial report is approved by the 
board of directors and signed by the 
1- authorised director, 2- CEO and 
3- CFO, prior to circulation to 
shareholders , 0 otherwise. 
 
Applicable of Accounting 
Standards 
ICAS RL 27/B/6 (P.25)    A binary number of 1 if the firm 
provides a statement in its annual 
report that there is no departure 
from the accounting standards 
applicable to Saudi listed firms, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Drafting Firms’ CG Code ICGC SC 10/C (P.12)     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
drafts its own CG code which does 
not contradict the SCG Code, 0 
otherwise. 
 
4- Rights of Shareholders and General Assembly 
 
 
Frequency of GA Meeting 
 
SGFM SC 5/A (P.5)    A binary number of 1 if a firm 
convenes at least once a year during 
the firm’s financial year, 0 
otherwise. 
 
GA Meeting Agenda SGMA SG 5/G&H (P.7) A binary number of 1 if a firm 
discloses its GA meeting agenda in 
a meeting announcement on the 
Tadawul website, 0 otherwise. 
 
Right of Shareholders to Appoint 
Others 
SGSA SC 6/C (P.8) A binary number of 1 if a firm’s 
GA meeting announcement 
indicates the right of shareholders 
to appoint others to attend the GA 
on their behalf, 0 otherwise. 
 
Accumulative Voting SGAV SC 6/C (P.8) A binary number of 1 if a firm 
applies the accumulative voting 
method in voting for the 
nomination of members to the 
board, 0 otherwise. 
 
GA Meeting Announcement 
 
SGMN SC 5/C (P.5)    A binary number of 1 if a firm 
announces a meeting by a notice at 
least 20 days prior to the date of 
meeting, 0 otherwise. 
 
GA Meeting Results 
Announcement 
SGMR SC 5/J (P.6)    A binary number of 1 if a firm 
immediately informs the Exchange 
website about the results of the GA 
meeting, 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix 2 (Continued): Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) Provisions and Measurement 
Corporate Governance Provision 
Acronym/ 
Code 
Saudi Code (SC)/ 
Companies Act 
(AC)/Listing 
Rules (LR) Ref of 
Article and Pages 
Measurement 
GA Meeting within Six Months of 
Year End  
 
SGMT SC 5/A (P.6) 
AC 84 (P.13) 
A binary number of 1 if the GA 
convenes within six months 
following the end of the firm’s 
financial year, 0 otherwise. 
 
Firms’ Social Contributions SFSC SC 5/E (P.11) A binary number of 1 if a firm 
discloses social contributions in the 
firms’ annual report, 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix 3: A Spreadsheet of Coded Corporate Governance Variables for the First Five Sampled Firms in Alphabetical Order 
Year 
Firm 
Acr. 
Sector 
Acr. 
BDUAL BCP BMBD BDCL BDB BDPA BMOB BMBN BFBM BDMA 
2004 BAN BS 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2005 BAN BS 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2006 BAN BS 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
2007 BAN BS 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
2008 BAN BS 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
2009 BAN BS 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
2010 BAN BS 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
2004 BBL BS 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2005 BBL BS 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
2006 BBL BS 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
2007 BBL BS 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
2008 BBL BS 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
2009 BBL BS 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
2010 BBL BS 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
2004 BJA BS 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2005 BJA BS 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2006 BJA BS 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
2007 BJA BS 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
2008 BJA BS 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
2009 BJA BS 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
2010 BJA BS 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
2004 BRI BS 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2005 BRI BS 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2006 BRI BS 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
2007 BRI BS 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
2008 BRI BS 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
2009 BRI BS 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
2010 BRI BS 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
2004 BRJ BS 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2005 BRJ BS 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
2006 BRJ BS 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
2007 BRJ BS 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
2008 BRJ BS 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
2009 BRJ BS 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
2010 BRJ BS 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
  
Appendix 4: A Histogram of Distribution of the Saudi Corporate Governance Index (SCGI) and 
Financial Performance Measures 
 
 
                                           A histogram of distribution of the SCGI 
 
  
 
                                               A histogram of distribution of the ROA 
 
 
 
            
                                             A histogram of distribution of the Q-ratio 
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 )noitalsnart  cibarA( mrof sredlohekats lanretni :ediug weivretni derutcurts-imeS :5 xidneppA
   مجلس الادارة واللجان المنبثقة: قسم أ
 1  حوكمة الشركات؟الاداء الجيد ليم اثر تشكيلة المجلس على كيف تق 
 2  الجيده لحوكمة الشركات؟ماهي تصوراتك حول لجان مجلس الادارة ودورها في الممارسة  
 3   لشركتكم؟تركز الملكية في هيكل راس المال هل من الممكن اطلاعنا على مستوى  
 4 كيف تقيم وعي المساهمين في شركتكم حول اهمية الممارسة الجيده للحوكمة ومتابعة اداء مجلس الادارة؟ 
   الافصاح والشفافية ونظام الرقابة الداخلي؟: قسم ب
 1  رأيك ماهي كفاية متطلبات الافصاح والشفافية في الكود السعودي لحوكمة الشركات؟في  
 2 هل بالامكان الحديث حول مستوى الشفافية والافصاح في شركتكم؟ 
 3  فعالية نظام الرقابه الداخلي في شركتكم؟كيف تقيم  
   حقوق المساهمين والجمعيات العمومية: قسم ج
 1  المساهمين بشكل عام و صغار المساهمين بشكل خاص؟ كيف تحمي شركتكم حقوق 
 2 ماهي الحماية لحقوق المساهمين التي تقدمها التشريعات القائمة؟ 
 3  ممارسة حقوقهم؟ علىماهي الاليات التي تستخدمونها لتشجيع المساهمين  
   الهيئات التنظيمية والنظام القانوني؟: قسم د
 1  الحوكمة التي تم تبنيها مؤخرا في السعوديه؟هل بالامكان تقييم اصلاحات  
 2  هم لاهمية الممارسة الجيده لحوكمة الشركات؟حاب المصالح وتقديرهل لك ان تقيم وعي اص 
 3 ماهو مدى النجاح في التنسيق والتفاعل بين الهيئات التنظيمية؟ 
 4  يدعم اصلاحات الحوكمة؟ان نظام القانوني الحالي لل يمكنالى اي مدى  
   مستوى الامتثال والاداء المالي: قسم هـ
 1 كيف تقيم مستوى الامتثال بكود حوكمة الشركات السعودي؟ 
 2 من وجهة نظرك ماهي العوامل الاكثر تاثيرا في الممارسة الجيده لحوكمة الشركات؟ 
 3 كيف تقيم العلاقة بين الممارسة الجيدة للحوكمة والاداء المالي للشركات؟ 
   اعداد الباحث: المصدر
  
 )noitalsnart  cibarA( mrof sredlohekats lanretxe :ediug weivretni derutcurts-imeS :6 xidneppA
   مجلس الادارة واللجان المنبثقة: قسم أ
 1  ماهي نظرتكم حول استقلال مجالس الادارة في الشركات المساهمة السعودية؟ 
 2  مجلس الادارة ودورها في الممارسة الجيدة للحوكمة؟ ماهي تصوراتكم حول لجان 
 3 بشكل عام كيف تقيم تركز الملكية في الشركات المساهمة السعودية؟ 
   الافصاح والشفافية ونظام الرقابة الداخلي؟: قسم ب
 1 في رأيك ماهي كفاية متطلبات الافصاح والشفافية في الكود السعودي لحوكمة الشركات؟ 
 2   الاهتمام بالافصاح والشفافية؟ قادت الى زيادةهل اصلاحات حوكمة الشركات  
 3 الى اي مدى تعتقد ان انظمة الرقابة الداخلية في الشركات السعودية فعالة؟ 
   حقوق المساهمين والجمعيات العمومية: قسم ج
 1 كيف تقيم حماية الشركات المساهمة السعودية لمساهميها؟ 
 2 من وجهة نظرك ماهي الحماية التي تمنحها التشريعات القائمة للمساهمين؟  
 3 الى اي مدى الشركات المساهمة السعودية تساعد المساهمين في ممارسة حقوقهم؟ 
   الهيئات التنظيمية والنظام القانوني؟: قسم د
 1 كيف تقيم اصلاحات حوكمة الشركات في السعودية؟ 
 2  اصحاب المصالح وتقديرهم لاهمية الممارسة الجيدة للحوكمة؟كيف تصف وعي  
 3 ما رأيك حول التفاعل والتنسيق بين الهيئات التشريعية؟ 
 4 الى اي مدى يمكن للنظام القانوني الحالي ان يدعم اصلاحات الحوكمة؟ 
   مستوى الامتثال والاداء المالي: قسم هـ
 1  حوكمة الشركات السعودي؟كيف تقيم مستوى الامتثال بكود  
 2 من وجهة نظرك ماهي العوامل الاكثر تاثيرا في الممارسة الجيده لحوكمة الشركات؟ 
 3 كيف تقيم العلاقة بين الممارسة الجيدة للحوكمة والاداء المالي للشركات؟ 
   اعداد الباحث: المصدر
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